II Logical Structure
The difference between Level 1 and Level 3 is in the degree of verifiability. The car is in my garage today - take a look; but the metal that doesn't expand when heated - I don't have a sample as yet, but it's out there, somewhere... prove me wrong!

Uncircumscribed existential statements are the stuff of conspiracy theories. There's a flying saucer in a US military base. I know we've looked in all the military bases we know of, but this base is secret...

Anyhow, the key point here is that Level 2 statements are unfalsifiable, Level 3 statements are unverifiable, and their conjugate, Level 4 statements, are neither verifiable nor falsifiable.

III Examples
Determinism: Every event has a cause. This has the form given for Level 4 statements, an existential statement nestled in a universal. Hence, if Watkins is correct, it can not be proved - doing so would require the impossibility that we examine every possible event and determine its cause; nor can it be falsified; that we have not so far found the cause of some given event does not imply that there is no such cause.

Examples given include determinism, historicism, mechanism (the denial of the existence of empty space), its opposite - field theories, vitalism and its denial, various aspects of mind, and conservation doctrines of all sorts. — Banno

Yes. Most of those theories are meaningful, but non-empirical. That's why I say that Quantum Physics has inadvertently crossed the line into Meta-physics. Yet, by "meta-physics", I don't mean ghosts & gods, but merely those aspects of our world that are not directly accessible to the Scientific Method. That's why there is still some fertile territory for philosophical exploration.

Some of the pioneers of Quantum Physics saw its meta-physical implications, and used Eastern Philosophical terminology to express some counter-intuitive concepts. But they eventually lost-out to the hard empiricists, who rebuffed the "errant" theorists with "shut-up and calculate".

I have downloaded the PDF, and may have more to say later. That's because us meta-physical types often get booed off the stage in this forum, just because we go beyond the purview of empirical Physics. Apparently, some posters here have Physics Envy. :grin:

"Physics envy" refers to the envy (perceived or real) of scholars in other disciplines for the mathematical precision of fundamental concepts obtained by physicists. ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics_envy

Determinism: Every event has a cause. This has the form given for Level 4 statements, an existential statement nestled in a universal. Hence, if Watkins is correct, it can not be proved - doing so would require the impossibility that we examine every possible event and determine its cause; nor can it be falsified; that we have not so far found the cause of some given event does not imply that there is no such cause. — Banno

This is how the problem of induction is resolved. It appears like an inductive conclusion cannot be proven. But an inductive truth is impossible to falsify, and if it is impossible to falsify it is necessarily true. Therefore demonstrating such an impossibility is what actually proves the truth of the inductive conclusion, thereby resolving the problem of induction.

Conservation doctrines

Conservation of momentum, energy, information - all reduce to the form "For every local increase or decrease in x there exists a compensating increase or decrees elsewhere"...

Unprovable and unfalsifiable.

One of my current interests is the relationship between physical and logical causation. Physical causation is the kind that is described by e.g. the laws of motion and physics generally. Logical causation being expressed by the rules of logic. So if physicalism is correct, then the latter supervene on the former. Conversely, if the laws of logic are irreducible to physical principles, then physicalism can't be correct. If there's anything in there along those lines I would be obliged for any reference.

another one would be whether there are correspondences between neural states and meaningful expressions (on the basis that, if brain-mind identity theories are correct, then meaningful expressions are a form of brain state.)

Metaphysical ideas connected with psychology

indirectly,

The doctrine of psycho-physical correspondence says that for every mental event experienced by an organism there exists corresponding physical event in the organism such that recurrence of the mental event implies recurrence of the physical event.

That is, physicalism is a metaphysical notion, by Watkin's standards.

Conservation of momentum, energy, — Banno

... are easy to test and clearly not metaphysical. Never heard of conservation of information though.

The way I see it, existential empirical statements are of lower utility than universal empirical statements. More can be done with, say, knowing all metals expand on heating than with some metals expand on heating. After all, consistency in behavior (universal statements) make up the meat on the bones of comprehending, and from there manipulating, our universe. The aim is to get our hands on a set of universal statements that both explains and gives us the power to control the universe.

According to some, universal empirical statements aren't verifiable but they're falsifiable. The classic example of "all swans are white" comes to mind. To verify it, we would have to observe all swans, something impossible because time is a factor - observing all swans over a hundred, or even a thousand generations will not suffice to prove "all swans are white" because that one non-white swan that breaks the pattern may just hatch from a perfectly good swan-egg just the next day after the triumphant but ill-considered decision to declare "all swans are white". However, we can falsify "all swans are white" with the observance of a single non-white swan.

