The result of your computation is determined by your frame of accounting. Mine is different; unlike you I include future joys in my computations — Olivier5

How many bullies do you require before the pleasure they get from bullying someone trumps the suffering they inflict and therefore makes it ok?

Or better, how much pleasure must I derive from getting a new PC that it becomes your obligation to get me one? My laptop is pretty old....

I would think it our moral duty to procreate — Olivier5

I think it's ridiculous to think this in any scenario. As ridiculous as thinking that because I would be overjoyed at having a new PC that that obligates you to get me one. And for the same reasons. Also I'm not a woman FYI, I remember you referring to me as "she" before too but I might be misremembering.

But additionally, since you accept pleasures as a basis for moral obligation, then the person getting bullied in the above example would have a moral obligation to continue to get bullied, as him not getting bullied would be denying people pleasure.

A whole lot of things start to go wrong when you say that harming people for joy is acceptable, nay obligatory.

Okay so accounting for future harm of hypothetical generations is something you can do but not accounting for their future joy, for some mysterious reason. — Olivier5

No. I am accounting for both. However you clearly defined a killjoy as someone who "reduces people's joy". That does not apply here. There is no joy getting reduced. There is joy not being created. There is a difference. The same difference between me taking 3 dollars from you, and me not giving you 3 dollars.

Oh sure, neither of us is saying anything out of the ordinary. I'm just struck by how specifically the terms match up. There's a scale on each side (self and other): doing good for another at no cost to yourself is good, but even better at great cost to yourself, and vice versa, and the more good or harm on each side, the stronger our judgment of the morality of the act. Not a big deal, but interesting.

doing good for another at no cost to yourself is good, but even better at great cost to yourself — Srap Tasmaner

Not sure I agree. Just more praised to do so at great cost to yourself. I am reluctant to say that self-sacrifice is a good thing in itself. There is nothing good about flogging yourself.

A person who jumps into the water to save a drowning person despite being a terrible swimmer himself is not any more "heroic" than the person who calmly wakes up the lifeguard who is sleeping on the job. The first is just being stupid.

Of course. I wasn't suggesting absolute rules -- there are all sorts of things to take into account in a specific situation. Still, there's a pattern to at least part of what makes an action praiseworthy or blameworthy. Not claiming anything more than that.

Ok.

FWIW, it's a pattern than anti-natalism passes right by.

I am accounting for both. — khaled

That is not true. It was not your position yesterday at least, which was that only harm should be accounted because your only moral imperative is to reduce harm. I can point you to the precise post if you don't remember.

But you are not able to understand anything I say right now, obviously. You just want to think of life as a sexually transmitted disease with a 100% mortality rate. Which it is, objectively. We all die in the end. Our children will die. The earth herself will die one day. And the sooner the better of course, from your point of view. Thanks for cheering me up!

Both of these are true but only one is a moral claim. 1) says that you are obligated to cause indignity to reduce suffering elsewhere. I would disagree with this actually. My point is not that you must wake up the life guard or save the drowning person, I don't think there is an obligation there. My point is that you could. And that a system that has it where you cannot wake up the life guard or save the drowning person is ridiculous, I think we can agree there.

But 2 is only a statement of fact. Yes you do in fact have the ability to completely prevent kidnapping someone against their will. But in doing so you harm others. So it is not clear from this fact alone that the action should be taken (not having children) as we know there are cases where harm to others trumps "kidnappings" -as you called them- as a consideration. — khaled

But you are assuming that I follow this aggregate model. There are two scenarios here. One can absolutely be prevented. One can only be relatively prevented. Always do the absolute if it's available. If it's not available, that is indeed an impossibility.

Again, true, but only a statement of fact. This does not lead to it being wrong to nonetheless do that thing that enables harm, if the harm alleviated elsewhere is enough. — khaled

Only if that is your assumption of what is right. If you are in the game, and the game has harm, I must follow the rule of alleviation of harm, which goes contra to the ideal of not causing any unnecessary harm above the individual. However, this game does not dictate the rule that thus if unnecessary harm for someone is attainable, it is now justified to have the child.

My point is your argument is not unilateral. You cannot conclusively say "having children is wrong". Since you do not mind violating dignity elsewhere for the sake of preventing harm.

