I don't understand the question. "WHO" is behind what? — Harry Hindu

It doesn't matter if you didn't understand the question.

Yes, causality = information = meaning. However, I don't understand your aversion to synonyms. Do you not use some words interchangeably? Also, I think "information" provides that sense of aboutness that "causality" does not seem to imply. — Harry Hindu

I get synonyms but information, last I checked, isn't synonymous with causality. They're treated as distinct concepts. To add, you said

all effects carry information about all prior cause — Harry Hindu

and that threw me off. In what sense would effects "carry information" if not in ways distinct and separate from causation itself? For instance, running with my detective example, if Sherlock Holmes sees the tables and chairs overturned in a room, he concludes that there had been a scuffle in the room. The information that there was a scuffle in the room is distinct from the scuffle itself right? is the inference of a scuffle identical to the scuffle itself? if it is then every time I gather causal information, whatever it is that I inferred should actualize in reality too, no?

Are you saying that all relations are causal? What about something like Joe is heavier than Ron? Isn't that information which is not a matter of causality?

We have terms that have more than one definition, so I don't understand this sudden aversion to different words meaning the same thing, or words that have more than one definition. It would only matter if the definitions contradicted each other, and they don't. — Harry Hindu

You can commit the fallacy of equivocation without the definitions contradicting each other, all that is required is that the word has two distinct meanings.

An intriguing implication of this would be the possibility that what we regard as things and whose opposite we consider is nothing may have opposites that are things themselves. — TheMadFool

Yea yea. I know what you mean. For me, the big implication is that we always think in terms of opposites. This is why there is no information in uniformity.

If uniformity was a country you could visit, you wouldn't be able to think there and you wouldn't remember anything about the trip.

It doesn't matter if you didn't understand the question. — TheMadFool

Now, not only do I not understand the question, but I don't understand your reason for asking it if you're just going to say that it doesn't matter if I understood the question or not.

I get synonyms but information, last I checked, isn't synonymous with causality. They're treated as distinct concepts. To add, you said

all effects carry information about all prior cause
— Harry Hindu

and that threw me off. In what sense would effects "carry information" if not in ways distinct and separate from causation itself? For instance, running with my detective example, if Sherlock Holmes sees the tables and chairs overturned in a room, he concludes that there had been a scuffle in the room. The information that there was a scuffle in the room is distinct from the scuffle itself right? is the inference of a scuffle identical to the scuffle itself? if it is then every time I gather causal information, whatever it is that I inferred should actualize in reality too, no? — TheMadFool

That's weird to say that information isn't synonymous with causality when you were the one that provided the example of a detective at a crime scene observing the aftermath of a crime and garnering information about the crime from the crime scene. I agreed with you. Would you agree that others would agree that that is a good example of how effects carry information about their causes? You're the one throwing me off.

The scuffle is the cause, the overturned chairs is the effect. The relationship between them is information. You basically have three separate things, but really those three things can't exist on their own ontologically, except in our minds.

Are you saying that all relations are causal? What about something like Joe is heavier than Ron? Isn't that information which is not a matter of causality? — Metaphysician Undercover

Excellent question. Thanks.

No. I'm not saying that all relations are causal. Causality is a kind of relationship. So, if you are saying that there is information in the comparison of Joe's weight with Ron's, then information is actually in all relationships. That is fine with me. I sometimes use "relationships" and "process" instead of "information" to define the fundamental layer of reality. My "Information Philosophy" is very similar to Process Philosophy.

On the other hand, it seems to me that both Joe and Ron's weight is information, and Joe being heavier than Ron is a comparison of those two bits of information that then creates more information by inference - that Joe is heavier than Ron. So could you get the information that Joe is heavier than Ron without first having the information of Joe and Ron's weight, or Joe and Ron's physical appearance? In a sense, Jon being heavier than Ron is an inference, or an effect, of comparing the information of Joe and Ron's weight or physical appearance.

No. I'm not saying that all relations are causal. Causality is a kind of relationship. So, if you are saying that there is information in the comparison of Joe's weight with Ron's, then information is actually in all relationships. That is fine with me. I sometimes use "relationships" and "process" instead of "information" to define the fundamental layer of reality. My "Information Philosophy" is very similar to Process Philosophy. — Harry Hindu

Why "process"? Do you deny the possibility of a static relationship? Are not the relationships between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, etc., static?

On the other hand, it seems to me that both Joe and Ron's weight is information, and Joe being heavier than Ron is a comparison of those two bits of information that then creates more information by inference - that Joe is heavier than Ron. So could you get the information that Joe is heavier than Ron without first having the information of Joe and Ron's weight, or Joe and Ron's physical appearance? In a sense, Jon being heavier than Ron is an inference, or an effect, of comparing the information of Joe and Ron's weight or physical appearance. — Harry Hindu

How is Joe's weight, or Ron's weight causal? That's what I don't understand. If a thing's weight is the product of a measurement, then this information is caused. But how would you account for the information within the thing itself? Clearly there must be some sort of information within the thing itself which is called "Joe", to validate the measurement as true. Isn't it the case that this information is there within Joe whether or not it acts as a cause in the case of Joe being measured?

