if everyone abides by the rule: "Only have children when it is likely that doing so prevents more suffering than the alternative" then it becomes sustainable. Even a population of 1 billion would suffer less than the original 100 if everyone abides by the rule. — khaled

Yes. But you make a good point nonetheless. I don't think there's nothing good to take away from antinatalist arguments (of the kind you presented anyway). In some respects I worry that arguing too hard against antinatalism (again, only of the variety you presented), might be itself problematic for this exact reason. There definitely are serious ethical considerations to be taken into account when contemplating having a child and these shouldn't be swept away in any attempt to counter the less palatable arguments of antinatalism. The problem of excessive population growth is certainly one such issue. I think a certain amount of population fluctuation is inevitable as people try to estimate what birth rate is required to ensure a new generation given their circumstances, but making private decisions to have a large number of children in a country where the birth rate far exceeds the death rate is, I think, unethical. There's clearly already going to be a sufficient next generation to serve the community's social needs, there's no need to increase it, and thereby increase the demands placed on the following generation to supply for.

You do it when you drive a car, you do it when you wear a mask in public (or not), when you teach others, when you take decisions for a collective (e.g. a general deciding to attack or something). — Olivier5

In all these cases NOT doing these things is more harmful. That's why we do them.

It's called taking responsibility. I don't see it as always morally bad. — Olivier5

And it would be very irresponsible to push the button for someone else. We use the word "irresponsible" when someone makes a decision for someone else that could harm them, when a safer alternative is available. Example: Pressing the button, wreckless driving, using other people's stuff without consent, playing with fire in a forest, etc.

Then I realized that, had this been the case I would not be me, but somebody else, so the thought morphed into: I could not have been born; the world would just exist without me. And such a thought led me to a sense of gratefulness for being alive, for existing. And I haven't lived a blessed life but I'm still grateful my parents took this decision for me (or didn't, I mean my mother wasn't taking the pill back then, but that too was her decision I guess). — Olivier5

Cool. Has nothing to do with anything. I am also grateful to be alive.

Suicide is only a bad thing if life is conceived as inherently good (as I do). — Olivier5

False. It is also a bad thing if death is conceived as bad. I never understood what "life is inherently good" even means. That it is enjoyable for most people most of the time, I get, but what does the word "good" even mean here.

You never responded to this argument though — Olivier5

why is that such a horrible horrible argument, pray tell? — Olivier5

Yikes.

I did. "If they don't like A they can kill themselves so it's fine to inflict A upon them" is a terrible argument because A can be anything. From rape to torture. So the argument is absurd. Not only absurd but also disgusting. What's your reaction to reading this: "We'll rip his eyes out and if he doesn't like it he can just kill himself". There is nothing that cannot be justified by this "argument".

Your own shock at the suicide argument only proves that you agree that life has inherent value — Olivier5

Just shock at how idiotic and disgusting the "argument "is.

you guys do — Olivier5

Who is "you guys"

But if you truly disagree with that, if you can put the life of a future child in a balance and conclude it's not worth living, why can't you apply the same logic to your own life? — Olivier5

Are you seriously not seeing the point?

For the same reason that I would not press the button for someone else even if I would press it for myself. It is irresponsible. Or so the argument goes. Because there is (supposedly) a safer alternative.

So you are saying that there ARE cases where you would violate dignity to reduce harm. — khaled

Yes, there are some distinctions to be made to my argument:
1) There IS a difference between bringing a child into existence vs. being alive currently. The distinction is about absolute and relative prevention. For a possible child, we are preventing that harm for that future person, as it wholesale can be prevented, "right off the bat". There is no having to compromise anything to do with violating harm or dignity.

If I was to say to you, in situation 1) You have no choice but to do mini-versions of "kidnapping" someone against their will (causing indignity by overlooking the harm you do to someone), but you can try to do this as little as possible.. and 2) You have the ability to completely prevent kidnapping someone against their will if you simply don't do a certain action.. Cannot 1 and 2 be right at the same time? I think they can.

False. You’re still forcing them into a dangerous game. Just one you know they’ll enjoy.

To use the gaming analogy, you’re still kidnapping them, taping them to a chair, and forcing them to play the game, they just happen to enjoy this whole process. And you knew they would enjoy it. — khaled

Yes the other distinction to be made...
2) The indignity comes not just from the kidnapping (the decision made for the other) but kidnapping with knowing of harm.. The indignity is putting someone else in a position of harm, putting other considerations above this.

