(drawing on memory, expectation, language, symbolism, etc) which are not meaningfully 'inside' the brain; — Wayfarer

Memory, expectations, meanings and the semantic aspect of symbolism are only in the brain. Just like the projection of a drama is only in the TV. You're trying to say that the projection is in the filming, etc. too. That's wrong.

A few years back I was in love with philosophy. I was strict in my unwillingness to have any, and I mean ANY, uninteresting conversation. A combination of reasons forced me (deterministically speaking) to stop.
So no, I am not new to this.
I do not understand how this can be a wrong question. I admit the implicit assumption and am open to discussing it. Would you care to elaborate?

Memory, expectations, meanings and the semantic aspect of symbolism are only in the brain — Terrapin Station

'In the brain' is a cognitive model. You will never find anything of the kind you mention 'in the brain'. You're writing as it what you're asserting is known or proven, when it's really not. 'The brain' has a role to play, but it's not the ultimate source of meaning. Besides, humans can survive with apparently massive loss or damage to the brain.

Would you care to elaborate? — Perdidi Corpus

OK.

"Where does truth exist?" looks like a question about truth. But is it? Try treating it as a question about how we use the words "truth" and "exist"; so that it morphs into something like "Does the word exist apply to truth?"

What looked like profound epistemology can be seen as just a question of grammar.

What do you think?

First, read this. I'll wait here.

Now, tell me: are you talking about the Picasso painting tokens, or the types? The tokens each occupy a single region. The type doesn't occupy any region, because it's not a concrete object.

As to space having multiple locations, the point is that "Where is space?" is not a sensible question.

"Where does truth exist?" looks like a question about truth. But is it? Try treating it as a question about how we use the words "truth" and "exist"; so that it morphs into something like "Does the word exist apply to truth?" — Banno

Or, more directly, does the word "exist" necessarily implies having a location? How could you argue for that? (You haven't even tried, as far as I can see.) If pretty much everyone, as appears to be the case, already uses the word "exist" so that it applies to things that do not have a clear location, then what's the point of this exercise?

'In the brain' is a cognitive model. — Wayfarer

"Not in the brain" isn't any sort of model. It's just nonsense.

You're writing as it what you're asserting is known or proven, when it's really not. — Wayfarer

Empirical claims are not provable.

Besides, humans can survive with apparently massive loss or damage to the brain. — Wayfarer

You can survive with parts of the brain being compromised, sure. That has no implication for whether meaning is something that the brain does. It's not as if meaning is only something that brains do just in case we're talking about a "complete" brain (as if brains don't continually change anyway).

I'm a nominalist. In my view there are no real (read "extramental") types. Types/universals are concrete ways that we think about things--namely, they're conceptual abstractions we make, and those are concrete events in our brains.

"Where is space"--it's the extension of all matter and the relational extension "between" all matter. We can point to that, and it doesn't exist aside from that.

"Where is the truth"

In history.

If pretty much everyone, as appears to be the case, already uses the word "exist" so that it applies to things that do not have a clear location, then what's the point of this exercise? — SophistiCat

I agree that such is the convention. But what do those who use and defend the convention mean when they say that something exists?

I'm a nominalist. In my view there are no real (read "extramental") types. Types/universals are concrete ways that we think about things--namely, they're conceptual abstractions we make, and those are concrete events in our brains. — Terrapin Station

In that case, a Picasso painting does not have many locations. Just one.

Anyway, nominalism of this kind doesn't work. A type is a "way" in which we think. OK, where's the "way"?

Note that when I asked you the question initially, I said, "Picasso paintings."

Anyway, nominalism of this kind doesn't work. — Pneumenon

Geez. I didn't realize that you had that view. Quick, let me change my own view because of that.


Re "where's the way"--didn't you read the "namely" part after the em dash?

Yep. Where's the conceptual abstraction?

Hm. Of course I agree that truth has no location. But better to avoid the reification of truth altogether, rather than in just the circumstances of location.

"Truth exists" just means that there are true statements.

Yep. Where's the conceptual abstraction? — Pneumenon

those are concrete events in our brains. — Terrapin Station

I agree that such is the convention. But what do those who use and defend the convention mean when they say that something exists? — Perdidi Corpus

Well, you appear to be a competent speaker of English, don't you already know what people mean when they say that something exists? I didn't have any exotic or specialist meanings in mind.

those are concrete events in our brains. — Terrapin Station

Okay. Which one of our brains? Because if it's in more than one brain, we're back to the abstract/concrete dichotomy and you haven't solved anything. That's why this form of nominalism never works; you end up appealing to event types rather than singular events.

Okay. Which one of our brains? — Pneumenon

In each brain that has the conceptual abstraction in question.

Okay, it's in multiple places. So far, so good. The same event doesn't occur in my brain and in your brain; they're two instances of an event type. Now, where's the type?

It's a regress issue.

they're two instances of an event type. Now, where's the type? — Pneumenon

Types are the conceptual abstractions in question. That's all there is to what a "type" is.

In other words, types/universals are concrete particulars. "Instances" are all there is.

My humble opinion follows:

If I may say so there are two worlds. One is outside - the physical world, the universe itself. The other is inside - our mind. I make this distinction because we have the power of imagination. This exceptional mental tool allows us to go beyond the limits of the physical world e.g. we can think of unicorns, santa claus, etc. I consider this unique ability of the mind sufficient to warrant the distinction inside and outside even though the mind is obviously part of the physical universe itself.

That said let us attempt to answer the question "Where is the truth?"

First the mind. In this particular world resides some truths that are arrived at through the sole us of or most powerful thinking tool - logic. A good example of truths that exist only in the mind is pure mathematics. In such cases we could, without erring, answer the OP's question by saying truth is in the mind.

Secondly, the physical world. This is not so easy for the simple reason that our minds cannot be factored out - we are doomed to think, so to speak. However we can still make a distinction here that should allow us to consider the truths of mind and the truths of our physical world as separate. How I make this distinction is that truths of the physical world require a correspondence between the physical world and the mind. For example...if a tree falls you should also be thinking a tree is falling. This additional requirement is absent in truths of the mind alone. Since, in this case, truth is a relation between the mind and the physical world I don't know how to describe a locus for such truths. It's at the boundary between the mind and the physical world - that's the best I can do.

Another issue here is that mind-truths like mathematics are absolute (as far as I know). They're unchanging...2+2 is always 4. Static.

However truths of the physical world are in a state of flux in the 4th dimension - time. As observers of nature we're always in the shadow of the problem of induction, as is all of science, and that may warrant the additional question ''when is the truth?''

It's all bullshit.

1+1 makes 1

:) ok

If truth, then isn't it necessarily in us as part of a community that uses the same normative rules.

don't you already know what people mean when they say that something exists? — SophistiCat

Kind of... But that is one of the key ideas which make this question pointy... That is - questioning what you seem to think you have a grasp of. There is certainly a feeling that I do. I want to understand this feeling better. Would you consider joining in on my other discussion regarding this feeling? http://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/957/what-is-the-rawest-form-of-an-idea-how-should-one-go-about-translating-it-into-language#Item_5

The question arises out of the idea that for something to exist, it must be somewhere. Am I wrong in thinking this? If so, than in what way does truth exist? — Perdidi Corpus

Where is the left and where is the right? Not "existing" in any one place, but consisting in relations among various things existing in various places.

I think of truth as something like the value of a relation between statements and facts. Given two truth-values, true and false, we may in principle divide (well-formed, meaningful) statements into "the true" and "the false", depending on how they line up with relevant facts.

Where are statements? Paradigmatically, in the heads of rational sentient speakers.