Unless you would argue that the child's dignity is somehow "special" and different from the lifeguard's dignity. I don't see a reason it should be. — khaled

But then you are not caring about the distinction between the two scenarios. It has nothing to do with aggregated harm. Again, I see ethics as person-affecting, not aggregate. Once born, we live in a society where in order to survive, we need to ameliorate suffering. However, if we were starving, I am not going to justify killing someone from a different tribe and eating them as the solution to our problem. That is essentially what you are doing here. I am not going to create a whole lifetime of suffering to another person for the calculus of some aggregated summary of those who already exist. At the same time, do you see there to be a qualitative difference in (since I'm already born) waking up the life guard, and then kidnapping the life guard and forcing him to save everyone I can think of? Maybe that is the better outcome, right? I mean.. maybe I have a cult where I kidnap all the life guards and make them into an emergency service or something that is meant to help the most people possible. But no, that would be violating his dignity in a MAJOR, reckless, and unnecessary way. It affects that person by violating their dignity and it mattered not that it helped the aggregated masses or technically led to less suffering.

Expressing your position in terms of tenseless indicatives is not only misleading, it's unnatural: there should be a future tense in here somewhere, or a subjunctive. ("If you have a child, they will suffer." "If I hadn't been born, I wouldn't be suffering." "If you were to bring a new a person into the world, they would suffer.")

But of course then you would have to describe a possible future world that includes the hypothetical person, and they would then hypothetically have exactly the same standing as everyone else, the same rights and duties, the same potential for good to their fellows or evil, the same potential to be helped or harmed. In describing that world, it's not clear why one person is singled out for special consideration above all others. — Srap Tasmaner

I've gone over this prior in the thread. The parent can prevent the wholesale suffering of a future person by not having them. As you mention, no "one" is losing out. However, no one will suffer either. I had a couple reformulations of it to make it pass this language barrier you describe. If you can, please try to look back in the thread for that discussion as it came up many different ways.

you are taking a risk with another person and you have no right to; schopenhauer1 seems to hold a position that, even if we knew for a fact that life is always and only pure bliss, it is a violation of that person's dignity (or perhaps "autonomy") to force them to lead such a blissful existence without so much as a "by your leave".

I'm with you: this whole "summing up" of a life is a bizarre and pointless approach. But even granting that, anti-natalism claims to be, as it were, defending someone's rights, albeit in the strangest way imaginable. That's a whole different confusion. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, but with the caveat that if you know that life has suffering for everybody (it's not a paradise), the indignity comes not only from violating consent (which I think there is a case for), but the unnecessary "overlooking" of harm on someone else's behalf. Any cause outside "don't cause unnecessary harm" in the case of procreation would indeed be using that person, and violating that person's dignity as your need for seeing X play out was more important than preventing suffering (and no person to even exist to be deprived of anything either).

life has suffering for everybody (it's not a paradise), — schopenhauer1

That's quite the understatement you got there. Life is unmitigated, absolute HELL. That's what it is. I can't wait for it to stop, personally.

That's quite the understatement you got there. Life is unmitigated, absolute HELL. That's what it is. I can't wait for it to stop, personally. — Olivier5

Yeah?

That is not true. — Olivier5

That is not true. I am accounting for both, instances of harming people and instances of "reducing pleasure". Because the latter is a harm. Sorry if I was being cryptic.

But you are not able to understand anything I say right now, obviously. — Olivier5

Doubt it. You said you take pleasure into the calculation. So there will come a point, where the number of people benefiting from one person's suffering trumps the consideration for that person's suffering. It's one of the most classic critiques of utilitarianism, which negative utilitarianism doesn't suffer from.

Thanks for cheering me up! — Olivier5

No problem.

There are two scenarios here. One can absolutely be prevented. One can only be relatively prevented. Always do the absolute if it's available. If it's not available, that is indeed an impossibility. — schopenhauer1

This is effectively special pleading though. Because in no other scenario is it possible for harm to be absolutely prevented. I don't understand why the child's dignity and suffering should be placed above the dignity and suffering of the people in the room, just because one can be prevented entirely and one partially.

Again, I see ethics as person-affecting, not aggregate. — schopenhauer1

There are people in the room, not some mass of goo.

However, if we were starving, I am not going to justify killing someone from a different tribe and eating them as the solution to our problem. That is essentially what you are doing here. — schopenhauer1

Yup. To a much smaller extent.

But that is also what you are doing when you wake up the lifeguard to save the drowning person. It is only a matter of extent, not principle. Though you make it a matter of principle (in the singular case of having children) by saying that if suffering can be prevented entirely, then that for some reason makes it more valuable to prevent than suffering that can only be partially prevented. That's something I don't agree with.

At the same time, do you see there to be a qualitative difference in (since I'm already born) waking up the life guard, and then kidnapping the life guard and forcing him to save everyone I can think of? — schopenhauer1

No. Quantitative difference.

