I'll repeat then, what I've said from the beginning, there is no such thing as the ordinary way of distinguishing an accident from a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well I think you are still stuck on something about these words; maybe thinking there is "no such thing as the ordinary way", as if the ordinary way were opposed to the philosophical way (which can make those distinctions). I can't sort it though. Let's just ask: can we distinguish between (the concept of) a mistake and an accident? Sure. Maybe we could ask what we say when: I shot the donkey accidentally and I shot the donkey by mistake. And here we can imagine the accident is something that I didn't intend to do, and the mistake was in hitting the donkey, though I was going to (intended to) shoot something else. So one distinguishing thing is that mistakes require an intention and accidents do not. Now let's see how traditional philosophy attempts to make a distinction:

Each particular incident, in each set of circumstances, must be judged according to the available evidence, and there is no such thing as the "ordinary criteria", to be applied in a particular situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Each"? "Particular"? "Must be judged"? And here we are imagining that each case is the worst case (skepticism without a net). Do we "apply" the criteria? Well, we didn't know them before and now we do, but do we always need them? Imagine that there is all this life we have that makes it so we don't usually need them ("Don't make a mistake!" "Don't worry; it's only an accident."); does this help dispell the sense of doom with every "circumstance"?

We say that the judge upholds the law, in many unique circumstances, but this is not really done through reference to criteria, it's done through the experience of many precedents. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think here it is important again to say that Witt is focusing on a special idea of criteria, as I mentioned to @Mww above. One difference is it is not the kind of criteria that we set, say, for identification of a show dog, or when someone has broken the law. Those criteria are in the wide open; one, standards of a perfect specimen; the other, the law. And yes, the law Is not a science and takes judgment to clearly align the facts of this case with the law, or, when necessary, rest on a precedent circumscribing a tricky set of facts or the interpretation of the law in a new context, but, even here, not every case is distinct in the eyes of the law either.

If this notion of "ordinary criteria" is your proposed solution, then it's quite clear to me that you do not have a solution at all. And if philosophy appears to be trying to take itself out of "the solution", you might take this as a hint, that the supposed solution is not acceptable to philosophers. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I believe I came to this same spot with @Mww above. OLP does not have a solution (to skepticism). Ordinary criteria are not acceptable for certainty, universality, predetermination, etc. I can perhaps some time in the future (or in my other posts) show its usefulness in morality, aesthetics, politics, etc. where traditional philosophy has failed to satisfy. Or I stand ready to try again to show /explain and hope to do better.

So it appears to me, like OLP is a lot of idle talk with no justification for what is said. — Metaphysician Undercover

The standard for OLP of a claim to our ordinary criteria is if you see it and agree; if you see what I see--that you can show yourself. If you can not, perhaps I have not done a good enough job with my example, or in filling out the imagined context, but we do have the grounds there for an intelligible discussion, which is the "rough ground" which Witt is trying to get philosophy back to.

If you allow that the same concept has different criteria according to different contexts, you are saying that the word refers to the same concept despite having a different meaning. Using the word with different meanings, and insisting that the different meanings constitute the same concept is equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, let's pull out "refer" just in case anyone gets confused that this is word=idea. For example, intending is a concept; to say it is (only) a word is to make it seem isolated, connected only to a "meaning', which is a picture Witt is trying to unravel. Meaning being more like, say, what is meaningful to us about a concept, along the ordinary criteria for it. And let's put it that: we are seeing how a concept is used. Witt says "sense" for the fact that a concept (knowing) can be used in various ways; here, again, I know as: I can give you evidence; I know as: I can show you how; I know as: I acknowledge you, your claim. He is imploring us to Look at the Use! (#340) to see that our concepts are various and meaningful in different ways.

A criterion is a principle or standard used for judgement. There is no ambiguity there. Either a person is following the criteria or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

And this is on me; I did not realize that Wittgenstein is limiting himself to a particular type of criteria, not the overt, set, delineated, followed criteria as we are most familiar with, say, ironically, that are the most ordinary. Sorry for the confusion.

The thing which you don't seem to be acknowledging is that in the vast majority of "ordinary" situations, the circumstances are unique and peculiar, such that a judgement cannot be made on the basis of criteria. There might be some criteria which would serve as some sort of guideline, but the real judgement is made by some process other than referencing the criteria. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I would say the vast majority of situations are mundane and uneventful and non-specific, such that our criteria (of this type) never really come up (Thoreau says we lead quiet lives of desperation). However, yes, there are problems and circumstances and issues (even philosophical ones) that do come up, exactly because we are at a point where we do not know what to do, we can not or do not want to use criteria as our base (excuse, justification, cover). As you say, "the real judgment is made by some other process". Now Wittgenstein talks about coming to an end, and about being "inclined" to draw a line, or convinced and shutting our eyes, but the other option he offers is to go on from our criteria into their open-endedness, their ability to point into new contexts, and act or speak so as to define ourselves beyond (further than) our criteria, to the other without certainty, and thus be intelligible and answerable for that extension or deviation, etc. as if there was a limit to knowledge (Cavell will refer to this as the truth of skepticism).

Reflect on this action, your example here: "You know you smirked when you apologized." I think you'll agree with me that what is referred to is a matter of interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure this was a great example (surprise). But you could say that identifying the smirk was an interpretation (of their facial movement), but what I was trying to point out is that everyone could agree that to correctly apologize, you can not scoff at the whole procedure--that it is not open to interpretation, that it is a categorical necessity.

Do you see how it may be the case that "criteria" is not the right word here? — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. I am sorry I ever brought it up. I don't know if it helps to fall back on "Grammar" but maybe the absolute made-up-ness of it solves the confusion, though I doubt it. The whole first chapter of Cavell's The Claim of Reason is about working out Witt's sense of "criteria" though I can't force myself through it because Cavell rarely makes anything easier to explain to anyone else.

I thank you for your patience and persistence.

it takes the concepts that philosophy wrings its hands o know the other or over and reveals their mystery and seeming power as driven by our disappointment with misunderstandings and our desire to take ourselves out of the solution.
— Antony Nickles

It makes it sound as though desire is at the heart of the split between olp and approaches antagonistic to it. — Joshs

The desire is Cavell explicating what Witt saw that representationalism really wants. Seeing the representation of an object with a word (or any other similar picture) as the only picture out there of how meaning works, Witt turned to look at all the variety of ways different things are meaningful to us. So why this other picture? And his interlocutor keeps going on about having to know, and about rules, etc. So the idea is that the fear of doubt and the black hole of skepticism/relativism cause the philosopher to skip over our regular criteria to fix meaning and word together, to have certain knowledge, normative rules, universal criteria, predetermined, etc.

Does Wittgenstein’s work not represent a paradigm shift? — Joshs

There are no new facts and everything is left as it is. So not so much a little shift or extension or new picture as...

a gestalt shift requiring turning the world on its head ? — Joshs

Yes, Emerson or Cavell say, turned on the point of our real need. As if our real needs and desires are in our ordinary criteria which we need only reflect on (turn to), rather than the need driven by our fear of uncertainty and irrationality, etc.

Is it possible to understand what you mean by ‘ taking ourselves out of the solution’ without already having undergone the paradigm shift necessary to relate to Wittgenstein’s world? — Joshs

In reacting to skepticism, philosophy sees the problem as the human, its fallibility, its inconsistency, its emotion, its partiality, its diversity, and decides that none of that is going to give us the certainty and universality and rationality that we want to solve skepticism, so we take philosophy out of any context and fashion it to meet the standards that will solve it. But this doesn't see that not only are ordinary criteria more adequate, but they also see that we still have a place in their application or their extension, or going past them, or against them.

So there is no "cognitive system" happening all the time — Antony Nickles

Yeah.....and there is no fire alarm system until the horn sounds?

I stand ready to help in understanding if that is of any interest. — Antony Nickles

Sorta asked for help, or at least showed interest, by inquiring as to method. You’ve been adamant in maintaining OLP is best understood by its examples, which suggests there isn’t a method, per se, or OLP isn’t really a philosophy, per se. But it could be just me, in as much as I am not familiar with any philosophy not grounded by its own conditionals, by which something is explained.

And I’ve already admitted to those damnable cognitive prejudices, so...there is that. In addition, my personal philosophical domain is far anterior to language anyway, so a claimed philosophy with language in its name, isn’t going to tell me what I wish to know.

I thank you for your patience and persistence. — Antony Nickles

I'm naturally persistent, so there's no need to thank me for that. However, it is you who is being patient, to put up with my persistence. Patience is a virtue.

ell I think you are still stuck on something about these words; maybe thinking there is "no such thing as the ordinary way", as if the ordinary way were opposed to the philosophical way (which can make those distinctions). I can't sort it though. — Antony Nickles

"Ordinary" in this instance implies normal, does it not? As if there is a customary, familiar, or habitual, normal, or "ordinary" way of making this decision as to whether it was an accident or a mistake..

Each"? "Particular"? "Must be judged"? And here we are imagining that each case is the worst case (skepticism without a net). Do we "apply" the criteria? Well, we didn't know them before and now we do, but do we always need them? Imagine that there is all this life we have that makes it so we don't usually need them ("Don't make a mistake!" "Don't worry; it's only an accident."); does this help dispell the sense of doom with every "circumstance"? — Antony Nickles

I can't grasp what you're saying here. I don't see where the reference to "worst case" comes from, or "sense of doom with every 'circumstance'". We are talking about judging an action which has already occurred, as to whether it was an accident or mistake. The action has already occurred so there is no sense of impending doom if the wrong decision is made.

What I said, is that in each particular instance of such an action occurring, if such a decision is to be made, the action must be judged in a way which is specific to that particular instance. That is because each particular instance is unique, and there is a very fine line of difference between the two possible judgements. There is no customary, familiar, or habitual way of deciding this, therefore no "ordinary way" of making such a judgement.