Yes, causality = information = meaning. However, I don't understand your aversion to synonyms. Do you not use some words interchangeably? Also, I think "information" provides that sense of aboutness that "causality" does not seem to imply. — Harry Hindu

Good point! That is why I say that Energy is Information (the power to enform), but Information is not just mechanical Energy. Information also causes Meaning in a mind. :smile:

Information :
* Claude Shannon quantified Information not as useful ideas, but as a mathematical ratio between meaningful order (1) and meaningless disorder (0); between knowledge (1) and ignorance (0). So, that meaningful mind-stuff exists in the limbo-land of statistics, producing effects on reality while having no sensory physical properties. We know it exists ideally, only by detecting its effects in the real world.
* For humans, Information has the semantic quality of aboutness , that we interpret as meaning. In computer science though, Information is treated as meaningless, which makes its mathematical value more certain. It becomes meaningful only when a sentient Self interprets it as such.
* When spelled with an “I”, Information is a noun, referring to data & things. When spelled with an “E”, Enformation is a verb, referring to energy and processes.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

Why "process"? Do you deny the possibility of a static relationship? Are not the relationships between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, etc., static? — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, I would just say that static relationships are less complex than dynamic relationships, therefore static relationships have less information than dynamic ones. I do prefer to use "information" for the prior reasons I've stated. As I said, Process Philosophy is similar, not exactly the same as my "Information philosophy".

How is Joe's weight, or Ron's weight causal? That's what I don't understand. If a thing's weight is the product of a measurement, then this information is caused. But how would you account for the information within the thing itself? Clearly there must be some sort of information within the thing itself which is called "Joe", to validate the measurement as true. Isn't it the case that this information is there within Joe whether or not it acts as a cause in the case of Joe being measured? — Metaphysician Undercover

Measurement are just comparisons, just like Joe being heavier than Ron. What is measured is the relationship between their body's mass and the Earth's gravity.

The thing itself is information in that it is caused. The thing being the effect, and it's reasons for existing here and now in the way that it does being the cause. So an organism carries information about it's parentage, it's eating habits, it's understanding of a native language, it's life and ancestral history essentially.

When we acquire information to compare, like two people's weight, then that is the cause of the inference that Joe is heavier than Ron. In other words, reasoning is causal. You point to reasons (causes) for your beliefs (effects), and point to your beliefs as causes for your actions (effects). Your actions carry information about your beliefs, which is how many of us can interpret what one believes based on their actions.

"Information" Is an ambiguous term which allows the modern materialist, or physicalist, through the use of illusion, to escape the need for God in metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Like Pierre Simon Laplace, Claude Shannon had "no need for that [God] hypothesis" in his definition of Information. In both cases the researcher was following the principles of Methodological Naturalism. As the quote below indicates, by eliminating supernatural causes from consideration, scientists could avoid getting entangled in insoluble perennial philosophical / theological wrangling over intangible & non-empirical Metaphysical concepts.

Ironically though, as the 20th century progressed in its understanding of Quantum foundations of the natural world, the less physical and more metaphysical it seemed. Now, instead of hard little atoms of matter, Physicists talk about cloud-like "Fields" composed of intangible "Virtual" particles. So, the term 'virtual" is another smokescreen "to give the appearance of solidity to pure wind" [Orwell on political speech]. Such terminology is only illusory if taken to refer to Actual existence, when they only point to Potential existence. They seem to be potential in the same sense as Plato's Forms : the general potential to enform particular things.

Now, the 21st century descriptions of Nature are technically Meta-beyond-Physical, and are literally ambiguous : "wave-particle". So, it's not surprising that most physicists prefer not to consider philosophical questions about the mushy foundations of Physics. But not all. Paul Davies is a highly credentialed physicist with a philosophical inclination, who does not shy away from the "hard problems". So, he uses the "G" word openly in his books. And he is not alone. Many of his fellows have come around to see that Information is not just ideas in a mind, or just data in a computer, but also the creative power of Energy. Still, he is careful to avoid committing to any traditional god-myth. Specifically, his notion of God is not the supernatural bible-god, but a natural information-god : The Enformer/Creator of everything in this world, both Matter & Mind. :smile:

Methodological Naturalism : Methodological naturalism, as a definition of the scientific method, is rather ill defined except for its main idea, namely that science, explicitly, by fiat, and with malice a-fore-thought, rejects God, gods, and the supernatural from all its considerations. . . . But Laplace gave the real reason for God’s absence: parsimony—there is no need of that hypothesis
https://www.quantumdiaries.org/2011/09/16/there-is-no-need-for-god-as-a-hypothesis/

Potential vs Actual : Aristotle describes potentiality and actuality, or potency and action, as one of several distinctions between things that exist or do not exist. In a sense, a thing that exists potentially does not exist, but the potential does exist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potentiality_and_actuality

The Mind of God : The Scientific Basis for a Rational World
https://www.amazon.com/Mind-God-Scientific-Basis-Rational/dp/0671797182/ref=sr_1_2?dchild=1&keywords=paul+davies&link_code=qs&qid=1608860627&sourceid=Mozilla-search&sr=8-2&tag=mozilla-20

God and the New Physics :
https://www.amazon.com/God-New-Physics-Paul-Davies/dp/0671528068/ref=sr_1_3?dchild=1&keywords=paul+davies&link_code=qs&qid=1608860774&sourceid=Mozilla-search&sr=8-3&tag=mozilla-20