Because it's a foregone conclusion you are always going to unintentionally cause some harm once born. Try your best, but the outcomes simply won't pan out. Once born into existence, compromises are necessary, and those compromises do indeed lead to harm. — schopenhauer1

This is true of everything you do, not just of having children. At the very least, you're probably a cause for a lot of children to be born, even if you don't have any yourself. Did a couple meet at one of your parties? You have created the conditions for harm.

There is no evading causing the conditions for harm, whether or not you personally have children. So you are forced to draw arbitrary lines somewhere in order to be allowed to do anything at all.

The point was that your idea seems cynical as well, "No pain, no gain".. which is essentially what it amounts to when you put anything other than consideration of someone else's harm/suffering/negative outcomes in a decision that affects them. — schopenhauer1

I reject this. The opposite is true. If I make my decisions solely based on "negative outcomes", then all my decisions are dictated by other people. And this, if applied universally, turns everyone into a zombie only ever reacting to other people's emotions.

Ironically, since procreation is something that is subjected from an outside force, your maxim might be used against yourself. The only move you can make here is to do the usual, "But no one exists prior", — schopenhauer1

It's true. You don't get to dismiss true statements merely because you do not like them.

yet this doesn't negate that an outside force will affect someone. — schopenhauer1

I didn't say "affect", I said "subjugate". Different words.

It's like saying if someone decided to immediately punch the new person in the face once born, that this is okay, as it was pre-planned (before there was a person with a "will") :roll:. — schopenhauer1

Not only is this sentence self-contradictory, it doesn't follow from anything I said, nor is it in any way related to the kind of moral philosophy I outlined. You don't get to punch people in the face for no reason. Nor did I ever claim that future people can't be part of consideration. You're just making stuff up.

If you knew the person whose life you save will end up a serial killer, then yes it's absolutely your responsibility. I already told you how I deal with this: By taking into consideration what you can predict. You could not have predicted that the person whose life you save will end up a serial killer. If you could have then you shouldn't have saved them. — khaled

How do you judge what someone "can predict"? I came up with the example, so clearly it is predictable, since we can think of the possibility. What else is required?

But better not to do so knowingly, surely? — khaled

But it is knowingly if you understand the logic. It's a certainty that the actions you take cause indefinite causal chains and therefore also cause harm.

Or the caveat that it depends on what you know. In other words: Try your best to not cause harm. Doesn't sound crazy does it? — khaled

How is it possible to "do my best" if I know I'll inadvertently cause harm by seekingly innocuous acts? Like if I celebrate my birthday, there is a significant possibility that by having a party, I cause not just one, but possibly several children to be born. I know this to be the case, it's not some outlandish scenario. So no parties?

What does this have to do with anything. You were the one that just said "I prefer not to have been born" makes no sense. Neither does "I prefer to exist and suffer". Because at no point were they in a position to choose. — khaled

I am asking how you arrive at the conclusion that preventing people from existing is morally equivalent to preventing some particular instance of suffering, since you agree they're not one and the same.

You don't know it's one time. And that we do punish them by law doesn't necessarily make it right (I agree it's right in this case though) — khaled

But if just potential avoidance of future harm is sufficient, how does this not apply to children?

If you don't want to be in a relationship and you are obligated to be in one that would fall under "Having things done to you that you wouldn't want done to you" I think, no? So it is prevention of harm. From yourself. — khaled

Does it matter here how strong the feelings are? Maybe you don't don't find the other person objectionable, you just don't think you'll be as happy as with someone else. But of course you don't know that. So why cause the immediate, certain harm?

Depends on how good they are at them. If they're good enough that they will not really risk harming others then it's fine. — khaled

Noone is good enough not to risk harming others. And even if only the driver is hurt, that still causes suffering to a bunch of other people (their family, the other driver, medical personnel, people stuck in traffic etc.). You seem to ignore these obvious consequences.

