I am making the claim that Ordinary Language Philosophy is a philosophically-sound methodology that is relevant to revolutionizing modern analytical philosophy. ("OLP"--exemplified by Wittgenstein, Nietzsche , J.L. Austin, and Stanley Cavell)

To start, roughly, OLP is an analytic* philosophical method that investigates what Witt terms "our concepts"** (say, practices) by making claims about each concept's "criteria" (though not as a standard of justification) or "Grammar" Witt will call them, e.g., ordinary implications, consequences, ways of judging, what counts for identity, etc., which allow us to discuss more usefully and see deeper into philosophical issues, and learn about ourselves.

The method is to ask or imagine, as Austin says: what do we ordinarily imply ("mean") when we say…, e.g., “I know”, "I think", "I forget", "I apologize", which also involves fleshing out the context that would go along with that case***. As an example, when we ordinarily say an action was done accidently rather than mistakenly, we can imagine a case (a context): that “the gun went off in my hands and killed the donkey” (accidently), as opposed to: “I did want to kill the cow, but hit the donkey instead” (mistakenly) (Austin's example). The example allows us to see what is usually skipped over unexamined; to describe what “actions” are and how they work, e.g., that “intention” does not come up in every circumstances (when asked about a mistake) and how moral culpability works (Austin will talk of excuses—“The donkey just walked in the way!”).

These claims--about the usually unexamined "criteria" (say, workings) of our "concepts" (again, just a grouping term) seen by imagining examples of what we mean (imply, what follows) when we say, e.g., "I know"; these descriptions of the criteria of our concepts are provisional claims, yet made in the name of everyone, because they are for anyone to look and see for themselves. There is no further justification. OLP philosophers can then discuss insights from these claims about the issues of philosophy.

So we would come up with circumstances (the contexts) when we say, as an example (from Malcolm): "I know" and then see and describe what those instances imply about our various criteria for that concept. And that a concept can have multiple options ("senses" Witt says--ways the make sense) or ways in which the can be used in different contexts.

One sense of "I Know" is that I am certain: "I know when the sun will rise today"; the criteria for this might be that I can give evidence of that certainty, etc. This appears to be philosophy's one and only use and preoccupation. Second, we can say "I know New York", as in: I know my way around; I can show you; Third, I know (knew) that, as in to confirm or agree with what you said; and Fourth, I know, as in to sympathize with you. Cavell uses this last sense to shed light on our knowledge of another's pain--we don't "know it" in the first sense, we acknowledge it, recognize and accept the claim their expression of pain makes on me.

Leaving that brief explanation*** I’ll point out some misconceptions about OLP, used to dismiss its method/contribution. The usual dismissals are:
1. That OLP is easy to understand and not revolutionizing; that it is simply another argument of justification or solving skepticism not require re-evaluating an unseen picture created by traditional philosophy.
2. That it is an argument in ordinary language, or an argument for ordinary language."
3. That the Grammar or criteria of these concepts are what is consciously used to explain the concept to regular people, or that they are regularly used in deciding what to say under a concept.
4. That OLP is pitting people’s ordinary opinions and regular words against the arguments of philosophers (OLP is working within the tradition).
5 That "context" is just what is happening at the moment, and not what is important ( about that, about our history in this concept, etc.) to what can be implied from what is said.
6. That OLP is just “about language” and not the (ways of the) world, culture, politics, philosophy's issues.
7. That OLP is a theory of general "langauge use", meaning, rationality, etc. rather than a method for insight.
8. That what we mean when we say____, is not subject to evidence, rigour, rationality, clarity, including the larger picture.
9. That representationalism, positivism, metaphysics, etc. are "wrong" and OLP is "right" on the same terms, rather than showing us we were confused, blind to ourselves (the entire picture ignoring our real needs/desires);
10. OLP is didactically explaining to everyone how, say, an apology works, in order to get them to act a certain way.
11. That Grammar are rules to explain everything or ensure a particular usage, rather than suppositions to shed light on philosophical issues.
12. That OLP is making statements about how language works (true explanations), rather than claims of description to be seen by you, or better fleshed out, finding a more fitting context.
13. This is simply an empirical popularity contest of what most people say (or sociology).
14. That OLP is simply conservatively limiting what can be said philosophically.
15. That OLP is saying or showing that language is simple, or works simply, dismissing or not interested in, or applicable to, philosophy's honest concerns (skepticism, the problem of other, identity, etc.),
16. That OLP is dismissing philosophy (and skepticism) with “common sense”. This is exacerbated by some OLP philosophers (Moore, Kripke, etc.) making mistakes in saying that everyone knows the world (my hand) exists; or claiming that language is about social agreement, or rules, or “forms of life”; or saying philosophy is nonsense.
17. That Witt blames philosophy's problems on language, rather than on:
a). philosophy's desire/need for language to meet its standard;
b). the possibility in language to allow us to bewitch ourselves in that way, its ability to seem uprooted (isolated words) and so appearing to need the roots traditional philosophy searches for; and
c) ordinary criteria's inability to defend itself.

