Ergo, intensionalism is a more reasonable theory of morality than consequentialism. — TheMadFool

The downside of intensionalism is that intention is private and cannot be reliably known by external observers.

A person can always say "I meant no harm" after they had done something that had bad consequences. Then what?


I think that intensionalism has the best prospect of being true as a moral theory, but it is also useless because of its extremely limited application (it's, at best, applicable when a person reflects on their own actions in private, and to a limited extent in interpersonal relationships in which there is trust).

Perhaps morality needs to combine the intentions and consequences. That is because a mere emphasis on consequences is a limited insight because it it is not possible to predict the effect of any action entirely. On the other hand, intention involves a certain amount of motivation towards an outcome.

If a person was simply acting in a certain way with an inner sense of being righteous for following a certain principle, rather than without any consideration of the effect of action, it might just really be self-righteousness.

:up:

I think you have the start of a good argument here. Yes, morally, only intentions can really be relevant, not least because we also need a moral judgement for our own conduct before we act.

But this does not eliminate the problem with consequentialism you outlined. Because intentions are aimed at at consequences, and so the problem repeats itself: how do we judge an intention, if the intended consequence gets lost in an indefinite causal chain?

Judging the intention purely based on the first consequence that is desired is obviously problematic. It seems clear that obvious further consequences are part of the equation. If you play Russian roulette, death is clearly an intended consequence, even if you don't know who will die when.

So we do need to ask how we ought to deal with distant consequences.

I think that intensionalism has the best prospect of being true as a moral theory, but it is also useless because of its extremely limited application (it's, at best, applicable when a person reflects on their own actions in private, and to a limited extent in interpersonal relationships in which there is trust). — baker

Well, a person reflecting on their own actions is the primary application of morality. Nevertheless, most legal systems deal extensively with the issue of establishing intent, so it is possible to judge.

Well, a person reflecting on their own actions is the primary application of morality. — Echarmion

This is extremely charitable!
Based on my experience, the primary application of morality is to judge others.

Nevertheless, most legal systems deal extensively with the issue of establishing intent, so it is possible to judge.

It's possible to ascribe intent, it's possible to accuse a person of a prticular intent, yes.
But intent is, in its nature, private. It cannot be up to a jury or forensic experts etc. to be the ones who decide what a person's intent truly was; they can only accuse a person of a particular intent and support this accusation with particular evidence.

As for the legal use of establishing intent: this makes for a statistical minority, given that a person typically has numerous intents in any given period of time. Building a moral theory on something that is a statistical minority is problematic.

Ergo, intensionalism is a more reasonable theory of morality than consequentialism. — TheMadFool

It seems unreasonable to me that intentions are all that matter. For example: If A is addicted to their phone I can intend to help them by taking it away, but then only result in A missing an important call and losing their job. Good intentions, bad outcome, and wrong.

I think the possibility of resulting in harm matters more than intention. Doesn’t matter how pure your intentions are, if they can result in harm it becomes questionable.

But isn't consequentialism focused on intended consequences. No sensible ethics can blame people for unforseeable consequences. I think consequentialism is usually contrasted to deontological ethics, in the sense that the latter prefers consistency. For example, under consequentialism, being just may not be as important as being constructive, but under deontological ethics, being just is more important. Then again, an opinion on quora argues that ultimately all ethics theories are interested in the consequences, the difference is which methods are used to promote the outcome. The closest to your definition of intentionalism appears to be virtue ethics, which tries to teach people to align with certain model criteria for moral superiority, not based on consequences or rules, but on aesthetically pleasing conduct. And again, another alternative appears to be pragmatic ethics, which takes an evolutionary approach or trial and error.

@simeonz is correct that your "intensionalism" sounds like it's basically virtue ethics.

I think that these different approaches to normative ethics can be better developed and reconciled with each other if they are instead viewed not as competing answers to the same normative ethical question, but as complimentary answers to the different questions within meta-ethics.

The primary divide within normative ethics is between consequentialist (or teleological) models, which hold that acts are good or bad only on account of the consequences that they bring about, and deontological models, which hold that acts are good or bad in and of themselves and the consequences of them cannot change that.

