So aside from outcomes and intentions, what kind of action also seems to matter. — ChatteringMonkey
The football example is actually an interesting one, because in football (and I'm talking about soccer here) they have very clear rules about what kind of tackles are allowed and which are not. Intentions usually are not considered in determining whether the player has made a fault. Either way such a tackle usually isn't considered morally wrong, even if it was a fault. But if you were to tackle someone outside of a football-field then it would be considered morally wrong. Intention to harm is assumed because why would you be tackling someone otherwise. So here we have basically the same actions that are judged completely differently because context matters. — ChatteringMonkey
I was referring to American football, but either one illustrates the point, I think. The context being that all parties involved in the game have consented to play it with the full knowledge that certain physical contact is allowed and could cause injury (I’m referring to legal tackles here, which could still lead to injury).
However, I wonder if there have been any cases, in any sport, where legal charges were filed due to excessive or malicious use of force (think fights in hockey where actual weapons (hockey sticks) have been used)? I know in American football, some illegal hits carry the additional burden of being judged as immoral as well. These are hits that are obviously done to intentionally injure a player. — Pinprick
I think of intentions as whatever it is you want to do, regardless of whether or not you have the means to do them, or are capable of doing them, etc. — Pinprick
In certain cases we do think intent to harm isn't necessary for something to be immoral, like say in case of doing harm because of drunk driving or negligence. — ChatteringMonkey
For example, is it wrong for me to shove pins in a Trump voodoo doll because I’m intending to do him harm? — Pinprick
So here we have basically the same actions that are judged completely differently because context matters. — ChatteringMonkey
In certain cases we do think intent to harm isn't necessary for something to be immoral, like say in case of doing harm because of drunk driving or negligence.
— ChatteringMonkey
I'd consider drunk driving a case of negligence. And what makes negligence what it is is your failure to act according to your duties before the outcome is unavoidable.
Using the drunk driving example: if there is a chance you'll end up drunk driving, don't drink in the first place. — Echarmion
So here we have basically the same actions that are judged completely differently because context matters.
— ChatteringMonkey
But is this a sign of different moral approaches or merely of different factual information? We always have to infer the intentions of others from outcomes.
Football players also agree to a specific game with specific written and unwritten rules. Which is why things that would otherwise be considered assault aren't if they can still be considered part of the game. — Echarmion
This was an example to illustrate that intention doesn't always matter. Maybe you intent to drive while drunk, but you don't intent to harm somebody. The harm done is an accident, made more probable because you are drunk but still an accident. Unless you are going to say that it is driving drunk itself that is immoral, regardless of whether you hit someone or not. But I don't think that's how we typically look at it, it does seem to matter that you hit someone or not. — ChatteringMonkey
You have the rules of the game, you have the law,... and then you also have morality? Makes you wonder where morality actually comes into play. — ChatteringMonkey
I consider morality the principle according to which we individually choose our actions in accordance with reason. — Echarmion
A man who desires to do evil and does good is not a good man. Just a failure. — Brian Gomes
Ah. "I cannot swim so will not swim but intend to swim." To me that's erroneous. An intention to me is an intent to act. I think that's typical. — Kenosha Kid
So you mean if you’re incapable of performing the act, for whatever reason, then you cannot intend to do it? — Pinprick
I take it that you mean that, even though we choose individually, the principle according to which we choose is the same for everybody, universal? — ChatteringMonkey
But what is there to make it wrong? There’s essentially no outcome, and no one is harmed, so why call it wrong? — Pinprick
I take it that you mean that, even though we choose individually, the principle according to which we choose is the same for everybody, universal?
— ChatteringMonkey
Well we assume it is. We cannot really know, since we only have access to our own reasoning. So the principle would have to be something universal according to our own reasoning. — Echarmion
Rules we make - for games or in the form of laws, should conform to morality insofar as they do make provisions, but they do not need to (and arguably shouldn't) require fully moral actions. I.e. not everything that's immoral should be illegal, but by and large everything that is moral should also be legal. — Echarmion
Ok, I expected you to make a stronger claim to universality because of the next sentences you wrote : — ChatteringMonkey
The idea that the rules we make and laws we vote should to be in accordance with morality, only really makes sense if there is one universal morality, right? — ChatteringMonkey
I mostly wanted to distance myself from the idea of a "divine logos" or similar. I only have access to my own reasoning. The best I can do is vet my reasoning by having other look for flaws. But even if all humans agreed to a principle, we could not technically be sure that it's universal in the ontological sense.