Point is, there is a breaking point at which you cannot seriously say that they are causing harm by riding. A point at which frustrating their desire to ride a motorcycle arbitrarily can be predicted to cause as much harm as actually riding the motorcycle. Until that point, yes it is wrong to ride the motorcycle. That point is around where they get a license — khaled

And we determine this breaking point how? What's the mental operation here? Because from the outside, it looks like you're just taking the status quo and then saying "this is what causes the least harm". Wouldn't it at least depend on the driver? Like if someone really wanted to, we'd have to allow it, but is someone was only lukewarm about it, it'd be immoral?

So why did you call doing harm without justification "evil"? — khaled

Given all the qualifications, it's just a "gotcha" question. If you pile on enough modifiers, you can make it say anything.

Net harm reduction is the measure you use elsewhere. Net harm reduction. The net harm reduced by having a child is something which is at least arguable. Certainly requires actual empirical data and is not this ridiculously simplistic equation you would have everyone use. — Isaac

And that's the one I used here. What are you on about?

Likely will not be overall harmful to himself or others — khaled

I am saying that EVEN IF the child is likely to have a net harm reduction effect, that does not make procreation right.

I am saying that EVEN IF the child is likely to have a net harm reduction effect, that does not make procreation right. — khaled

Yes, I gather that. Which is inconsistent with your response to surgery, laws and parenting where in those cases you use the net harm reduction to justify the action to take on another's behalf.

Why does net harm reduction apply in those cases but not birth?

How do you judge what someone "can predict"? — Echarmion

This again? We already went over this.

But it is knowingly if you understand the logic. It's a certainty that the actions you take cause indefinite causal chains and therefore also cause harm. — Echarmion

I'm saying it's surely better not to do something that you know is way more likely to cause more harm than its alternatives.

How is it possible to "do my best" if I know I'll inadvertently cause harm by seekingly innocuous acts? Like if I celebrate my birthday, there is a significant possibility that by having a party, I cause not just one, but possibly several children to be born. I know this to be the case, it's not some outlandish scenario. So no parties? — Echarmion

You likely haven't increased the number of children in the world in any way, so no. But there is also a chance that by not holding a party, your depressed friend kills themselves. But there is also a chance that by not holding the party, one of the people you would have invited gets killed in a house robbery as opposed to just being robbed. But but but.

Point is, you're being ridiculous by taking a single possibility and based on that concluding that the thing is wrong. At the level you're talking at, with things that have incredibly low chances of happening, no amount of processing the possibilities will yield a very clear answer. Which is why I don't think having the party is wrong. It doesn't do any clear damage. You can think of a million ways it can harm and I can think of a million ways NOT having it can harm. So don't be outlandish and try to only highlight the bad.

With birth, there is no way not doing it can harm. That's the point.

I am asking how you arrive at the conclusion that preventing people from existing is morally equivalent to preventing some particular instance of suffering, since you agree they're not one and the same. — Echarmion

It isn't. Because in the once case (preventing an instance of suffering) that's usually seen as a good thing. You helped someone. But not having kids is not a good thing. Not a bad thing. The point is "Not a good thing, not a bad thing" is better than "A bad thing" which is the alternative.

But if just potential avoidance of future harm is sufficient, how does this not apply to children? — Echarmion

I don't get what you mean here.

Does it matter here how strong the feelings are? Maybe you don't don't find the other person objectionable, you just don't think you'll be as happy as with someone else. But of course you don't know that. So why cause the immediate, certain harm? — Echarmion

Because otherwise you'll be causing certain harm later to yourself since you're not with the person you like.

Noone is good enough not to risk harming others. — Echarmion

I said "not really risk harming others". You know what I mean.

And we determine this breaking point how? What's the mental operation here? Because from the outside, it looks like you're just taking the status quo and then saying "this is what causes the least harm". — Echarmion

It's more like, I find the point at which it becomes acceptable around the point of the status quo.

Yes, I gather that. Which is inconsistent with your response to surgery, laws and parenting where in those cases you use the net harm reduction to justify the action to take on another's behalf. — Isaac

How is it inconsistent?

