I have to be honest here: call me obtuse, but I have to say I don't have any idea what Wittgenstein is getting at in those passages from PI. Can it be explained in plain language? — Janus
So be it. To strike out is to show one should stick to his own game. — Mww
Cavell does account for the connection (I wouldn't call it logical more then inevitable, or sliding down a slippery slope) between the desire for certainty and removing the human.
Witt separately refers to a picture (like a framework) but it is not one people "believe" in. It is forced on them by their desire for certainty. — Antony Nickles
Apart from the fact that 'mistake' is also a verb which 'accident' is not, it is easy to see that there are a significantly different constellation of associated ideas in each case. There is also some overlap to be sure. The two terms are far from being synonymous. — Janus
Wittgenstein's use of "grammar", I find is very elusive. I think he wants the word to do what it cannot possibly do, and that of course is a problem.I have to be honest here: call me obtuse, but I have to say I don't have any idea what Wittgenstein is getting at in those passages from PI. Can it be explained in plain language? — Janus
n #90 the statements we say about concepts show us their possibilities; these possibilities are part of its Grammar--this concept can do that and this, but if it tries to do this other, than it is no longer that concept. — Antony Nickles
In #90 the statements we say about concepts show us their possibilities; these possibilities are part of its Grammar--this concept can do that and this, but if it tries to do this other, than it is no longer that concept. When does a game just become play? The concept of knowledge has different possibilities (senses, options) and each is distinguished by its Grammar. — Antony Nickles
It's a funny thing that LW's other really salient metaphor for what he's up to is seeking a "bird's eye view" -- that puts you not only not on the rough ground but not on the ground at all! Perhaps this is his "stereoscopic vision", I don't know. It's odd though. — Srap Tasmaner
Wittgenstein talks about things like "following a rule", which you can't formalize in rules on pain of regress, and then he asks how it is possible that we clearly can follow a rule or fail to despite the lack of definitive criteria. To answer that question, you need the bird's eye view, but therein lies temptation: it is from such heights that we perceive structure, human civilization laid out before us like a circuit board in all its logical perfection, the territory reduced to a map. — Srap Tasmaner
122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. — Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links. The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?) — PI §122
if I am a Cartesian philosopher, I can (....) still not recognize ‘language game’ or ‘picture theory ‘ any differently than Mmw (...) after many exchanges with you. That is, such notions will be forced into what my Cartesian pre-conceptions impose on them. — Joshs
I read him as indicating instead that a "surveyable overview" of all grammar is difficult, if not practically impossible, since our grammar is "deficient in surveyability": — Luke
Of course we cannot examine the coming into being of knowledge without knowledge having already come into being, but how is that point relevant to anything? — Metaphysician Undercover
the reality that, e.g., heliocentrism could never have come to be known, if the standing knowledge represented by geocentrism wasn’t being first examined by Aristarchus. Just because Ptolemy turned out to be wrong doesn’t take away from his knowledge.
— Mww
You have no logical association here. — Metaphysician Undercover
so we cannot logically say that the existence of heliocentrism is dependent on the prior existence of geocentricism. — Metaphysician Undercover
in many cases principles are built on existing principles. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since we cannot account for those fundamental principles, then all of our knowledge of knowledge is fundamentally flawed. — Metaphysician Undercover
If we cannot account for the fundamental principles, that's no problem, we just posit a priori principles and there you have it, problem solved. — Metaphysician Undercover
But now you are rejecting that assumption, saying that there might not even be such a thing as knowledge. I don't think you can have it both ways. That would just lead to ambiguous meaninglessness. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is what I think is fundamental to knowledge. We start with premises which prove very useful, and since they are so useful they seem solid to support structures of knowledge......
Yes, agreed.
.....An important thing to remember here, is that the principles at the base of the structure have been around for the longest.
Ditto.