My point was, that if there was an ordinary way, the person would not have to appeal to any criteria in making that decision. There would be a customary, familiar, habitual way of saying that the action was accidental or that it was a mistake, the person would say that, and therefore no criteria involved in deciding which word to use. However, since there is not a customary, familiar, habitual, or ordinary way of deciding which of these two words to use, one would have to appeal to criteria to make that decision. The point being that the two, "ordinary way", and "using criteria" are incompatible with each other. This makes "ordinary criteria" an oxymoron.

I think here it is important again to say that Witt is focusing on a special idea of criteria, as I mentioned to Mww above. One difference is it is not the kind of criteria that we set, say, for identification of a show dog, or when someone has broken the law. Those criteria are in the wide open; one, standards of a perfect specimen; the other, the law. And yes, the law Is not a science and takes judgment to clearly align the facts of this case with the law, or, when necessary, rest on a precedent circumscribing a tricky set of facts or the interpretation of the law in a new context, but, even here, not every case is distinct in the eyes of the law either. — Antony Nickles

"Criteria" is a very straight forward, unambiguous word, with a very direct meaning, a standard or principle for judgement. It makes no sense to say that Witt is not using "criteria" in the ordinary way, but in a special, private way. This is why we need to be aware of Wittgenstein's masterful hypocrisy. It's as if there's a soothing, calming voice, repeating over and over again, 'Deception is impossible, I am not deceiving you because deception is impossible...'. What is that person doing with that voice other than deceiving you? This is why there is a very clear need to distinguish, in principle, between what a person is saying, and what a person is doing with the words. If I judge what a person is 'saying' to me, according to my customary, familiar, habitual, ordinary way, but the person is actually 'doing' something different from what appears through my ordinary interpretation, then I will be deceived. Therefore, I need to apply criteria in my interpretation, to go beyond the ordinary interpretation which the deceiver intends for me to use to support the deception, in my effort to determine what the person is really doing with the words.

And I believe I came to this same spot with Mww above. OLP does not have a solution (to skepticism). Ordinary criteria are not acceptable for certainty, universality, predetermination, etc. I can perhaps some time in the future (or in my other posts) show its usefulness in morality, aesthetics, politics, etc. where traditional philosophy has failed to satisfy. Or I stand ready to try again to show /explain and hope to do better. — Antony Nickles

But you said this: "Yes, but you're probably not going to be happy about it because it takes the concepts that philosophy wrings its hands over and reveals their mystery and seeming power as driven by our disappointment with misunderstandings and our desire to take ourselves out of the solution." If you can judge that philosophers are acting on a desire to take themselves out of the solution, then you must have some criteria by which you can say that what they are observed as trying to take themselves out of, is the solution. If you allow that OLP cannot dispel skepticism concerning "the solution", then you have no principle whereby you can argue that OLP is better than any other philosophy, so it's revealed for what it really is, and that is just another form of poorly supported metaphysical speculation.

The standard for OLP of a claim to our ordinary criteria is if you see it and agree; if you see what I see--that you can show yourself. — Antony Nickles

But this has no logical rigour. Agreement does not require criteria. You propose something to me, I can agree or disagree, but neither requires criteria. So if I agree with you, this does not justify your claim to "ordinary criteria". The problem being, as I described above, that we only apply criteria in cases which go outside the ordinary, customary, familiar, or habitual. So as long as your proposal appears to me to be ordinary, I will agree without question, or applying any sort of criteria. And your claim that "ordinary criteria" is justified by me agreeing, is unsupported.

Well, let's pull out "refer" just in case anyone gets confused that this is word=idea. For example, intending is a concept; to say it is (only) a word is to make it seem isolated, connected only to a "meaning', which is a picture Witt is trying to unravel. Meaning being more like, say, what is meaningful to us about a concept, along the ordinary criteria for it. And let's put it that: we are seeing how a concept is used. Witt says "sense" for the fact that a concept (knowing) can be used in various ways; here, again, I know as: I can give you evidence; I know as: I can show you how; I know as: I acknowledge you, your claim. He is imploring us to Look at the Use! (#340) to see that our concepts are various and meaningful in different ways. — Antony Nickles

Here you go, with the hypocrisy. You say let's get rid of the notion "word=idea", it's a faulty "picture". Then you say "let's put it that: we are seeing how a concept is used." But what we are seeing is words being used. We cannot proceed to "seeing how a concept is used" without that faulty picture, 'word=concept'. And when you allow for this separation between word and concept, and see that people are doing things with words, and that meaning is a feature of what the person is doing with the words, not a property of the words themselves, you'll understand that using the same word in different contexts gives it a different meaning. So if your desire is to associate "a concept" with the word, you must allow that it is a different concept in each different context, according to the difference in meaning, otherwise you are susceptible to deception by equivocation.

Well, I would say the vast majority of situations are mundane and uneventful and non-specific, such that our criteria (of this type) never really come up (Thoreau says we lead quiet lives of desperation). — Antony Nickles

This is the problem. If, in the vast majority of situations criteria never come up, why assume that criteria are employed in those cases. "Criterion" is very specifically a principle or standard which is followed. This means that it is something present to the conscious mind, as a principle for logical reasoning. This is the same issue I had with Mww who proposed logic proceeding from premises which are not present to the conscious mind. How can logic proceed in that way? Clearly it's not logic, if it employs unstated premises. Likewise, the person cannot be said to be employing criteria when proceeding without any criteria present to that person.

If we move to say, this is "criteria" in another sense of the word, then we need to define that sense, otherwise people will just think, as I did, that it's "criteria" in the ordinary sense. What I've been arguing, is that these customary, familiar, habitual, or ordinary acts are not even remotely similar to acts which employ criteria. In fact, they are more like polar opposites. The customary, habitual, familiar, ordinary acts proceed from an attitude of certainty, while we only apply criteria when we are uncertain. So if we wish to obtain a true understanding of these types of acts, we need to maintain that separation between acts carried out with an attitude of certainty, and acts carried out with uncertainty, we ought not use "criteria" when referring to the motivating factor in customary, habitual, familiar, ordinary acts, which are carried out with an attitude of certainty. We only apply criteria when we are uncertain.

I'm not sure this was a great example (surprise). But you could say that identifying the smirk was an interpretation (of their facial movement), but what I was trying to point out is that everyone could agree that to correctly apologize, you can not scoff at the whole procedure--that it is not open to interpretation, that it is a categorical necessity. — Antony Nickles

This opens another can of worms. What constitutes certainty?. We say "everyone could agree that...". And this means that everyone would interpret the situation in the same way. This would constitute a customary, habitual, familiar, or ordinary way of interpretation. We can see that "certainty" is tied together with the ordinary way. Which causes the other is not evident, but they are reciprocating and mutually supportive. The problem though, is that the term "everyone" is extremely inclusive, in an absolute sense, therefore too inclusive. All it takes, is one person who is abnormal, and doesn't share that ordinary way, to be skeptical, uncertain. This person might start applying criteria, and develop the belief that the judgement which everyone else is certain of, as they proceed in the ordinary way, with certainty and without criteria, is actually wrong. The criteria might even show very clearly that the abnormal person is correct, and everyone else proceeding in the ordinary way, with certainty, but without criteria, are incorrect. This is why we cannot ever exclude skepticism.

So the idea is that the fear of doubt and the black hole of skepticism/relativism cause the philosopher to skip over our regular criteria to fix meaning and word together, to have certain knowledge, normative rules, universal criteria, predetermined, etc. — Antony Nickles

Let's consider this statement. When we "fix meaning and word together" we are inclined to assume "a concept" which the word signifies. This is because we want the word to represent something directly, just like when a proper noun represents an object directly, or even when we use a noun to refer to a particular object directly. This facilitates our capacity to talk about meaning, when there are things, concepts which we can talk about. Now we have these objects of meaning (Platonic Forms perhaps), concepts, which we can talk about, just like we can talk about physical objects. It's a matter of what's customary, familiar, and habitual in our ordinary use of language. We ordinarily use language to talk about the physical world, objects and such, so language is designed and evolved to work in that way. So when we go to talk about meaning, we are inclined to use language in the customary way, thus we invent this notion of "concepts" and that facilitates the discussion of meaning. because natural language is purposed to talk about things not meaning.

But what Wittgenstein demonstrated is that this is really a mistaken way to proceed in talking about meaning. It actually encourages skepticism, because we talk about objects of meaning, "concepts", which just are not there. So now we need to reassess this desire to talk about meaning. Either we must just accept as a fact that language was not designed to talk about meaning, and we simply cannot go there with language, it is a realm of what cannot be spoken about, or, we need to redesign language such that it can be used to properly speak about meaning. I think that the latter is the appropriate way forward, and the way which philosopher generally proceed, giving the impression that philosophy uses language in an abnormal way. Well yes, but that's because we cannot do philosophy using language in the ordinary way, because ordinary language was not purposed for doing philosophy. OLP ought to simply acknowledge this difference.

I consider this a particular kind of structuralism. — Joshs

I think that's largely right.

One thing I'd emphasize is how one of the quintessential moves of OLP works: if X were true then it would make sense to say Y. This is a particular way of showing how no concept stands alone, and thus cannot be analyzed on its own, but is always part of a constellation. That constellation consists not just of other concepts, but of what we say, what we do, what we think, and what we feel. You can see this sort of thing clearly in Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" -- we talk about an action having been done freely or not in particular ways, and we have particular emotional responses that are intimately related to that somewhat abstract characterization, the "moral sentiments". "Did she do that of her own free will?" is a concrete question, addressed by ordinary people everyday with considerable subtlety, and with real stakes.

It is very nearly philosophy as, at least in large part, a sort of anthropology. (Austin dreamed of having teams of researchers doing field-work.)

But what of the normative claims of philosophy -- that this is the right way to think, not that, or that this is the right way to act, or organize a society, or evaluate a work of art? LW famously claimed that philosophy leaves everything as it is, that it has nothing special to contribute. By and large, I think that stands as a reasonable rebuke to the absurd hubris of philosophers, as if no one knew anything until they finally came along to tell everyone what they really think, as opposed to what they think they think, and what they should think. Never listen to anyone who wants to tell you about your metaphysical presuppositions.

