Again, this “dignity argument” seems extreme. It means you shouldn’t wake up the life guard who is sleeping on the job even if someone you can’t save is drowning. Because that involves using them. And this is unlike the “stop the gunner” example because the lifeguard did nothing wrong. You could argue that “sleeping on the job” is something wrong, but then I’d just modify the example to being about your ex-lifeguard friend sleeping as a relative of his is drowning, you can’t wake him up. — khaled

But I don't apply it in extremes. Rather, I recognize that there is a substantive difference in how it is applied to someone not yet born and explain that this is because it a case of absolutely not creating unnecessary harm, vs. people who already exist and recognize that there are compromises in living in groups and socially. It's not ideal, but it can never be ideal once born. Here is a case where the ideal can be applied. Thus it would be a violation to unnecessarily start a life to use them to try to create benefits, vs. people being able to compromise with each other once alive for the sake of survival and mutual benefit. Once born, you indeed would be overlooking someone's dignity if you ignored egregious harm, and didn't make the compromise to recognize this. The dignity doesn't necessarily "look the same way" for each case. I certainly would be not recognizing someone's dignity by not waking up the life guard. I would go further and say, if I had to violently shove the life guard to wake him, to the point of causing a broken arm, I might say that was necessary to preserve the drowning person's dignity. I do not believe breaking the life guard's arm in the attempt to get them to do their job was violating the lifeguard's dignity. Certainly I harmed them in some way though.

I know you are going to say you don't buy it, but I guess that is where the line is drawn. I see the distinction as valid and substantive and you do not. You seem to lump everything together with the aggregated approach without looking at the distinction between starting a life and then living out a life that already exists. It's not a matter of special pleading but a different case.

Unlikely. Considering that most people are a positive influence. If they weren’t, then as Isaac said, we’d all be happier as hermits. But we’re clearly not. — khaled

This is simply a variation of the "there is not enough suffering" variant of objection. I mean, I can also say the social relations lead to suffering, as much as we are drawn to them. But what is the case, is that social relations in and of itself, don't mean, that everything is now "not suffering". It's almost an aside. Also, it can be construed as a sort of naturalistic fallacy. Just because we are social animals, does not mean, we must have more people to keep sociality going. As related to my previous statement, suffering occurs despite, in spite, along side, and due to being social.. so it is somewhat irrelevant to the argument of harm/suffering. How much emotional anguish comes from other people along with the joy of relationships? So, while already existing, certainly it is a good idea to cultivate good relationships, to then say that this justifies making other people experience the harms of existence to have this would be violating the dignity, and overlooking the unnecessary harm on a personal assessment of your doing.

As a further argument I just thought about.. In the aggregate calculation, there are always mitigating circumstances if you only care about outcomes. Most likely, no parent was thinking about the real possibility of a deadly pandemic, for example. That should at least give some pause.

It's not a matter of special pleading but a different case. — schopenhauer1

Yet all you've done is describe the difference. Which is exactly the definition of special pleading. Nowhere have you explained why that difference is relevant ethically. What else do you see as the difference between 'special pleading' and substantive difference, other than that in the former no substance is given to the distinction?

You say the dignity of the sleeping lifeguard can be imposed upon to alleviate the swimmer's suffering, but the dignity of the imaginary future child cannot be, yet the only distinction you offer is that in one case you are starting a life. You've not given any reason why starting a life should have this special status whereby the suffering doing so might alleviate is insufficient to out weigh the imposition, yet with the already living, it is.

The closest I can find is "it a case of absolutely not creating unnecessary harm", but, as has been shown, this is absolutely not the case. Harm is caused either way.

I can also say the social relations lead to suffering, as much as we are drawn to them. — schopenhauer1

You could. But you'd be evidently wrong. If it we the case that social relations lead to suffering, as much as we are drawn to them then you'd expect on average about 50% of people to live as hermits. We see nothing of the sort, so the pros of social living clearly outweigh the cons, for most people.