Again, false. You keep saying this but by not procreating you are harming the people in the room. And if harm done to the child should not be treated differently to harm done to the people in the room, then there will be cases where it is acceptable to have the child. And you can’t use the dignity argument either because there ARE cases where you would violate dignity to reduce harm as we’ve gone over. There should be no reason the dignity of the child is in any way different from the dignity of anyone in the room. So if you are willing to violate dignity in “inter-room interactions” there should be no difference between that and violating the child’s dignity with the goal of reducing suffering. — khaled

I think this can be answered with understanding the distinction of 1 and 2.

Say the human population is exactly 100 people. I can buy that those 100 people having children and increasing the population to say, 250 would overall reduce harm on the entire group. But I cannot buy that continuously having children can ever compare to the original suffering prevented by the first act. I cannot buy that a population of billions is suffering less than the original 100 suffering due to childlessness. As shope said: It's kicking the can down the road. In the end, if you look purely at consequences, having children is always the more harmful option.

Edit: Nevermind it doesn't really work as a rebuttal. Because if everyone abides by the rule: "Only have children when it is likely that doing so prevents more suffering than the alternative" then it becomes sustainable. Even a population of 1 billion would suffer less than the original 100 if everyone abides by the rule. Though we'll likely never get to 1 billion doing so. Which I think is a win-win honestly. And saying "But there is no way everyone abides by the rule" is not an argument against this as it can also be used against AN (much more effectively).

I'll just leave this here if anyone thinks of arguing along the same lines. — khaled

But I think you might be right before the edit.. In this scenario, you are worried about outcomes. "Only have children when it is likely that doing so prevents more suffering than the alternative". Well, you did say "likely" which lives some wiggle room, but if it is outcomes you are interested in, then perhaps you want the best estimate of probabilities. If someone did indeed realize that the best scenario was the the least people being born bringing the least amount of harm, and this resulted in eventually no people born, would you accept it? For example, if it was found that all the models noted that when you ran it completely, everyone suffered more by continuing the next generation rather than abstaining from continuing it, would you accept that model?

I think that there might be a "hidden assumption" in the model...something to do way back with how community is above and beyond the consideration of the child that will be affected here. So this presents as a straight up utilitarian thing, but is really more of an argument to "keep the community going at all costs".

There is no having to compromise anything to do with violating harm or dignity. — schopenhauer1

Because you choose to only look at the child in your "system". We compromise the wellbeing of the people in the room, as well as the parents. There are people who exist already that would be harmed by the decision.

1) You have no choice but to do mini-versions of "kidnapping" someone against their will (causing indignity by overlooking the harm you do to someone), but you can try to do this as little as possible.. and 2) You have the ability to completely prevent kidnapping someone against their will if you simply don't do a certain action. — schopenhauer1

Both of these are true but only one is a moral claim. 1) says that you are obligated to cause indignity to reduce suffering elsewhere. I would disagree with this actually. My point is not that you must wake up the life guard or save the drowning person, I don't think there is an obligation there. My point is that you could. And that a system that has it where you cannot wake up the life guard or save the drowning person is ridiculous, I think we can agree there.

But 2 is only a statement of fact. Yes you do in fact have the ability to completely prevent kidnapping someone against their will. But in doing so you harm others. So it is not clear from this fact alone that the action should be taken (not having children) as we know there are cases where harm to others trumps "kidnappings" -as you called them- as a consideration.

2) The indignity comes not just from the kidnapping (the decision made for the other) but kidnapping with knowing of harm.. — schopenhauer1

Again, true, but only a statement of fact. This does not lead to it being wrong to nonetheless do that thing that enables harm, if the harm alleviated elsewhere is enough.

The indignity is putting someone else in a position of harm, putting other considerations above this. — schopenhauer1

Cool. But you don't mind doing this with the lifeguard. Why not with children?

My point is your argument is not unilateral. You cannot conclusively say "having children is wrong". Since you do not mind violating dignity elsewhere for the sake of preventing harm.

Unless you would argue that the child's dignity is somehow "special" and different from the lifeguard's dignity. I don't see a reason it should be.

