You're Sartre needs work. Since we are free, our use of language included, English could be used to talk about anything at all. There is nothing conceivable that English (or any other language) could not talk about. The game of English can be anything we choose.

Hence, in so far as we can talk of our beliefs as being true or false, we must also include that their content is also capable of being true or false. — Banno

This is a point I also agree with, with the additional caveat that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it.

The fire example is a case of learning that fire causes pain when touched. We know that that is the case. We know that that statement is true. A language-less creature can learn that fire causes pain by virtue of drawing correlations between the fire, the touching, and the ensuing pain. That could be described as a belief that touching fire caused pain, but the creature has no language, so this puts the claim that that language-less creature's belief is propositional in content in serious doubt.

There's certainly a bridge between the language-less belief and the simple belief statement, but it cannot be propositions, unless propositions somehow exist in their entirety prior to language in such a way that a language-less creature is capable of drawing correlations between them, or having an attitude towards them, etc.

The bridge, it seems to me, is the ability to attribute meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. With the language-less creature, the correlations are drawn between the touching, the fire, and the pain in such a way that amounts to the recognition/attribution of causality. With the belief statement, it's all that in addition to the naming and descriptive practices.

There's no insight to be gained, from the "beliefs" of babies, or the "beliefs" of cats - because they're not the same thing as an adult, human, articulated belief - with or without propositional content. If the purpose of this debate is to decide if the content of belief is propositional, how can we possibly examine that question in organisms incapable of articulating a belief? — counterpunch

By virtue of acquiring knowledge of what all belief has in common. The insight is a notion of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression. The result is a reliable standard by which we can discern between what counts as anthropomorphism and what does not.

Furthermore, think about the sheer scope of the consequences of getting our own thought and belief wrong...

I'm playing Camus; fdrake's playing Sartre...

Nothing I've said should be read as putting limitations on English. Yep, everything conceivable can be said or shown. Just not the inconceivable stuff - because it's not stuff, and hence cannot be chosen.

You keep talking about meaning. It obscures what's going on. Attributing meaning is just finding a use, which has already been done in your correlations.

There's something very small in counterpunch's thinking.

There's no insight to be gained, from the "beliefs" of babies, or the "beliefs" of cats — counterpunch

:roll:

I'm wary. Thanks for the heads up.

He claimed that all propositions are about the self, which is absurd on it's face. There's adequate ground for doubting his sincerity already.

However, the comment about what we can know about creatures' belief when the creatures under consideration are incapable of articulating that belief via language is one worth considering though, even if that consideration eventually leaves counterpunch behind...

l You keep talking about meaning. It obscures what's going on. — Banno

I don't think it does though; at least not when it comes to taking proper account of all belief. It provides a simple undeniable true statement(all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it) that serves as standard of sorts. Drawing correlations is attributing, and sometimes (mis)attributing meaning, so in that sense, you're close when you say I've done it already with correlations.

Finding a use though, that seems to me to be more about language.

I'm saying you're playing Sartre. Since any use of English could mean anything, there is nothing beyond the scope of what could be said in English. fdrake is arguing the opposite to Sartre, suggesting there was some essence to English, such that it is incapable of talking about some concepts.

...the comment about what we can know about creatures' belief when the creatures under consideration are incapable of articulating that belief via language is one worth considering though... — creativesoul

As previously discussed, I don't see that as any different to what we can know about creature's beliefs when the creature under consideration is capable of articulating that belief. We do after all attribute beliefs to folk that are contrary to what they claim to believe, often the basis of their other behaviours. So now Trump claims to believe in peaceful protest, in the face of his previous behaviour.

Meaning

provides a simple undeniable true statement(all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it) that serves as standard of sorts. — creativesoul

I don't think it is undeniable, nor fixed. Belief is far more fluid than that; in a state of constant flux.

I'm saying you're playing Sartre. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Ah.

Since any use of English could mean anything... — TheWillowOfDarkness

It can? I'm surprise dot see oyu defending the Humpty Dumpty view of meaning!

Again, rather out of cuff interjection. How do we know which parts of the sentence are existentially bound and which refer to particulars. The sentence could mean that one well known presently ruling king of France is bald. It could mean that such a king presently exists and is bald. Or in some point in time (prior to reading the statement), a king of France existed and was bald. In fact, it could mean that a country named France existed at some point, that country had a person acting in a particular capacity, called king, he had a condition, which for lack of a better term was named baldness, and that person had it. It seems to me that the battle for revealing propositions behind isolated sentences is obscured by linguistic inadequacy, if we are talking about ordinary language and without context that implies the intent of the author. The result is speculation. — simeonz

Yes, so context matters. That sentence had an obvious use in a time when a French King existed. But it doesn't have that use now.

Well, I'm not.

Could is not does. Just because I could use English to say anything, it doesn't mean I do. In any given instance where I use English, I make a choice (to keep to the context Sartreian terms) to speak one meaning or another. I could have said "Banno ate ghosts for breakfast" with this entire paragraph of this post, in English (a new, novel use of English compared to what people usually use), but I didn't. I said something else, with an entirely different meaning, which will never be "Banno ate goats for breakfast."