But no, that would be violating his dignity in a MAJOR, reckless, and unnecessary way. — schopenhauer1

So the difference is between a major violation and a minor violation. That is a quantitative difference not a qualitative one. The this is on the same spectrum as cannibalism and having children. We both have points on the spectrum at which we consider this type of action ok (that being, harming someone for the sake of reducing suffering elsewhere). Yours for example at least includes that it is acceptable to wake up a lifeguard who is sleeping to have him save someone. And does not include forced kidnappings of lifeguards (neither does mine for the record).

However you take having children off this spectrum entirely by proposing a rule I don't agree with:

One can absolutely be prevented. One can only be relatively prevented. Always do the absolute if it's available — schopenhauer1

I don't see why the fact that harm can be absolutely prevented in an instance makes it more valuable to prevent than harm that can be partially prevented. You make it a qualitative difference when it is a quantitative one in every other scenario.

Good point now that I think about it. Ignore my previous response. — khaled

I'm afraid I didn't get a chance to properly read your previous response (other than to spot that this one is a slightly edited version), so consider it ignored (by chance).

Since there will be future generations regardless of what you do it’s good to try to create a “family tree of harm reducers”. Since by doing so, by following CN strictly or near strictly, at every step you will always be reducing harm. And since genocide and AN compliance are both impossible then NOT having that family tree around is the more harmful option, since every generation the number of people in the room grows ad infinium, and so does the number of people that you harm by having the child but a lot more slowly (by definition). Would be a pretty small one though due to the nature of CN. — khaled

Yes. Oddly enough, even though I don't have the same ethical system as you, this is very much the picture that I come to also. For me it's more about duty derived from natural virtues, than it is about reducing harms. I know we could get into these differences, but all I really wanted to point out here is that it's noteworthy that our two, quite different approaches, have landed on a similar outcome. Although it may be nothing but a meaningless coincidence, of course.

AN increases harm significantly, then goes to 0. CN keeps a mostly steady level of harm going forever. It is clear which is more harmful overall. — khaled

Yes, I think that's right (within your system). It's one of the reasons why I don't hold with that system alone, it leads to conclusions I find unpleasant, so I assume something must be wrong somewhere. I use my sense of what 'feels' right a lot in ethical decisions, partly because calculating it rationally is fraught with potential errors, and if I went against my gut but later found I was wrong, I'd feel worse than if I went against my calculation but later found it was right. I don't know why.

But considering real conditions, and not idealizations, it is clear that the next generations will exist anyways. In this case it also becomes clear that new people are added to the room each generation you consider. So applying CN is better in real scenarios, applying AN is better in ideal scenarios. — khaled

(I like 'CN' - good coining of a term!). Yes, whichever angle you approach this it seems to lead to the same outcome and I think that's fundamentally because we are a social species whose reproduction of new generations is continuous, rather than sporadic. If either of those two factors didn't exist I'd have a much harder time arguing against AN on their own terms. If we all got together at some point and said "shall we have another generation?", then I can well imagine ANists being at that meeting making a strong case for "no", but as that's not what happens, the arguments don't really apply.

It's one of the most classic critiques of utilitarianism, which negative utilitarianism doesn't suffer from. — khaled

The same critique does apply to negative utilitarianism. There's no universal metric to measure harm, and therefore one cannot actually compute harms. So the whole idea of 'bean counting life' like this is at best shoddy theory, at worse an illusion.

There's a story about a zen farmer whose horse ran away. Upon hearing the news, his neighbors came to visit. "Such bad luck," they said sympathetically. "We'll see," the farmer replied.

A few days later, the horse returned, bringing with it three other wild horses. "How lucky you are," the neighbors exclaimed. "We'll see," the farmer replied.

The following day, the farmer's son tried to tame one of the wild horses, was thrown, and broke his leg. The neighbors again came to offer their sympathy on his misfortune. "We'll see," the farmer replied.

The day after, a recruiting sergent came to the village to draft young men into the army for a war. Seeing that the son's leg was broken, they passed him by. The neighbors congratulated the farmer on how well things had turned out for his family.

"We'll see," said the farmer.

This is effectively special pleading though. Because in no other scenario is it possible for harm to be absolutely prevented. I don't understand why the child's dignity and suffering should be placed above the dignity and suffering of the people in the room, just because one can be prevented entirely and one partially. — khaled

For the reason I wouldn't make a society of life guards to defend the public or cannabilize a person from the next tribe to help my tribe out.

