• creativesoul
    12k
    Belief is far more fluid than that; in a state of constant flux.Banno

    Of course it is. We begin drawing meaningful correlations between different things long before we start talking about it. That happens autonomously.
  • creativesoul
    12k
    The speech act theorists paved some new paths, and some very good ones. They drew new correlations between some particular already meaningful marks. Austin's bit on promises left quite an impression on me. However, it's not the correlations they drew and captured our attention by doing so that is interesting and relevant here, in this discussion. It's the fact that they drew new correlations between already meaningful marks. They added to the meaning of some already familiar language use by virtue of using different terms to describe the same set of meaningful marks. Or perhaps, articulated some previously undisclosed meaningful aspects of familiar use...

    No?

    :brow:

    Looking at use is all interesting and sheds some much needed light of all sorts of stuff regarding how we attribute meaning to language use.

    However, what does that have to do with how a language-less creature forms, has, and/or holds belief? What does that have to do with how a belief can even be and/or become meaningful to a language-less creature capable of having one?

    Well, it shows us that drawing correlations between things is something that both complex linguistic belief and simple language-less belief have in common with one another. It supports the very part of the claim that you seem to balk at.
  • creativesoul
    12k
    and yes...

    Trump is a walking, talking, living, eating, and breathing performative contradiction.
  • Andrew M
    1.6k
    Maybe the first translation to predicate logic would satisfy your objections (edit: because existence is not entailed by it, just material implication in case of actual existence). I am not sure.simeonz

    Yes, my translation would just be the first. The background to my original comment was Russell's analysis of definite descriptions and Strawson's criticism of it:

    P. F. Strawson argued that Russell had failed to correctly represent what one means when one says a sentence in the form of "the current Emperor of Kentucky is gray." According to Strawson, this sentence is not contradicted by "No one is the current Emperor of Kentucky", for the former sentence contains not an existential assertion, but attempts to use "the current Emperor of Kentucky" as a referring (or denoting) phrase. Since there is no current Emperor of Kentucky, the phrase fails to refer to anything, and so the sentence is neither true nor false.Criticism of Russell's analysis - P.F.Strawson

    Obviously, I could invent context that indicates such meaning. But altogether, my point was that our everyday language does not produce encapsulated sentences with individual semantics, a la mathematical logic. We could only guess what the most probable meaning was as we anticipate the surrounding context.simeonz

    I think your spaceship example captured the ordinary meaning just fine. As the above Wikipedia quote suggests, we would ordinarily use such a sentence as a referring phrase. So to use it today would, in effect, be a misuse.

    The question may have been about soundness vs validity in ordinary language and I may have misunderstood. About whether ordinary sentences require actual application to be considered meaningful or can they have vacuously correct meaning.simeonz

    So my view here is that ordinary sentences require actual application to be true (or false). The issue is not so much one of meaningfulness (i.e., we know what the sentence means, as your spaceship example shows) as one of usefulness (i.e., if the sentence is non-referring, it doesn't have a use). My view is similar for so-called vacuous truths - they also fail to refer to anything and so are also neither true nor false.
  • bongo fury
    1.6k
    drawing correlations between thingscreativesoul

    Ok, so drawing of correlations between things is formation of dispositions to respond to them which are relative to each other? Maybe?bongo fury

    Or something else?

    Or is it only another way of saying having of beliefs?

    Which are?

    Irreducible mental stuff?
  • simeonz
    310
    Yes, my translation would just be the first. The background to my original comment was Russell's analysis of definite descriptions and Strawson's criticism of it:

    P. F. Strawson argued that Russell had failed to correctly represent what one means when one says a sentence in the form of "the current Emperor of Kentucky is gray." According to Strawson, this sentence is not contradicted by "No one is the current Emperor of Kentucky", for the former sentence contains not an existential assertion, but attempts to use "the current Emperor of Kentucky" as a referring (or denoting) phrase. Since there is no current Emperor of Kentucky, the phrase fails to refer to anything, and so the sentence is neither true nor false. — Criticism of Russell's analysis - P.F.Strawson
    Andrew M
    Actually, if Russell meant something more akin to
    Exists P (KingOfFrance(P, Now) and Bald(P, Now))
    
    which will be rephrased back into ordinary speech as "exists a bald king of France", its opposite would have been
    ForAll P (KingOfFrance(P, Now) implies not Bald(P, Now))
    
    which in ordinary speech is "all kings of France have hair", not "there exists no king of France". If Strawson wants to interpret claims of ordinary sentences in the intuitionistic sense, as indicated from the "neither true nor false" remark, the two statements above are not complementary, but "there exists no king of France" is still not the opposite of "exists a bald king of France" and doesn't prevent Russell from inferring (however frivolously) that there is some implicit existential quantifier in the original sentence.