.....they are actually the weakest ones, having been put into use the longest time ago when the state of knowledge was most primitive. — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course they're not synonymous, I don't think anyone suggested that. The issue was how to distinguish a mistake from an accident in order to ensure that the correct word is used to describe the situation.. And, as I demonstrated, sometimes a mistake is also an accident, and in those instances the accident would also be a mistake. What makes one of those a better choice of words in these instances? — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein's use of "grammar", I find is very elusive. I think he wants the word to do what it cannot possibly do, and that of course is a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover
What we learned about (the Grammar of) Memory in #56 is: we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal. (That it is certain and a perfect copy). This is (grammatically) a constraint on this concept. — Antony Nickles
these possibilities are part of its Grammar--this concept can do that and this, but if it tries to do this other, than it is no longer that concept. — Antony Nickles
"Expectation is a state" is a claim to its Grammar--to be expecting is to be in a state; that's how expecting works. And we see this when we say: "What counts as a criterion for expecting [being in that state]?" And criteria here being special as well, tied to "what counts as". — Antony Nickles
In #574 to call the statement "believing is not thinking" a grammatical remark is to say that it is not a statement that Witt is claiming is true (relying on some logic or justification). It is an OLP claim that structurally, categorically, the process and identity of believing is not the same as that of thinking. I have discussed above how an accident is grammatically different than a mistake--not to claim that they are different, but how. — Antony Nickles
The logical possibility that heliocentrism could have come to be without the antecedent geocentrism is irrelevant in the face of fact that the record shows Copernicus developed the former because he knew something about the later, sufficient to justify changing it. — Mww
So we can logically say the existence of the one is entirely dependent on the other, given the historical facts.. — Mww
Minor point, but no: laws are built on principles, rules are built on laws, suppositions are built on rules, but principles are not built on each other. If they were, each principle would be contingent, hence any law built on a contingent principle, is not properly a law. — Mww
Agreed, almost. We can account for principles simply from the thought of them, but they are not thereby empirically proven. It follows that our empirical knowledge, when based on them, is not so much flawed, as always uncertain. And it really doesn’t change or help anything, to call uncertainty a flaw, even if in the strictest possible technical sense, it is. — Mww
It must be absolutely true a priori principles are real, because we cannot deny having thought them, — Mww
It could, however, also be said the principles at the base of the structure, being around the longest, are the most powerful, because they have been used to evolve knowledge from the primitive. — Mww
If I were to analyze the idea to a finer point, I might say premises support what knowledge is about, while principles base the structure of knowledge itself. In this way, it is explained why some fundamental principles have lasted so long and some supporting premises fall by the epistemological wayside. — Mww
It would help if you could give an example of a mistake which also is, as opposed to merely is causing, an accident. — Janus
I have long thought Wittgenstein thinks of grammar as being equivalent to one sense of logic. So, the grammatical structure of statements reflects the logical structure of perception. Also, the logical structure of conception reflects the logical structure of perception. But that is probably more Tractatus than Investigations. I have tried to read PI but have never found it illuminating enough to sustain much interest in it. — Janus
What is meant by "the grammar of a mistake"? If "grammar" concerns rules of correct usage, and a "mistake" is to do something incorrectly, then how could a mistake have grammar? Doesn't "grammar of a mistake" seem oxymoronic to you? — Metaphysician Undercover
With OLP we are not "judging" (or justifying) the action, we are making a claim to our observation of the grammar (my claim, your concession to it), and the evidence is the example of what we say when we talk of accidents, or mistakes. So we are not doing the judging; people just make mistakes and accidents happen, and these are part of our lives, as is the deciding between them--which is what OLP looks at.