The decision between them is precisely the decision as to whether the ends justify the means, with consequentialist models saying yes they do, and deontological theories saying no they don't. I hold that that is a strictly speaking false dilemma, between the two types of normative ethical model, although the strict answer I would give to whether the ends justify the means is "no". But that is because I view the separation of ends and means as itself a false dilemma, in that every means is itself an end, and every end is a means to something more.

This is similar to how the my views on ontology and epistemology entail a kind of direct realism in which there is no distinction between representations of reality and reality itself, there is only the incomplete but direct comprehension of small parts of reality that we have, distinguished from the completeness of reality itself that is always at least partially beyond our comprehension. We aren't trying to figure out what is really real from possibly-fallible representations of reality, we're undertaking a fallible process of trying to piece together our direct sensation of small bits of reality and extrapolate the rest of it from them.

Likewise, to behave morally, we aren't just aiming to use possibly-fallible means to indirectly achieve some ends, we're undertaking a process of directly causing ends with each and every behavior, and fallibly attempting to piece all of those together into a greater good.

Perhaps more clearly than that analogy, the dissolution of the dichotomy between ends and means that I mean to articulate here is like how a sound argument cannot merely be a valid argument, and cannot merely have true conclusions, but it must be valid – every step of the argument must be a justified inference from previous ones – and it must have a true conclusion, which requires also that it begin from true premises.

If a valid argument leads to a false conclusion, that tells you that the premises of the argument must have been false, because by definition valid inferences from true premises must lead to true conclusions; that's what makes them valid. If the premises were true and the inferences in the argument still lead to a false conclusion, that tells you that the inferences were not valid. But likewise, if an invalid argument happens to have a true conclusion, that's no credit to the argument; the conclusion is true, sure, but the argument is still a bad one, invalid.

I hold that a similar relationship holds between means and ends: means are like inferences, the steps you take to reach an end, which is like a conclusion. Just means must be "good-preserving" in the same way that valid inferences are truth-preserving: just means exercised out of good prior circumstances definitionally must lead to good consequences; just means must introduce no badness, or as Hippocrates wrote in his famous physicians' oath, they must "first, do no harm".

If something bad happens as a consequence of some means, then that tells you either that something about those means were unjust, or that there was something already bad in the prior circumstances that those means simply have not alleviated (which failure to alleviate does not make them therefore unjust). But likewise, if something good happens as a consequence of unjust means, that's no credit to those means; the consequences are good, sure, but the means are still bad ones, unjust.

Moral action requires using just means to achieve good ends, and if either of those is neglected, morality has been failed; bad consequences of genuinely just actions means some preexisting badness has still yet to be addressed (or else is a sign that the actions were not genuinely just), and good consequences of unjust actions do not thereby justify those actions.

Consequentialist models of normative ethics concern themselves primarily with defining what is a good state of affairs, and then say that bringing about those states of affairs is what defines a good action. Deontological models of normative ethics concern themselves primarily with defining what makes an action itself intrinsically good, or just, regardless of further consequences of the action.

I think that these are both important questions, and they are the moral analogues to questions about ontology and epistemology.

In addition to consequentialist and deontological normative ethical models, there is a third common type, called aretaic or virtue ethics, which holds that morality is about the character, the internal mental states, of the person doing the action, rather than about the action itself or its consequences. I hold that that is also an important question to consider, and that that question is wrapped up with the question of what it means to have free will.

And lastly, though it's not usually studied as a philosophical division of normative ethics, there are plenty of views across history that hold that morality lies in doing what the correct authority commands, whether that be a supernatural authority (as in divine command theory) or a more mundane authority (as in some varieties of legalism). That concern is of course wrapped up in the question of who if anyone is the correct authority and what gives their commands any moral weight, which is the central concern of political philosophy.

So rather than addressing normative ethics as its own field, I prefer approaching those four questions corresponding to four kinds of normative ethical theories as equally important fields: teleology (dealing with the objects of morality, the intended ends), deontology (dealing with the methods of justice, what the rules should be), the philosophy of will (dealing with the subjects of morality, who does the intending), and the philosophy of politics (dealing with the institutions of justice, who should enforce the rules).