If someone did indeed realize that the best scenario was the the least people being born bringing the least amount of harm, and this resulted in eventually no people born, would you accept it? — schopenhauer1

If he's correct sure. Have thought so for 2 years. But I doubt he would be. Since we have evidence to suggest that the average person is a positive influence. And especially since I only care about the "remembering self" as opposed to the "experiencing self" if you remember our first disagreement.

For example, if it was found that all the models noted that when you ran it completely, everyone suffered more by continuing the next generation rather than abstaining from continuing it, would you accept that model? — schopenhauer1

There is an important point here I think you're missing. I think you're comparing the antinatalist ideal with the reality of my rule (idk what to call it, "careful natalism"? I'll just use that for now: CN).

As I said, if everyone applies CN, every generation suffering will decrease. With AN, there will be a massive "surge" of suffering before going to zero. And they are set up so that, ideally, everyone applying CN is less (or equal) suffering than everyone applying AN, by definition.

But what you are doing here is comparing the ideal AN scenario with the realistic prediction of applying CN. Which is not fair. I am aware that if someone has children there is a good chance those children will not be CN, and so will result in more suffering overall. But on the other hand, even if we were to somehow try to enforce AN by force, this will realistically never work. All it will do is drastically reduce the population for the people who follow it and whoever remains who is not AN will make it all for naught. All the while all the followers suffered for nothing. We both know that realistically, most people would not able to actually enforce AN. But this cannot be used as an argument against it. So similarly, you cannot use the difficulty of enforcing CN as an argument against it.

This is what I meant when I added "much more effectively" here:

And saying "But there is no way everyone abides by the rule" is not an argument against this as it can also be used against AN (much more effectively). — khaled

Realistically speaking, AN is much less likely to be enforced than CN. And half-assing AN is worse than half-assing CN. Because with half assing AN, you end up with the current generation suffering severely, and the next generation still going on anyways. If you half ass CN at least the current generation doesn't suffer.

I think that there might be a "hidden assumption" in the model...something to do way back with how community is above and beyond the consideration of the child that will be affected here. So this presents as a straight up utilitarian thing, but is really more of an argument to "keep the community going at all costs". — schopenhauer1

There is no such thing. I have argued for why it can be expected that having a child can be expected to be the less harmful option a lot of the time (It was Isaac's argument). On the other hand you predict with no basis, that there is a "better model" out there that would come out with having children always being worse. It's like saying "I know God exists, because eventually there will be a scientific theory that incorporates him".

I agree that there might be a hidden assumption. But you have not presented any evidence that there is. Whereas all the evidence I presented only references suffering/happiness of real people. No considerations given to "the community" as its own entity.

In all these cases NOT doing these things is more harmful. That's why we do them. — khaled

That's not a fact. You don't know for sure when you take the wheel to go do some shopping, that you will not kill a dozen people in some horrible accident. People take chances with their life and the lives of others all the time.

. I am also grateful to be alive. — khaled

As would your kids, most probably...

What's your reaction to reading this: "We'll rip his eyes out and if he doesn't like it he can just kill himself". There is nothing that cannot be justified by this "argument". — khaled

My reaction -- as already posted -- is that destroying somebody's eyesight is an act of violence, of life destruction. It is not comparable to act that affirms life, it's the opposite.

Suicide is only a bad thing if life is conceived as inherently good (as I do).
— Olivier5

False. It is also a bad thing if death is conceived as bad. I never understood what "life is inherently good" even means. — khaled

Death is generally considered a bad thing because life is generally considered a good thing. Death if just the end of life. If life had no inherent positive value, why would death have any inherent negative value?

But if you truly disagree with that, if you can put the life of a future child in a balance and conclude it's not worth living, why can't you apply the same logic to your own life?
— Olivier5

For the same reason that I would not press the button for someone else even if I would press it for myself. It is irresponsible. Or so the argument goes. Because there is (supposedly) a safer alternative. — khaled

You misunderstood my argument. I am asking an hypothetical AN -- got it that you're not an AN anymore -- to do to herself what she does to others, not vice versa. More precisely, I am asking why she cannot apply to her own life the same analysis she applies to a hypothetical child. Certainly that is a reasonable demand.

