. . . but philosophy journals, as distinct from popular magazines like Philosophy Now, are mainly read in philosophy departments. I would have thought that getting something published in them, if you have no history of publication or academic affiliation, would be quite a challenge. — Wayfarer
Yes, I'm curious about this. In mathematics, academic institutions have a very powerful influence of what gets published in important journals. The reviewers are mostly faculty members or work in jobs that are roughly equivalent. — jgill
So are you developing your paper in a philosophy department?
— Wayfarer
No, usually at home or a Starbucks. I'm not an academic.
— Ron Cram
Might be worth mentioning Ron Cram's previous posts on this topic. — Wayfarer
Hume argued that inductive reasoning and belief in causality cannot be justified rationally; instead, they result from custom and mental habit. We never actually perceive that one event causes another but only experience the "constant conjunction" of events.
My first paper on Hume is not published yet, but it is not possible that the world is a consistent illusion. — Ron Cram
How long is it? — counterpunch
Submission guidelines for all three of the journals mentioned can be viewed online, they first request a blind copy of a manuscript (i.e. from which author ID is removed), which is assessed by two or three referees prior to acceptance. But I imagine it's a pretty tough row to hoe! — Wayfarer
Before this I knew nothing of Hume, but it turns out I've been making versions of his arguments for years. From his Wiki entry -
— fishfry
Hume argued that inductive reasoning and belief in causality cannot be justified rationally; instead, they result from custom and mental habit. We never actually perceive that one event causes another but only experience the "constant conjunction" of events.
“Every event must have a cause” cannot be proven by experience, but experience is impossible without it because it describes the way the mind must necessarily order its representations. ... According to the Rationalist and Empiricist traditions, the mind is passive either because it finds itself possessing innate, well-formed ideas ready for analysis, or because it receives ideas of objects into a kind of empty theater, or blank slate [Hume’s view]. Kant’s crucial insight here is to argue that experience of a world as we have it is only possible if the mind provides a systematic structuring of its representations. This structuring is below the level of, or logically prior to, the mental representations that the Empiricists and Rationalists analyzed. — Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy, Kant’s Metaphysics
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