There are people in the room, not some mass of goo. — khaled

As is the case with the life guard recipients and cannibals.

I don't see why the fact that harm can be absolutely prevented in an instance makes it more valuable to prevent than harm that can be partially prevented. You make it a qualitative difference when it is a quantitative one in every other scenario. — khaled

Because in the procreation decision, there is only one way to violate dignity- overlooking harm of that person for any other reason. The person does not exist, so anything outside considerations of harm violate the dignity. However, if someone exists, that person has interests etc. once born. Presumably, those interests are things like not drowning. It starts getting complicated in terms of what "violation of dignity" means for people with interests, needs, wants, experiences, and the like. That is a qualitative difference, not one of degree.

For the reason I wouldn't make a society of life guards to defend the public or cannabilize a person from the next tribe to help my tribe out. — schopenhauer1

But you would wake up the life guard. How come? This is a quantitative difference. You only make it qualitative in the one case by giving harm done to people that aren't here yet special value over harm done to people that are here.

Because in the procreation decision, there is only one way to violate dignity- overlooking harm of that person for any other reason. — schopenhauer1

False. What about overlooking harm of the people in the room for that one person? What's the difference here?

That is a qualitative difference, not one of degree. — schopenhauer1

That I don't think should matter. Just because my child isn't born yet, doesn't mean he gets special treatment in the calculation.

For the same reason that just because the lifeguard wasn't doing anything wrong doesn't mean he gets special treatment in the calculation. I won't absolutely abstain from harming the lifeguard at any cost just because he did nothing wrong. And neither would you, as you would in fact wake him up.

There's no universal metric to measure harm, and therefore one cannot actually compute harms. — Olivier5

That's not the critique I'm talking about. I'm talking about the "Colosseum" argument. "How many spectators must there be in the Colosseum before their pleasure from watching someone get mauled by a lion justifies having someone get mauled by a lion". We don't have Colosseums anymore so I changed it to bullying.

Incidentally, this also applies to pleasures. And you are supposed to be calculating with both.

There's a story about a zen farmer whose horse ran away. Upon hearing the news, his neighbors came to visit. "Such bad luck," they said sympathetically. "We'll see," the farmer replied. — Olivier5

I know the story. However it is crazy to use it as a justification for stealing people's horses. There may not be a universal metric here but we can make pretty good guesses on which is more harmful, to steal or not to steal.

And, again, you supposedly use both harms and pleasures in your calculations, even though there is no universal metric to measure them by. Doesn't stop you though does it? So why use a critique that can be used against your own position?

But you would wake up the life guard. How come? This is a quantitative difference. You only make it qualitative in the one case by giving harm done to people that aren't here yet special value over harm done to people that are here. — khaled

For the same reason that just because the lifeguard wasn't doing anything wrong doesn't mean he gets special treatment in the calculation. I won't absolutely abstain from harming the lifeguard at any cost just because he did nothing wrong. And neither would you, as you would in fact wake him up. — khaled

Because you are pinning the people born back to violating harm as the only way to overlook dignity. You don't look out for certain interests of people already born, like letting them die, you are violating the dignity. It's the same thing as a parent who needs to make sure the child is doing stuff that doesn't kill them or makes them survive better in society. However, in deciding on procreation, harm is the only consideration for that child, not whatever else you might want to "see" happen from its birth.

You don't look out for certain interests of people already born, like letting them die, you are violating the dignity. — schopenhauer1

That is what I do when I consider the people in the room.

However, in deciding on procreation, harm is the only consideration for that child, not whatever else you might want to "see" happen from its birth. — schopenhauer1

This is the exact point I disagree with.

Because it leads to things like: The lifeguard did nothing wrong, therefore when considering whether or not to wake him up, the only consideration is harm for that lifeguard, not whatever else you might want to "see" happen from waking him up. Anything else is violating the lifeguard's dignity.

Point is you consider it fine to violate dignity sometimes, and to consider harms outside of the lifeguard. Why not the child?

There's no universal metric to measure harm, and therefore one cannot actually compute harms.
— Olivier5

That's not the critique I'm talking about. I'm talking about the "Colosseum" argument. "How many spectators must there be in the Colosseum before their pleasure from watching someone get mauled by a lion justifies having someone get mauled by a lion". — khaled

In other words, how many spectators must there be in the Colosseum before their harm reduction from watching someone get mauled by a lion justifies having someone get mauled by a lion.