— Antony Nickles
Can't you see though, that this is a judgement in itself? To say that something is a "mistake", or it is an "accident", implies that you have made that judgement. It's hypocritical to say to a person, "I'm not judging you", but then proceed to talk about what the person has done as a :"mistake". So in reality, you really are judging, by referring to things as mistakes or accidents. — Metaphysician Undercover
Choice of words implies judgement, and that's why we can categorize language use as an action. And we assume that this activity is carried out through some form of intention, like other human acts. The difficult aspect about language use is that it is activity which is often carried on rapidly, in an habitual way, therefore with very little thought. So we're faced with the question of how does intention play a role in an activity carried out with very little thought, and no immediate indications of intention even being present. — Metaphysician Undercover
we relate to what has been said through "meaning" implying what was meant, or intended. Therefore there is a serious gap here, a hole in our knowledge. We assume to know what was meant or intended, by an act in which intention is barely evident. So we turn to something completely other than the speaker's intention to justify our interpretations. — Metaphysician Undercover
The hole, or gap is only closed by skepticism. — Metaphysician Undercover
You say for instance, "grammar of a mistake", I recognize that I might very easily misunderstand what you mean by this, so I question you in a skeptical way. Now, we'll see what comes out of this, but the way I see it, is that very often on this forum, people cannot explain what they mean when questioned about a phrase they have used. This fact provides another piece of evidence. Not only do people appear to be talking away habitually, without thought or intention entering into what they are saying, but even when questioned about what they mean by what they have said, sometimes they cannot even determine what they themselves intended. The evidence therefore, is that there are speech acts with very little if any intention, thus very little meaning, yet they appear to be correct grammatically. — Metaphysician Undercover
What OLP is doing is looking at Grammar to: 1) show that philosophy's preoccupation with a picture where there is one explanation (for speech, say) is confused by our desire for certainty...
— Antony Nickles
This I believe is a misrepresentation of philosophy. It is not preoccupied by this 'one picture', or 'one explanation'. * * * A philosopher might appear preoccupied in skepticism, with the question of what validates that particular explanation (definition), the one employed by the mathematician as the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover
Take Plato's dialectical method for example. Each dialogue takes a term, like love, courage, friendship, knowledge, or just, and investigates the various different ways that the word is used. The implication is, that if there was an ideal, the ideal would validate the correct definition, therefore correct use of the term. — Metaphysician Undercover
Clearly this is folly, to claim that we can have "rationality and logic and truth value" without justification. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore we ought to conclude that interpretation, and explanation, the aspects of language use which philosophers are interested in, cannot be deferred to grammar or criteria. — Metaphysician Undercover
But this doesn't make sense to say that there is a particular grammar for each unique action. * * * if we say that each particular action has a description unique to it, how could we call unique, distinct, and different incidents, as following "a grammar"? — Metaphysician Undercover
But every circumstance is unique, time and space are that way, despite what you say about the way that we align our lives. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you feel the urge to think that there is always 'concepts' involved when people are speaking? Why not just start with the evidence, and basic facts, that people are doing something with words? If, when we proceed to analyze what they are doing with words, the need to assume concepts comes up, then we can deal with that. But until that point I see this assumption of "concepts" as misleading. — Metaphysician Undercover
I see your assumption of "concepts" as directly opposed to what you say that OLP is telling you: 'What OLP is doing is looking at Grammar to: 1) show that philosophy's preoccupation with a picture where there is one explanation (for speech, say) is confused by our desire for certainty'. You have just replaced the 'picture which can give certainty' with 'concept'. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is what I'll ask of you, as a proposition, to enable our capacity to proceed in a manner of discussion which is acceptable to both of us. Can we start simply with the idea that in language and communication people are 'doing something with words'. We cannot assume "concepts", nor can we assume "grammar", or "criteria", or any such type of principles or rules as prerequisite for 'doing something with words'. — Metaphysician Undercover
let's start with the assumption that a human being is free to act as one pleases, and if the need to assume some sort of grammar appears to arise, we can discuss that need. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, I further propose that this type of action, customary, habitual, familiar, and ordinary acts, are carried out with little, if any, reference to grammar in the performing of those acts. * * * thought is not directed toward, or by, grammar, it is directed by the intent to bring about the desired consequences in the particular context or circumstances. — Metaphysician Undercover
Because of this progression of knowledge, this philosophical need for evolution or advancement of knowledge, there is a need for a progression and evolution of language as required to capacitate the evolution of knowledge. Therefore there is a need for philosophy to "redesign language", and use language in a way initially perceived as "abnormal", or else we could not venture into the unknown with the intent to make it known. — Metaphysician Undercover
I read him as indicating instead that a "surveyable overview" of all grammar is difficult, if not practically impossible, since our grammar is "deficient in surveyability":
— Luke
How could there be grammar which is not surveyable? The rules of grammar must be observable if they are to be followed. It makes no sense to say that someone is obeying grammatical rules which they have not found, located, or identified. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are there other ways that frameworks get forced on people? If there is a desire for certainty, is this universal, or it it possible some people don’t have this desire for certainty? — Joshs
it would also be a mistake to think that exploration is not required for making good maps, or to think that having drawn the map you've actually been everywhere you want to go. — Srap Tasmaner
Dictionaries are based on ordinary, everyday usage and are constantly being revised, so why should they not be fair guides to the meanings of terms? — Janus
To say Witt is corrective is not to say he is convincing people to "now believe" in language games. He is doing more than changing the subject; he is hoping you see what you desired of the picture, and then to turn around and see a better way (method) to see our actual desires.