IF an AN argues that the hypothetical life of a hypothetical child entails risks that are too great to take, why can't the same AN proponent conclude that her own life entails risks that are too great to take?

So if a demon told this hypothetical AN that he had the power to make her disappear in an instant, would she take the offer, or would she try and stick around a little longer? I bet the latter, for most. And this points to a logical contradiction, a fundamental dishonesty. Do as I say, not as I do.

You say that one IS MORALLY ENTITLED take a risk with one's own life, and I agree. I'm not saying AN are not morally entitled to live, God forbid. I am saying that all the AN proponents I know cherish their own life, and hold on to it hard enough. They'll keep living for as long as they can, and that says something about the REAL value they attach to life. They prefer it to the alternative, by far. They take all these risks in a heartbeat, without even thinking, and would not consider ending the game before the bitter end. They like this world of grief quite a lot, often, but they are not sure they are morally entitled to bring a new person into it.

My guess is that a hypothetical, yet unborn child, would most certainly feel exactly as this hypothetical AN proponent (and you and I) do about life. It would feel grateful to be alive, given the chance. Cause it's better to take chances than to have no chance at all.

You don't know for sure when you take the wheel to go do some shopping, that you will not kill a dozen people in some horrible accident. — Olivier5

But I can reasonably guess that I won't. The odds of this happening are so slim that the harm I bring to myself by not going to the store and doing that shopping is probably greater.

My reaction -- as already posted -- is that destroying somebody's eyesight is an act of violence, of life destruction. It is not comparable to act that affirms life, it's the opposite. — Olivier5

Handwaving. You never said anything about "life destruction" and "life affirmation". All you said was "If ANs don't like it so much they should just kill themselves". And I explained to you why that's a terrible argument.

If life had no inherent positive value, why would death have any inherent negative value? — Olivier5

Neither of these logically lead to the other.

IF an AN argues that the hypothetical life of a hypothetical child entails risks that are too great to take, why can't the same AN proponent conclude that her own life entails risks that are too great to take? — Olivier5

Because, for the third time, there is a difference between risks worth taking for YOURSELF and risks worth taking for OTHERS. Pressing the button is an example of a risk that you may find worth taking yourself but is wrong to take for others. Any risk is wrong to take for others, unless not doing it is the more risky option.

would most certainly — Olivier5

Key word: Most certainly. What justifies taking the risk.

Again, we don't take risks with others unless the consequences of not doing so are worse.

So after more thinking I came to the conclusion that most of my arguments in the previous reply to shope and in the edit are flawed because they only consider one generation at a time.

Because if everyone abides by the rule: "Only have children when it is likely that doing so prevents more suffering than the alternative" then it becomes sustainable. Even a population of 1 billion would suffer less than the original 100 if everyone abides by the rule. — khaled

Is false. A more accurate statement would be "Each generation would suffer less by implementing CN rather than AN". But this is only true of one generation at a time. Say we start from a population of 100, and out of each 100 people 2 are miserable. If the 100 apply AN, they will all be miserable, then that will be the end. If they apply CN, and each have 2 children say, then the next generation (comprising of 200 people) will have 4 miserable people. 4 is a lot smaller than 100. But the number only grows. That is the problem.

So it is the case that having children is always the more harmful option. Even though having a child is the less harmful option most of the time only considering the current generation, overall it will eventually be more harmful. This small percentage of people that "slip through the cracks" leading miserable lives will eventually outnumber the number of people whose suffering we wanted to prevent in the first place.

@Isaac How would you respond to that?

How would you respond to that? — khaled

First, I'm not sure I completely follow you, so this may not really address what you're saying but...

It seems as though you're applying a different weight to the harm reduction in the new population. If you have two children the risk you took of having miserable ones will have reduced harm in the 98, so still an ethical choice. But the problem you're raising (if i've understood it correctly) is that in doing so you guarantee another 2 miserable people (assuming a fertility rate of exactly 2), yet your actions were only justified by benefitting an original 98. The further you look into the future the worse this balance starts to look.

But, barring either genocide or a 100% compliance with AN regulations, you know there's going to be a generation 2, and a generation 3, and so on. So your actions ensuring two further kids to supply these further generations with sufficient numbers are justified by the same logic. Having a child now reduces suffering in their generation, but it also ensures that there are people willing to have children themselves to reduce suffering in the following generation.