It's the same idea: one cannot measure the harm made to John and compare it with that made or avoided to Peter. That's what I mean when I say, in mathematical terms, that there's no metric there. One cannot measure and add up the feelings of several people.

This is the exact point I disagree with.

Because it leads to things like: The lifeguard did nothing wrong, therefore when considering whether or not to wake him up, the only consideration is harm for that lifeguard, not whatever else you might want to "see" happen from waking him up. Anything else is violating the lifeguard's dignity.

Point is you consider it fine to violate dignity sometimes, and to consider harms outside of the lifeguard/child. — khaled

Does the life guard exist? Does the child exist? Their interests are more than "not being woken up". A child not born, has no such interests like "not dying". Rather, it becomes a much more stark, "Do not enable harm, if it can be prevented".

Edit: rephrase "a child not born" to fit the linguistic threshold of making sense.. ya know what I meant.. in other words.

I know the story. However it is crazy to use it as a justification for stealing people's horses. There may not be a universal metric here but we can make pretty good guesses on which is more harmful, to steal or not to steal. — khaled

Depending on the circumstances, there may be cases where stealing a horse would be the right thing to do. But that's not what the tale means. It means (to me at least) that a joy or a harm are transient, and one can be intimately tied with the other in a cause to effect relationship. So don't count your beans too soon, or too often, like the neighbours keeping a tally day after day. These things go up and down, like a pendulum, or ying yang style.

In other words, you can't actually compute harms and joys because the story never ends, and is not predictable. One thing leading to another, an event that looks good as and when it happens may lead to unsavory consequences later, and vice versa something that feels wrong or painful can help cause a good (or harm reductive) consequence later, and nobody can tell for sure. We're all guessing. And even if you reduce the computation to the negative, any joy can be described as 'harm reduction' thus it doesn't help.

In other words, you can't actually compute harms and joys because the story never ends, and is not predictable. — Olivier5

Yup.

One thing leading to another, an event that looks good as and when it happens may lead to unsavory consequences later, and vice versa something that feels wrong or painful can help cause a good (or harm reductive) consequence later, and nobody can tell for sure. — Olivier5

Sure.

We're all guessing. — Olivier5

But the point is to not guess ridiculously. I can't justify killing someone because "maybe it's actually gonna be a good thing later". ANs think that guessing that having children is fine is akin to that, is guessing ridiculously.

Though I'm not sure why I'm even arguing with you anymore tbh seeing as I don't agree. I think I'll stop now.

Does the life guard exist? Does the child exist? — schopenhauer1

I don't think it should matter. Never have. I don't think that just because the child doesn't exist his suffering gets special value in the calculation.

Their interests are more than "not being woken up". — schopenhauer1

But that IS one of their interests. But you consider more than just their interests and so wake them up, for a purpose outside of themselves. But refuse to do the same with the child because the child doesn't exist yet, but again, I don't think that should matter.

Rather, it becomes a much more stark, "Do not enable harm, if it can be prevented". — schopenhauer1

I don't agree that "enabling harm" is the problem as I said. If it was then having a child who would lead a perfect life would be wrong, because harm is still being enabled there.

ANs think that guessing that having children is fine is akin to that, is guessing ridiculously. — khaled

And I think that's ridiculous, as an absolute statement. I think sometimes it may be "guessing ridiculously" (whatever the threshold for that is), and sometimes not.

As I am found to say....

And for good measure...

I don't think it should matter. Never have. I don't think that just because the child doesn't exist his suffering gets special value in the calculation. — khaled

I do. If the lifeguard can prevent all harm for a future person, then he should. No other things are required to consult. But I don't think ethics involves aggregation when considering something that does not exist yet because that is a case, where one does not have to ameliorate but rather, where one can prevent all suffering for someone else.

But that IS one of their interests. But you consider more than just their interests and so wake them up, for a purpose outside of themselves. But refuse to do the same with the child because the child doesn't exist yet, but agai — khaled

I don't agree that "enabling harm" is the problem as I said. If it was then having a child who would lead a perfect life would be wrong, because harm is still being enabled there. — khaled

n, I don't think that should matter.

The issue multiplies exponentially once born. It isn't a simple if/then, as no "one" exists prior to existence. The only consideration here that would violate what would be the child's dignity is putting anything above harm, as there is nothing to "ameliorate" for the child.

Once born, we ameliorate all the time to survive. We might make lesser harm for a greater good. Honestly, this seems like classical trolley problem as applied to AN. Does the individual count that you are harming? I am saying, while the aggregate could matter due to the constraints of being alive with interests, no such thing is the case for considering a future child who is not born.