Existential statements aren't falsifiable because to falsify, say, "some swans are white", we'd have to demonstrate the truth of, verify, the universal empirical statement "all swans are non-white" and verifying universal empirical statements is impossible for the reason mentioned in the preceding paragraph (time). Nevertheless, existential statements can be verified - observing one white swan would do the trick.

As you can see, given that we're, or rather scientists are, on the lookout for universal empirical statements that we can add to the theory/theories that explains our universe, we don't have the option of verifying them for that's impossible and so we're left with nothing else but falsficationism and this, according to Karl Popper, is [real] science.

What's intriguing is Karl Popper's idea that science is about falsifiability isn't a conscious choice on our part. It's not that we, sat down together somewhere, and after a good, long and serious discussion, decided to define science in terms of falsifiability. Given that science is about universal statements (the laws of nature), falsificationism is unavoidable, it's inevitable. That said, due credit must be given to Karl Popper for discovering this truth about science.

Note one important fact. Science is, first and foremost, empirical i.e. observation is a central feature of science. This is because verification but more importantly falsfication depends on observation. When (an) observation(s) is inconsistent with a scientific theory, that theory is falsified.

At this point it becomes clear that if a theory is non-scientific then it doesn't, in any way, involve observation, the very basis of falsification. Does this description of the non-scientific fit metaphysics and what it deals with? :chin:

As for this:

The article here is very much in the Popperian tradition, looking at the logical structure of unfalsifiable metaphysical propositions, but does not simply dismissing them as meaningless

Whatever the scientific verdict on metaphysics is, it bears mentioning that falsficationism as a scientific principle is itself not without fault for it commits the argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy; after all, it assumes a [scientific] theory to be true based on it not being falsified. The fallacious reasoning here is akin to, to use an example from metaphysics, believing that God exists just because it hasn't be proven false that God exists. Is the pot calling the kettle black? :chin: It's obvious that falsificationism is itself a deeply flawed perspective.

To sum it all up, neither metaphysical claims nor scientific claims are verifiable and even given that metaphysics is largely unfalsifiable, science is entirely, if falsificationism is its foundational premise, an argumentum ad ignorantiam.

Unprovable and unfalsifiable. — Banno

As I explained, these two are contradictory. Unfalsifiable means impossible to falsify, which implies necessarily true, therefore proven.

Banno seems to think that a proposition can be claimed as "unfalsifiable" without proving that it is unfalsifiable. But this is just a ploy to avoid having to answer whether the proposition is true or not. In reality, either the proposition is truly unfalsifiable, therefore necessarily true, or else "unfalsifiable" is just being asserted in an attempt to avoid the issue of whether the proposition is true or not.

Worthy read, yes, so.....thanks for it. I particularly favor Part III onward, myself.

But I have to ask....what does the paper say to you? You are historically an analytic-type, the premier tenet of which, is the notion that metaphysical propositions are not so much true or false, but generally meaningless. Yet the opening paragraph in the linked paper specifies that they are not, being “too serious to be shrugged aside”. Odd, I must say, that the thesis, as “too serious to be shrugged aside” as a ghost story, appeals to that very same pejorative conception as the ground for justifying it.

Inquiring minds want to know.....were you already familiar with this article, or did you do some research in order to comment, however clandestine such comment may be, on my “every change is succession in time”?

But even setting that aside, where in the levels of “logical decidability” does your response to it: “the floor changes from the living room to the bathroom”, fit in? And did you see, did it occur to you, that your floor changing response sustains the author’s anecdotal missive, “...It is curious that some anti-metaphysicians have relied on some instantiation criterion of empirical confirmation without realizing that this lets in a host of untestable metaphysical doctrines...”

Let’s just call me confused. Might be my fault, but it seems to me you’ve always presented yourself as anti-metaphysical, yet this article presents metaphysical sentences is a more favorable light than you’ve allowed them. And if you’re not an anti-metaphysicalist, how did you not approve my “change” comment, but rather, attempt to refute it with propositions entirely insufficient for doing so?

Anyway......interesting read, especially the latter parts.

As I explained, these two are contradictory. Unfalsifiable means impossible to falsify, which implies necessarily true, therefore proven. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmm. God exists. Therefore God exists? Or to round out, God does not exist. Therefore God does not exist? Or even, God either exists or does not exist. Therefore either God exists or does not exist?

And let us tiptoe past "Godel" here.

Logical positivism is not the whole of analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein, despite being adored by the Vienna Circle, rejected them precisely because they rejected metaphysics. Watkins is here applying Popperian method to do something not dissimilar, in showing the role of metaphysical propositions is methodological. Metaphysics is best understood as about what is done, not what is said.

I read the article as an undergraduate. I hope you will not be disappointed to be told that it's return to my interest had nothing to do with your comment about change. I was reminded of it while considering conspiracy theories, and on rereading found a few bits in it that I thought worthy of some extra consideration. Hence this thread.

