Meaningful belief is not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location.

A capable language-less creature believes a mouse ran behind the tree if they draw correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of themselves, the mouse, and the tree. The content of that belief is the mouse, the tree, themselves, spatiotemporal locations, and the correlations drawn between all those different directly perceptible things(and others undoubtedly).

The content of all belief about mice running around trees always includes mice, trees, and spatial relationships. All of these different directly perceptible things are necessary elemental constituents of such language-less belief. Remove any one of them and the elemental correlational content is lacking.

For animals scents and sounds are signs of prey, for example, but they don't represent prey symbolically. — Janus

Indeed. The scents and sounds become significant(meaningful) as a result of becoming part of a capable creature's correlations drawn between them, possible food items(prey), their own hunger pangs, etc. Prior to becoming part of those correlations, they were not at all meaningful for the aforementioned animal. Rather, they were just sounds and scents.

I don't know. — frank

...then where are we going?

I didn't decide to call those red flowers "roses". — frank

Sure. So you think you were caused to do so? You could not have done otherwise?

If something can be put into propositional form, then it is propositional? — creativesoul

If something is put into square form, is it square?

Would you think that when something is put into square form, it was not square prior to the putting?

It's not put into square form or propositional form. It is square or propositional.

Unless you are heading off into some form of antirealism.

I suppose no such thing. — creativesoul

Did too.

The content of that belief is the mouse, the tree, themselves, spatiotemporal locations, and the correlations drawn between all those different directly perceptible things(and others undoubtedly). — creativesoul

...which if it is anything is propositional: "the mouse went behind the tree".

Which was to be proved.

I can't see you doing anything here except agreeing with me most ardently.

Sure. So you think you were caused to do so? You could not have done otherwise? — Banno

I'm bound to call them roses by my desire to communicate.

I'm bound to call them roses by my desire to communicate. — frank

...bound...?

No, you are not. You might say "them pretty flowers over there", or "the Rosaceae", or "Роза" or even "the bush I cut down last week because it prickled my foot".

And if they say, "You mean the rose?"

If I want to communicate, I have to follow the rules. My desire makes a slave of me.

Ah. Yes, follow the rules. I'll agree with that. But sometimes you communicate by rules, following not.

And not all language is communication.

But still, where is this going? "Cause if we don't know where we are going, any post will take you there.

More on that. There's information here; it needs to be over there; it is transmitted as a signal. Introduce Shannon's equations and entropy, and it all becomes very interesting.

But that's not the whole of language, any more than it is the whole of the world.

For animals scents and sounds are signs of prey, for example, but they don't represent prey symbolically. — Janus

Indeed. The scents and sounds become significant(meaningful) as a result of becoming part of a capable creature's correlations drawn between them, possible food items(prey), their own hunger pangs, etc. Prior to becoming part of those correlations, they were not at all meaningful for the aforementioned animal. Rather, they were just sounds and scents. — creativesoul

I'm tempted, but remain skeptical. Seems like another (along with "belief") anthropomorphic over-extension of the real thing, which in this case is humans' game of pretend: wherein, as you say,

the sounds of the word or the visible written marks are associated with the objects they (are understood to) represent. — Janus

The anthropomorphising extends too easily (for my liking) to self-driving cars and Chinese Rooms.

But still, where is this going? "Cause if we don't know where we are going, any post will take you there. — Banno

I thought @fdrake was sorting out how the T-sentence rule works? I think the answer is that it does no work. It's not informative. It's trivially true.

Do you agree?

"Drawing correlations" is not necessarily a symbolizing activity. — Janus

Can you provide an example fo a correlation that cannot be shown to be in propositional form?

That would be a correlation that was not a property nor a relation between things.

So, yes, what you say is correct, but does not exclude the proposal that the content of belief is propositional. Indeed, if anything, it says the same thing.

Right, I didn't say that the correlations animals make when "reading" signs of prey or predators or water and so on cannot be symbolically represented by us, just that they are not understood symbolically by the animals; they are just associations (correlations) of one thing with another.

No.

T-sentences have two uses.

Firstly, if we take "P" as some proposition, and A as it's translation, then the T-sentence ("P" is true iff A) sets out the meaning of "...is true". This is what Tarski did with them.

Secondly, if we take truth as understood, the the T-sentence ("P" is true iff A) sets out the conditions under which "P" is true; that is, A. That's what Davidson did with them.

Sure. Animals can't speak. I think we are in agreement...?

@Banno @creativesoul @fdrake @frank

I know quoting from my holy book (apocrypha) isn't an argument, but...

One thread of an argument by Herbert Hochberg runs some­what as follows: that "white" applies to certain things does not make them white; rather "white" applies because they are white. Plausible enough but misleading. Granted, I cannot make these objects red by calling them red--by applying the term "red" to them. But on the other hand, the English language makes them white just by applying the term "white" to them; application of the term "white" is not dictated by their somehow being antecedently white, whatever that might mean. A language that applies the term "blanc" to them makes them blanc; and a language if any that applies the term "red" to them makes them red.

Some of the trouble traces back to Alfred Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence, coherence, or other) that gives " 'Snow is white' is true" and "snow is white" the same truth-value.

