The quintessential problem here is that if I don't agree that this is absurd, there is no further basis for discussion. You think it's absurd, I think it's rather reasonable. Insightful, even. I suppose many of the people who disagree feel the same. There is no easy way to bridge that conceptual chasm. — Echarmion
Suppose there were a pill that killed instantly, should parents be allowed to bring children into the world if the children were allowed to take that pill at any time?
Surely that would be in accordance with your logic? — SolarWind
But again, khaled and I have been agreeing with this sentiment. — schopenhauer1
because the ways in which x is dissimilar from conceiving children could otherwise be held as rational reasons to absolve such an obligation. — Isaac
All your arguments are of the form " but you wouldn't do x, which is similar to conceiving children in ways a, b and c...so you're obliged by reason to not conceive children" — Isaac
Protestations to the contrary aside, your approach implies an objectivity you've not demonstrated to be there. — Isaac
I don't know why posters are assuming that any argument can't be debated on a philosophy forum. — schopenhauer1
So are all the other alternatives. Which makes the statement “There is something wrong with antinatalism” false. — khaled
don’t think anyone here is willing to say something like “Birth, although similar to malicious genetic engineering in every respect, is fine because it starts with a ‘B’” — khaled
Despite the title, the OP makes it clear that it is the form of argument, not the subjectivity of the premises which is being taken issue with. — Isaac
You can't be seriously saying the only difference anyone could point to between malicious genetic engineering and birth is the initial letter? Ridiculous. — Isaac
If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. And I just am not. Weird, right? — Echarmion
I can tell you a hundred times that we can only compare situations of different existences (tortured child - not tortured child, seeing child - blind child), but never compare an existence with a nonexistence. — Echarmion
Perhaps you feel exactly the same way. — Echarmion
I can tell you a hundred times that we can only compare situations of different existences (tortured child - not tortured child, seeing child - blind child), but never compare an existence with a nonexistence. But you just somehow don't see it. — Echarmion
IF there is a situation to create unnecessary suffering and there is a lack of consent that can be had (and he gives the contingent circumstances of not improving a situation, permissions etc.), don't do it as that will affect a person negatively in the future and violate consen — schopenhauer1
And I just somehow don't see why it's just as bad to cause common suffering as it is to inflict special suffering. — Echarmion
If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. — Echarmion
And I just somehow don't see why it's just as bad to cause common suffering as it is to inflict special suffering. If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. And I just am not. Weird, right? — Echarmion
IF there is a situation to create unnecessary suffering and there is a lack of consent that can be had (and he gives the contingent circumstances of not improving a situation, permissions etc.), don't do it as that will affect a person negatively in the future and violate consent — schopenhauer1
I don’t think there is anything wrong with my form of the argument at least. — khaled
emember the other thread? Where you kept saying “If I have unreasonable premises I end up with unreasonable conclusions” in reference to my argument? That means not even you think there is something wrong with the form, just the premises. That is a failure to show that there is anything wrong with AN. — khaled
Sure, technically true, but that doesn’t make any difference convincing. Or reasonable in any traditional sense. — khaled
I would be interested in what features about malicious genetic engineering and birth make one ok and the other not, for you. Because all the features I’ve heard so far have seemed ridiculous to me. — khaled
What does make a difference convincing or reasonable? — Isaac
“Birth, although similar to malicious genetic engineering in every respect, is fine because it starts with a ‘B’” — khaled
since you've literally had to make a moral judgement in order to even describe the situation. 'Malicious genetic engineering'. — Isaac
In the example of malicious genetic engineering there is an intention to cause harm — Isaac
I think that's abundantly apparent. — Isaac
But if there's no compelling argument (other than just "well that's what my unusual premises lead to") — Isaac
How so? There have been several arguments put forward, that was an opposition to one of them. — Isaac
"Suppose there were a pill that killed instantly, should parents be allowed to bring children into the world if the children were allowed to take that pill at any time?
Surely that would be in accordance with your logic?" — SolarWind
No, procreation isn't justified with faster ways to commit suicide. It's like a game that you start for someone else, and death is an escape. The very fact that you have to do this harm of death, is enough reason not to start the game for that person. It is quite presumptuous to assume, "Well, you'll just endure it.. death is your only option". Something wrong about that. Never existing and existing and then dying are two very different cases. — schopenhauer1
In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died? — SolarWind
Any and all harms can be prevented, not just the possibility of torture. — schopenhauer1
Can ever be interpreted as “comparing existence to non existence”. The word “compare” doesn’t come up once in any shape or form. Neither does “existence” — khaled
Harm who? There is no one to be harmed. This is a consequence of the insistence that having children is not causing harm "because there is no one to be harmed". — khaled
Also, what if the intention was benign? — khaled
I don't remember putting forward multiple arguments for AN I've been harping about the same one since I found it. — khaled
"In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died?" — SolarWind
I already explained my contention in what you quoted. — schopenhauer1
Not my insistence, nor anyone here, as far as I can tell. — Isaac
The issue with non-existence is about consent to risk harm, not future harm itself. — Isaac
This just goes back to my first point: I do literally believe that someone needs to exist in order for us to conclude that there was harm. — Echarmion
This is true in the literal sense that obviously if no-one was around at all, "harm" wouldn't exist, since it's a human concept.