    P.S. I would have quantified the time instant also, if I wanted to make the claim meaningful. It is common sense to reject it as such right now. But this would be a second-order translation, between the original and the present context, not between the ordinary language and formal language counterpart in that original context.

    I feel that the ambiguity is not a matter of a fixed choice of interpretation. Reading an old newspaper report stating that "the president initiates a lockdown" implies that some president was in charge of some country at some moment in time and that he/she had issued a lockdown, as opposed to the institution having tendency for issuing lockdown orders. On the other hand, for a textbook making examination of an institution, stating that "the president commands the army" does not guarantee that the model of government was ever implemented and was not just proposed at some point. The binding of terms (not simply as referring phrases, but universals, existence claims) depends on the precise context. The sentence about the king of France we can heavily infer from knowing that France has no king, and that prescribing the baldness attribute to a general group of people is improbably useful. But such suggestion lacks rigor, and cannot be argued strictly. In my opinion anyway.

    So my view here is that ordinary sentences require actual application to be true (or false). The issue is not so much one of meaningfulness (i.e., we know what the sentence means, as your spaceship example shows) as one of usefulness (i.e., if the sentence is non-referring, it doesn't have a use). My view is similar for so-called vacuous truths - they also fail to refer to anything and so are also neither true nor false.Andrew M
    Fair enough. This makes an interesting point that mathematical and ordinary language have different objectives, which result in different kinds of senses of the word "useful".
  • creativesoul
    12k
    drawing correlations between things
    — creativesoul

    Ok, so drawing of correlations between things is formation of dispositions to respond to them which are relative to each other? Maybe?
    — bongo fury

    Or is it only another way of saying having beliefs?

    Which are irreducible mental stuff?
    bongo fury

    It's the basis, the common denominator, the basic process by which all minds emerge; by which all experience can be had; by which all thought, belief, and statements thereof are formed; by which all meaning emerges(via attribution); by which all successful communication happens.

    The process is irreducible, but neither mental or physical(it's both after-all). It provides a basic outline which is rightfully applicable to any and all discourse. We can 'watch' people offer different correlations when needed to clarify what was originally meant by some use or another. Happens all the time, here in this thread even, within the side conversations going on.
  • creativesoul
    12k


    Not sure if you remember Banno's recent Davidson thread on malapropism A Nice Derangement Of Epitaphs, which was a critique of what counts as successful communication and/or learning/having a language. In that paper Davidson was repeatedly claiming that something more was needed aside from just learning, knowing, and/or following conventional rules, and that the conventional understanding did not offer an acceptable description of that, as the success of malapropisms show.

    Attributing meaning and misattributing meaning is what we do when interpreting another's language use, and we do that solely by virtue of drawing correlations between the use and other things. When we draw correlations between the same things, we correctly interpret. What I've been arguing here is germane to that paper as well as Moore's paradox, Gettier, and so many other historically challenging philosophical 'problems'.
  • creativesoul
    12k
    Are you denying that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief?
    — creativesoul

    Do you have issues making sense of the above?
    creativesoul

    What does it do? Paraphrase it in terms of use.Banno

    It directs our attention to what we ought be paying attention to when taking account of another's belief; the content thereof.

    What is meaningful and how does it become so?

    I'm left a bit confused regarding how you've no problem assenting to "all belief is meaningful" but balked at "all belief is meaningful to the creature having the belief".

    :brow:
  • Banno
    25.2k


    Left unexplained is how drawing a correlation is not propositional.

    The general form of a correlation: P(x,y)
  • Banno
    25.2k
    That's not on the page I was reading...

    Did I assent to "All belief is meaningful"? Must have been a moment of weakness. Try this:, talk of meaning here is revving the engine without engaging the clutch.
  • creativesoul
    12k
    Try this:, talk of meaning here is revving the engine without engaging the clutch.Banno

    Interesting that you'd draw correlations between talking of meaning and revving the engine without engaging the clutch, and in doing so change the focal point from how things become meaningful to doing it by virtue of drawing correlations between different things...
  • creativesoul
    12k
    Left unexplained is how drawing a correlation is not propositional.Banno

    The latter requires language, the former does not always. That explanation has been expounded upon throughout the entire debate.
  • creativesoul
    12k
    Did I assent to "All belief is meaningful"? Must have been a moment of weakness.Banno

    You did. Should the time ever come when I finally convince you to incorporate correlations into your position regarding meaning(and truth), I will have done my job.