So rather than addressing normative ethics as its own field, I prefer approaching those four questions corresponding to four kinds of normative ethical theories as equally important fields: teleology (dealing with the objects of morality, the intended ends), deontology (dealing with the methods of justice, what the rules should be), the philosophy of will (dealing with the subjects of morality, who does the intending), and the philosophy of politics (dealing with the institutions of justice, who should enforce the rules). — Pfhorrest

Very nice. This gives a much better structure to the question. And from this angle, the different ethics theories emphasize some aspect, depending on which one they believe should take precedence for the best possible outcome. I made an addendum to my earlier post, but I want to add a variation of it here, and maybe read your opinion on it.

One question occurred to me, of whether events from the past should be used to determine the effectiveness of the ethics. Does the unhappiness of the population during the industrial revolution detract from the achieved prosperity after the fact. A consequentialist may still involve the past to some degree as it will shape the structure of society in the future. But even if we could completely erase it from our consequences, some would argue that the misery caused then deserves condemnation, despite the achieved merit, because our morality should be concerned with the entire timeline, not just the distant future.

It seems unreasonable to me that intentions are all that matter. For example: If A is addicted to their phone I can intend to help them by taking it away, but then only result in A missing an important call and losing their job. Good intentions, bad outcome, and wrong. — khaled

This is incomplete.
The sequence should be: Good intentions, bad action, bad outcome, and wrong.

Your intention to help is good. But there is a considerable range of options (with different outcomes) to review as to which action to do in order to act on that intention to help. Instead of taking away their phone altogether, you could install an application that blocks Facebook on A's phone, for example.

In your example, the fault is not with the intention, but with the particular action taken in the name of that intention.

whether events from the past should be used to determine the effectiveness of the ethics. Does the unhappiness of the population during the industrial revolution detract from the achieved prosperity after the fact — simeonz

I'd say yes, but that doesn't mean that the industrial revolution shouldn't have happened. It just means that it was done wrongly in some ways, and should have happened differently.

Do you think that different ethical systems, speaking of them as distinct and not as aspects of one total framework, differ in this regard? Do you think that some of them consider the entire timeline while others emphasize the future?

And because the ethical standards need to be established without knowledge of the consequences, it appears to me that the different systems will use different predictive methods in this regard. Consequentialism prefers rational, analytic means, virtue ethics relies on human instincts for right and wrong, deontology relies on tradition, and pragmatic ethics on experience. Those will fuse eventually, but the emphasis is probably different.

how do you tell what a bad action is from a good one?

Do you think that some of them consider the entire timeline while others emphasize the future? — simeonz

Consequentialism definitely only seems to consider the future; that's the whole point of ends justifying means, only the ends count, doesn't matter what you have to go through to get there, in their view.

And because the ethical standards need to be established without knowledge of the consequences, it appears to me that the different systems will use different predictive methods in this regard. Consequentialism prefers rational, analytic means, virtue ethics relies on human instincts for right and wrong, deontology relies on tradition, and pragmatic ethics on experience. Those will fuse eventually, but the emphasis is probably different. — simeonz

I don't think that characterization is entirely accurate. (I'm also not a fan of treating "pragmatic ethics" as its own school of thought on par with the other three, as it's basically just a "not ideologically committed to any of those schools, mix and match them however works best" category.)

I think if anything, consequentialism and pragmatic ethics are both more empirical in their methodology, while both virtue ethics and deontology are more "rational" in the sense opposed to empirical (a priori vs a posteriori, basically).

The core aretaic tradition, the Aristotelian one, basically concludes that the highest virtue is reason, and other classical virtues like courage or temperance are just reason prevailing over irrational things like fear or desire. So characterizing that as human instinct isn't very accurate.