But I think we can say this much: philosophy doesn't come along to add a normative dimension to our lives -- it's already there, and available for philosophy to participate in just as people do ordinarily. Philosophy doesn't stand outside or above life in judgment, but by the same token philosophy can make just the same sort of normative claims as non-philosophers do everyday.

One could say that the terms of ordinariness are whatever allows for an alignment of moving parts that creates agreement, shared practice , normativiity. — Joshs

I think that's close -- but I'd resist seeing this as some sort of frozen structure. Normativity is not a feature that emerges from the existence of a complete and closed system describable in terms of rules and criteria and so on. Normativity is in play. People act and judge each other's actions, react to them emotionally, dispute not only whether an action was just but what justice is. Examining and modifying the rules as you go is part of the game, so philosophy cannot be in the business of figuring out what The Rules are. If structuralism has pretensions to explain people's behavior by reference to some fixed "underlying" system (economic, cultural, psychological, what have you), that's obviously not what you'll get from any of these folks.

I don't see how a rule is an identity. It might be a principle that a person would use in an effort to identify something, but that does not make the rule itself an identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Point. Worded backwards: identity is the rule, or, as you say, a standing principle by which the determination of the correspondence of properties to an object, or the correspondence of objects to each other, is possible.
—————

Do you really believe that when a child is learning to call a dog a dog, it goes through a synthesis/reduction process of possible properties — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t care. From a metaphysical point of view, that is, as opposed to mere anthropology or rational psychology, reason is presupposed as developed sufficiently to be the ground of learning, which has more to do with some arbitrarily sufficient measure of extant experience. In other words, in the philosophical examination of how knowledge is acquired, something must already known.

Besides, given that a young dog is the same kind of thing as an old dog, it is logically consistent that a young brain is the same kind of thing as an old brain. No matter how an old brain learns or knows things, it must be the case the young brain learns or knows things in the same way, or, at least can learn or know. Otherwise, it becomes possible, e.g., that a child is taught of a thing, yet learns of some other thing, which can never explain how that other thing came to be. Rather, it is always the case that a child simply does or does not learn the one thing, rather than learns some other thing instead, and it is here that, by whatever means any human learns anything, the explanation is given, because the knowledge system is common to all humans.

And the quantity of brain, said to condition the quality of it......the bigger the brain is the finer the knowable is....is irrelevant, insofar as the question concerns the how of its operation, and not the extent of its content.

So....do I think? If the child is thinking on his own accord, yes. If he is being instructed, no. Remember learning your letters? Tracing the little dotted resemblances of the shape representing them? Tell me you were mentally actively thinking....cognizing by means of concepts..... and not merely motivating your hand to follow the dots. And afterwards, henceforth forever, was it the hand motion you remember for the letter you want to write, or the rule that the shape identifies the name of the letter you want to write?
—————

You neglected the influence of social relevance. — Metaphysician Undercover

HA!!!! I offer Col. Jessup: “YOU DAMN RIGHT I DID!!!!”

‘Nuff said.
———————

One cannot make a valid deductive argument which relies on premises which are not stated, or "behind the scenes". — Metaphysician Undercover

(Sigh) Illustrative purposes. The path is enough, but you still gotta move your own feet.

Our lives have agreed in all the little ways (all the pieces are in place Wii says) that allow for us to recognize the terms of a misunderstanding, the concept of miscommunication. — Antony Nickles

Except that it seems to me in the case of Einstein’s
theory, or better yet, Wittgenstein’s writings, our lives will have had to agree in more than just the little ways in order for our criteria to align closely enough to attain agreement on the content of the ideas. It seems to me that body of work on the order of a Kant or Descartes represents a comprehensive form of life.

You’ve been adamant in maintaining OLP is best understood by its examples, which suggests there isn’t a method, — Mww

I've given examples of its method, of looking at examples. With knowledge, an apology, intention (accident/mistake), etc throughout this thread.

the idea is that the fear of doubt and the black hole of skepticism/relativism cause the philosopher to skip over our regular criteria to fix meaning and word together, to have certain knowledge, normative rules, universal criteria, predetermined, etc. h — Antony Nickles

After I wrote this post , I read Rorty’s critique of Cavell and realized that he was making a similar argument to mine.

https://www.pdcnet.org/revmetaph/content/revmetaph_1981_0034_0004_0759_0774

Rorty:“ My complaint about Cavell's treatment of skepticism may be summed up by saying that his book never makes this possibility clear for someone for whom it is not yet an actuality. It is fairly easy to connect (b) with (c): the realization that the world is available to us only under a description hooks up with the realization that it exists without a self-description, that it has no language of its own which we might one day learn. Its existence "makes no sense" because sense is relative to descriptions and existence is not. But, just as I do not know how to hook up (a) with (b), I do not know how to hook (a) up with (c) either. Thus (c) seems to me not to serve as a useful link between (a) and (b).”

Rortyand I are both claiming that Cavell is assuming a logical connection between such situations as believing in the picture theory of meaning and Wittgenstein’s corrective of that thinking. Instead, we argue that moving from a belief in the picture theory to language games amounts to a change of subject. I suppose Lyotard might refer to this incommensurability as a differend.

For most of the history of the West , in the sciences, philosophy, literature and the arts something like a picture theory dominated ( there are many kinds of picture theories ). That shouldn’t be surprising. We see the same phenomenon in child development. Merleau-Pony pointed out that young children do not recognize that others have their own perspective and point of view , that what is a fact for me is the same fact for everyone. So there is a developmental process in child
development and also in philosophical history of decentering of perspective.

In reacting to skepticism, philosophy sees the problem as the human, its fallibility, its inconsistency, its emotion, its partiality, its diversity, and decides that none of that is going to give us the certainty and universality and rationality that we want to solve skepticism, so we take philosophy out of any context and fashion it to meet the standards that will solve it. But this doesn't see that not only are ordinary criteria more adequate, but they also see that we still have a place in their application or their extension, or going past them, or against them. — Antony Nickles

Skepticism belongs to the type of thinking that is incommensurable with Wittgenstein. In order for a skeptic to “take meaning out of any context” they would fist have to understand ‘context’ and ‘ meaning’ in the way that Witt means it , and that is precisely what they cannot do.
This is like accusing the young child who only recognizes their own perspective(because the very notion of perspective doesn’t exist for them yet ) of taking meaning out of any context , because of the fear of doubt. What those of us who come after Witt should say about the young child or the Cartesian skeptic is that while they IMPLICTLY understand the world via language games , at an EXPLICIT level they only recognize an undifferentiated terrain.

I don’t care. From a metaphysical point of view, that is, as opposed to mere anthropology or rational psychology, reason is presupposed as developed sufficiently to be the ground of learning, which has more to do with some arbitrarily sufficient measure of extant experience. In other words, in the philosophical examination of how knowledge is acquired, something must already known.

Besides, given that a young dog is the same kind of thing as an old dog, it is logically consistent that a young brain is the same kind of thing as an old brain. No matter how an old brain learns or knows things, it must be the case the young brain learns or knows things in the same way, or, at least can learn or know. Otherwise, it becomes possible, e.g., that a child is taught of a thing, yet learns of some other thing, which can never explain how that other thing came to be. Rather, it is always the case that a child simply does or does not learn the one thing, rather than learns some other thing instead, and it is here that, by whatever means any human learns anything, the explanation is given, because the knowledge system is common to all humans. — Mww

Sorry Mww, but I disagree with all of this, at a most fundamental level. First, we cannot philosophically examine the acquisition of knowledge with the presupposition that something must already be known, for the acquisition of knowledge, because this is contrary to the observed evidence of empirical science. What the evidence indicates is that knowledge is the type of thing which came into existence when there was no knowledge prior to its existence, just like there was no human beings prior to there being humans, and no life prior to there being life. So knowledge seems to be a type of thing which comes into existence from a state of no knowledge. And, we ought not accept the premise that knowledge must come from prior knowledge, or else we get drawn into the problems Plato faced with the theory of recollection, and eternal Forms.

Since we cannot characterize knowledge as relying on something already known, we cannot characterize it as the type of thing which continually builds upon an existing foundation. Furthermore, we cannot make generalizations like you do, that all learning is done in the same way, because there may be many different ways that knowledge comes into existence as evidenced by the many different forms of life. And this is very evident from the aptitude tests given to high school students. Some people are good at some things, and not so good at others, while other people are the opposite. So a child learning how to talk follows a completely different process from one learning arithmetic, which is different from learning deductive logic, etc.. And, there are many things which people come up with, which cannot be explained as to how they came up with them. Therefore a significant number of people stray off the beaten path of the straight and narrow, and learn some other things instead.

Tell me you were mentally actively thinking....cognizing by means of concepts..... and not merely motivating your hand to follow the dots. And afterwards, henceforth forever, was it the hand motion you remember for the letter you want to write, or the rule that the shape identifies the name of the letter you want to write? — Mww

Are you kidding? I don't think I learned to think in concepts until advanced math in high school, and I had great difficulty, I did not catch on quickly, and I dropped out of math, so to this very day I might still not cognize by means of concepts very well, if at all. I take "cognizing by means of concepts" to mean when the symbols being used are meant to represent a particular unchanging idea. So even in basic arithmetic I thought that "7" represented a group of seven things, and I learned adding, subtraction, multiplication, etc. thinking this way.

So when I learned to write letters, it was very clearly particular hand motions which I learned. The teacher performed these on the blackboard and made us copy. And I learned to memorize the alphabet along with the way that each letter looked, so that on the command of a spoken letter, I could recall the look of it, and perform the hand motion required to draw it. Then I'd look at the letter I'd drawn, and compare with the teacher's to see how good I was getting at it, and what aspects needed more practice. After many repetitions it became habit. If I wanted a C I'd imagine it's looks briefly, do the required motion, and check to make sure it looked right. The only rules I remember concerned the size and positioning of the letters on the page and perhaps the positioning of my hand on the paper. There were no conceptual rules.