    :wink:
  • Banno
    25.2k
    Engage the clutch; talk about the use of your beliefs. It's not a change of topic.
  • creativesoul
    12k


    We draw correlations between different things for all sorts of reasons, as a means for doing all sorts of things.

    Talking about how we use our beliefs, or how we use language(doing things with words) neglects how we form belief. How we form belief is germane to all belief, not just how we use our beliefs, or what we do with language. I'm not even sure if it makes sense to say that language-less creatures use their beliefs, so...

    I'm having trouble understanding how talk of language use is relevant to the content of language-less belief, aside from supporting the claim that all belief is correlational in content, but never admitting that much.
  • Banno
    25.2k
    I'm having trouble understanding how talk of language use is relevant to the content of language-less belief,creativesoul

    And that will happen until you try parsing your argument in terms of use.

    But I'm beginning to get a bit worried about you. This is becoming a but obsessive, don't you think?
  • creativesoul
    12k


    Obsessive?

    :gasp:

    Has any philosopher ever been anything but?

    :smile:
  • creativesoul
    12k


    Besides that, don't worry about me... I'm just fine! My position has served me very well in real life... I do put it into everyday practice. Yup... obsessive, but well worth it!

    :wink:
  • Banno
    25.2k
    :grin: So long as you are happy.

    I've Turkish coffee and enough eggs for an omelet.
  • creativesoul
    12k


    Try 100% Kona. Freshly ground and prepared with a French press.
  • creativesoul
    12k
    The general form of a correlation: P(x,y)Banno

    I'm not going to allow you to continue conflating our account of another's belief with the others belief.creativesoul
  • Banno
    25.2k
    I'm not looking for finesse in my coffee. Quite the opposite.
  • creativesoul
    12k


    Go dark roast then! French press is not finesse! Makes the boldest flavour.
  • Banno
    25.2k
    I'v a very dark roast imported from Palestine that quite comfortably meets my needs. I bring four teaspoons of coffee and four of sugar in one cup of water to the boil and pour immediately.

    No french press will match that.
  • creativesoul
    12k


    Gotcha! My better half just informed me that Turkish coffee is quite strong, and too strong for her, which is saying something. You must prefer very strong coffee. Kona is more smooth, so. You're right then. No match for what you like!

    :wink:
  • Janus
    16.5k
    Yes, and about how the "world stage" emerges from the earthly; the geological, floral and faunal environment.
  • Harry Hindu
    5.1k
    Use your words.Banno
    No. You use scribbles and sounds, not words. Using scribbles and sounds to point to things makes those scribbles and sounds words, and not just merely scribbles and sounds.
  • creativesoul
    12k


    I've some sympathy for the idea that the limit of one's language is the limit of 'one's world', if by that we mean worldview or belief system. However, Banno proudly conflates word and world, by not drawing and maintaining the actual distinction between belief statements that are about language use and belief statements that are about mice and trees. Part of that comes as a result of overstating the strength of the case that the belief that approach makes. Another part comes from the idea that truth is unanalyzable. Another from his preference for a redundancy approach. Another from a conflation between truth as coherence and truth as correspondence.

    Truth - as correspondence - is presupposed in all belief statements. That's how/why "is true" becomes a redundant use of language. However, "is true" is not equivalent to truth. "Is true" marks belief(assuming sincerity), and belief while it is necessary, is also insufficient for truth. <-----Banno would object to the necessary part, but the objection is based upon a misunderstanding. Belief is necessary for correspondence between belief and fact(what's happened) because when and where there has never been meaningful belief, there could never have been a meaningful correspondence between belief and what's happened. It's insufficient because some belief is false.

    Human thought, human belief, meaning, and truth are all things that exist in their entirety prior to our talking about them. Those sorts of things are peculiar in that it requires language to become aware of them and their role in our lives, and we can most certainly get them wrong.

    Since all belief is meaningful, being meaningful requires meaning, and language-less creatures can form, have, and/or hold belief, it only follows that meaning is prior to language.

    The question then is what does such meaningful belief consist of? Hence, this debate.

    Not propositions.
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