Since you can be almost certain that no matter what you do, these generations are going to happen anyway, you can be almost certain that setting in motion a chain of events to ensure a continuous supply of harm-reducers is a moral choice.

This is still subject to, and makes even more clear, the it requires a reasonable assumption of at least average quality children, and no action to significantly worsen the miserable/happy ratio, or, for that matter, the extent to which people are more likely than not to reduce harm by socialising. None of these are a given.

But I can reasonably guess that I won't. The odds of this happening are so slim that the harm I bring to myself by not going to the store and doing that shopping is probably greater. — khaled

Key word: probably. What justifies taking the risk?

Again, we don't take risks with others unless the consequences of not doing so are worse.

How do you know what consequences you acts will have? You make a probability calculation?

If you can take chances with the lives of others because you need to do some shopping, you can take chances with having kids because you need kids.

But, barring either genocide or a 100% compliance with AN regulations, you know there's going to be a generation 2, and a generation 3, and so on. So your actions ensuring two further kids to supply these further generations with sufficient numbers are justified by the same logic — Isaac

Yup. Good point now that I think about it. Ignore my previous response.

Since there will be future generations regardless of what you do it’s good to try to create a “family tree of harm reducers”. Since by doing so, by following CN strictly or near strictly, at every step you will always be reducing harm. And since genocide and AN compliance are both impossible then NOT having that family tree around is the more harmful option, since every generation the number of people in the room grows ad infinium, and so does the number of people that you harm by having the child but a lot more slowly (by definition). Would be a pretty small one though due to the nature of CN.

Having a child now reduces suffering in their generation, but it also ensures that there are people willing to have children themselves to reduce suffering in the following generation. — Isaac

But the point is: it is still not good enough. Compare the suffering that Adam and Eve would have had to endure due to childlessness to the suffering of all mankind thus far. It pales in comparison. Even though Adam and Eve reduced the suffering of the population by having children. And even though at every step, having children is likely the less harmful option, in the end, their decision to have children resulted in way more harm than they would have had to endure at step 1. Adam and Eve can be Jeff and Janis and the result is still the same.

AN increases harm significantly, then goes to 0. CN keeps a mostly steady level of harm going forever. It is clear which is more harmful overall.

But considering real conditions, and not idealizations, it is clear that the next generations will exist anyways. In this case it also becomes clear that new people are added to the room each generation you consider. So applying CN is better in real scenarios, applying AN is better in ideal scenarios. A bit of a weird conclusion but one I can swallow.

Since you can be almost certain that no matter what you do, these generations are going to happen anyway, you can be almost certain that setting in motion a chain of events to ensure a continuous supply of harm-reducers is a moral choice. — Isaac

Well put. Otherwise by not having children, you create an ever growing room. Which is worse than the alternative.

If you can take chances with the lives of others because you need to do some shopping, you can take chances with having kids because you need kids. — Olivier5

No you can’t. Because you not having kids is less harmful than you having kids. On the other hand, you not shopping is more harmful than you shopping.

Key word: probably. What justifies taking the risk? — Olivier5

That I need food or I’ll die. So I’m going to go buy it.

That I need food or I’ll die. So I’m going to go buy it. — khaled

You have less harmful alternatives than driving a car: you could go shopping by foot or bicycle; you could order your groceries on the internet; heck, you could grow your own food. You could live as a hermit and eat grasshoppers. It may be less harmful than what you do now to procure your food, less convenient too though...

Moreover, you could assess the food you buy to make sure its production, processing, storage and transportation don't involve too high a health, social or environmental cost for you as well as for this and future generations to come... You could calculate the harm done or avoided by eating vegan, shopping local, buying only fair trade or organic, etc. etc. etc. Most people do a tiny little bit of that here or there, some people more than others, but most of us don't agonize over it. We do what seems right, and reasonably convenient.

Not everybody can buy all organic food, so we buy stuff that has pesticide residues in them, pesticides that are basically nerve gases and other niceties killing insects who happen to share a lot of our own biology... These pesticides are carcinogenetic but the dose is low so we consume them, and serve them to others. We take risks about other people's lives, all the time, without ever calculating them because it's impossible to do so accurately. We just figure it's gona be okay.

