Why would such lives contain far more undeserved suffering than pleasure? Can you explain? — baker

Because most people don't want to live such monkish lives of self deprivation. So they will suffer considerably if they live such lives. And that suffering is unjust, for by hypothesis they are subjecting themselves to such deprivations becasue and only because they live in a world in which not doing so would visit even greater sufferings on others. None of that was their doing, so their suffering is undeserved.

This would be true even if it were the case that they were morally required to live lives of deprivation.

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As I said, ignoring non human suffering, you cannot deny that the average person is a positive influence. And so not having them risks becoming more harmful than having them. — khaled

But that's trivial. Yes, if we ignore all the ways in which we have a negative impact and focus only on the ways in which we have a positive impact, then yes, I would say that we have a positive impact. But that's to do no more than say "a positive consequence is a positive consequence". It tells us nothing about the morality of procreation.

In fact procreating is clearly an activity that creates both suffering and pleasure. Even putting aside the quantities involved, what I am noting is that most of the suffering that such acts create is undeserved - which is the worst kind of suffering, morally speaking. That is, of all the kinds of suffering we have moral reason to prevent, the kind we have weightiest reason to prevent is undeserved suffering. By contrast, most of the pleasures procreative acts create are non-deserved. (Indeed, many are positively undeserved, for if procreative acts are immoral, then the pleasures that those who commit such acts derive from having done so will typically be positively undeserved).
Non-deserved pleasures are still good or can be. But their being non-deserved typically means that we do not have any weighty moral reason to create them.
And undeserved pleasures are positively bad and we typically have moral reason to prevent them.

Non-deserved pleasures are still good or can be. But their being non-deserved typically means that we do not have any weighty moral reason to create them. — Bartricks

I’m of the mind that we have no moral obligation to create pleasure. Period. Furthermore that we’re not even obligated to alleviate all suffering, only that which we are responsible for. So I don’t find your distinctions very impactful.

But that's trivial. Yes, if we ignore all the ways in which we have a negative impact and focus only on the ways in which we have a positive impact, then yes, I would say that we have a positive impact. But that's to do no more than say "a positive consequence is a positive consequence". It tells us nothing about the morality of procreation. — Bartricks

I wouldn’t say it’s obvious that we should weigh animal suffering nearly as much as human suffering.

I’m of the mind that we have no moral obligation to create pleasure. Period. Furthermore that we’re not even obligated to alleviate all suffering, only that which we are responsible for. So I don’t find your distinctions very impactful. — khaled

Well, all you're doing there is expressing a belief in a prima facie implausible view.

Even if your view is correct - and I see no evidence that it is - one would be responsible for the suffering that one's procreative acts create, wouldn't one?

It's irrelevant too, because what I'm talking about is the moral value of the pains and pleasures such acts create, not the responsibility of the procreator.

Well, all you're doing there is expressing a belief in a prima facie implausible view. — Bartricks

Why do you think it's implausible?

one would be responsible for the suffering that one's procreative acts create, wouldn't one? — Bartricks

Yes. But not procreating brings about arguably worse suffering (if you only look at human suffering). It depends on what your "system" consists of. If you are only concerned with the suffering of the child and the parent, then having children will always come out the more harmful option, so it would never be right. But if you consider the people the child would help, then you realize there is a risk both ways. So there will be situations where it is acceptable to have the child.

Even if your view is correct - and I see no evidence that it is - — Bartricks

So you believe we are obligated to reduce world suffering everywhere all the time? That all undeserved suffering everywhere should be treated equal? Caused or uncaused by us?

It's irrelevant too, because what I'm talking about is the moral value of the pains and pleasures such acts create, not the responsibility of the procreator. — Bartricks

Pretty relevant for me because I don't think the amount of pain and pleasure is created provides a basis for a moral obligation as long as it's not my responsibility. Example: By not donating to charity someone out there is getting harmed. Despite this, I don't have to donate to charity. Because that person is not my responsibility. However I still can, and it is good to do so.

Why do you think it's implausible? — khaled

Intuitively one of the considerations that informs the morality of our actions is how much pain or pleasure they produce. Not the only consideration, obviously, but one of them.

If a child is drowning in a pond, and all you have to do to save it is reach down and pull it out, you ought to do so, yes? I think the intuitions of virtually everyone will concur. Yet on your view there is no such obligation. Your view is prima facie implausible - grotesquely so.

Yes. But not procreating brings about arguably worse suffering (if you only look at human suffering). — khaled

That's a different point, though equally implausible. And you keep saying 'if you only look at human suffering" - that's like saying "yes, but if we ignore most of the suffering this act causes, then it doesn't cause much suffering".