"Antinatalism, or anti-natalism, is a philosophical position and social movement that assigns a negative value to birth.

Antinatalists argue that humans should abstain from procreation because it is morally bad (some also recognize the procreation of other sentient beings as morally bad)." -Wikipedia

Do I have to point out where the ought statement is? — khaled

The distinction is right in your very quote. And only pulls out what I was discussing in my very post. That the wrongness in arguments from anti-natalists does not speak to the fact suffer will an does persist independently of ones objections to the existence of it, and I don't definitions as a means of analysis, because definitions are guidelines toward analysis not explanations themselves, and should be examined for their utility, hence the point of philosophy. You give a googled 'definition' as if it explains anything, but all it does is stifle analysis.

I argue in my previous post as an anti-natalist, I believe other antinatalists argue this position weakly when they introduce fallacious ought arguments to the position, and if you understood what I was saying that other anti-natalists deducing that "people should not reproduce," is flawed because it ignores the harm caused by abstaining from an ingrained biological drive to reproduce hardwired within species. Potential parent(s) OUGHT to reproduce if it reduces their own suffering when they deny this desire.

However,

This does not negate the fact that giving 'birth' (i.e. enabling consciousnessness) will almost always "give birth" to an inevitable sufferer subjected to suffering that will serve no utility. Thus, it's not the action of "giving birth" that is wrong, but the LAZINESS is not opportunistically striving to mitigate the suffering of the sufferer. Those that understand this fact, anti-natalists, and have accepted this fact,choose not reproduce based on these grounds. I understand the act of "not having a child," to be altruistic.

No one is arguing about "preventing" any future child from being born because there no existing attributes to stall or prolong; which in my previous post is why I mentioned gestational period. That is immoral.

The rest of your post is a literal repeat of the other strawman's, and I literally couldn't care less about whether you understand it or not.

I could be the most retarded person on this site, and still not care. I am just here to argue my points. If your point is literal brain damage, I'll say. It doesn't matter what my IQ is or not.

Rather, I recognize that there is a substantive difference in how it is applied to someone not yet born and explain that this is because it a case of absolutely not creating unnecessary harm, vs. people who already exist and recognize that there are compromises in living in groups and socially. — schopenhauer1

I don’t see the distinction. In the case of children, having them is sometimes fine because there are people who already exist (the ones in the room) and compromises are inevitable. Not having the child is harming the people in the room. And since you:

I don't apply it in extremes — schopenhauer1

Then you can’t unilaterally say that violating the child’s dignity to not harm the people in the room is wrong.

Once born, you indeed would be overlooking someone's dignity if you ignored egregious harm, and didn't make the compromise to recognize this. — schopenhauer1

Sure no one is disagreeing there.

I certainly would be not recognizing someone's dignity by not waking up the life guard. — schopenhauer1

I do not believe breaking the life guard's arm in the attempt to get them to do their job was violating the lifeguard's dignity. — schopenhauer1

Typo? How in the world is waking up the life guard violating his dignity (I assume violate and “not recognize” are synonymous here) and breaking his arm is not violating his dignity?

It's not a matter of special pleading but a different case. — schopenhauer1

You say so but I seriously can’t see how.

In one case, there is someone that will be harmed unless you violate another person's dignity. Wait, no that’s both cases.

This is simply a variation of the "there is not enough suffering" variant of objection. — schopenhauer1

It’s more so: There is suffering no matter what you choose and it’s not clear that having the child is always the less suffering option.

I can also say the social relations lead to suffering, as much as we are drawn to them — schopenhauer1

What Isaac said.

to then say that this justifies making other people experience the harms of existence to have this would be violating the dignity — schopenhauer1

Which you can’t say is unilaterally wrong, assuming that having them is the less harmful option. Because you think it’s fine to wake up the lifeguard / ex-lifeguard.