So all this talk about not risking it when it's about other people? It's BS. You and I do it all the time. Because we want a life too, and living involves appropriating and consuming stuff. It involves taking decisions with insufficient information. It involves taking the risk of harming others. And yet we go on living. Not many of us become hermits either.

less convenient too though — Olivier5

So harmful to me?

All the time, without ever calculating them because it's impossible to do so accurately. We just figure it's gona be okay. — Olivier5

Too much of this is literally the definition of irresponsibility.

You and I do it all the time. Because we want a life too — Olivier5

Agreed. Where did I imply that we are not part of the calculation? If I purely wanted not to harm people I would kill myself. But I don’t. Because that would harm me. And I consider myself part of the calculation. Heck, I treat harm done to me with more weight than harm done to others most of the time.

It involves taking decisions with insufficient information. It involves taking the risk of harming others. And yet we go on living. — Olivier5

We have sufficient information to conclude that not having children results in less harm than having them. So to go on to have children anyways is irresponsible and immoral. Is the argument.

However, not bringing a new person into the world is preventing wholesale all suffering for that person. — schopenhauer1

Can you present this argument in different terms somehow? When you put it like this, it makes it sound like this person benefits by not existing, but of course that's not the case and I know you don't think that.

On the other hand, you've made a point in this thread of rejecting approaches that aggregate "happiness" or "fulfillment", so I'm not sure how you could phrase this to avoid attributing something to a non-existent referent, while at the same time avoiding aggregation (something like, "not adding to the net suffering of the world's sentient beings").

Expressing your position in terms of tenseless indicatives is not only misleading, it's unnatural: there should be a future tense in here somewhere, or a subjunctive. ("If you have a child, they will suffer." "If I hadn't been born, I wouldn't be suffering." "If you were to bring a new a person into the world, they would suffer.")

But of course then you would have to describe a possible future world that includes the hypothetical person, and they would then hypothetically have exactly the same standing as everyone else, the same rights and duties, the same potential for good to their fellows or evil, the same potential to be helped or harmed. In describing that world, it's not clear why one person is singled out for special consideration above all others.

We have sufficient information to conclude that not having children results in less harm than having them. So to go on to have children anyways is irresponsible and immoral. Is the argument. — khaled

Well, this being the AN argument, my argument is that life is far more important than a mere accounting of harm and joy, and that its complexity is beyond our capacity to predict. You cannot know in advance the amount of joy and harm a person will create in this world, you cannot even compute it post facto.

Were the lives of Cleopatra, Genghis Khan, Emmanuel Kant and Alexander Fleming overall positive or negative? Did they generate more harm than joy? Even God doesn't know that.

Everything you say is obviously true.

However, @khaled (before his conversion) argued specifically from this uncertainty: not knowing means you are taking a risk with another person and you have no right to; @schopenhauer1 seems to hold a position that, even if we knew for a fact that life is always and only pure bliss, it is a violation of that person's dignity (or perhaps "autonomy") to force them to lead such a blissful existence without so much as a "by your leave".

I'm with you: this whole "summing up" of a life is a bizarre and pointless approach. But even granting that, anti-natalism claims to be, as it were, defending someone's rights, albeit in the strangest way imaginable. That's a whole different confusion.

not knowing means you are taking a risk with another person and you have no right to; — Srap Tasmaner

And I have pointed out that living, at least in society, involves taking chances with other people's lives. By that I don't mean that it's okay to be reckless, so there should be limits, but one cannot live without taking a few risks for himself and others, therefore the injunction: "live without taking any risks with other people's lives" is simply not doable in practice. It sets an unrealistic standard.

schopenhauer1 seems to hold a position that, even if we knew for a fact that life is always and only pure bliss, it is a violation of that person's dignity (or perhaps "autonomy") to force them to lead such a blissful existence without so much as a "by your leave". — Srap Tasmaner

Technically, it is not true that one forces life on anyone. Life is a gift that can be and is sometimes rejected. A non-existing person has no dignity to lose, and as soon as she exists, her primary objective will be to stay alive. If her dignity does indeed require her annihilation, then there are many different options available to her, some as benign as social death by isolation.

But the point is: it is still not good enough. Compare the suffering that Adam and Eve would have had to endure due to childlessness to the suffering of all mankind thus far. It pales in comparison. Adam and Eve [...] decision to have children resulted in way more harm than they would have had to endure at step 1. — khaled

More harm, but also more joy. Why are you not counting the joys that life brings? If your only measure for life is the amount of tears shed, of course it's always going to be negative.