Arithmetic brought on many more rules, but again they were procedural rules, not conceptual rules. And the role of memory was increased such that there were little rules or tricks of association used to facilitate memorizing times tables etc.. I can't say that I think any of this involved cognizing by means of concepts. That perhaps comes about from reading. In reading I learned to imagine fictitious scenarios. This cultivates the notion that words represent something which you can create in your mind, something imaginary. I think that this is fundamental to cognizing by means of concepts, the idea that a word signifies something imaginary. That there may be very specific rules for how those imaginary things must be created (in mathematics for example) was not received well by me because I didn't have an aptitude for interpreting those rules. I learned very basic geometry, but that's about as far as I got in cognizing through the means of concepts. Things were too abstract, so I could not imagine very well what I was supposed to be doing.

well I think you are still stuck on something about these words; maybe thinking there is "no such thing as the ordinary way", as if the ordinary way were opposed to the philosophical way (which can make those distinctions). I can't sort it though.
— Antony Nickles

"Ordinary" in this instance implies normal, does it not? As if there is a customary, familiar, or habitual, normal, or "ordinary" way of making this decision as to whether it was an accident or a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's just use the term grammar for what OLP is doing and criteria for what traditional philosophy uses, as that is along the lines of a set standard to apply or judge by (the most familiar use of criteria and the one I think you are focusing on). Now let's just clear up that the grammar of a mistake would not be used in making a decision as in beforehand (in most cases--except a deliberate appeal to them, like in a speech), but, as I believe you are saying, in a decision as to what happened, though usually indirectly. For example, "Did your finger slip? (Was it an accident?); or, "Why did you shoot the cow?" (Was this a mistake?)

"Each particular incident, in each set of circumstances, must be judged according to the available evidence, and there is no such thing as the "ordinary criteria", to be applied in a particular situation." - Tony Nickles

I don't see where the reference to "worst case" comes from, or "sense of doom with every 'circumstance'". We are talking about judging an action which has already occurred, as to whether it was an accident or mistake. The action has already occurred so there is no sense of impending doom if the wrong decision is made. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was overreacting here I think to the supposition I saw that every instance calls for the need to be "judged" ("must" be justified), which I took as tied to the assumption that everything is intended or decided, or needs to be, or even can be, judged (Witt here talks of the grammar of knowledge: that there can be none without the possibility of doubt). And especially, that, if we were to (could) always judge, it would be based on one picture of how we judge.

And I think we also need to clear up that "criteria" (grammar) is not being investigated to (necessarily) figure out how we judge, as that implies justifying the action; as if every act needs justification (or is judged the same way); i.e., that philosophy is only (primarily) about grounded action or speech. What OLP is doing is looking at Grammar to: 1) show that philosophy's preoccupation with a picture where there is one explanation (for speech, say) is confused by our desire for certainty; and 2) to learn something about, e.g., intention by looking at the grammar of actions which delineate them from each other (here, see Austin, ad infinitum) @Banno. Here, above, we learned that part of the grammar of an accident does not allow it to be considered beforehand (again, revealing something about intention), but that a mistake's grammar allows for mitigation, say, by concentration "Don't make a mistake".

With OLP we are not "judging" (or justifying) the action, we are making a claim to our observation of the grammar (my claim, your concession to it), and the evidence is the example of what we say when we talk of accidents, or mistakes. So we are not doing the judging; people just make mistakes and accidents happen, and these are part of our lives, as is the deciding between them--which is what OLP looks at.

So, I think we are onto something to say OLP is not in the business of justification--we would be seeing what counts (what matters to us)--the grammar--to show us about intention, evidence, judging, decisions, etc., starting with the basic goal of OLP initially, which was to say judging and evidence--justification--works in different ways depending on the concept and even the context; that not everything is about certainty, universality, etc., but we can still have rationality and logic and truth value in other ways, and in cases philosophy thought we could not, e.g., what it is to judge and what counts as evidence, in: the problem of the other, aesthetics, moral moments, types of knowledge, and other philosophical concerns.

What I said, is that in each particular instance of such an action occurring, if such a decision is to be made, the action must be judged in a way which is specific to that particular instance. That is because each particular instance is unique, and there is a very fine line of difference between the two possible judgements. There is no customary, familiar, or habitual way of deciding this, therefore no "ordinary way" of making such a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now we can see that we are saying each "instance" is "unique" (and here is where @Joshs is, I believe, hanging onto "context" as unique/different) instead of saying there is a "particular" grammar for each "action" (concept). One implication when we say this may be that, if the "circumstances" are (context is) different each time, then the way of judging (justifying?) is the same---say by the one acting, or the one judging, or both in some way in each unique circumstance. This is only to say, look and see!: what are we hinging on the fact that every event is its own. I offer the grammar that, in any expression/act, what is "particular" about the context usually only comes up in light of the "grammar' of how we judge that thing (e.g., its felicity, or identity). In other words, if every circumstance was "unique", we would not have our lives aligned in the ways they are. Different parts of the context will come up with different questions about the act, endlessly, but rationally.

This is why there is a very clear need to distinguish, in principle, between what a person is saying, and what a person is doing with the words. If I judge what a person is 'saying' to me, according to my customary, familiar, habitual, ordinary way, but the person is actually 'doing' something different from what appears through my ordinary interpretation, then I will be deceived. Therefore, I need to apply criteria in my interpretation, to go beyond the ordinary interpretation which the deceiver intends for me to use to support the deception, in my effort to determine what the person is really doing with the words. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, there are ordinary means we use to judge deception, but there is always its possibility (the fear of the other mind). And Austin does show that some expressions "do" things--like, I promise, is: to promise. (He also shows that intention=meaning is the opening for deception). But not everything we say "does" something. Maybe we could say, there is what a person says, and then the possibility this is a different concept based on the anticipated grammar and the context, so that there is what is actually "done" with the words in terms of the aptness of the expression and the anticipated implications, and the consequences which should follow. That is to say, if you say: that, here you MUST (grammatically) be, e.g, making a threat, when the words you used took the form of an overture. The difference between these two is a major philosophical issue; Austin touches on it, Cavell is obsessed by it.

If you allow that OLP cannot dispel skepticism concerning "the solution", then you have no principle whereby you can argue that OLP is better than any other philosophy... — Metaphysician Undercover

Here I didn't mean to say that OLP was solving skepticism, just in a different way. The reintroduction of ordinary grammar is to show the many ways we have for rationally handling situations where doubt creates skepticism for the philosopher. Now that is not to say these "solve" skepticism as they come to an end somewhere, but they are ours and we are responsible for them, in our lives, in a way traditional philosophy would like to ignore in just setting its own standards (Cavell will say Witt sees the truth of skepticism)--knowledge has a limit; we are separate but answerable to each other, and the possibility for continued intelligibility exists.

The standard for OLP of a claim to our ordinary criteria is if you see it and agree; if you see what I see--that you can show yourself.
— Antony Nickles

But this has no logical rigour. Agreement does not require criteria. You propose something to me, I can agree or disagree, but neither requires criteria... And your claim that "ordinary criteria" is justified by me agreeing, is unsupported. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is supported by the evidence of my examples and their detail and "perspicuity" (Witt calls it); the distinctions I describe between grammar; the description being thorough (rigorous; not lazy, haphazard, sloppy). I don't think you can read Austin and not call that "rigour". Now maybe you mean logical certainty; rigour as in: held to a certain standard for justification or something.

This does reveal OLP's inability to force itself on us, or necessarily require your agreement if you agree on premises, etc. It is based on you seeing for yourself what I am claiming (about the grammar of a thing). In Wittgenstein there are a lot of places left with questions, for us to answer for ourselves; or (oblique) statements which only point at a conclusion we have to draw, He, and Nietzsche, will make a grammatical claim, and everyone assumes it is a statement justified to be true; that they both are taken to have theories about philosophical issues when they are (mostly) describing what they see, for you to try to see as well. (You can read Cavell and feel like he only told you half the story, and Austin is so obtuse that people only take him to be making the case for different types of acts, with no point to it at all.)

"You say let's get rid of the notion "word=idea", it's a faulty "picture". Then you say "let's put it that: we are seeing how a concept is used." But what we are seeing is words being used.[/quote]

This could have been worded better. I did not mean to say "Words/concepts are used (by people)". Just that OLP is looking at the uses (as in "senses") of a concept, describing the grammar of that use (as a concept may have different uses/senses--see "I know" above). Not that I control the meaning (how it is "used") of the expression, but only that expressions (concepts) have different ways in which they work (uses/senses)--a concept will have different grammar for each use, but we don't "use" that grammar, manipulate, control, intend, etc., or "use" a concept.

The customary, habitual, familiar, ordinary acts proceed from an attitude of certainty, while we only apply criteria when we are uncertain. So if we wish to obtain a true understanding of these types of acts, we need to maintain that separation between acts carried out with an attitude of certainty, and acts carried out with uncertainty, we ought not use "criteria" when referring to the motivating factor in customary, habitual, familiar, ordinary acts, which are carried out with an attitude of certainty. We only apply criteria when we are uncertain. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is well taken. Part of what OLP is saying is that all acts are subject to uncertainty (though I'm not sure we carry out our acts with "certainty" so much as confidence). But by uncertainty I mean, every act is subject to failure. Now if something "fishy" (Austin will say), happens, the Other will be uncertain in a sense, yes. However, what OLP makes clear is that this is not the open hole that leads to the type of skepticism where we abstract from any context and install "certainty" in some other way. This would be to overlook or wipe out the grammar of the act, which includes the way it might fail, and how we rectify that, with qualifications, excuses, detail, etc. "Was that a threat...?" "No, I was trying to make an overture, and left off what I intended next." Now the Other is reassured, but are they now "certain"?