In the aggregate calculation, there are always mitigating circumstances if you only care about outcomes. Most likely, no parent was thinking about the real possibility of a deadly pandemic, for example. That should at least give some pause. — schopenhauer1

Again, this is idle speculation. You cannot use “But maybe some terrible event will happen” as real evidence that not having the kid is less harmful. Statistically speaking, I would say it’s pretty clear that having children is overall, a positive influence. And this is taking into account catastrophic events.

That the wrongness in arguments from anti-natalists does not speak to the fact suffer will an does persist independently of ones objections to the existence of it, and I don't definitions as a means of analysis — Cobra

Sorry I have no clue what this word salad means XD

You give a googled 'definition' as if it explains anything, but all it does is stifle analysis. — Cobra

It explains whether or not you’re misusing the word. You can’t just define whatever word however you like and expect people to agree with you. If I say “Hitler did nothing wrong” and you disagree, it’s ridiculous for me to amend it by saying “Actually, by hitler I mean Timmy, and by ‘nothing wrong’ I mean ‘his homework’ therefore you must agree with me that hitler did nothing wrong”. That’s just being maliciously misleading

When you make up definitions for words that already have a use you end up with ridiculous scenarios like the above.

I argue in my previous post as an anti-natalist, I believe other antinatalists argue this position weakly when they introduce fallacious ought arguments to the position — Cobra

You are seriously saying that antinatalism is not about saying that having kids is wrong. Wow. Ok guess I’m a vegan then. I’ll go have my beef jerky now....

Thus, it's not the action of "giving birth" that is wrong — Cobra

I understand the act of "not having a child," to be altruistic. — Cobra

Altruistic but not necessary? Then you’re not an antinatalist. Just someone who thinks it’s better not to have kids.

Alright, I'm convinced you're a troll.

Alright, I'm convinced you're a troll. — Cobra

Says the person harping about being an antinatalist without thinking that having children is wrong.

There is a difference between thinking that not having kids is altruistic and thinking that having kids is wrong. You can think both or neither at the same time. And neither leads to the other. Antinatalism is precisely the belief that having kids is wrong, not that not having kids is altruistic. You are not an antinatalist.

And stop personalizing the debate to convincing you, it’s rude and entitled. :wink:

Then you can’t unilaterally say that violating the child’s dignity to not harm the people in the room is wrong. — khaled

I patently think this is an extreme, to create a whole new life for the sake of the people in the room.

Typo? How in the world is waking up the life guard violating his dignity (I assume violate and “not recognize” are synonymous here) and breaking his arm is not violating his dignity? — khaled

Because he already exists and so will have to live in compromised situations. One of the harms of coming into existence ;).

In one case, there is someone that will be harmed unless you violate another person's dignity. Wait, no that’s both cases. — khaled

Compromised once born. There is no "one" that needs to compromise prior to birth. You are making someone from "scratch" that will then indeed be put in these compromising situations. I do indeed make the distinction and see it as real. It is not rolled up into aggregated harm with no distinctions.

What Isaac said. — khaled

I don't pay attention to him anymore. I did for a second, and then realize I don't like feeding antagonizing trolls and sticking to my original policy of that. There's a way to disagree without being disagreeable. He has decided not to follow that policy.

Which you can’t say is unilaterally wrong, assuming that having them is the less harmful option. Because you think it’s fine to wake up the lifeguard / ex-lifeguard. — khaled

Again, I make the distinction. To enable a whole new life of conditions for suffering doesn't necessarily follow from "because relationships are enjoyable". Starting harm unnecessarily when one could have prevented it, is that matters here. The life guard is already forced "recruited" on the team. He was already kidnapped into the game. To force recruit and kidnap into the team/game is not justified. You can use the players that have already been created, but don't keep violating the principle.

Again, this is idle speculation. You cannot use “But maybe some terrible event will happen” as real evidence that not having the kid is less harmful. Statistically speaking, I would say it’s pretty clear that having children is overall, a positive influence. And this is taking into account catastrophic events. — khaled

Says you. Wait until the unexpected airborne Ebola happens or something.. It's never a real possibility until it is.