With surgery: NOT doing the surgery is the more harmful option.
With laws: NOT having the laws is the more harmful option.
With parenting: NOT sending your kids to school is the more harmful option.

With having kids: Having kids is the more harmful option. EVEN IF it is likely that it won't be harmful. It CAN be. Because NOT having kids guarantees 0 harm. Except to yourself that is (and only if you don't adopt).

With surgery: NOT doing the surgery is the more harmful option.
With laws: NOT having the laws is the more harmful option.
With parenting: NOT sending your kids to school is the more harmful option. — khaled

Yep. And with having kids (of above average ethics) not having them is the more harmful option. Same as with law. Not having children increases the likely harm everyone will suffer who will not have their suffering reduced by your ethical harm-reducing children.

Whereas NOT having kids guarantees 0 harm. — khaled

No it doesn't because it exposes to harm alk those people whose harm your children would otherwise have reduced/eliminated.

With birth, there is no way not doing it can harm. — khaled

Absolutely absurd thing to say. I can think of a hundred ways not having a child might cause some harm.

This again? We already went over this. — khaled

The answer always seems to be arbitrary fiat.

I'm saying it's surely better not to do something that you know is way more likely to cause more harm than its alternatives. — khaled

That's not telling me anything useful. What kind of consequences do I need to consider? Is there some cutoff?

You likely haven't increased the number of children in the world in any way, so no. — khaled

This is an entirely unfounded assumption.

Point is, you're being ridiculous by taking a single possibility and based on that concluding that the thing is wrong. At the level you're talking at, with things that have incredibly low chances of happening, no amount of processing the possibilities will yield a very clear answer. — khaled

Yes, that's the point.

Which is why I don't think having the party is wrong. It doesn't do any clear damage. You can think of a million ways it can harm and I can think of a million ways NOT having it can harm. So don't be outlandish and try to only highlight the bad. — khaled

Oh, now a new standard: "clear" damage. That's helpful.

With birth, there is no way not doing it can harm. That's the point. — khaled

That's patently ridiculous. Your child could be the one to cure cancer. Or invent mind uploading. Or just be someone's happy spouse. Obviously them not existing can do harm.

It isn't. Because in the once case (preventing an instance of suffering) that's usually seen as a good thing. You helped someone. But not having kids is not a good thing. Not a bad thing. The point is "Not a good thing, not a bad thing" is better than "A bad thing" which is the alternative. — khaled

Hmm, fair enough. So there is, good, bad and neutral.

I don't get what you mean here. — khaled

If it's enough to say "well it's possible locking them up is necessary to prevent harm", why is it not enough to say "it's possible my child will do something very important that alleviates lots of harm"?

I said "not really risk harming others". You know what I mean. — khaled

No, not really. As I have pointed out, I don't know what your standard for "really" or "clear" or "predictable" is.

It's more like, I find the point at which it becomes acceptable around the point of the status quo. — khaled

But what are you actually doing? What principles inform your decision? Are is there some hierarchy of harms? Some pages earlier you said it essentially depends on the strength of the emotions involved, but everytime I bring up the question of how much the emotions count, you simply ignore it.

I actually see the inconsistency now. Will get back to you later. This might just do it.

I actually see the inconsistency now. Will get back to you later. This might just do it. — khaled

Wow. You would be about the first person I've ever debated with on here that's even considered the possibility of changing their position in response to an argument put by the other side. Regardless of what you come up with in response, I'm impressed you'd have the intellectual honesty to do so.

Wow. You would be about the first person I've ever debated with on here that's even considered the possibility of changing their position in response to an argument put by the other side. Regardless of what you come up with in response, I'm impressed you'd have the intellectual honesty to do so. — Isaac

I wasn't always AN. I moved to AN from the standard view and haven't really had a reason to move back. But hey, good to know that I'm not an intellectually dishonest spawn of Satan :blush:

I remember hearing a similar objection a year ago, but it didn't quite click. Now it does. Consider my mind changed. Though I'm sort of at a "cusp" here and might change back easily. I try not to grow attached to my ideas.