Now if we are qualifying acts as "customary, habitual, familiar, ordinary", then we are assuming a sense of "certainty" in those types of acts, where with "other" acts we need certainty, in the sense of justification perhaps. Now we may just be thinking of aesthetics, morality, politics, etc., where some might say there are no justifications, or none that satisfy reason, or logic, or certainty. And even here, OLP will point to the grammar of the concepts in these areas as a sense of rationale, intelligibility, if not certainty, nor agreement. But there may be times when, even given the existence of our grammar, we are at a loss as to how to proceed. And then perhaps reflection on our grammar (philosophy) might help, or at least allow us to see the ground we are on in this case (the rationality of our options), so that we may go beyond our grammar, or against it, or extend it into a new world.

The problem though, is that the term "everyone" is extremely inclusive, in an absolute sense, therefore too inclusive. All it takes, is one person who is abnormal, and doesn't share that ordinary way, to be skeptical, uncertain. This person might start applying criteria, and develop the belief that the judgement which everyone else is certain of, as they proceed in the ordinary way, with certainty and without criteria, is actually wrong... This is why we cannot ever exclude skepticism. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I agree, skepticism shows that the ability of knowledge to take our place has a limit. After that, we are responsible for the decision that our ("shared") judgments are wrong (that it is "I" that must go beyond our morality Nietzsche will say). There are ways to address this: education, political action, we ourselves stand for the new judgment by our example, etc.

But the universality I was referring to, as it were, was between philosophers, those investigating the grammar of our concepts. Here, if you disagree, you are obligated to make yourself intelligible, with counterexamples, further, more-detailed contexts, etc.; though philosophy breaks down too.

Either we must just accept as a fact that language was not designed to talk about meaning, and we simply cannot go there with language, it is a realm of what cannot be spoken about, or, we need to redesign language such that it can be used to properly speak about meaning. I think that the latter is the appropriate way forward, and the way which philosopher generally proceed, giving the impression that philosophy uses language in an abnormal way. Well yes, but that's because we cannot do philosophy using language in the ordinary way, because ordinary language was not purposed for doing philosophy. OLP ought to simply acknowledge this difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the paragraph before this, you do an excellent job of describing the picture of meaning which Witt is trying to reveal we (philosophy) had been struggling under (and still does in some circles). And your first option here is the direction Witt went with the Tractatus. But then you say '"or, we need to redesign language such that it can be used to properly speak about meaning." And here is where we are caught by the same net. I admit (@Banno) that our language is the rope, as it were, but OLP's idea is not to "redesign language", use it in an "abnormal" way (I would say this is, backwards, putting certainty first and the words second), yet neither, as I have been saying, use it in a contrasting "normal" way, within the net as it were. OLP is turning and looking at what we imply when we say "I mean" in order to see the grammar of meaning--I would say, that our grammar allows for expressions to be meaningful (not justified) because grammar tracks what is meaningful in our lives.

But I think we can say this much: philosophy doesn't come along to add a normative dimension to our lives -- it's already there, and available for philosophy to participate in just as people do ordinarily. Philosophy doesn't stand outside or above life in judgment, but by the same token philosophy can make just the same sort of normative claims as non-philosophers do everyday. — Srap Tasmaner

:100:

Perhaps we are looking for a specific version of "higher", even before we start our investigation to look at the use of our concepts. — Antony Nickles

In reacting to skepticism, philosophy sees the problem as the human, its fallibility, its inconsistency, its emotion, its partiality, its diversity, and decides that none of that is going to give us the certainty and universality and rationality that we want to solve skepticism, so we take philosophy out of any context and fashion it to meet the standards that will solve it. — Antony Nickles

Seeing the representation of an object with a word (or any other similar picture) as the only picture out there of how meaning works, Witt turned to look at all the variety of ways different things are meaningful to us. So why this other picture? And his interlocutor keeps going on about having to know, and about rules, etc. So the idea is that the fear of doubt and the black hole of skepticism/relativism cause the philosopher to skip over our regular criteria to fix meaning and word together, to have certain knowledge, normative rules, universal criteria, predetermined, etc. — Antony Nickles

I question whether it is necessarily a fear (e.g. of doubt) that motivates all skepticism or all philosophy. I think the philosopher's desire for an undefined "higher" form of knowledge may also be a contributing factor. I find it difficult to explicate what "higher" means in this regard, except for all the factors that you mention: more universal/objective, more certain, more logical/rational.

I hadn't previously considered what you appear to be presenting here and for which OLP claims to provide a resolution: that at least some traditional philosophical problems are a direct result of this "higher" striving, especially with its byproduct removal of humanity from the picture. This would mean that philosophers end up in some (context-less) problems of their own making.

As Witt says, "back to the rough ground!"

"Ordinary" in this instance implies normal, does it not? As if there is a customary, familiar, or habitual, normal, or "ordinary" way of making this decision as to whether it was an accident or a mistake.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just look up dictionary definitions of the two words and see if there is any consistent conceptual difference.

One thing I'd emphasize is how one of the quintessential moves of OLP works: if X were true then it would make sense to say Y. — Srap Tasmaner

This is a good point (and I'm glad someone out there is taking up the banner). I have been focusing so much on just getting over some kind of threshold misunderstanding we are having that I have not provided any of the other (negative) ways OLP works. Witt does this a lot, as I mentioned parenthetically above, when he says (grammatically, of knowledge) that we can not speak (categorically) of knowledge, when there is no possibility of doubt. They will also take a statement of traditional philosophy and ask: in what context would this be said? "I only see the appearance of a Goldifinch."

Thank you for the contribution.

Our lives have agreed in all the little ways (all the pieces are in place Wii says) that allow for us to recognize the terms of a misunderstanding, the concept of miscommunication.
— Antony Nickles

Our lives will have had to agree in more than just the little ways in order for our criteria to align closely enough to attain agreement on the content of the ideas. — Joshs

But we are not talking about "attaining" "agreement" on "ideas" or "meanings". Our lives align (in apologizing) in ways (what is apt or not, how excused, or fixed...) that we can see in looking at saying: I apologize. The alignment is, as Austin said, over thousands of years in myriad ways. And Witt will add from top to bottom, big and small: that we are human, that we act in uncertainty, that things go wrong, that there is pain, that there are remedies, etc. All these things need to be in place beforehand. We do not agree what an apology is, we agree in judgements, Witt will say. #242

Rorty and I are both claiming that Cavell is assuming a logical connection between such situations as believing in the picture theory of meaning and Wittgenstein’s corrective of that thinking. Instead, we argue that moving from a belief in the picture theory to language games amounts to a change of subject. — Joshs

Well I read the Rorty, and I don't agree that we do not have to go through the history of analytical philosophy to get to a point where we feel the need (desire) for radical skepticism. I'm not sure if he just hasn't read enough Cavell (maybe the early stuff), but Cavell does account for the connection (I wouldn't call it logical more then inevitable, or sliding down a slippery slope) between the desire for certainty and removing the human. Rorty even refers to the discussion Cavell has that our relation to the world is not one of knowing, as we understand it (perhaps most directly evidenced in Knowing and Acknowledging).

And there is the "picture theory of meaning" but Witt separately refers to a picture (like a framework) but it is not one people "believe" in. It is forced on them by their desire for certainty. To say Witt is corrective is not to say he is convincing people to "now believe" in language games. He is doing more than changing the subject; he is hoping you see what you desired of the picture, and then to turn around and see a better way (method) to see our actual desires.

Skepticism belongs to the type of thinking that is incommensurable with Wittgenstein. In order for a skeptic to “take meaning out of any context” they would fist have to understand ‘context’ and ‘ meaning’ in the way that Witt means it , and that is precisely what they cannot do. — Joshs

What I mean by "taking away any context" is an implication of what they do; or, in this case, the abstraction of meaning to have an explaination for all communication, or to require that morality be determined before an event (or deontologically--without us). Not everything is done with my intention or reasons--the effect of what I say is not causally related; I may choose my words, but then they are in the world, subject to the criteria or our concepts, even though I remain answerable for them. (@Metaphysician Undercover)

As Witt says, "back to the rough ground!" — Luke

Thank you, I understand your being wary of talking about something "higher". A reticence that I have is that philosophy does want something higher, a more complete understanding, to better ourselves, to rise above what can be lazy, nasty, partisan, ineffective, unintelligible, etc. I think OLP provides the possibiity of that in taking us from: grasping for a goal of certainty to have it slip away, to waiting to see the grammar that provide the humble dirt from which to begin that work.

Thank you, I understand your being wary of talking about something "higher". A reticence that I have is that philosophy does want something higher, a more complete understanding, to better ourselves, to rise above what can be lazy, nasty, partisan, ineffective, unintelligible, etc. I think OLP provides the possibiity of that in taking us from: grasping for a goal of certainty to have it slip away, to waiting to see the grammar that provide the humble dirt from which to begin that work. — Antony Nickles

I agree. I was probably insufficiently clear that I had traditional (pre-OLP) philosophy in mind in reference to this desire for something "higher"; that is, something more objective, certain, rational, etc.

There is an age-old argument that each rational being has his own philosophy, that by which his intelligence, inclinations and personality in general becomes susceptible to their respective manifestations. So saying, it follows that each rational being, upon being linguistically engaged, is, in effect, philosophizing in accordance with it, objectively.

Ordinary language can be taken as the content of any linguistic engagement, thus OLP can then be taken as each rational being’s internal ground for his philosophizing by means of that content, and such philosophizing suffices as that by which such internal ground is represented. From here, it makes sense that he intends differing meanings for articles of his linguistic engagement depending on the differing contexts of its expression, all in accordance with an overarching personal philosophy with respect to all of them. As such, each engagement is itself a measure, or an example, of a philosophy.

How’m I doing? Close? Ballpark?

in the philosophical examination of how knowledge is acquired, something must already known.
— Mww

I disagree with all of this, at a most fundamental level. (W)e cannot philosophically examine the acquisition of knowledge with the presupposition that something must already be known, for the acquisition of knowledge, because this is contrary to the observed evidence of empirical science. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except you aren’t at the fundamental level, obviously, because my assertion presupposes knowledge already acquired.