Because he already exists and so will have to live in compromised situations. One of the harms of coming into existence ;). — schopenhauer1

That doesn’t answer the question. How the heck is it that waking someone up is violating their dignity but breaking their arm isn’t? There is a person existing in both scenarios.

I patently think this is an extreme, to create a whole new life for the sake of the people in the room. — schopenhauer1

Why?

How about waking up the lifeguard for the sake of the person in the water? That was fine. EVEN THOUGH it is a violation of his dignity.

I don't pay attention to him anymore — schopenhauer1

I’ll just quote it then:

I can also say the social relations lead to suffering, as much as we are drawn to them.
— schopenhauer1

You could. But you'd be evidently wrong. If it we the case that social relations lead to suffering, as much as we are drawn to them then you'd expect on average about 50% of people to live as hermits. We see nothing of the sort, so the pros of social living clearly outweigh the cons, for most people. — Isaac

Starting harm unnecessarily when one could have prevented it, is that matters here. — schopenhauer1

It’s not unnecessary. It’s for the people in the room. Who already exist.

To force recruit and kidnap into the team/game is not justified. — schopenhauer1

Then having a child who will have a perfect life is not justified. But you have stated before that it is. So this cannot be your principle. It is not the simple act of forcing someone to play the game that is problematic. It only becomes problematic if there is a risk they get harmed. But if you’re only looking at risks that people get harmed then you cannot ignore the people in the room either.

Says you. Wait until the unexpected airborne Ebola happens or something.. It's never a real possibility until it is. — schopenhauer1

Says you. Wait until aliens come down and lead us to a new age of technological prosperity. It’s never a real possibility until it is.

Again, idle speculation.

That doesn’t answer the question. How the heck is it that waking someone up is violating their dignity but breaking their arm isn’t? There is a person existing in both scenarios. — khaled

Maybe I didn't understand what you were arguing for.. Did I have a typo? I'll have to look back. I meant that, waking the lifeguard up to save the person is not violating dignity.. and even if by mistake I broke that person's arm, perhaps if that was violating his dignity (though if he had good intent to have wanted to save that child, would he think so).. this is exactly what I mean by the compromises that we have to make for those already in the room (but not necessary for new people to endure).

Why?

How about waking up the lifeguard for the sake of the person in the water? That was fine. EVEN THOUGH it is a violation of his dignity. — khaled

Yes, I accept that the ideal will never be realized for the people in the room. Almost all social decisions are compromises of some sort, even ethically. However, not bringing a new person into the world is preventing wholesale all suffering for that person. I consider that a win at least in terms of realizing the ideal.

It’s not unnecessary. It’s for the people in the room. Who already exist. — khaled

It's unnecessary to cause it for that person being born. The lifegaurd exists, and the drowning person exists. The future child, does not exist. If I had the capacity to completely prevent the situation of the lifeguard's indignity and the child drowning, I certainly would. Here is a chance to prevent all harm, period. So I will. Certainly, I will not enable all harm on his behalf for the people already existing. But if you already exist, there's no other choice unless you want to commit suicide or something. Ideally, no one's dignity would be violated. In reality, it can't work that way as it is at odds with living communally. This is not the situation with possible future people. They don't have to be unnecessarily violated like us who are here and must make do.

Then having a child who will have a perfect life is not justified. But you have stated before that it is. So this cannot be your principle. It is not the simple act of forcing someone to play the game that is problematic. It only becomes problematic if there is a risk they get harmed. But if you’re only looking at risks that people get harmed then you cannot ignore the people in the room either. — khaled

The people in the room in the perfect life would presumably also be experiencing paradise no? So force recruiting in a perfect life.. is that violating dignity? Not sure. Certainly force recruiting in a non-paradise is.

Says you. Wait until aliens come down and lead us to a new age of technological prosperity. It’s never a real possibility until it is.

Again, idle speculation. — khaled

Aliens.. unless you pay attention to the historical conspiracy theories, aren't proven. Deadly viruses have been. And famines, and wars, etc. etc. True story (and continuing to this day). But anyways, it doesn't negate the fact that a better calculation could indeed show that not having children is the best course for the least harm.