You may have noted the “necessity” that OLP claims, mentioned above, which is that, to be an accident (and not a mistake), certain things MUST be (are being claimed necessary to being) the case. One appears to be: a mistake requires an intended action, where an accident does not. This is part of the Grammar of these concepts: if you have no intention, you can not be making a mistake--showing that not every action is "intended", nor every movement an “action”. Traditionally, philosophy has removed the context around "intention" (as with “meaning” “reality”), which starts a slippery slope--ending in traditional philosophy's desire for a universal theory of meaning--which OLP is trying to come back from through many examples of the different ordinary workings and criteria of our concepts in a context.

OLP is making its claims for everyone, in a universal voice as Kant says about the Beautiful (see the post “Can Aesthetics be Objective” @Possibility). The voice is not dogmatic (though Nietzsche, Witt, and especially Austin are seen as so fervent that people take their claims of criteria as statements of fact), nor is the point to get these right, as “rules”, to explain how everything works. The claim (about what counts for something being said how) is to reflect on the philosophical issue (here, e.g., of action/intention).

So, if I speak for everyone, than everyone can weigh in on my claim to criteria/context, and the only truth it has is if you see it too; thus the need for it to be detailed, encompassing, distinguishing, etc.; It is thus important in OLP to see the other’s argument on their terms, draw out the context to clear up differences, and resolve issues of speaking past each other. It is more collaborative than argumentative because, if we can not agree on the criteria for concepts or the context which would show how those work, we are at a standstill—there is no force behind a claim to the ordinary. It is a description to be seen, not an argument for a theory; there is no other justification than the description (my claim) from the imagined case and context. Thus people aren't interested in it because it doesn’t appear to be playing fair, or it doesn't give them the type of answers they’d like. But I only want to point out that, instead of imposing frameworks of limitations, preconditions, expectations, etc., OLP takes philosophy more seriously by first looking at our concepts where they are (their human criteria, their ordinary workings), which gives us a wider view, a better grip, more to talk about, and some satisfaction and agreement rather than jaded isolation.

* Analytical philosophy topics/practitioners include: Plato; A.J. Ayer, Comte; Descartes, Hume; Kant; here I would add Hegel as an OLP philosopher because of his process and Socrates in asking questions of people who answer "from the street".

**When Witt says "concepts" he is not referring to the way philosophy talks about abstract ideas, or other mental objects that refer to a word or the world. It is a general term; just a way of grouping together our, say, practices: knowing, seeing, understanding, thinking, meaning, having an opinion, but also regular things like mistaking, sitting in a chair, seeing an aspect, raising your arm, remembering correctly, etc. As is "criteria" which is not a standard for justification as much as all the ways our concepts work and are identified, how we make judgments about them, the differences we make with them, etc. Other terms being "sense" (options for a concept not a word's "meaning") and "use" (which sense of the concept is used, not use as a ground for justification.)

*** Asking what we mean in an imagined context when we say "______" is opposed to starting with imposing grounds for justification of knowledge by a vision of what philosophy is which desires certainty, universality, predetermination, predictability, under the name of a picture of "rationality".

**** I have argued from OLP in my post about Wittgenstein’s lion quote (@Mmw), and in the posts about: objective aesthetics, freedom and duty, science straying into philosophy, what is “real”, only emotion mattering (@darthbarracuda), and “Not All Belief Can Be Put Into Statement Form” (@creative soul @Banno).