— Antony Nickles
What does it mean to see a better way? If you’ve read Kuhn, you know that embracing a ‘better’ scientific theory always implies a change of subject. — Joshs
I think you, Austin and Cavell are holding onto a version of realism along with Putnam, who has nothing but praise for Cavell, and this puts you at odds with Rorty and a thoroughgoing postmodernism. — Joshs
That Copernicus knew the geocentric system, is clearly not the cause of him developing the heliocentric system, because millions of people already knew it as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
But clearly the old conceptual structure was rejected, lock stock and barrel, and replaced by the new. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is a problem epistemologists have, how can knowledge be wrong. If it's wrong, it can't be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover
And it really doesn’t change or help anything, to call uncertainty a flaw, even if in the strictest possible technical sense, it is.
— Mww
When we're talking about knowledge, clearly uncertainty is a flaw. — Metaphysician Undercover
If we thought up the so-called a priori principles, and we are sentient beings, then how could these principles be free from the influence of sense experience, to be truly a priori? — Metaphysician Undercover
So scientists focus on their capacity for making predictions rather than trying to find the true nature of things. — Metaphysician Undercover
how you would differentiate between a principle and a premise. — Metaphysician Undercover
The "logical structure of perception" is what I am arguing against. I think it's nonsense to say that perception uses logic. — Metaphysician Undercover
1) you insist on your terms and your framework (and your criteria for judging what I say) instead of working to see my terms and how what I am saying requires you to see everything in a new way (walking in my shoes is exactly the method of OLP--trying to see what I see). — Antony Nickles
2) we are getting side-tracked on every little statement I make if it doesn't fit what you believe even if it isn't part of my trying to explain a different method of philosophy, instead of having to justify every little thing. — Antony Nickles
4) the points I have made above or to other participants are getting forgotten or lost and so I am having to repeat myself. — Antony Nickles
I do think you may be taking "grammar" too literally (as regularly defined), but I'm not sure this is all wrong. (Though Witt does differentiate Grammar from "rules" in many different ways (we don't "follow" Grammar), but that is a rabbit hole.) Grammar does show the boundaries of what would be considered a "correct" or apt apology (but this type of criteria does not work for, say, intending--though we may find the Grammar of what is or is not part of intending). And there can be different "uses" (senses) of a concept (like: I know, above), and Grammar does differentiate between these. But the phrase "rules of correct usage" makes it seem like we are looking for something to ensure "usage"; maybe, of meaning, or communication, etc. that would be "correct" as in justified or certain. — Antony Nickles
In any event, moving on, the focus is the "concept" of a mistake--we could call it the "practice" of a mistake (though that has confusing implications). And looking at what we imply when we say "I made a mistake" is to find differences that make it distinct (in our lives) from, say, an accident (this differentiation is "part of the Grammer" as Witt says). If I can say "what did you intend to do there?" we learn that part of the Grammar of intention is that it is not always present--you do not intend anything when you have an accident, or (usually) if you do something in the ordinary course. These are, in a sense, categorical claims, procedural claims, claims of distinctions, etc. So it is a different level of investigation than just how language is justified--these aren't rules about language or communication, they are what matters and counts in our lives--we are simply turning to look at them. — Antony Nickles
Yes, this got all twisted up. OLP is not "saying" something is a "mistake". It is making a claim to the conditions of/for a mistake--you can call that "judging" the example, but the point is to see the grammatical claim. Now, yes, another philosopher might hear the grammatical claim and say, "no, you haven't got that right." At which point they might say "The context would be different", or "the implication does not have that force." (This happens between Cavell and Ryle). But the point is you have the means and grist with which to have a discussion. I was trying to say this is not the normal conversation that people would have to figure out if it was a mistake or an accident--people in a sense "assume" (though this is misleading) the things that philosophers would call Grammar because mistakes are part of our lives. We are not trying to justify whether it was one or the other, we are discerning what makes it so by investigating what we mean (imply) when we talk about it. — Antony Nickles