Edited the first quote a bit there.

I meant that, waking the lifeguard up to save the person is not violating dignity — schopenhauer1

Why not? It is a harm (though a very slight one) inflicted for a purpose outside of the lifeguard. You are using the lifeguard as a means to an end.

The people in the room in the perfect life would presumably also be experiencing paradise no? — schopenhauer1

No. Perfect life =/= paradise. The situation is that you know your next child will not suffer at all. But it’s still the same game. It’ll just happen that your next child will never suffer while he is playing this dangerous and potentially harmful game called life. In this scenario, it is ok to have them, as they won’t suffer, and you yourself said this. Which leads to the conclusion that merely forcing someone into a game, even a dangerous one, is not problematic. What is problematic is that they are likely to suffer. But again, if you are concerned with preventing suffering you cannot ignore the people in the room either.

it doesn't negate the fact that a better calculation could indeed show that not having children is the best course for the least harm. — schopenhauer1

Who cares if it COULD? Until this better calculation actually DOES show this this is just idle speculation.

Aliens.. unless you pay attention to the historical conspiracy theories, aren't proven — schopenhauer1

It’s never a possibility until it is :cool:

Certainly, I will not enable all harm on his behalf for the people already existing. — schopenhauer1

There is a very important distinction here. Is your problem with enabling harm, or is your problem with someone being harmed?

Because if your problem is with enabling harm, then having a child you know will not suffer in an imperfect world is wrong, as that is still enabling harm. But I find that an absurd conclusion.

I don’t see why “enabling harm” should be worse than harming the people in the room. And it’s not even an argument of magnitude, you’re not arguing that “enabling harm” is nevertheless the more harmful option, no, you’re saying that “enabling harm” is fundamentally worse than directly harming. I don’t see why it would be. Why does the fact that a person doesn’t exist yet, make enabling harm for them fundamentally worse than harming people who do exist right now? The outcome is the same: someone gets hurt. Why does the fact that that someone doesn’t exist yet give their hurt some special value as opposed to the suffering of people that are here already?

Why not? It is a harm (though a very slight one) inflicted for a purpose outside of the lifeguard. You are using the lifeguard as a means to an end. — khaled

Fair enough. Doesn't really change the compromise that takes place in the room and bringing someone into the room who wasn't there before, so that they will now have to compromise, "for their own benefit".

No. Perfect life =/= paradise. The situation is that you know your next child will not suffer at all. But it’s still the same game. — khaled

So you are looking for something that has never taken place, a completely charmed life? If you knew that was a guarantee that is different than if you know that it is definitely not.

Who cares if it COULD? Until this better calculation actually DOES show this this is just idle speculation. — khaled

But that's the thing.. have you consulted the best calculation? I mean, you have your own. You care about outcomes right? You are serious about this, no? Are you really an expert in this kind of statistical analysis? Have you really factored in everything? With this kind of thinking, the person with the least knowledge is still justified, because they didn't care to look into it a bit further.

It’s never a possibility until it is :cool: — khaled

So there is a precedent for alien invasions? I mean I guess if you want to put that in the equation, I'm not opposed. Doesn't hurt the argument one way or the other. But certainly there is a precedent for war, disaster, pandemics, and the like.

Because if your problem is with enabling harm, then having a child you know will not suffer in an imperfect world is wrong, as that is still enabling harm. But I find that an absurd conclusion. — khaled

If you absolutely "know" they won't be harmed, then you aren't violating dignity. That is not the actual world. If the possibility exists, that someone can live a charmed life, show me proof. With the almost near 0% chance the person born will have lived a life with no harm, this indeed would violate dignity if you knew how the world is. I just don't believe a charmed life can ever be the case based on that no life has ever been so charmed as far as I know.. That's not the same as having a "happy" disposition or what not. Let's keep that in mind.