Some alien might come along with entirely alien reasoning. Our principles wouldn't be universal to them. — Echarmion
The best I can do is vet my reasoning by having other look for flaws. — Echarmion
Universal among the moral subjects, yes. But since it's unlikely we'll ever all agree on just what that universal morality is, we'll always have to hope we're not mistaken. — Echarmion
You derive the universality from a shared biology then? — ChatteringMonkey
While I would agree that we have many more similarities than differences because of our shared biology, there are differences too... so it seems to me that could only make for a tentative universalism at best. — ChatteringMonkey
So you think differences in moral evaluation can only be a matter of flawed reasoning? — ChatteringMonkey
To me it does seem like there are also differences in moral evaluations not because of flawed reasoning, but because of genuine different values. — ChatteringMonkey
If you set out do something with specific intentions, and fail to accomplish your goals, you are technically a failure. — Brian Gomes
You derive the universality from a shared biology then?
— ChatteringMonkey
Yes, you could say that. Though my metaphysics skew constructivist, so I'd say shared mental faculties. — Echarmion
While I would agree that we have many more similarities than differences because of our shared biology, there are differences too... so it seems to me that could only make for a tentative universalism at best.
— ChatteringMonkey
I think our shared reasoning is pretty fundamental. Pretty much everyone agrees with the scientific method, for example, even those who completely disagree with some of it's commonly accepted findings. The concepts we represent by basic propositional logic or algebra are accessible to anyone who we ordinarily consider sane. — Echarmion
So you think differences in moral evaluation can only be a matter of flawed reasoning?
— ChatteringMonkey
Yes. Though I would qualify this by saying that no-one has flawless reasoning all the time, so I'd nevertheless expect there to always be different moral evaluations.
To me it does seem like there are also differences in moral evaluations not because of flawed reasoning, but because of genuine different values.
— ChatteringMonkey
People have genuinely different values, but I consider the aim of a moral philosophy to moderate the expression of these values so that they can coexist. — Echarmion
Yeah I'm not so sure about that, I think history would beg to differ. I came to this thread having just listened to a podcast about WEIRD-biases. — ChatteringMonkey
And if we put some belief in that research, it seems like a lot of our reliance on reason and our moral way of looking at things is historically contingent. Myth and tradition were for the largest part of history what determined morality, not reason... although reason played a role there too, no doubt. — ChatteringMonkey
Ok but then you don't have one morality, right? Unless you think different values need not imply different moral evaluations. — ChatteringMonkey
Sounds interesting. Can you point me to it? I have read a bit about common cognitive biases on Eliezer Yudkowsky's blog. The fact that there are biases that pretty much everyone has points to a significant amount of shared mental machinery. Yudkowsky also argues that from an evoltionary perspective, you would expect all brains to be very much alike in terms of hard-wired logic, since it's more or less impossible that a mutation would lead to a different but viable system. — Echarmion
Well, it's true that we can never be actually sure whether or not what we think is reason is not just a rationalisation of myth or tradition. It probably often is. But this seems to be one of those dilemmas that you can only get out of by asserting a solution. And morality is a practical field. So it makes sense to me to say that, insofar as we are all capable of reason, we should try to find universal principles to base our actions on. This will have the highest likelyhood of giving us true - if no necessarily objective - results. — Echarmion
To be honest, after writing my first reply I noticed I was confused about the concept of value in the first place. What are examples of the kind of values we talk about here? Something like a specific religious creed, or something more abstract? — Echarmion
Right, but intentions aren’t acts, so how can the be called right/wrong? — Pinprick
The two cannot be disentangled for the purpose of morality, but if we're talking about selecting a moral course of action, then right and wrong must already apply to the selection process. — Echarmion
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