I hadn't considered your "Every change is a succession in time" as an all-and-some proposition; indeed, it looks to me to be a simple universal statement, especially since it was falsified so easily by my example. In so far as I gave it further consideration, it reinforced my prejudice that Kantian metaphysical notions didn't survive 19th century developments in maths and physics.

I think I have a better understanding of Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction now than when I last read this article, and I'm curious about how Watkins addresses that. I also noted the mention of physicalism with regard to theory of mind, and intend to check that out for more interesting arguments.

Mad, you've a good basic understanding of critical rationalism. Nice summation.

it assumes a [scientific] theory to be true based on it not being falsified. — TheMadFool

Well, not quite, although that's the pop view. Unfalsified theories are not assumed to be true. They are taken as helpful, to greater or lesser extents, and hence the need for Lakatos' research programs to acknowledge the variety of unfalsified theories. For my money, Feyerabend put paid to Poppers program (alliteration unintended...), showing firstly that it did not solve the problem of induction, and secondly that it is not the way science actually works.

It's good to see tha there are folk here who have a grasp of falsificationism and critical rationalism's approach to metaphysics. Other posts here show a clear lack of understanding of what is involved, and a failure to engage with the article, which is disappointing.

I also noted the mention of physicalism with regard to theory of mind, and intend to check that out for more interesting arguments. — Banno

Some passages from the SEP entry on Mind-Brain Identity Theory

Reichenbach said that mental events can be identified by the corresponding stimuli and responses much as the (possibly unknown) internal state of a photo-electric cell can be identified by the stimulus (light falling on it) and response (electric current flowing) from it. In both cases the internal states can be physical states.

My argument is this: The definitive characteristic of any (sort of) experience as such is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we materialists believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since these physical states possess the definitive character of experiences, they must be experiences. — David Lewis

The causal approach was also characteristic of D.M. Armstrong's careful conceptual analysis of mental states and processes, such as perception and the secondary qualities, sensation, consciousness, belief, desire, emotion, voluntary action, in his A Materialist Theory of the Mind...

Armstrong's central state materialism involved identifying beliefs and desires with states of the brain.

So - my avenue of attack is that, whilst it's perfectly fine to theorise about the neurophysiology of 'pain' or 'sensation' or even 'experience' in some general sense, how could it be possible to equate neural or organic states with rational arguments? Is a simple logical syllogism or arithmetic proof identical to a 'brain state'? Is it conceivable that there is a singular disposition of neurochemicals that must always be associated with specific propositions? I think when you put it that way, it is obviously preposterous. It is, in my view, a consequence of regarding brain-states and physical configurations of matter as having the attributes of symbolic representation, where a brain state 'stands for' or 'represents' a proposition. But that in itself is a confusion or equivocation about the meaning of 'representation'.

But, even if this were true, how could it ever be demonstrated? Given the massive complexity of the brain and 'brain-states' - more neural pathways than stars in the sky, it's said - how could you establish any kind of identity between neural data and symbolic meaning?

I mean, I can possibly accept that a neuroscientist could discern 'pain states' from neural data, as presumably they might evoke a recognisable chemical footprint. But what, pray tell, would be the chemical signature of the law of the excluded middle? Of of any other kind of rational proposition? How could you map syntactical or algebraic expressions against 'states of the brain'?

I think this is far more fruitful line of attack against materialist theories of mind than the never-ending arguments about the nature of experience.

it reinforced my prejudice that Kantian metaphysical notions didn't survive 19th century developments in maths and physics. — Banno

Can you help me out here? I think Kant endures very well and nicely, in a way analogous to Newton's physics under relativity. But we may say that while Newton's becomes approximations that are more than adequate for many purposes, Kant's insights remain precise and accurate wrt his subjects, and simply inapplicable to the physics of things beyond direct perception. If not, why/how not?

... are easy to test and clearly not metaphysical. Never heard of conservation of information though. — Olivier5

The Black Hole Information Paradox is a big issue in physics because information loss would mean processes cannot in principle be time reversible, which is not the case with most of physics. Thus there is ongoing theoretical work to resolve the paradox. There is some deep relationship between information, energy and thermodynamics, I believe.



The question I have with this sort of thing is where is the empirical basis? It's not like we can observe a black hole evaporate and then measure the state of the Hawking Radiation to see whether any info was lost.

it reinforced my prejudice that Kantian metaphysical notions didn't survive 19th century developments in maths and physics. — Banno

Don't be so hasty. This video suggests otherwise, at least form some physicists:



This is a form of the Copenhagen interpretation of QM in which the wave function is just quantifying our knowledge of the system, not the underlying physical reality. The idea is that we set up experiments that have a certain relationship with what's being measured, and we make observations of the experimental results. This is a correlation between the world and our observations. But we can't say what the reality is when we're not performing the experiment. There is one, but it's hidden from us beyond the correlation. Kant is brought up as is anti-realism regarding the math (but not the world as it is).