More harm, but also more joy. Why are you not counting the joys that life brings? If your only measure for life is the amount of tears shed, of course it's always going to be negative. — Olivier5

Because I find that we never use joys to trump considerations of suffering irl. And we never make duties out of providing pleasure but we make duties out of not harming. For example, no matter how happy I would be to have 3 dollars, you don’t owe me 3 dollars. However you do owe me not to rob me, as that is harmful.

And we never make duties out of providing pleasure but we make duties out of not harming. — khaled

We make duties about not decreasing other people's joy though. It's not okay to be a killjoy.

I find that we never use joys to trump considerations of suffering irl — khaled

?!

I find that we do this all the time. Dunno what you're talking about here.

We make duties about not decreasing other people's joy though. It's not okay to be a killjoy. — Olivier5

Didn’t claim otherwise.

I find that we do this all the time. Dunno what you're talking about here. — Srap Tasmaner

Example?

We make duties about not decreasing other people's joy though. It's not okay to be a killjoy.
— Olivier5

Didn’t claim otherwise. — khaled

And yet you would want Adam and Eve to have killed all the joys ever to be had by the whole human race.

We must not have the same things in mind because examples are infinite. I didn't enjoy being a young-ish hyper-stressed broke father and husband, but the joy my kids bring me more than makes up for it. Most adults who enjoy playing the piano didn't enjoy practicing scales. I hear BUD/S sucks big-time but many find being a Navy SEAL rewarding.

What are you talking about?

We must not have the same things in mind because examples are infinite. — Srap Tasmaner

We're not. I'm talking about joys and sufferings as considerations for doing things to other people, not for yourself. We make joy/suffering calculations where joy wins out for ourselves all the time.

But we don't have cases where A would be really happy if he did X to B but B would be harmed and doing X is ok.

Example: Bullying is wrong, no matter how much pleasure it gives the bullies. Illegal fighting pits are wrong, no matter how much joy they bring the spectators (assuming the participants are being coerced to participate). Etc

And yet you would want Adam and Eve to have killed all the joys ever to be had by the whole human race. — Olivier5

A killjoy is someone who decreases people's joys as you defined it. That clearly doesn't apply here. As there are no people.

If you want to count not having children as being a killjoy, and being a killjoy is wrong, you run into the absurd scenario where sometimes not having children is wrong.

And I have pointed out that living, at least in society, involves taking chances with other people's lives. By that I don't mean that it's okay to be reckless, so there should be limits — Olivier5

The AN argument is precisely that having children is always reckless.

A non-existing person has no dignity to lose, and as soon as she exists, her primary objective will be to stay alive. — Olivier5

So are you of the opinion that having a child is ok under any circumstance? If not then how do you explain it?

Okay, cool.

Curiously, we find the reverse of your scenarios particularly praiseworthy: that is, risking harm to yourself or knowingly sacrificing your own well-being in order to benefit someone else.

What do we make of all this?

All the examples I gave are actually nearby: delayed gratification is precisely a case of present-time you accepting something negative to benefit future you.

Curiously, we find the reverse of your scenarios particularly praiseworthy: that is, risking harm to yourself or knowingly sacrificing your own well-being in order to benefit someone else. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes because you could have chosen to take account of your own suffering and not done the heroic act, but you went above the call of duty and helped people when you knew you didn't have to. Pretty praiseworthy.

What do we make of all this? — Srap Tasmaner

You tell me. You're the one that expressed surprise at my statement but it turns out to be pretty mundane. In everyday language I'm basically just saying "It's wrong to hurt others for your pleasure"

A killjoy is someone who decreases people's joys as you defined it. That clearly doesn't apply here. As there are no people. — khaled

Okay so accounting for future harm of hypothetical generations is something you can do but not accounting for their future joy, for some mysterious reason. Therefore you take only the harm in consideration, and conclude that Adam and Eve should have known better than procreate.

The result of your computation is determined by your frame of accounting. Mine is different; unlike you I include future joys in my computations. Therefore if I were the last man on earth, and if you were the last woman, I would think it our moral duty to procreate. Even though I'm quite sure you're not my type.