I don't think "pretend" is a suitable term here. We do understand (some) words to represent objects; that's simply a fact of human experience. Against what purported actuality could you juxtapose that fact of human experience, such as to justify calling it a "pretence"?

We do understand (some) words to represent objects; that's simply a fact of human experience. — Janus

Yep, we know how to play the game of agreeing to pretend that certain words and pictures point at certain things. Pretend seems to me a suitable word for that kind of game. I don't mean we don't actually play it.

We do understand (some) words to represent objects; that's simply a fact of human experience. — Janus

We understand this not in the way we understand that the cat is on the mat, but in the way that we understand that the Bishop only ever stays on the same coloured squares. We understand not a fact, but a procedure that allows us to get on with the game.

That seems to me what is incongruous in @fdrake and @Constance, that in seeing reference as ready-to-hand they are mystified by its being conventional.

I agree with that.

What do you think we are pretending then? We are not pretending that (some) words (sounds and groups of visual symbols) are associated with objects by us. It's obvious there is no direct cause and effect (energetic) relation between words and what they represent or any logically necessary relation between any particular sound or group of visual symbols and what they are designated to represent, so where does the supposed pretence sit?

@Banno See above. Are we disagreeing?

One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree...
— creativesoul

...which can be put into propositional form; hence, all belief is propositional. — Banno

It's not put into square form or propositional form. It is square or propositional. — Banno

:smirk:

More self-contradiction.

I don't know.

We understand this not in the way we understand that the cat is on the mat, but in the way that we understand that the Bishop only ever stays on the same coloured squares. We understand not a fact, but a procedure that allows us to get on with the game. — Banno

Sure it is a matter of understanding following conventional associations. I don't think chess is a very good analogy, but I agree we don't understand it in the same way we understand a statement about some sensible state of affairs; I take all this to be trivially true, so much so that I cannot understand why anyone would disagree.

I don't know. — Banno

Well you should since I'm certainly not using obscure language; it's very straightforward. I'm happy to explain anything you haven't understood in what I've said.

Well you should... — Janus

And yet I don't. What do you think we might disagree about?

Some of the trouble traces back to Alfred Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence, coherence, or other) that gives " 'Snow is white' is true" and "snow is white" the same truth-value. — bongo fury

Seems amenable!

Though @Banno here uses it (at least, last time we talked about it) in a deflationary manner. IE the sense of a declarative sentence is spelled out in the conditions that would make it true and only those conditions, and there's no better candidate for spelling out those conditions than disquoting the declarative sentence itself. The major contrast between deflation and correspondence (as I see it) is that a correspondence theory takes a sentence and matches it to some sort of worldly fact - like an event, a thought, an object's properties - and says the sentence is true when it matches the fact.. Banno's deflationary view doesn't match the sentence with some worldly fact, it matches it with other sentences that would be true in all and only the same conditions.

Banno's particular quirk (probably following Davidson) is that he then treats truth (IIRC) as an unanalysable primitive in norms of language; so the meanings of sentences are spelled out by how they are true, but what it means to say a sentence is true is something that must be assumed of any use of language and can't be spelled out in terms of any other idea or language practice. You already know what it means for a declarative sentence to be true, if you didn't the whole apparatus of language around it would fall apart. For Banno, as for Davidson, it seems the T-sentence isn't a theory of truth; it takes truth as a given and uses the T sentence to provide a theory of meaning.

That seems to me what is incongruous in fdrake and @Constance, that in seeing reference as ready-to-hand they are mystified by its being conventional. — Banno

It is conventional, but it isn't merely conventional. I doubt you believe that "this is a red rose" simply because we call it one. Norms play a part, they don't determine it all; otherwise there'd be no ability to coordinate between systems of evaluating sentences - how can we tell "snow is white" is true if and only if schnee ist weiß? Have to look at the snow and the norms of use.

Those experiences are what ground the use of that language
— Andrew M

Yes, what do you mean by "ground", how does it work? — fdrake

It's the context for our talk. Language doesn't arise in a vacuum, but in our interactions with the world (our experiences). We perceive a difference between wet weather and dry weather, say, and when being aware of such differences is useful for our purposes, language is created and used. Those perceived differences are what our talk is grounded in, i.e., they provide the context for our talk.

Those perceived differences are what our talk is grounded in, i.e., they provide the context for our talk. — Andrew M

If you'll permit me to be a bit socratic, when you say that they "provide the context for our talk", and that this context "grounds" the use of language, I was wondering if you could comment on:

(1) How speech acts are assigned to contexts; how do you tell which context a speech act is in?
(2) Whether the context of a given speech act doesn't just "ground" but also determines some component of its meaning - or in a more pragmatic vocabulary, if the context the speech act arises in influences the norms of use of the speech act?

The norms of use consist of patterns of speech acts in interaction with the world.
Which are used to ground and contextualise speech acts interacting with the world.
One point of the analysis treats speech acts as a given - a base/guarantor of meaning, one point of the analysis treats them as fungible - the superstructure/vehicle of meaning. Both contextualiser and context element - condition of possibility and actual instance.

I agree that speech acts both contextualise norms of language use and arise in contexts, what I think this does is stop them from being appealed to as a ground at one moment and as an expression in that ground the next.