And thus the suggestion is that theories like MWI and the Pilot-Wave are pointless, because we can't know the state of the world without performing an experiment.

The debate between myself and Creative is along similar lines - that some particular belief does not have a correlate item in the believers mind or brain.

The interesting part in the article was that Watkins pointes out that the theory that mind is correlated to physical states is neither provable nor falsifiable.

Nevertheless I still reject the view that there is more to the mind than neural functions embedded in a body embedded in a world.

That't be a book rather than a post.

No, I'll not go into it. It's outside the scope of this thread, it's outside my present interests and in the end it is just a comfortable prejudice that I use in selecting what to read next... not Kant.

Nor am I going to spend a half hour watching a dubious video that could be summarised in a couple of paragraphs.

Yeah, that sort of thing.

Conservation laws are bookkeeping strategies for physicists. Odd, how they work.

Hmm. God exists. Therefore God exists? Or to round out, God does not exist. Therefore God does not exist? Or even, God either exists or does not exist. Therefore either God exists or does not exist? — tim wood

None of these qualify as an "unprovable" inductive conclusions, or universals, which is the substance here. One could make up all sorts of nonsense and insist that its both unprovable (due to inadequately defined terms) and also unfalsifiable (due to the impossibility of testing what is inadequately defined), but that's not really relevant.

What is relevant is that valid inductive conclusions are rejected under the pretense of "unfalsifiable".

Nevertheless I still reject the view that there is more to the mind than neural functions embedded in a body embedded in a world. — Banno

That's your religion.

Yep.

Hmm. 1) God exists. Therefore God exists? Or to round out, 2) God does not exist. Therefore God does not exist? Or even, 3) God either exists or does not exist. Therefore either God exists or does not exist?
— tim wood

None of these qualify as an "unprovable" inductive conclusions, or universals, which is the substance here. One could make up all sorts of nonsense and insist that its both unprovable (due to inadequately defined terms) and also unfalsifiable (due to the impossibility of testing what is inadequately defined), but that's not really relevant.

What is relevant is that valid inductive conclusions are rejected under the pretense of "unfalsifiable". — Metaphysician Undercover

Make this a little clearer? Because I do not understand it. Above you said:

In reality, either [if] the proposition is truly unfalsifiable, therefore [then] necessarily true,. — Metaphysician Undercover

Each of my three propositions above is unfalsifiable. And according to you, necessarily true. How do you reconcile the nonsense?

The difference between Level 1 and Level 3 is in the degree of verifiability. The car is in my garage today - take a look; but the metal that doesn't expand when heated - I don't have a sample as yet, but it's out there, somewhere... prove me wrong!

Uncircumscribed existential statements are the stuff of conspiracy theories. There's a flying saucer in a US military base. I know we've looked in all the military bases we know of, but this base is secret...

Anyhow, the key point here is that Level 2 statements are unfalsifiable, Level 3 statements are unverifiable, and their conjugate, Level 4 statements, are neither verifiable nor falsifiable. — Banno

We could just say that one of the characteristics of metal is that it expands when heated. Anything else would be, at best, semi-metal. We can simply redefine words or make up new words to resolve the first example. It's a language issue.

Religious claims are just as conspiratorial as many political claims. Some claims are more useful than others, depending on your goals and more fundamental beliefs. Those that already assume there are aliens, gods, or Republicans/Democrats out to oppress you, will see these types of claims as more proof of their assumptions. Not very useful to those without those assumptions, and require the same empirical evidence as you provided for your car being in the garage to believe in UFOs being secret military garages.

Determinism: Every event has a cause. This has the form given for Level 4 statements, an existential statement nestled in a universal. Hence, if Watkins is correct, it can not be proved - doing so would require the impossibility that we examine every possible event and determine its cause; nor can it be falsified; that we have not so far found the cause of some given event does not imply that there is no such cause. — Banno

Again, here we could just define effects as having causes. Any event without a cause would be classified as being a non-effect. It seems that many metaphysical problems can be resolved by changing the way we use words.

Did anyone actually read the article?

I still reject the view that there is more to the mind than neural functions embedded in a body embedded in a world. — Banno

Purely out of habit, and the difficulty presented by the alternatives, I’d wager.

I spent about 20 minutes on the article, I rather like him. I don’t think the author has a reductionist ax to grind, but on the other hand, he’s very much Anglo-American plain language, i.e. simplifying the arguments in syllogistic form.