The core deontological tradition meanwhile, the Kantian one, likewise concludes that the single overriding duty is to do what is logically consistent to universalize of your will (or rather, to do whatever doesn't result in a contradiction of your will if you universalized it, i.e. don't do something you want to do that you wouldn't want everyone else to do too). So likewise characterizing that as based on tradition isn't very accurate.

Both of these emphasize a priori reasoning primarily, over a posteriori experience or anything else. Consequentialists on the other hand generally turn to empirical evidence for their determination of what actions are more likely to result in good consequences. And pragmatists are generally empiricists about most everything, and so rely on experience to judge what has or hasn't been working, and thus what is likely to work or not in the future.

Can't the utilitarian say that the right action is that with the highest expected utility from the actor's point of view?

In your example of saving the drowning child, the actual negative outcomes of the action do not constitute its expected negative utility. Hence, it is not wrong. Indeed, the action is right: the actor has reason to think that the expected outcome of her action will be positive.

Small note: 'intensionalism' is standardly understood to be a view in philosophy of language relating to intensions (there is more to meaning that reference or extension). You mean intentionalism.

The downside of intensionalism is that intention is private and cannot be reliably known by external observers.

A person can always say "I meant no harm" after they had done something that had bad consequences. Then what?


I think that intensionalism has the best prospect of being true as a moral theory, but it is also useless because of its extremely limited application (it's, at best, applicable when a person reflects on their own actions in private, and to a limited extent in interpersonal relationships in which there is trust). — baker

Yeah, that's a problem. So, it's a dilemma then. We have control over our intentions but we don't have access to a person's mind and what people say their intentions are could be out and out lies. We have no control over the consequences of our actions but they're conveniently observable. Is this some kind of a prank God, if fae exists, is playing on us?

Because intentions are aimed at at consequences, and so the problem repeats itself: how do we judge an intention, if the intended consequence gets lost in an indefinite causal chain? — Echarmion

There seems to be practical difficulties with intensionalism - intentions aren't observable and the intentions made public could be lies. That's a bummer because it erects an insurmountable obstacle on the matter of moral judgments.

In addition, intentions are consequence-oriented i.e. we intend to cause good/bad effects (consequences) depending on our moral character. We couldn't talk of intentions without including consequences for the former relies on the latter for its meaning; moral intentions can't exist independent of consequences they wish to bring about. Nevertheless, focusing only on consequences, which consequentialism is all about, ignores a critical phase in [moral] actions viz. the actor's intentions.

There are multiple ways in which things could go wrong between intentions behind actions and the consequences of those actions. Sometimes, the consequences can be the exact opposite of what was intended. It's in this gap between intentions and consequences that intensionalism finds a cozy spot to call home.

But isn't consequentialism focused on intended consequences. — simeonz

Correct. Intention and consequences are two sides of the same coin. We can't separate the two in a way that would make it possible to deal with them independent of each other. However, coming at this issue from an attitude that recommends choosing the lesser of two evils, intensionalism seems a better bet than consequentialism for, as I said, we have less control over the consequences of our actions than our intentions and, before I forget to mention, what the consequences are is entirely a matter of where along the causal chain one wants to stop and look.

how do you tell what a bad action is from a good one? — khaled

Personally, I believe that there are three kinds of actions, depending on where/how in reference to the person they occur: mental, verbal, and bodily; ie. whether one performs the action with one's mind, one's tongue, or one's body. (I am well aware that people usually don't view this this way.)
Then, depending on quality, there are another three kinds of actions: good, bad, and neutral.

If an action leads to harm and suffering for oneself, for others, or both, it's bad.


See here, the Buddha's advice to his son.

So, it's a dilemma then. — TheMadFool

It's a dilemma if our aim is to judge, condemn, and punish others (or ourselves).

For all practical intents and purposes, the primary use of a moral theory seems to be precisely to judge, condemn, and punish others (or ourselves). Have you ever seen a moral theory be used for some other purpose?

We have control over our intentions

What do you mean by that?

Have you ever tried to give up a bad habit? Would you say that in the process of doing so, you always had control over your intentions and your intentions were exactly what you wanted them to be?