It's also true in the sense that harm is something that happens to discrete, existing individuals, and so of course only exists when they do. — Echarmion
And it's also true when we consider the hypothetical future person, because to conclude that they will be harmed, we need to imagine a second counterfactual future where they exist but whatever harmful thing we imagine didn't happen to them. — Echarmion
That is wrong, I think, because this abstract position is fictional. But I can't think of a way to explain this in a way you're likely to find convincing. — Echarmion
"cause", "suffering" and "unnecessary" have a large frayed edge to their common definitions. And you require all three to agree on a specific issue. — Echarmion
This implies we're looking at two timelines: one where A happens and one where it doesn't. — Echarmion
Because an event A is necessary for an event B if, in the absence of it, event B doesn't happen. — Echarmion
And lastly, the notion of suffering also implies a comparison. This is more or less what I've written to Schopenhauer above with respect to harm. We don't just conclude that bad things are bad in a vacuum. If something had happens to someone, they wish it didn't happen . And since there is no simple absence of events, that means they wish for something different to have happened instead. — Echarmion
AN (a form of it) is simply moving the bar from "near certainty" to ">0%". What is wrong with that? — khaled
It's ridiculous. No-one normally sets the bar that low. — Isaac
If that's all you're saying then we're back to ridiculous premises leading to ridiculous consequences. — Isaac
But you keep trying to make your premises sound less ridiculous with examples of the form I outlined above. — Isaac
Examples of this form are logically flawed in the way I showed. — Isaac
for which it is shown to be trivially true that it leads to ridiculous conclusions. — Isaac
But in adding these caveats, you change the nature of the argument. — Isaac
When these altered arguments are shown to be flawed (as I've just done) — Isaac
assumed consent of the unconscious — Isaac
let's take the example of shooting someone for entertainment. — khaled
You didn't show much. — khaled
Try it. At least with my own system. — khaled
What do you mean "change the nature of the argument"? — khaled
You didn't. You said it's trivially easy then proceeded to not give an example. — khaled
assumed consent of the unconscious — Isaac
Is not something I ever add but something NAs add often if anything. — khaled
No intent to mitigate non-trivial harm, no reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits, no reasonable expectation of consent. — Isaac
So not an example comparable to conception. — Isaac
That's yet to be established as you've not yet offered any counter-argument — Isaac
The difference between malicious genetic engineering and birth is trivially easy to show once you allow the kinds of caveat to a single maxim which you allow. That is what I showed in my example. — Isaac
Harm who? There is no one to be harmed. This is a consequence of the insistence that having children is not causing harm "because there is no one to be harmed".
— khaled
Not my insistence, nor anyone here, as far as I can tell. I think everyone's agreed that we can imagine a future child and mitigate harms that might befall them. — Isaac
Then you have the recklessness argument, as I stated in my actual definition of the differences which you've just ignored. It is insufficient to have good intentions, one must also have just cause to believe those intentions will yield the expected result. An arbitrary and unevidenced belief in the benefits of blindness does not satisfy this requirement. — Isaac
instead choosing to switch lanes again, back to the ridiculous premise. — Isaac
Most people consider ending the human race as an ethical outcome prima facie ridiculous. — Isaac
Who's adding caveats now? — khaled
I was just saying that setting a low bar when it comes to "how likely it is that our acts will harm someone" is the norm, and not ridiculous in any way. — khaled
Your claim was that any difference between the two acts in question can be used to make one ok and the other not. — khaled
So if we can imagine a future child and recognize that an act done now, that will result in harm later, is considered "harmful" and therefore shouldn't be done, that would apply to both. — khaled
So what caveat will you add now? — khaled
Intent doesn't work, because: — khaled
The recklessness argument also applies to birth in general. Birth will cause harm in the same way MGE does. — khaled
I did so to demonstrate your inability to find anything wrong with the form of the argument. You still have not provided anything wrong with the form of the argument. — khaled
When I give an example I am trying to do 2. — khaled
But it is ridiculous in some circumstances. That's the whole point. We do not simply have one unadulterated maxim which we apply in all cases. — Isaac
only that it was disingenuous of you to ignore differences. — Isaac
Only we can't agree. Not even you agree. When pressed on "we should not cause harm" as a maxim you add a load of caveats, we all do — Isaac
Non-malicious intent — Isaac
reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits — Isaac
intent to mitigate forseeable harms — Isaac
mutual goal — Isaac
expectation of duty — Isaac
You're simply confusing sufficient with necessary. The fact that it alone cannot account for the difference does not mean it's not a contributory factor. — Isaac
To say the birth will cause harm in the same way MGE will is again monumentally disingenuous. — Isaac
I've never claimed there is anything wrong with that argument, so I don't know why you might have done that. — Isaac
The argument that "'we should not cause any harm under any circumstances, birth causes harm' - is not a ridiculous premise because we generally agree to something similar" is not valid. It assumes a similarity with other moral dilemmas without taking any account of the circumstances which make them different. — Isaac
It feels far more like you're trying to sneak in an argument in favour of AN by suggesting some inconsistency between our response to your examples and our response to birth. — Isaac
But no such inconsistency can be shown once you allow for caveats to the maxim, and you have already agreed that caveats are required. — Isaac
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