I don’t see why “enabling harm” should be worse than harming the people in the room. And it’s not even an argument of magnitude, you’re not arguing that “enabling harm” is nevertheless the more harmful option, no, you’re saying that “enabling harm” is fundamentally worse than directly harming. I don’t see why it would be. Why does the fact that a person doesn’t exist yet, make enabling harm for them fundamentally worse than harming people who do exist right now? The outcome is the same: someone gets hurt. Why does the fact that that someone doesn’t exist yet give their hurt some special value as opposed to the suffering of people that are here already? — khaled

It isn't. Ideally we should not unnecessarily harm anybody. However, there is only one case where we can ideally prevent this, procreation. It is bringing more people into the world who will then be harmed. For those of us already here.. we have to compromise our ideal of causing unnecessary harm to be able to survive.

Just some thoughts...

I just don't believe a charmed life can ever be the case based on that no life has ever been so charmed as far as I know.. — schopenhauer1

I agree, but because death itself is a harm. So even if someone was born and experienced no harm, when their life ended they would.

In my last response to @khaled (not sure if he missed my post, or just hasn’t responded yet), I brought up a point that I think could pose a problem. Should someone be resuscitated knowing that they will end up suffering if brought back to life? And for the sake of argument, we’ll say that you are not able to obtain consent, have no idea how they became deceased, or whether they want to live.

Also, a couple other questions.

If there was a button that could sterilize everyone, would you push it? AN’s have to consider this a net positive, right? It eliminates all future suffering.

What is your position on suicide? If killing yourself prevents more suffering than it will cause, should you do so?

Fair enough. Doesn't really change the compromise that takes place in the room and bringing someone into the room who wasn't there before, so that they will now have to compromise, "for their own benefit". — schopenhauer1

So you are saying that there ARE cases where you would violate dignity to reduce harm.

So you are looking for something that has never taken place, a completely charmed life? — schopenhauer1

That is the hypothetical yes.

Are you really an expert in this kind of statistical analysis? Have you really factored in everything? With this kind of thinking, the person with the least knowledge is — schopenhauer1

Isaac’s argument is convincing enough. I have consulted statistical analyses of happiness. They all come back positive. This means that the average person is a positive influence. Your critiques against this have not been convincing.

If you absolutely "know" they won't be harmed, then you aren't violating dignity. — schopenhauer1

False. You’re still forcing them into a dangerous game. Just one you know they’ll enjoy.

To use the gaming analogy, you’re still kidnapping them, taping them to a chair, and forcing them to play the game, they just happen to enjoy this whole process. And you knew they would enjoy it.

With the almost near 0% chance the person born will have lived a life with no harm, this indeed would violate dignity if you knew how the world is. — schopenhauer1

“Near zero percent”. I’m saying that we know this very minuscule probability is what’s going to happen for your child. That’s the hypothetical.

However, there is only one case where we can ideally prevent this, procreation. It is bringing more people into the world who will then be harmed. — schopenhauer1

Again, false. You keep saying this but by not procreating you are harming the people in the room. And if harm done to the child should not be treated differently to harm done to the people in the room, then there will be cases where it is acceptable to have the child. And you can’t use the dignity argument either because there ARE cases where you would violate dignity to reduce harm as we’ve gone over. There should be no reason the dignity of the child is in any way different from the dignity of anyone in the room. So if you are willing to violate dignity in “inter-room interactions” there should be no difference between that and violating the child’s dignity with the goal of reducing suffering.

What is your position on suicide? If killing yourself prevents more suffering than it will cause, should you do so? — Pinprick

AN should be big suicide fans, in theory, but there's some unpleasantness about it. So let's remove the unpleasantness in this thought experiment:

One demon come to you and say: 'If you want I can erase you from this world. You won't feel anything. Your dear ones won't remember you and therefore they will not miss you at all". Would any AN here take the offer and chose inexistence over existence? :-)

You misunderstand the argument. Why would they?