If an action leads to harm and suffering for oneself, for others, or both, it's bad. — baker

Then the sequence is not incomplete. Good intention, bad outcome, wrong. You added “bad action” in the middle but if “bad action” is literally “bad outcome” (because that’s how you defined it) then it’s redundant.

Then the sequence is not incomplete. Good intention, bad outcome, wrong. You added “bad action” in the middle but if “bad action” is literally “bad outcome” (because that’s how you defined it) then it’s redundant. — khaled

Here's the sequence again:
good intention: to help A
bad/inappropriate action: take away A's phone
bad outcome: A misses an important call


Another one:
good intention: to help A
good/appropriate action: instal app to A's phone that blocks FB
good outcome: A can still use the phone normally for important calls

if “bad action” is literally “bad outcome” (because that’s how you defined it)

Can you copy-paste based on which words of mine you surmise that?

Can you copy-paste based on which words of mine you surmise that? — baker

These:

If an action leads to harm and suffering for oneself, for others, or both, it's bad. — baker

Key words: Leads to. You define a bad action as something that has bad consequences. Which makes it redundant in the sequence.

The mental action of desiring to help someone doesn't automatically lead to a particular verbal or bodily action.

There is an element of choice inbetween. You can have the intention to help someone, and then you can choose from many possible options what you're actually going to do in an effort to help them.

It's a dilemma if our aim is to judge, condemn, and punish others (or ourselves).

For all practical intents and purposes, the primary use of a moral theory seems to be precisely to judge, condemn, and punish others (or ourselves). Have you ever seen a moral theory be used for some other purpose? — baker

I think your reasoning is domino-effect like, slippery-slope-ish. We can stop at any point in the chain: judge -> condemn -> punish. Anyway, the idea is to find a reasonable basis for deciding [judging] the moral status of people, their actions, and it looks like we have no better choice than to pin our hopes on intentions relative to consequences i.e. intensionalism is makes more sense than consequentialism.

The only problem is that we have no way of finding out what a person's intentions are/were. Intensionalism looks good on paper but it's, as of the moment, impractical. Would people even want it to be implementable though. Anyone willing to be moderated by thought police?

What do you mean by that?

Have you ever tried to give up a bad habit? Would you say that in the process of doing so, you always had control over your intentions and your intentions were exactly what you wanted them to be? — baker

You wanted to give up the bad habit. So, you're good as per intensionalism.

You wanted to give up the bad habit. So, you're good as per intensionalism. — TheMadFool

Would you say that in the process of giving up the bad habit, you always had control over your intentions and your intentions were exactly what you wanted them to be?

If you ever relapsed, then clearly you didn't have control over your intentions. If the only thing that stopped you from acting on the bad habit was some external circumstance, then clearly you didn't have control over your intentions.

You can have the intention to help someone, and then you can choose from many possible options what you're actually going to do in an effort to help them. — baker

I can intend to help someone, but if I pick something an act that instead harms them then I did something wrong. On the other hand if the act helps then I did something good. The variable here, is the consequence. Saying that the variable is the action is equivalent in this case to saying that it’s the consequence. Because you define what a good and bad action is by its consequences.

Would you say that in the process of giving up the bad habit, you always had control over your intentions and your intentions were exactly what you wanted them to be?

If you ever relapsed, then clearly you didn't have control over your intentions. If the only thing that stopped you from acting on the bad habit was some external circumstance, then clearly you didn't have control over your intentions. — baker

I'm a chain smoker (thank you) and my intention is to kick the habit. I've lost count of how many times I've wanted to quit but...alas...I couldn't. I had, in some sense, good intentions, it's just that I lacked what I think people call will power or perhaps it's a case of physical dependence. Whatever the case may be, my intentions can be different from my actions. That's the essence of intensionalism.

Consequentialism definitely only seems to consider the future; that's the whole point of ends justifying means, only the ends count, doesn't matter what you have to go through to get there, in their view. — Pfhorrest

I asked because, even though your separation of ethical concerns into aspects resolves some of the contentions, it appears to me that a view of having scruples over the past (not due to understanding of its future consequences, but on its very own) and being interested only in the consequences are truly irreconcilable.