Since could is what I possiblity might have said, and did is what I did, both are true at the same time. I did use language which never says, "Banno ate goats for breakfast", but that use could have (even though it never will).

Yes, so context matters. That sentence had an obvious use in a time when a French King existed. But it doesn't have that use now. — Andrew M

Actually, I failed to convey my remark. Meanwhile, I have also reviewed and revised my original position. What I meant was that the sentence, independent of when it was said, was actually ambiguous on its own terms, without knowing the particulars of the context in which it was delivered. If we tried to translate it in a formal language, such as first order predicate logic, to allow encapsulation of its meaning, the translation would be ambiguous. For example:

BaldAsPredicate(PresentKingOfFranceAsNamedConstant)
Exists PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant))
Exists PersonAsBoundVariable Exists InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
Even the rather exotic:
Exists PersonAsBoundVariable Exists InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Exists BaldAsBoundVariable Condition(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable, BaldAsBoundVariable))

Imagine the following paragraph:
We came to earth on our spaceship. There was a description of a person that the people here used to obey and was called their king. In one particular territory, called France, the person had no hair on his head. He tried to hide it, but all his subjects knew it and it was obvious. The present king of France is bald.

Only later, I realized that not only existential, but also universal quantifiers could apply:
ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) implies Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable ForAll InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))

Maybe the first translation to predicate logic would satisfy your objections (edit: because existence is not entailed by it, just material implication in case of actual existence). I am not sure. Obviously, I could invent context that indicates such meaning. But altogether, my point was that our everyday language does not produce encapsulated sentences with individual semantics, a la mathematical logic. We could only guess what the most probable meaning was as we anticipate the surrounding context.

Later I realized that there was another angle. That, in terms of my take on the problem, even if the translation to a formal statement was somehow made, the result could have required a logical framework that was not classical logic. Something akin to intuitionistic logic. Since the law of excluded middle does not apply there, a person could end up being neither the king, nor not the king. Thus, for example,
not Exists PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant))
does not infer automatically that
ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) implies Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))

The question may have been about soundness vs validity in ordinary language and I may have misunderstood. About whether ordinary sentences require actual application to be considered meaningful or can they have vacuously correct meaning.

P.s. Either way, I realize that this is detour. But decided to mention my view.

Edit: Found some duplicated predicate names in the logic formulas.

There's a great sci-fi movie called Arrival in which the protagonist gains the alien's worldview as she learns their language. — frank

I watched it again last night. The premise that learning a language could somehow bestow the power to see the future struck me again as unworkably magical.

In Solaris, the protagonists deal with extraordinary events by adjusting their conceptual scheme, accepting the reality of the returning dead as a form of communication. In comparison Arrival has the causal chain arse about.

To be sure there is a sort of magic in language; its recursive acceptance brings into being such things as ownership of property, politics and shared knowledge. But Arrival's premise does not derive from recursion, and remains unexplained; it has little merit.

Nor does the movie show a conception that cannot be pointed to by English; indeed, the key role of the main character is to do exactly that; and she succeeds.

In Solaris, the protagonists deal with extraordinary events by adjusting their conceptual scheme, accepting the reality of the returning dead as a form of communication — Banno

.

It's interesting that you took that idea from the Tarkovskyvs movie. The author of the story meant the contrary:

"As Lem wrote, "The peculiarity of those phenomena seems to suggest that we observe a kind of rational activity, but the meaning of this seemingly rational activity of the Solarian Ocean is beyond the reach of human beings."[4]" --wikipedia

Soderbergh's movie emphasizes that theme.

it again last night. The premise that learning a language could somehow bestow the power to see the future struck me again as unworkably magical. — Banno

That would be unworkable. The idea that learning a language might unlock abilities isn't outlandish. I see what learning European languages did for native americans. That someone has to remind you that capabilities are bound up in language shows how much you take for granted.

beyond the reach of human beings — frank

...and yet in the conclusion a new 'form of life' is created. Which was to be proved.

I don't think the new lifeform is human except in appearance.

Does this mean you are arguing Europeans are only human in appearnce because they thought some concepts in their language that other people didn't at a certain time?

One also wonders what this means for babies, since they have to learn language. Are babies the only time anyone is human, before they start thinking in the concepts of only appearing-older-people in language they never had access to before?

"Form of life" - -Wittgenstein reference.

Yep. :grin:

Are you denying that all belief is meaningful?

No.

Ok. Good.

Are you denying that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief?

Come one. Meaning is not a useful notion. Put your comment in terms of use.

You need to do better than that.

No, I don't. Meaning is unworkable; looking at use will lead to more interesting results.

Try it.

Are you denying that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief? — creativesoul

Do you have issues making sense of the above?

What does it do? Paraphrase it in terms of use.

It puts your position to rest. Talking about the ways we use language aside from naming and descriptive practice is utterly irrelevant.