These are all different senses of when we say "I mean" or you ask "Did you mean?" Each will have its own grammar. We do not get someone's meaning by, as Witt will say, "guessing thoughts". — Antony Nickles
Just two things: calling a speech act grammatically correct (not of course correct in regular grammar) does nothing to ensure understanding. Second, one might choose their words very carefully (as is necessary in philosophy as opposed to regular life), and it might be the other is not doing their part in understanding, but rather just insisting on justification or explanation on their terms. — Antony Nickles
I would put it that there is Grammar for each "class" or "type" of action (I'm not sure I would say "unique" because they overlap, etc. (as if family resemblances); and one might get the idea we are talking about each individual act.) So each concept, e.g., --"meaning", "knowing", "understanding"--all have associated "grammar" (multiple, and extendable, as much as our lives). Now we are tripping up on "incident" again as well--some incidents are not (grammatically) distinct from each other; we will only come up against grammar when necessary, and, even then, the discussion may not be "about" grammar (just along its lines as it were). Maybe it helps to point out that we are not "following" grammar, that we are just meaning, knowing, understanding, having accidents, making mistakes. — Antony Nickles
Are you consciously aware of the grammatical rules as you speak or write every sentence? Could you name the grammatical rules for all uses of a given word (without looking it up, of course)? Are you aware of the grammatical rules and meanings/uses of all words in every English-speaking location? — Luke
The issue was how to distinguish a mistake from an accident in order to ensure that the correct word is used to describe the situation.. And, as I demonstrated, sometimes a mistake is also an accident, and in those instances the accident would also be a mistake. What makes one of those a better choice of words in these instances? — Metaphysician Undercover
We can say that an accident in some cases is the result of a mistake, the consequences of. But a mistake might also be the consequences of another mistake, or some other unforeseen thing, making the mistake itself an accident. So in many instances the same thing could be correctly called an accident or a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover
In #90 the statements we say about concepts show us their possibilities; these possibilities are part of its Grammar--this concept can do that and this, but if it tries to do this other, than it is no longer that concept. When does a game just become play? The concept of knowledge has different possibilities (senses, options) and each is distinguished by its Grammar.
— Antony Nickles
So here's the dilemma for you Antony. Can the word "grammar" be successfully used in the way that Wittgenstein demonstrates, which is to go outside of the concept's grammar? If so, then it's not true that a concept's grammar is what determines its possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Walking in my shoes" is exactly the type of thing which requires criteria, rules and definitions. Agreeing with each other does not require criteria, rules, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover
So I requested, that you define "ordinary criteria", in a way which I could understand, and you couldn't, or didn't. — Metaphysician Undercover
At this point I would say that we do not have a clear understanding between us, as to what "grammar" refers to. I will adhere to a familiar understanding, that grammar refers to some sort of rules which we follow, and I will attempt to demonstrate how it makes sense to interpret "grammar" in this way. If you can show me another way to interpret "grammar" which makes sense to you, then I will attempt to follow you. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you want to show me a method of philosophy, then show me a method of philosophy — Metaphysician Undercover
Your words are referring to some type of thing or things which you assume exists somewhere, "ordinary criteria", "grammar of a mistake", But you are not describing this thing or things, and when you point toward where the thing ought to be I do not see it, nor do I see any logical possibility that the thing referred to through my normal, familiar, use of those words, could even be there. Therefore you need to provide me with a better description of what you are referring to, so that I might understand your use of those words. — Metaphysician Undercover
criteria is very explicitly principles for judgement. In language use we have two very distinct types of judgement, choosing one's words, and interpreting the words of others. So if grammar shows some boundaries as to what is correct in language use, and it doesn't refer to rules of correct usage, then can I conclude that it refers to rules of correct interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover
If the boundaries for choosing words were different from the boundaries for interpreting words, wouldn't this lead to misunderstanding? Where else could you possibly be pointing with "grammar", and "criteria", other than to rules of usage? I just don't see it. That's how the words are normally used, now you want to say that you are pointing to something different than this, but what could that different thing possibly be? — Metaphysician Undercover