Your rejoinder is even more absurd empirically, considering the reality that, e.g., heliocentrism could never have come to be known, if the standing knowledge represented by geocentrism wasn’t being first examined by Aristarchus. Just because Ptolemy turned out to be wrong doesn’t take away from his knowledge.

Works in reverse just as well: how could knowledge acquisition ever be examined, if there was never anything known?

Empirical knowledge isn’t destroyed, it’s replaced. A priori knowledge, if one grants the validity of it, is neither destroyed nor replaced. Even if not accepted as a general knowledge condition due to the impossibility of its empirical proof, it can still be granted logical necessity.

Since we cannot characterize knowledge as relying on something already known, we cannot characterize it as the type of thing which continually builds upon an existing foundation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yet, that is exactly how science is done, and science is both the means and the ends of human empirical knowledge, so.....the asymptotic relation is glaringly obvious.

Nevertheless, it’s irrelevant, because that’s not what I’m doing. I’m not characterizing knowledge, but theorizing on its acquisition, which presupposes its character is already determined, as it must have been, in order to grant it is something possible to acquire by the means supposed for it. The state of knowledge builds on its existential antecedents, yes, but that doesn't in the least give any indication of what knowledge is. It might just be that knowledge doesn’t even have a character, but it is a characterization of something else. Knowledge may be characterized as merely the condition of the intellect. But that still doesn’t indicate what knowledge is, but only what it does.

Metaphysical reductionism....don’t hate it because it’s beautiful.

Now let's just clear up that the grammar of a mistake would not be used in making a decision as in beforehand (in most cases--except a deliberate appeal to them, like in a speech), but, as I believe you are saying, in a decision as to what happened, though usually indirectly. For example, "Did your finger slip? (Was it an accident?); or, "Why did you shoot the cow?" (Was this a mistake?) — Antony Nickles

Can you clear this up for me then? What is meant by "the grammar of a mistake"? If "grammar" concerns rules of correct usage, and a "mistake" is to do something incorrectly, then how could a mistake have grammar? Doesn't "grammar of a mistake" seem oxymoronic to you?

quote="Antony Nickles;492631"]Here, above, we learned that part of the grammar of an accident does not allow it to be considered beforehand (again, revealing something about intention), but that a mistake's grammar allows for mitigation, say, by concentration "Don't make a mistake".[/quote]

See, replacing "criteria" with "grammar" does not resolve the issue. If it was a "mistake", then the grammar was not adhered to, and you cannot talk about "a mistake's grammar". If grammar was adhered to, you cannot call it a mistake. What is a mistake then, an act without grammar? But is an act without grammar necessarily a mistake. Wasn't there a time prior to grammar? Were these actions which brought grammar into existence mistaken actions?

With OLP we are not "judging" (or justifying) the action, we are making a claim to our observation of the grammar (my claim, your concession to it), and the evidence is the example of what we say when we talk of accidents, or mistakes. So we are not doing the judging; people just make mistakes and accidents happen, and these are part of our lives, as is the deciding between them--which is what OLP looks at. — Antony Nickles

Can't you see though, that this is a judgement in itself? To say that something is a "mistake", or it is an "accident", implies that you have made that judgement. It's hypocritical to say to a person, "I'm not judging you", but then proceed to talk about what the person has done as a :"mistake". So in reality, you really are judging, by referring to things as mistakes or accidents.

But that's just the nature of language use. Choice of words implies judgement, and that's why we can categorize language use as an action. And we assume that this activity is carried out through some form of intention, like other human acts. The difficult aspect about language use is that it is activity which is often carried on rapidly, in an habitual way, therefore with very little thought. So we're faced with the question of how does intention play a role in an activity carried out with very little thought, and no immediate indications of intention even being present.

I was overreacting here I think to the supposition I saw that every instance calls for the need to be "judged" ("must" be justified), which I took as tied to the assumption that everything is intended or decided, or needs to be, or even can be, judged (Witt here talks of the grammar of knowledge: that there can be none without the possibility of doubt). And especially, that, if we were to (could) always judge, it would be based on one picture of how we judge. — Antony Nickles

So the point here, is that every instance of saying something, as an instance of performing an action, implies that judgement has been made prior to the act, and it was an intentional act. And, we really know very little about how intention plays a role in this activity of saying things, because much of it is done in an habitual way which displays little if any of the features of intention. However, we relate to what has been said through "meaning" implying what was meant, or intended. Therefore there is a serious gap here, a hole in our knowledge. We assume to know what was meant or intended, by an act in which intention is barely evident. So we turn to something completely other than the speaker's intention to justify our interpretations.

The hole, or gap is only closed by skepticism. Skepticism is to recognize that there is the possibility that I misunderstand what was meant due to a deficient method of interpretation. You say for instance, "grammar of a mistake", I recognize that I might very easily misunderstand what you mean by this, so I question you in a skeptical way. Now, we'll see what comes out of this, but the way I see it, is that very often on this forum, people cannot explain what they mean when questioned about a phrase they have used. This fact provides another piece of evidence. Not only do people appear to be talking away habitually, without thought or intention entering into what they are saying, but even when questioned about what they mean by what they have said, sometimes they cannot even determine what they themselves intended. The evidence therefore, is that there are speech acts with very little if any intention, thus very little meaning, yet they appear to be correct grammatically.

What OLP is doing is looking at Grammar to: 1) show that philosophy's preoccupation with a picture where there is one explanation (for speech, say) is confused by our desire for certainty; and 2) to learn something about, e.g., intention by looking at the grammar of actions which delineate them from each other (here, see Austin, ad infinitum) Banno. — Antony Nickles

This I believe is a misrepresentation of philosophy. It is not preoccupied by this 'one picture', or 'one explanation'. Take Plato's dialectical method for example. Each dialogue takes a term, like love, courage, friendship, knowledge, or just, and investigates the various different ways that the word is used. The implication is, that if there was an ideal, the ideal would validate the correct definition, therefore correct use of the term. It is only in the more logical based fields, mathematics and science for example, which assumes a definition as a starting point, assuming an ideal as a premise, that the 'one explanation' scenario is paramount. A philosopher might appear preoccupied in skepticism, with the question of what validates that particular explanation (definition), the one employed by the mathematician as the ideal.

So, I think we are onto something to say OLP is not in the business of justification--we would be seeing what counts (what matters to us)--the grammar--to show us about intention, evidence, judging, decisions, etc., starting with the basic goal of OLP initially, which was to say judging and evidence--justification--works in different ways depending on the concept and even the context; that not everything is about certainty, universality, etc., but we can still have rationality and logic and truth value in other ways, and in cases philosophy thought we could not, e.g., what it is to judge and what counts as evidence, in: the problem of the other, aesthetics, moral moments, types of knowledge, and other philosophical concerns. — Antony Nickles

Clearly this is folly, to claim that we can have "rationality and logic and truth value" without justification. You know, a person could go on and on, saying all sorts of things in all sorts of ways, without even knowing what oneself is saying, spouting off all sorts of inconsistencies and contradictions, but how is the meaning of what that person is saying going to be revealed without justification? Without justification how can anyone judge whether what the person is saying is rational, logical, or true? We could consider justification to be a type of explanation, or interpretation..

This is why there is a very real difference between saying something and interpreting (explaining) what has been said. Philosophy seeks the interpretation, the explanation. Now, there is a very real problem in affirming that interpretation is carried out according to criteria, or grammar. This is because grammar and criteria consists of principles, rules, and these things themselves need to be interpreted. This is what Wittgenstein demonstrated very early in the PI, as a fundamental principle. We cannot assume an infinite regress of rules required for the interpretation of rules. Therefore we ought to conclude that interpretation, and explanation, the aspects of language use which philosophers are interested in, cannot be deferred to grammar or criteria.

Now we can see that we are saying each "instance" is "unique" (and here is where Joshs is, I believe, hanging onto "context" as unique/different) instead of saying there is a "particular" grammar for each "action" (concept). — Antony Nickles

But this doesn't make sense to say that there is a particular grammar for each unique action. If we separate a descriptive grammar from a prescriptive grammar, we can see that the prescriptive grammar consists of general rules for application, so we can rule out the prescriptive grammar as insufficient for a particular grammar. And if we say that each particular action has a description unique to it, how could we call unique, distinct, and different incidents, as following "a grammar"?

In other words, if every circumstance was "unique", we would not have our lives aligned in the ways they are. — Antony Nickles

But every circumstance is unique, time and space are that way, despite what you say about the way that we align our lives. Have you ever been in two circumstances exactly the same? Even deja vu is regarded as inconclusive.

Maybe we could say, there is what a person says, and then the possibility this is a different concept based on the anticipated grammar and the context, so that there is what is actually "done" with the words in terms of the aptness of the expression and the anticipated implications, and the consequences which should follow. — Antony Nickles

Why do you feel the urge to think that there is always 'concepts' involved when people are speaking? Why not just start with the evidence, and basic facts, that people are doing something with words? If, when we proceed to analyze what they are doing with words, the need to assume concepts comes up, then we can deal with that. But until that point I see this assumption of "concepts" as misleading.

I see your assumption of "concepts" as directly opposed to what you say that OLP is telling you: " What OLP is doing is looking at Grammar to: 1) show that philosophy's preoccupation with a picture where there is one explanation (for speech, say) is confused by our desire for certainty;". You have just replaced the 'picture which can give certainty' with 'concept'.

This could have been worded better. I did not mean to say "Words/concepts are used (by people)". Just that OLP is looking at the uses (as in "senses") of a concept, describing the grammar of that use (as a concept may have different uses/senses--see "I know" above). Not that I control the meaning (how it is "used") of the expression, but only that expressions (concepts) have different ways in which they work (uses/senses)--a concept will have different grammar for each use, but we don't "use" that grammar, manipulate, control, intend, etc., or "use" a concept. — Antony Nickles

This is what I'll ask of you, as a proposition, to enable our capacity to proceed in a manner of discussion which is acceptable to both of us. Can we start simply with the idea that in language and communication people are 'doing something with words'. We cannot assume "concepts", nor can we assume "grammar", or "criteria", or any such type of principles or rules as prerequisite for 'doing something with words'.