I don't think that characterization is entirely accurate. — Pfhorrest

I was trying to shoehorn some ideas very hard. Because some ethics in practice incorporate tradition and innate sense of aesthetics (having social and instinctive component). For example, we make ethical statements like "it is good to be courteous", "it is good to be kind and strong", or even "it is good to be create beauty in the world".

The core aretaic tradition, the Aristotelian one, basically concludes that the highest virtue is reason, and other classical virtues like courage or temperance are just reason prevailing over irrational things like fear or desire. So characterizing that as human instinct isn't very accurate. — Pfhorrest

I was extrapolating virtue ethics. I was seeing virtues like kindness, beauty, strength (not of prevailing reason, but all strength) as virtues. Obviously, those can be seen rationally by social and genetic Darwinism, but I don't think that it is always explained in any way. Seen through the prism of its Greek roots, I can understand why virtue ethics is rational, but I still wonder if generalization are misplaced. And it also begs the question, can the choice of reason be a rational choice.

The core deontological tradition meanwhile, the Kantian one, likewise concludes that the single overriding duty is to do what is logically consistent to universalize of your will (or rather, to do whatever doesn't result in a contradiction of your will if you universalized it, i.e. don't do something you want to do that you wouldn't want everyone else to do too). So likewise characterizing that as based on tradition isn't very accurate. — Pfhorrest

Ultimately, even if you can do it easily conceptually, wont universalizing be a matter of politics and tradition in practice. How would the theoretical ethics be implemented? How is consensus reached?

Consequentialists on the other hand generally turn to empirical evidence for their determination of what actions are more likely to result in good consequences. And pragmatists are generally empiricists about most everything, and so rely on experience to judge what has or hasn't been working, and thus what is likely to work or not in the future. — Pfhorrest

For consequentialists, I felt, the adamancy on making correct projections of the future is imperative, whereas pragmatists would easily profess eventual failure to project and just adapt. That is why I thought consequentialists as being more so analytical, and pragmatists as genuinely empirical. But I can see that both have empirical roots and vary in their concessions.

However, coming at this issue from an attitude that recommends choosing the lesser of two evils, intensionalism seems a better bet than consequentialism for, as I said, we have less control over the consequences of our actions than our intentions and, before I forget to mention, what the consequences are is entirely a matter of where along the causal chain one wants to stop and look. — TheMadFool

I think that in the sense in which described it, those are different ethical aspects. That is, how you should judge your actions versus what are your objectives. Consequentialist do indeed rely on accurate predictions of the consequences, which I do also see as inadequate, if the burden of making such predictions is placed on the individual. On the other hand, it is impossible to make the individual the only carrier of all ethical responsibility, so there has to be some kind of exterior force that compels and advises them, in the form of government and rules, again as Pfhorrest stated.

P.S. And the latter are going to have to balance between considering the impact of the rules and authority on the person's character in itself, on the effect it has for society, and on its admissibility on its own.

It also occurred to me, that considering the entire timeline may not be consequentialist, but it would still be teleological in essence, shouldn't it?

I asked because, even though your separation of ethical concerns into aspects resolves some of the contentions, it appears to me that a view of having scruples over the past (not due to understanding of its future consequences, but on its very own) and being interested only in the consequences are truly irreconcilable. — simeonz

I am definitely anti-consequentialist in my views, but that doesn't mean that consequences are irrelevant. As I said in my first post in this thread, I think that ends and means are both important, and neither can be neglected for the sake of the other. As consequentialists think only the ends matter, I disagree with them. But to whatever extent other classes of ethical theory may say ends don't matter at all, I disagree with those too.

It also occurred to me, that considering the entire timeline may not be consequentialist, but it would still be teleological in essence, shouldn't it? — simeonz

Inasmuch as teleological means concerned with ends at all, but not necessarily to the exclusion of all other concerns, sure. It seems to me a bit like asking whether science is ontological or epistemological; it's both, correctly describing what really exists is important, but having sound epistemological reason for saying the answer to that question is this rather than that is just as important.