But yea I am not quite at "standard" level yet. I would still want to see some proof that the parent can actually parent before considering having kids to be right. That they actually are likely to produce ethically good children. But this has always been the case. Even before AN I thought people should have to take a "parenting certificate". Nothing too difficult to get, just don't be a cunt basically. Though I have no idea what the practical ramifications of that would be or how it would be enforced.

I think the main reason it didn't click the first time was that in the other cases (parenting, surgery, laws) the effects of not doing them were immediate. It never occurred to me that that was the ONLY difference and it's not one that I think should be significant. In the case of not having children, people will still be harmed, just way later, and way more indirectly. I was only considering the parent and the child as part of the "system".

But then how do you deal with a The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas situation? By this logic, it would be fine to do what was done in the book. Imagine for instance, that you knew your next child will be absolutely miserable, to a point where normally you would consider it wrong to have them, but would cure cancer. Is it ok to have them?

Kinda glad I procrastinated and didn't leave when I did actually. Didn't think you'd be able to change my mind.

How would you respond to this?

The claim is that, by not having children, you are harming those they could have helped. And I don't really find "You couldn't know that having children will result in them helping people more than average" convincing but it was my first line of defense. Most people have a positive impact overall I'd say.

And if you want to commit to "It is not harming them since you were never responsible for them" then that would put you in a weird situation when it comes to saving drowning people. Because then it becomes wrong to save them. They could have been trying to commit suicide. And by saving them you risk harming them. However, if not being responsible for someone means you are not harming them, then by not saving the drowning person you are not harming them (since you can't really argue that you have a responsibility there, unless you're a life guard). So it becomes: Save(risk of harm) or Don't Save(No risk of harm) and by that logic you would be obligated to let them drown.

Point is that it becomes similar to the situation of finding someone drowning. I apply my system:

Would they have suffered if I hadn't been there? Yes. Ergo, I do not have to pick the least harmful option (because it's not my responsibility), but I still can

Now we consider alternatives:
1- Save the drowning person / Have children:
Likely to be good overall. Small chance of being bad overall.

2- Do not save the drowning person / Do not have children:
Likely to be bad overall. Small chance of being good overall.

The key is that option 2 is actually more risky. And is not 0 risk, if you consider the "system" as comprising of everyone not just the parent and child.

So the less risky option is clearly 1. But you do not have to pick this.

Consider me impressed as well. It's indeed quite rare to see someone actually be open to changing their mind. And I admit being angry and combative on my part probably only makes it harder.

And I admit being angry and combative on my part probably only makes it harder. — Echarmion

Lol. You think that is angry and combative? You were the nicest guy I disagreed with in a while on this site.

I find that it's a trend that the more posts you have on this site the more combative you become. Looking at you Isaac. And the departed S.

, good to know that I'm not in intellectually dishonest spawn of Satan :blush: — khaled

Sorry if my response came out a bit condescending. I just wanted to say something positive. Hope you weren't offended.

I would still want to see some proof that the parent can actually parent before considering having kids to be right. That they actually are likely to produce ethically good children. But this has always been the case. — khaled

Yeah. I agree. I'm not really a consequentialist at all, so don't normally look at things this way, but it's an interesting exercise.

So the idea that your children are overall slightly more likely to produce a net reduction in harm than not is not something we can just take for granted.

If you're a pretty bad parent, it's a less reasonable assumption (though becoming a better parent would be a better ethical choice here).

Having loads of kids is less justified, a reasonable assumption might be that society's general harm-reducing effects might only require a threshold 'new generation'. Excessive birth rates might not be justified.

The dynamics of the society you bring children into might have an influence. Excessively bad societal influences might make an ethical child increasingly less likely.

And your example of the war zone. If a child's really going to suffer badly during their life, they'll have a lot of harm-reduction work to do to make up for that. Not impossible, but increasingly hard to justify.