We can start by inquiring as to what it is that people are doing with words, and perhaps make a few divisions as to the different types of things which people do with words, like Plato suggested in his analysis of "rhetoric". If the need comes up to consider concepts, or grammar, then we will consider the roles of these things as the need arises. But until then, I think that any preconception concerning the roles of these things is a hinderance to good philosophy.

However, what OLP makes clear is that this is not the open hole that leads to the type of skepticism where we abstract from any context and install "certainty" in some other way. This would be to overlook or wipe out the grammar of the act, which includes the way it might fail, and how we rectify that, with qualifications, excuses, detail, etc. "Was that a threat...?" "No, I was trying to make an overture, and left off what I intended next." Now the Other is reassured, but are they now "certain"? — Antony Nickles

This is what I request, that we "wipe out the grammar of the act". That there is necessarily a grammar to an act is what I dispute as an unjustified, unnecessary, doubtful, and actually a very fishy claim in itself. It's fishy because it is unwarranted and therefore must conceal a hidden motivation, and this makes me uncertain about your intention. So let's start with the assumption that a human being is free to act as one pleases, and if the need to assume some sort of grammar appears to arise, we can discuss that need.

Now if we are qualifying acts as "customary, habitual, familiar, ordinary", then we are assuming a sense of "certainty" in those types of acts, where with "other" acts we need certainty, in the sense of justification perhaps. Now we may just be thinking of aesthetics, morality, politics, etc., where some might say there are no justifications, or none that satisfy reason, or logic, or certainty. And even here, OLP will point to the grammar of the concepts in these areas as a sense of rationale, intelligibility, if not certainty, nor agreement. But there may be times when, even given the existence of our grammar, we are at a loss as to how to proceed. And then perhaps reflection on our grammar (philosophy) might help, or at least allow us to see the ground we are on in this case (the rationality of our options), so that we may go beyond our grammar, or against it, or extend it into a new world. — Antony Nickles

So, I further propose that this type of action, customary, habitual, familiar, and ordinary acts, are carried out with little, if any, reference to grammar in the performing of those acts. These acts are carried out with minimal thought, and the thought which is used is used to determine an efficacious method, for the particular circumstances (context). Therefore the thought is not directed toward, or by, grammar, it is directed by the intent to bring about the desired consequences in the particular context or circumstances. Grammar is not a principal feature of this type of act. If you disagree, then you could explain why, or how you disagree.

And here is where we are caught by the same net. I admit (@Banno) that our language is the rope, as it were, but OLP's idea is not to "redesign language", use it in an "abnormal" way (I would say this is, backwards, putting certainty first and the words second), yet neither, as I have been saying, use it in a contrasting "normal" way, within the net as it were. — Antony Nickles

Here is the problem with this perspective, and it's a very simple and straight forward issue. Knowledge is a type of becoming. It is the type of thing which comes into being, progresses, and evolves. Knowledge advances. Language is the same type of thing as it is closely related to knowledge as a facilitator of knowledge. Because of this progression of knowledge, this philosophical need for evolution or advancement of knowledge, there is a need for a progression and evolution of language as required to capacitate the evolution of knowledge. Therefore there is a need for philosophy to "redesign language", and use language in a way initially perceived as "abnormal", or else we could not venture into the unknown with the intent to make it known.

Just look up dictionary definitions of the two words and see if there is any consistent conceptual difference. — Janus

I have. We can say that an accident in some cases is the result of a mistake, the consequences of. But a mistake might also be the consequences of another mistake, or some other unforeseen thing, making the mistake itself an accident. So in many instances the same thing could be correctly called an accident or a mistake.

As Witt says, "back to the rough ground!" — Luke

It's a funny thing that LW's other really salient metaphor for what he's up to is seeking a "bird's eye view" -- that puts you not only not on the rough ground but not on the ground at all! Perhaps this is his "stereoscopic vision", I don't know. It's odd though.

A couple months ago I had an exchange with @Andrew M in which I made a somewhat fanciful use of the rough ground vs. ice thing, suggesting that one way of doing philosophy is to make glass-soled boots that will glide all the way across a frozen pond with one push. Of course you can't actually use them for anything, but you can pretend you've demonstrated the perfect boot.

I have felt very strongly the pull of formal systems (as LW did), of logic and game theory and the rest. I have admired the perfection of many a glass-soled boot. But I have come to suspect that the desire to formalize philosophy is a desire not to think, but instead to build a machine that simply spits out the answers.

LW, like Derrida, offers a sort of internal critique of the project: Derrida repeatedly shows that every self-described "complete" system has swept something under the rug, something it needs to work but pretends isn't there; Wittgenstein talks about things like "following a rule", which you can't formalize in rules on pain of regress, and then he asks how it is possible that we clearly can follow a rule or fail to despite the lack of definitive criteria. To answer that question, you need the bird's eye view, but therein lies temptation: it is from such heights that we perceive structure, human civilization laid out before us like a circuit board in all its logical perfection, the territory reduced to a map.

But a map is also a tool. There are good maps and bad, useful and misleading, and how you use the map, how you modify it, update it and improve it -- none of that is on the map. A map is such an extraordinary thing! It would be a mistake to regret their invention. But it would also be a mistake to think that exploration is not required for making good maps, or to think that having drawn the map you've actually been everywhere you want to go.

Except you aren’t at the fundamental level, obviously, because my assertion presupposes knowledge already acquired. — Mww

OK, sorry I misunderstood. But now that I think I understand, I don't see the relevance of what you said. Of course we cannot examine the coming into being of knowledge without knowledge having already come into being, but how is that point relevant to anything?

Your rejoinder is even more absurd empirically, considering the reality that, e.g., heliocentrism could never have come to be known, if the standing knowledge represented by geocentrism wasn’t being first examined by Aristarchus. Just because Ptolemy turned out to be wrong doesn’t take away from his knowledge. — Mww

You have no logical association here. Let's say that geocentricism was examined and demonstrated as incorrect. Then heliocentrism took its place. Heliocentrism is not based in geocentricism, nor does it require geocentricism to precede it. Heliocentrism is completely distinct, and not dependent on geocentricism at all, so it may have come into existence without geocentricism preceding it. Just because it didn't and the one does follow the other in time, does not prove a causal connection, so we cannot logically say that the existence of heliocentrism is dependent on the prior existence of geocentricism.

Yet, that is exactly how science is done, and science is both the means and the ends of human empirical knowledge, so.....the asymptotic relation is glaringly obvious. — Mww

I agree very much, that some knowledge depends on other knowledge, and that in many cases principles are built on existing principles. The problem is that characterizing knowledge in this way denies one the capacity for a complete understanding of knowledge. This is because the most fundamental principles are also a part of knowledge, and we cannot characterize them in this way, as built on other principles. If we characterize knowledge in this way, then all knowledge will be based on other knowledge, and therefore all knowledge will require some fundamental principles not derived this way, at its base, to support it. Since we cannot account for those fundamental principles, then all of our knowledge of knowledge is fundamentally flawed.

You can try to avoid this problem by positing a priori principles as the foundation, but I see this proposal as unacceptable. This is because the reality of a priori principles cannot be demonstrated, so they appear to me to be simply an assumption of convenience. If we cannot account for the fundamental principles, that's no problem, we just posit a priori principles and there you have it, problem solved.

I’m not characterizing knowledge, but theorizing on its acquisition, which presupposes its character is already determined, as it must have been, in order to grant it is something possible to acquire by the means supposed for it. — Mww

Let me see if I can understand what you are saying here then. You are assuming that there is something called "knowledge" and since there is such a thing its character is already determined. Now you are theorizing as to how knowledge might have been acquired.

It might just be that knowledge doesn’t even have a character, but it is a characterization of something else. Knowledge may be characterized as merely the condition of the intellect. But that still doesn’t indicate what knowledge is, but only what it does. — Mww

But now you are rejecting that assumption, saying that there might not even be such a thing as knowledge. I don't think you can have it both ways. That would just lead to ambiguous meaninglessness. If your premise is "there is knowledge", so you proceed to inquire into the acquisition of knowledge, and the conclusions you come to, make you realize that the original premise "there is knowledge" is unsound, then shouldn't you reject that premise altogether, and start from something completely different?

This is what I think is fundamental to knowledge. We start with premises which prove very useful, and since they are so useful they seem solid to support structures of knowledge. So we build huge structures on these fundamentals, which appear to be unshakably sound due to their usefulness, until we get really high, and far out on the branches, where the conclusion start to appear a little absurd. Why are the conclusions absurd? Well it's not evident, and we can reexamine the logical process over and over again without finding the fault. Then we must face the only remaining possible solution, the fundamental premises, the premises which we take for granted, as absolutely unshakable, which support the entire structure, are not sound, and therefore the entire structure must come done and be rebuild all over again from bottom up.

So I think that your example of heliocentrism and geocentricism is very relevant and can tell us a lot about this reality. Thousands of years ago, that the sun moves across the sky, was a fundamental, unshakable premise, very useful for making clocks, calendars, and all sorts of representations. Back then, no one would even think of anything other wise. So huge structures of knowledge and predictions were built on this fundamental premise. However, it turned out that certain predictions weren't coming out quite right, there were some anomalies. When this happens, we can proceed by piling more and more principles onto the structure, to deal with the anomalies, but this just makes the entire structure more and more unstable. Eventually, the whole structure had to come down, to start over again from scratch, to address the unsound premises, which had at one time seemed so obviously true.

An important thing to remember here, is that the principles at the base of the structure have been around for the longest. Although they are the ones taken for granted as the most obvious, and basic, they are actually the weakest ones, having been put into use the longest time ago when the state of knowledge was most primitive.