In my last response to khaled (not sure if he missed my post, or just hasn’t responded yet) — Pinprick

I didn't respond because I changed my mind so thought there would be no point to.

Because they think that life is full of harm, that's why. They think it is better for a child not to be, and therefore, if they were presented with the possibility of erasing their own life (without harm), they should take it.

Yet I predict they won't. Because IMO their beef is not really philosophical. It's about their own personal fear of having kids, which is rationalized into some philosophical blah or another as a protection.

Because they think that life is full of harm, that's why. — Olivier5

False. They think life could be full of harm. Which is a fact. And it is wrong to bring in children because it risks them having a life full of harm, and there is a non-risky alternative (supposedly). So this:

They think it is better for a child not to be, and therefore, if they were presented with the possibility of erasing their own life (without harm), they should take it. — Olivier5

Doesn't follow. They would only take that bet if they were miserable. But people are mostly not miserable.

False. They think life could be full of harm. Which is a fact. And it is wrong to bring in children because it risks them having a life full of harm, and there is a non-risky alternative (supposedly).... — khaled

If life could be full of harms, and if that risk justifies not giving life to a child, why should the lives of AN be an exception? Why should they opt to live, when "life could be full of harm"?

"Do as I say, don't do as I do. Children can't take the risk of living but I can."

If life could be full of harms, and if that risk justifies not giving life to a child, why should the lives of AN be an exception? Why should they opt to live, when "life could be full of harm"? — Olivier5

This doesn't even make sense on a first read, let alone the second that you should have given it before posting. That a thing could be harmful is completely resolved once immersed in that thing. "the water might be cold!" [gets in] "Oh no, it's fine".

Think about this a little bit more: just because life was bearable to you until now, it doesn't follow that it will stay that way. All the risks that may befall your child may still befall you in the future. Life is a bath which temperature keeps changing unpredictably.

just because life was bearable to you until now, it doesn't follow that it will stay that way. All the risks that may befall your child may still befall you in the future — Olivier5

It's not about the risks it's about the reasons to take them. The argument presented is that once living you may have reasons to take those later risks (the things you actually know that you're actively enjoying) whereas the potential child is not currently enjoying anything and so cannot be presumed to have any reasons of their own to take the risks associated with that enjoyment.

Really it would be better if you just read the thread before rehashing the arguments from pages back. We don't need to go over them all again, the argument has very much moved on.

If life could be full of harms, and if that risk justifies not giving life to a child, why should the lives of AN be an exception? Why should they opt to live, when "life could be full of harm"?

"Do as I say, don't do as I do. Children can't take the risk of living but I can." — Olivier5

It's more like "You shouldn't take the risk of harming others but do whatever with yourself". This is common sense. For example: If there is a button that has a 98% chance of giving you 1000 dollars and a 2% chance of killing you, is pressing it for yourself wrong? No, if you see the odds are worth it go ahead, none of my business. Is pressing it for others wrong? Absolutely. Because there is an almost perfectly harmless alternative called "Not pressing the button"

Your first argument against AN is basically "If you don't like it kill yourself". Your second is "Because I wouldn't take the risk for others that means I won't take it for myself". Maybe you should read up on the subject matter a bit before presenting ridiculous arguments. Sincerely, Not an AN.

I just thought of a rebuttal to your argument that I think shope hinted at but didn't expand on fully. If the argument is that not having children is the more harmful option that is patently false, despite of all the happiness surveys, and despite the fact that it is probably better overall for the current generation. That's because if you extend the "system" to also include your child's descendants, there is no way you can make up for the harm caused that way.

Say the human population is exactly 100 people. I can buy that those 100 people having children and increasing the population to say, 250 would overall reduce harm on the entire group. But I cannot buy that continuously having children can ever compare to the original suffering prevented by the first act. I cannot buy that a population of billions is suffering less than the original 100 suffering due to childlessness. As shope said: It's kicking the can down the road. In the end, if you look purely at consequences, having children is always the more harmful option.