So yeah, not my cup of tea exactly, but an interesting way of looking at it, with some useful explanatory power with regards to our instincts.

I find that it's a trend that the more posts you have on this site the more combative you become. Looking at you Isaac. — khaled

Guilty. In my defense, I've lead rather a blessed academic life, replete with ivory tower. I'm not that used to having to discuss issues in a 'public forum' kind of way. Steep learning curve perhaps.

Sorry if my response came out a bit condescending. — Isaac

It's not that it's just the change of tone that's funny.

I'm impressed you'd have the intellectual honesty to do so. — Isaac

You're just being disingenuous now. — Isaac

All good man.
Still:

But then how do you deal with a The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas situation? By this logic, it would be fine to do what was done in the book. Imagine for instance, that you knew your next child will be absolutely miserable, to a point where normally you would consider it wrong to have them (warzone, genetic illness, poverty, you name it), but would cure cancer. Is it ok to have them? — khaled

Says the guy with "special suffering" — khaled

Quite apart from this particular discussion, I think when we say things like "clear harm", or "reasonable prediction", we're not actually using any standard. We just appeal to an (assumed) shared hierarchy of values. It's basically a reversed reductio ad absurdum.

So in a western, very individualistic society we automatically assume that things like "the honor of the household" are not examples of "clear harm" and that events that require the independent intervention of several people (as in the "your grandson is Hitler" scenario) don't count as "predictable". But that's not because we're doing something like calculating the probabilities. We just imply "clearly that result is absurd".

Imagine for instance, that you knew your next child will be absolutely miserable, to a point where normally you would consider it wrong to have them (warzone, genetic illness, poverty, you name it), but would cure cancer. Is it ok to have them? — khaled

This is why I don't particularly like consequentialism. I believe that if we were ever capable of such certain predictions we would have evolved mechanisms to make decisions in the light of such knowledge. We aren't, so we haven't.

In the spirit of hypothetical musing though, I think you'd have to have the kid. If we assume nothing but a requirement to not increase overall harm.
And once alive, of course, they'd have the same obligation and so ending their own suffering would be disallowed.

But this is one reason why I don't think least overall harm is a good thing to have as one's sole objective.

“It’s fine to hurt them cuz if they don’t like it they can just kill themselves”

Do I need to say more? What does this NOT justify? — khaled

My comment was more general than that: if life becomes unbearable, there's always the suicide option. This is true for antinatalists themselves. Of course it's easier said than done, but it's done all the time.

You see, most people see life as a good thing per se and hence they see death as a bad thing. But to those who disagree, and who see life as full of harm, to them death ought to look pretty good. And yet you don't see many antinatalist suicide notes... Why is that? I suspect because quite a few antinatalists are like the rest of us: they either like their own life enough not to quit it yet, or hope it's gonna get better.

Antinatalists like their life or hope it will get better. Ok. Now what?

But to those who disagree, and who see life as full of harm, to them death ought to look pretty good. And yet you don't see many antinatalist suicide notes... Why is that? — Olivier5

To be fair, this has already been addressed. The argument presented was about not committing to courses of action which lead to a net increase in harms/suffering. A person's suicide would arguably do that to those left behind even if they themselves would thereby no longer experience harms themselves.

I mention this just so we don't get caught up in that particular quagmire again. Not committing suicide is perfectly consistent with the form of antinatalism presented here. Thankfully.

I am an anti-natalist, and will try address your points, because I do think some anti-natalists argue it rather lazily, such as the irrationality around persecuting a woman for bringing a pregnancy to term, and these wrong arguments themselves are distinct from the rightness that exists within the position itself.

A question of causality
If living entails suffering (e.g. philosophical pessimism) then living doesn't cause suffering. Much in the same way that me killing a person doesn't cause his death, killing entails death.