"Ordinary" in this instance implies normal, does it not? As if there is a customary, familiar, or habitual, normal, or "ordinary" way of making this decision as to whether it was an accident or a mistake..
— Metaphysician Undercover

Just look up dictionary definitions of the two words and see if there is any consistent conceptual difference. — Janus

I have been going back and forth with @Metaphysician Undercover about the role "concept" plays in the Philosophicl Investigations because it is not a concept as in "idea". He uses it as a technical term, only to say as his own way of categorizing the type of expressions and actions for which we don't set the standards and thus need to investigate their criteria (grammar), another specific term, before we know what they actually are (meaning, intending, thinking--though also to show everyday concepts like sitting in a chair, or a game, or apologies, are subject to the same investigation/mystery--we don't usually think about).

All this to say, with these two words, we are not going to find our answers in a dictionary. I will also throw out there that a definition is one type of description of, say, intention, but the idea that we understand every word independently is one way we get into problems with the picture of how language works.

Ordinary language can be taken as the content of any linguistic engagement, thus OLP can then be taken as each rational being’s internal ground for his philosophizing by means of that content, and such philosophizing suffices as that by which such internal ground is represented.

From here, it makes sense that he intends differing meanings for articles of his linguistic engagement depending on the differing contexts of its expression, all in accordance with an overarching personal philosophy with respect to all of them. As such, each engagement is itself a measure, or an example, of a philosophy.

How’m I doing? Close? Ballpark? — Mww

I hate to say it, because I appreciate the effort, but this is, metaphorically, not even playing baseball in terms of describing OLP.

OLP is not a theory nor the "content of linguistic engagement"; it is a philosophical method, to learn about our lives. The process was first used by Witt and Austin to show a picture--as it turns out, exactly the one you are trying to understand it within. Now, the Grammar of a "concept"--Witt's term, not, like, an "idea", rather, e.g., apologizing, walking, knowing, sitting in a chair)--is a description (the Grammar is) of what is meaningful about these "concepts"--what counts for it being that (or not), what matters in its judgments, the distinctions that are made, the interests involved, etc. As Austin is quoted above as saying, all the things embedded from living our lives for thousands of years.

Grammar is not discussed (usually), so much as lived (we know, apologize, etc.). Though we reflect (doing philosophy) on them through examining what we say, e.g., "I didn't intend to shoot the cow" (It was a mistake, I meant to shoot the donkey).

And Grammar does not serve as "grounds", as in justification or to ensure meaning ("forms of life" or agreement). As an example, "intention" (above) is found not always to be present, and thus not casual for "meaning", which is also seen as not in any form an object. Try to imagine why and when we would say: "What did you mean when you... ?" and then look for the grammar of it--say, for one, something has to be wrong in order to ask what you mean (that is a categorical necessity), or, we don't always ask, and then, we don't always "mean" something, or maybe something particular, or what you might misunderstand the meaning of.

The grammar is public; that is it is "external" and shared--in the way our lives are shared (not that people explicitly know it, or use it to argue--some things we just do or say without "knowing" the grammar, though we can make/judge a claim about it. Think of Socrates asking about the Good, Justice, and getting answers/judgements from strangers). It is "claimed" to be universal by the philosopher, subject to your seeing it as well, showing it to yourself. Also, Witt and Austin are fighting the picture of an idea being "represented", along with a word "having" a meaning, something internal corresponding with anything else.

OLP makes a claim to those ways and means and identity (a concept's Grammar) in order to learn about our philosophical questions--first, to show that there are as many ways of rationality and justification, etc. as there are concepts (though of course things overlap); and second, about the problems we have of other minds, skepticism, morality, reason, etc.

It is not that each occurrence is an example; we are describing examples of what is said about the concept in order to investigate the Grammar--more public and general than looking at each occurrence and our opinion or "personal philosophy" with respect to "all of them" (articles?).

So be it. To strike out is to show one should stick to his own game.

All this to say, with these two words, we are not going to find our answers in a dictionary. I will also throw out there that a definition is one type of description of, say, intention, but the idea that we understand every word independently is one way we get into problems with the picture of how language works. — Antony Nickles

I have. We can say that an accident in some cases is the result of a mistake, the consequences of. But a mistake might also be the consequences of another mistake, or some other unforeseen thing, making the mistake itself an accident. So in many instances the same thing could be correctly called an accident or a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quick searches produced these from Merriam Webster:

MISTAKE noun

Definition of mistake
1 : a wrong judgment : misunderstanding
2 : a wrong action or statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge, or inattention

ACCIDENT noun
Save Word

Definition of accident

1a : an unforeseen and unplanned event or circumstance Their meeting was an accident.
b : lack of intention or necessity : chance They met by accident rather than by design.
2a : an unfortunate event resulting especially from carelessness or ignorance was involved in a traffic accident
b medical : an unexpected and medically important bodily event especially when injurious a cerebrovascular accident
c law : an unexpected happening causing loss or injury which is not due to any fault or misconduct on the part of the person injured but for which legal relief may be sought
d US, informal —used euphemistically to refer to an uncontrolled or involuntary act or instance of urination or defecation (as by a baby or a pet)The puppy had an accident on the rug.
3 : a nonessential property or quality of an entity or circumstance the accident of nationality

Apart from the fact that 'mistake' is also a verb which 'accident' is not, it is easy to see that there are a significantly different constellation of associated ideas in each case. There is also some overlap to be sure. The two terms are far from being synonymous.

Dictionaries are based on ordinary, everyday usage and are constantly being revised, so why should they not be fair guides to the meanings of terms? All the more so the more different dictionaries you consult as an adjunct to your own experience and memory of different usages?

Also dictionary definitions are not examples of understanding words "independently" whatever that could even mean. There are not precise meanings of any words but we arrive at an understanding of their meanings by acquaintance with Thesaurus-like constellations of associated words (ideas), which we get from everyday experience, but our own experience can also be further augmented by consulting dictionaries, where others have already done the work for us, and broadened the overview of experienced usage by their own experience and research..

All: @Mww@Joshs@Banno@Metaphysician Undercover@Srap Tasmaner@Luke@Janus

I think it might help to see examples of Wittgenstein showing how we see Grammar and what it consists of. I have underlined and put in bold some phrases [and added some comments] that might allow you to see the method of OLP (that what we say reveals something):

#56 "But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word stands for?——"And if we bear it in mind then it comes before our mind's eye when we utter the word. So, if it is always supposed to be possible for us to remember it, it must be in itself indestructible."——But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?—When we work with a sample instead of our memory there are circumstances in which we say that the sample has changed colour and we judge of this by memory. But can we not sometimes speak of a darkening (for example) of our memory-image? Aren't we as much at the mercy of memory as of a sample? (For someone might feel like saying: "If we had no memory we should be at the mercy of a sample".)—Or perhaps of some chemical reaction. Imagine that you were supposed to paint a particular colour "C", which was the colour that appeared when the chemical substances X and Y combined.—Suppose that the colour struck you as brighter on one day than on another; would you not sometimes say: "I must be wrong, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday"? This shews that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal." [ A Grammatical claim ]

#90 "We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena [ the concept of phenomena ]. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena. * * Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one.""

P. 59 or 90 "(a) "Understanding a word": a state. But a mental state?—Depression, excitement, pain, are called mental states. Carry out a grammatical investigation as follows: we say
"He was depressed the whole day".
"He was in great excitement the whole day".
"He has been in continuous pain since yesterday".—
We also say "Since yesterday I have understood this word". "Continuously", though?—To be sure, one can speak of an interruption of understanding. But in what cases? Compare: "When did your pains get less?" and "When did you stop understanding that word?""

#199 "Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?— This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression "to obey a rule"." [ The concept of obeying a rule ]

#353 "Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking "How d'you mean?" The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition."

#572 "Expectation is, grammatically, a state; like: being of an opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, being able to do something. But in order to understand the grammar of these states it is necessary to ask: "What counts as a criterion for anyone's being in such a state?" (States of hardness, of weight, of fitting.)"

#573 "To have an opinion is a state.—A state of what? Of the soul? Of the mind? Well, of what object does one say that it has an opinion? Of Mr. N.N. for example. And that is the correct answer.
One should not expect to be enlightened by the answer to that question. Others go deeper: What, in particular cases, do we regard as criteria for someone's being of such-and-such an opinion? When do we say: he reached this opinion at that time? When: he has altered his opinion? And so on. The picture which the answers to these questions give us shews what gets treated grammatically as a state here."

#574 "A proposition, and hence in another sense a thought, can be the 'expression' of belief, hope, expectation, etc. But believing is not thinking. (A grammatical remark.)"

#692 "Is it correct for someone to say: "When I gave you this rule, I meant you to ..... in this case"? Even if he did not think of this case at all as he gave the rule? Of course it is correct. For "to mean it" did not mean: to think of it. But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?—The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the usual way, is such a criterion. [ Part of the Grammar of meaning, criteria of judging ]

To say Witt is corrective is not to say he is convincing people to "now believe" in language games. He is doing more than changing the subject; he is hoping you see what you desired of the picture, and then to turn around and see a better way (method) to see our actual desires. — Antony Nickles

What does it mean to see a better way? If you’ve read Kuhn, you know that embracing a ‘better’ scientific theory always implies a change of subject.
A new theory can’t be understood as better within the terms of the prior theory because it has no existence within the terms of the prior theory and this includes its methods, its assumptions , its criteria of validity, etc.

What would it mean to do ‘more’ than change the subject? Changing the subject, that is, qualitatively , ‘ revilutionarily’ transforming the terms of a science , is the most profound way of achieving a better scientific theory.

I think you, Austin and Cavell are holding onto a version of realism along with Putnam, who has nothing but praise for Cavell, and this puts you at odds with Rorty and a thoroughgoing postmodernism.

“While Rorty claims that his view is "almost, but not quite, the same as....Putnam's] "internalist conception of philosophy" (1984b, p. T), Putnam is uncomfortable with this association. Putnam claims to be preserving the realist spirit but he takes Rorty to be "rejecting the in- tuitions that underlie every kind of realism (and not just metaphysical realism)" (1988a, p. 16). Putnam views Rorty's pragmatism as a self-refuting relativism driven by a deep irrationalism that casts doubt on the very possi- bility of thought.”(Paul Forster)