Edit: Nevermind it doesn't really work as a rebuttal. Because if everyone abides by the rule: "Only have children when it is likely that doing so prevents more suffering than the alternative" then it becomes sustainable. Even a population of 1 billion would suffer less than the original 100 if everyone abides by the rule. Though we'll likely never get to 1 billion doing so. Which I think is a win-win honestly. And saying "But there is no way everyone abides by the rule" is not an argument against this as it can also be used against AN (much more effectively).

I'll just leave this here if anyone thinks of arguing along the same lines.

Mods, can anyone delete this?

Really it would be better if you just read the thread before rehashing the arguments from pages back. We don't need to go over them all again, the argument has very much moved on. — Isaac

If you don't find my posts of value, simply don't respond to them. Simplify your life. The reason I'm insisting is I don't think very highly of your intelligence. You could have missed something in your exploration of these matters. As I know you, you probably did.

The argument presented is that once living you may have reasons to take those later risks (the things you actually know that you're actively enjoying) whereas the potential child is not currently enjoying anything and so cannot be presumed to have any reasons of their own to take the risks associated with that enjoyment. — Isaac

These reasons might evaporate tomorrow. The people and things you like may be taken away from you. These reasons to love life may become reasons to hate it. Yet you and I are ready to take that risk. You and I prefer pain to inexistence. At least in some measure, and that says something about life and pain.

A life without pain is not a fancy of the imagination. It's doable: it's what you get when you take large amounts of morphine, and it can kill you. Pain exists for a reason: to keep us alive. Pain is 'pro-life'. It's not the definition of "morally wrong". It's an incentive to live better, and thus it's the price to pay to live. Total quietness = death.

We all know about this equation, and we all go by it when we chose to continue living a life of dreads and boredom and pain, in the hope it will get better. Life is better than the alternative, most of times. And there's no life without pain.

So the whole utilitarian idea of assessing the value of life based on pain and pleasure is misconceived, because pain and pleasure are an incentive system to try and make life better. It is just an indicator, a compass. You break your compass at your own risk.

Put in this (IMO biologically correct) framework, the fundamental idea of AN is absurd and contradicted by their own life choices. This idea is that, because any hypothetical child will be born with a (useful) pain compass, and it will be put to use during his life, therefore we have no right to give life to this child. Meanwhile we'll continue living, thank you very much!

It's more like "You shouldn't take the risk of harming others but do whatever with yourself". This is common sense. For example: If there is a button that has a 98% chance of giving you 1000 dollars and a 2% chance of killing you, is pressing it for yourself wrong? No, if you see the odds are worth it go ahead, none of my business. Is pressing it for others wrong? Absolutely. Because there is an almost perfectly harmless alternative called "Not pressing the button" — khaled

And yet we take decisions that affect the life of others all the time. You do it when you drive a car, you do it when you wear a mask in public (or not), when you teach others, when you take decisions for a collective (e.g. a general deciding to attack or something). It's called taking responsibility. I don't see it as always morally bad.

When I was a kid, one of the first philosophical idea that came to mind was: I could have been born elsewhere, in a different country, time, background... Then I realized that, had this been the case I would not be me, but somebody else, so the thought morphed into: I could not have been born; the world would just exist without me. And such a thought led me to a sense of gratefulness for being alive, for existing. And I haven't lived a blessed life but I'm still grateful my parents took this decision for me (or didn't, I mean my mother wasn't taking the pill back then, but that too was her decision I guess).

Your first argument against AN is basically "If you don't like it kill yourself". — khaled

You never responded to this argument though. Suicide is only a bad thing if life is conceived as inherently good (as I do). But if you truly disagree with that, if you can put the life of a future child in a balance and conclude it's not worth living, why can't you apply the same logic to your own life? What so wrong about it? And why is that such a horrible horrible argument, pray tell?

Your own shock at the suicide argument only proves that you agree that life has inherent value, and should not be weighted in a purely utilitarian way. To assess the value of life in terms of potential harm and non-harm like you guys do here is to belittle life, to show contempt to it.