Yes, but living doesn't only entail suffering, but rather it enables it — in humans, anyhow. This is not saying that living is suffering or life is suffering, but only that when one is consciously alive in the world as a human being, they are subjected to suffering through what is unique to living as one. Particularly, they are agents.

So if the position is, suffering is intrinsic to life then it must necessarily fail as an argument because living then does not cause suffering and the ethical question becomes moot.

I'm not sure how this follows your previous points, life is a broad term and not the same as living. I understand living to be more than just being alive (life), but instead in the context of philosophy, thriving in the environment as a complexly conscious moral agent. When this occurs, and we introduce ethics, it is not a matter of cause/effect, but of enable/disable. "Death" doesn't stop suffering, for example. It disables it - akin to deep sleep.

The fact that all living things suffer at some point in time, is not a valid argument to conclude that living is a sufficient condition for suffering so this does not resolve the causal chain.

I do think this is a strawman.

A disease causes suffering, being run over by a car causes suffering, a break up causes suffering etc. etc. Suffering is unique and particular and for an important part based on how a person experiences it and remembers it.

These are very isolated events that don't seem very informative when discussing something as broad as suffering; it is posing a personal/subjectivist take on objective causes of harm and hurt. But suffering is not "unique" nor dependent on the person and how one experiences or remembers it, because what causes harm and suffering is not determined by the person, nor is deciding such a thing dependent on their understanding of it.

I think the fact that you can utilize "all other animals get diseases as well," demonstrates this point.

How would you respond to this?

The claim is that, by not having children, you are harming those they could have helped. And I don't really find "You couldn't know that having children will result in them helping people more than average" convincing but it was my first line of defense. Most people have a positive impact overall I'd say.

And if you want to commit to "It is not harming them since you were never responsible for them" then that would put you in a weird situation when it comes to saving drowning people. Because then it becomes wrong to save them. They could have been trying to commit suicide. And by saving them you risk harming them. However, if not being responsible for someone means you are not harming them, then by not saving the drowning person you are not harming them (since you can't really argue that you have a responsibility there, unless you're a life guard). So it becomes: Save(risk of harm) or Don't Save(No risk of harm) and by that logic you would be obligated to let them drown.

Point is that it becomes similar to the situation of finding someone drowning. I apply my system:

Would they have suffered if I hadn't been there? Yes. Ergo, I do not have to pick the least harmful option (because it's not my responsibility), but I still can

Now we consider alternatives:
1- Save the drowning person / Have children:
Likely to be good overall. Small chance of being bad overall.

2- Do not save the drowning person / Do not have children:
Likely to be bad overall. Small chance of being good overall.

The key is that option 2 is actually more risky. And is not 0 risk, if you consider the "system" as comprising of everyone not just the parent and child.

So the less risky option is clearly 1. But you do not have to pick this. — khaled

I just don't buy into this kind of aggregated utilitarianism. My view has always been person-affecting. That is to say, the locus of ethics is at the level of individual, not an aggregate. Using this kind of aggregation puts some abstract cause above and beyond the individual. In a less absolute argument against it but still relevant is that it relies on probabilities and contingencies one can never know for certain regarding how it affects the aggregate (however, we do know how that birth affects the person being born, almost certainly negatively to some degree).

However, the practical application of the probabilities issue, is not my main contention. Again, it is not recognizing that the locus of ethics lies with individual experiences. When I want to prevent suffering, I am preventing unnecessary harm from taking place (for what would be that future person presumably). I am not doing it for some overall scheme. Conversely, having a child to help some aggregate scheme, is using that child's negative experience for some cause. That is using people, and as I've stated before, I believe this violates their dignity (once a person is actually born), to put some other cause above the harm/suffering/impositions put upon the person that would be born.

That is using people, and as I've stated before, I believe this violates their dignity (once a person is actually born), to put some other cause above the harm/suffering/impositions put upon the person that would be born. — schopenhauer1

So no laws then, no taxation, no parenting, no charitable work for whole communities, no overseas development aid, no welfare, no health provision... I'm afraid your president has just left office, you'll have to try again in four years' time.

