OK, you said that the statement can't be verified and it can't be falsified, yet it doesn't classify as level 4 by the standards of the op. How does it classify then? Surely it is in some way influential.

It's an axiom. Says so on the packet.

So axioms don't qualify as "statements" in the article of the op? They get a special exemption? See why I reject this interpretation?

as if he never published. — Banno

The question was, "Was Galileo doing science before he published?"

I learned a long time ago, in a philosophy forum far, far away that you are more interested in hearing yourself talk than in actually trying to solve problems. That's why your threads are so long.

Hm. You seem to have an image of poor Galileo working in secret. His persecution began after he published, not before.

There's quite a body of discussion on falsifiability. Some familiarity with that would be helpful. — Banno

You should have noticed, from what I've posted, that I'm not at all interested in the conventional interpretation of "falsifiability". I believe it tends to be way off the mark. So I really don't know why you would make this suggestion to me. If you're content to sink into the quicksand of that interpretation, then so be it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll go back to ignoring your posts. — Banno

Please, and thank you.

Excellent post on the verifiable and falsifiable.

You should have noticed, from what I've posted, that I'm not at all interested in the conventional interpretation of "falsifiability". I believe it tends to be way off the mark. So I really don't know why you would make this suggestion to me. If you're content to sink into the quicksand of that interpretation, then so be it. — Metaphysician Undercover

The curious issue I have is about metaphysical hypotheses that are by definition consistent with any previous, current, or future experiential phenomenon. Take idealism, forms of neutral monism, most forms of ontology on substances, the brain in a vat, the simulation/matrix hypothesis, the misleading demon, being in a dream, etc. These are unfalsifiable in that you could most definitely define the terms well enough in question to the benefit of your intuitions regarding them but yet be no where closer to falsifying or proving any of them nor would it be the case that any one of them is necessarily true. . . it is also not the case that any are necessarily false.

The only true unfalsifiable series of propositions 'S' in the way you seem to be construing 'un-falsifiability' are statements or metaphysical viewpoints that for any experiential phenomenon 'E' they would be consistent with it.

This is to distinguish this from some practical weaker sense of 'un-falsifiability' that you portray here,

I don't think it implies necessary truth. For example, the claim that there is some particular configuration of stars and planets beyond the edge of the observable universe. That's unfalsifiable, because we can never check it out, no matter how close to the speed of light we accelerate a probe. But it's certainly not necessarily true.
— bert1

I don't agree that such a claim is unfalsifiable. Just because we do not have the means to falsify it right now does not mean that we will not develop the means. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your critique of this weaker sense of 'un-falsifiability' being an appeal to a healthy skepticism to our best scientific knowledge of the world that certain experiences, such as going beyond the observable horizon of our local cosmos, are physically impossible but such knowledge could be in fact over turned. Give or take a few hundred years, a thousand, or an indefinite amount of time until it is done so.

The only true unfalsifiable series of propositions 'S' in the way you seem to be construing 'un-falsifiability' are statements or metaphysical viewpoints that for any experiential phenomenon 'E' they would be consistent with it.

This is to distinguish this from some practical weaker sense of 'un-falsifiability' that you portray here, — substantivalism

Yes, that's what I mean. Isn't this what falsifiable, and unfalsifiable mean? If empirical evidence can be used to prove the falsity of the proposition, then it is falsifiable. The only truly unfalsifiable propositions would be ones in which it is impossible to get empirical evidence to falsify them. The closest we have is tautologies, and self-evident truths, which might still be falsified if we alter definitions.

The "weaker sense" seems to say that if the empirical evidence is not readily available we can designate the proposition as "unfalsifiable". But the judgement as to whether the evidence is readily available or not, is completely subjective. So those who are too lazy to seek the evidence required to falsify the various metaphysical propositions will simply designate them as "unfalsifiable", and refuse to engage in the metaphysics required to determine how the various propositions are to be falsified.

The curious issue I have is about metaphysical hypotheses that are by definition consistent with any previous, current, or future experiential phenomenon. Take idealism, forms of neutral monism, most forms of ontology on substances, the brain in a vat, the simulation/matrix hypothesis, the misleading demon, being in a dream, etc. These are unfalsifiable in that you could most definitely define the terms well enough in question to the benefit of your intuitions regarding them but yet be no where closer to falsifying or proving any of them nor would it be the case that any one of them is necessarily true. . . it is also not the case that any are necessarily false. — substantivalism

I don't agree with this because I do not accept your initial premise. I don't think there is such a thing as a metaphysical hypothesis which is consistent with all experiential phenomena. If there was, then metaphysics would be complete, no more need to solve metaphysical problems, and no more metaphysics, which is the activity of trying to resolve such inconsistencies. We have self-evident truths, but they do not really qualify as metaphysical hypotheses. And a big part of philosophy involves analyzing supposed self-evident truths to determine whether they really are.

So, all that is required to falsity such hypotheses is to find the inconsistent phenomena. And all metaphysical hypotheses are falsifiable in this way, because no one is capable of completely understanding reality to the extent of producing a metaphysics which describes experiential phenomena to that degree of perfection.

Your critique of this weaker sense of 'un-falsifiability' being an appeal to a healthy skepticism to our best scientific knowledge of the world that certain experiences, such as going beyond the observable horizon of our local cosmos, are physically impossible but such knowledge could be in fact over turned. Give or take a few hundred years, a thousand, or an indefinite amount of time until it is done so. — substantivalism

Actually, there are other methods, like the application of deductive logic, using premises derived from empirical observation. That's the way we normally proceed don't we? We already go far beyond the observable horizon of our local cosmos, through logical proceedings, as quantum physics deals with particles which cannot be observed..

I still reject the view that there is more to the mind than neural functions embedded in a body embedded in a world. — Banno

Why do you reject that? How can a material process experience pain or see sounds, hear colors (though normally it is the other way round), feel itch, dream, or love and be angry? Because these qualities are emergent like temperature? I think this is the hard problem.

I don't agree with this because I do not accept your initial premise. I don't think there is such a thing as a metaphysical hypothesis which is consistent with all experiential phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover

So what experiential phenomenon is solipsism inconsistent with?

If there was, then metaphysics would be complete, no more need to solve metaphysical problems, and no more metaphysics, which is the activity of trying to resolve such inconsistencies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consistency only requires that the truth of said metaphysics does not or cannot result in falsifying the metaphysical viewpoint via experiential phenomenon. This doesn't require it to be explanatorily useful or to 'solve' all metaphysical problems.