First, as you say to 'practice a mistake' has very confusing implications. No one practices a mistake. Couldn't you have found a better way to say what you wanted here? I assume you are asking 'what does it mean to make a mistake?'. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why must we "find differences"... "animal" is a descriptive term used for describing "human being". In describing a thing we do not assume to have to distinguish that thing from other things, we do the exact opposite, compare it to others, looking for similarities, to establish its type. The differences are what is obvious to us, we don't have to find them, as they normally jump out at us, to describe the thing we look for points of similarity, and make comparisons. — Metaphysician Undercover
But you really lose me with "Grammar of intention". What is the point of "Grammar" here? It appears to serve no purpose but to distract, as if you are talking about Grammar when you are really talking about intention. — Metaphysician Undercover
Clearly you are talking about intention rather than grammar, as you proceed with "you do not intend anything when you have an accident". However, this statement is itself mistaken. "Doing something" always involves intention, so even when there's a mistake or an accident there is still something intended. So a mistake, or an accident, is an unintended feature of an intentional act. Therefore the fact that there was an accident is insufficient for the claim that intention was not present. — Metaphysician Undercover
We might however, use this fact, the occurrence of a mistake, as evidence that Grammar wasn't present. Let's do that instead shall we? Now we have evidence of intention without grammar. And we appear to have no principle whereby grammar could be brought into intention. So "the Grammar of intention" is a misnomer, a mistaken use of words which we need to reject. As you ought to be able to see, grammar is not inherent to intention, but extrinsic to it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Grammar is not any part of a mistake. Grammar is brought into existence intentionally, to serve a purpose, and that purpose is to avoid mistakes, to exclude the possibility of mistakes. The "conditions of/for a mistake" are the absence of appropriate grammar. If the appropriate grammar was there, there would not have been a mistake. So we can see that since "mistakes are part of our lives", so is the absence of grammar. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is not the phrase itself which has a grammar, it is the people using the phrase which have grammar. It really doesn't make any sense to say that there is grammar within the spoken words. How would we locate this grammar in our attempts to interpret the words? As I explained above, we apply grammar. — Metaphysician Undercover
It makes no sense to say that the grammar is within the words, "meaning", "knowing", "understanding". Where could it possibly be hiding? Instead, we follow a grammar when using the words (speaking), and interpreting the words. Otherwise we have no way to understand the nature of misunderstanding. If the grammar was in the spoken words, then either we'd perceive it (and understand), or not. To allow for the possibility of misunderstand, we allow that the words are apprehended, but improperly interpreted. Then what does "improperly interpreted" mean other than not applying the correct grammar? So we must allow that "grammar" is the rules we follow in choosing words and interpreting words. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you follow me so far, I can tell you about a third condition, and this one is the most difficult to understand. The third condition is the willingness to follow, or adhere to the grammar. as we are free willing beings, their is some tendency for us to drift off into some sort of random actions, or trial and error situations. Here again we would have no grammar in our intentions. — Metaphysician Undercover
This would mean that a person's grammar is developed individually from another person's, through one's social interactions for example. But this implies that a person goes into the social interactions, in the original condition (as a child), without grammar. And, the person must still be capable of communicating, in that original condition, in order to learn the grammar, without having any grammar. Therefore grammar is not a fundamental aspect of communication — Metaphysician Undercover
What's the logic of "Pass me the salt"? — Srap Tasmaner
Do requests or commands even have truth values? — Srap Tasmaner
So here's the dilemma for you Antony. Can the word "grammar" be successfully used in the way that Wittgenstein demonstrates, which is to go outside of the concept's grammar? If so, then it's not true that a concept's grammar is what determines its possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
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