Antinatalists like their life or hope it will get better. Ok. Now what? — khaled

It follows that they see their own life as inherently good and good to hold on too, like many other people do. And the children of the once antinatalists -- if they ever get conceived and born -- will probably cherish their own life too. And curse it also sometimes, but often enough they will cherish it. And they might even teach their once antinatalist parents a thing or two about the beauty of life...

Hi Cobra, really good points.. And I agree with most of them, especially the specific causation issue being a strawman in that OP. Can you elaborate on your idea of objective suffering? Also, you will more likely get people's attention to respond if you quote them and mention them. These features will allow the person you are responding to, to see that they have a response or a mention. To respond to someone, simply click the "Reply" button (curved arrow) on the bottom of a post. To mention someone, click the @ symbol on the editor tool when typing your response. To quote a specific point, you can click and drag over someone's text and then click the "quote" button that displays.

And curse it also sometimes, but often enough they will cherish it — Olivier5

The argument would be that it is not ethical to force someone into such a position. Like forcing someone to play a game. Just because most people like the game most of the time doesn't give me justification to force you to play it. When the alternative is completely harmless (supposedly).

In a less absolute argument against it but still relevant is that it relies on probabilities and contingencies one can never know for certain regarding how it affects the aggregate (however, we do know how that birth affects the person being born, almost certainly negatively to some degree). — schopenhauer1

The point is that we certainly do know how not having a child will affect others. Almost certainly negatively to some degree.

The point is not that having children is no longer harmful, or that there is some "greater cause" that justifies it, it is that the alternative, not having children is ALSO harmful. Not to the child, but to those the child would have helped.

In both cases, we cannot pinpoint the harm being done. I know my child will be harmed, but I don't know how. Point is, I also know that the people he would have helped would be harmed by him not being around but I don't know how, in the exact same way. So now EITHER option is risky. Either option harms people.

The point is that the only difference between causing harm by having a kid and causing harm by not having a kid is time, and the degree to which the harm was caused directly. But in both cases harm is caused.

The point is not that having children is no longer harmful, or that there is some "greater cause" that justifies it, it is that the alternative, not having children is ALSO harmful. Not to the child, but to those the child would have helped.

In both cases, we cannot pinpoint the harm being done. I know my child will be harmed, but I don't know how. Point is, I also know that the people he would have helped would be harmed by him not being around but I don't know how, in the exact same way. So now EITHER option is risky. Either option harms people. — khaled

Again, this isn't even my main contention. I was almost not going to bring it up due to this kind of response. But where the probabilities of how it affects the aggregate is practically immeasurable (the butterfly effect), the actualities of birth negatively affecting the individual that will be born is 100%.

this kind of aggregation puts some abstract cause above and beyond the individual. — schopenhauer1

It is no less individual people being harmed by the lack of harm-reduction activities of the theoretical child than it is the theoretical child themselves. In each case we're postulating an actual single individual who will be harmed by your actions. One by your bringing about their birth, the other by the lack of harm-reduction your future child would most likely provide.

it relies on probabilities and contingencies one can never know for certain regarding how it affects the aggregate — schopenhauer1

Nonsense. Most people are satisfied with their lives and most people would be significantly less happy living as hermits. The means it is virtually a certainty that other people in society are responsible for reducing the harms you would otherwise suffer in their absence. There's no ambiguity about it.

When I want to prevent suffering, I am preventing unnecessary harm from taking place (for what would be that future person presumably). — schopenhauer1

What about the people who would otherwise rely on that future person to reduce their own suffering? Why do they not feature in you calculations?

Conversely, having a child to help some aggregate scheme — schopenhauer1

It's not 'conversely'. It's the same scheme. Avoiding courses of action which result in harms to actual people.

believe this violates their dignity (once a person is actually born), to put some other cause above the harm/suffering/impositions put upon the person — schopenhauer1

So, take laws specifically, on what basis do we arrest murderers?