So you believe we are obligated to reduce world suffering everywhere all the time? That all undeserved suffering everywhere should be treated equal? Caused or uncaused by us? — khaled

Er, no, and that in no way followed from anything I said. If i reject as implausible the view that we are in no way obligated to promote pleasure, that doesn't mean that I think we are always obligated to promote pleasure. Likewise, if I reject as implausible the view that we are in no way obligated to prevent suffering that we're not the agents of, that does not imply that I think we are always obligated to prevent all suffering.

Pretty relevant for me because I don't think the amount of pain and pleasure is created provides a basis for a moral obligation as long as it's not my responsibility. — khaled

Again, you're once more appealing to your belief in a prima facie implausible moral theory (we obviously do sometimes have moral obligations to do alleviate suffering that we played no part in creating - that's why I ought to reach down and save the child who accidentally fell in the pond and is now drowning).
And again, it's beside the point anyway, as I am talking about the relative moral weights of the suffering and pleasures that procreative acts create.

I think the intuitions of virtually everyone will concur. Yet on your view there is no such obligation. — Bartricks

Yup.

grotesquely so — Bartricks

What would be grotesque is if I said "You must not reach out and help". But that is not the case.

'if you only look at human suffering" — Bartricks

Because it's not clear to me other forms of it matter.

That's a different point, though equally implausible. — Bartricks

If the average person was a negative influence on others, then we wouldn't form groups, and we'd be better of as hermits. Or, at least, we'd be miserable in groups. Both are not the case.

Er, no, and that in no way followed from anything I said. If i reject as implausible the view that we are in no way obligated to promote pleasure, that doesn't mean that I think we are always obligated to promote pleasure. Likewise, if I reject as implausible the view that we are in no way obligated to prevent suffering that we're not the agents of, that does not imply that I think we are always obligated to prevent all suffering. — Bartricks

What you were rejecting is that we are only responsible for certain sufferings and not others. I thought this meant that you think we are responsible to alleviate all undeserved sufferings.

we obviously do sometimes have moral obligations to do alleviate suffering that we played no part in creating - that's why I ought to reach down and save the child who accidentally fell in the pond and is now drowning — Bartricks

I disagree.

I am talking about the relative moral weights of the suffering and pleasures that procreative acts create — Bartricks

But to someone who doesn't take created pleasures into account in the first place, it's not a compelling argument.

These are not objections to anything I've argued. You're just telling me you don't find the argument compelling - well, no, I'm sure you don't given the implausible moral beliefs that you have. But that's really neither here nor there. It's no objection to a view to point out that it is inconsistent with a grossly implausible view.

Well initially I wanted to point out this:

But not procreating brings about arguably worse suffering (if you only look at human suffering). It depends on what your "system" consists of. If you are only concerned with the suffering of the child and the parent, then having children will always come out the more harmful option, so it would never be right. But if you consider the people the child would help, then you realize there is a risk both ways. So there will be situations where it is acceptable to have the child. — khaled

But if you want to consider non human harm then yes any form of procreation will be unethical right off the bat, people have to eat. Have a good day.

What other pains and pleasures are there other than those in a life of one who has been subjected to life? — Isaac


The pains and pleasures caused to others, obviously. — Bartricks

All of whom have been born, presumably. Or are you including Jesus - yes, I didn't think of the immaculate conception of the spirit of the son of god. My mistake. Oh, and there's androids too. I see I've just not thought this through properly...

No, I said that's one way in which one might come to deserve pleasure, I did not say that it was inevitable that it would. — Bartricks

So now some people who are born do not deserve pleasure as a result of their being made to suffer. Poor sods. What did they do have such a reward taken away, was it something in a past life?

Some of the undeserved suffering a person who has been subjected to a life here will endure may well make them deserving of subsequent pleasures. That is not being denied. — Bartricks

So how much? You've not answered my question about your deserve-o-meter. How much is one entitled to in compensation for being born, and how much does one actually get (and is there somewhere I can make a claim if I feel I've been short-changed)? Presumably you've done the maths, let's have it laid out for us.

that even if 'all' of the pleasures in a life come to be deserved in that way, it would probably still be immoral to create that life, because it is generally wrong to do bad that good may come of it. — Bartricks

Why is it 'bad'? Your whole argument for it being 'bad' is that it causes undeserved suffering, but only undeserved pleasure in balance. If it actually delivers deserved pleasure in balance, then there's nothing left making it 'bad' is there. So this counter doesn't work.

Because most people don't want to live such monkish lives of self deprivation. — Bartricks

Well, you're the one making an argument in favor of antinatalism, so you have to find a way around people refusing to live monkish lifestyles.

That makes no sense.

All of whom have been born, presumably. Or are you including Jesus - yes, I didn't think of the immaculate conception of the spirit of the son of god. My mistake. Oh, and there's androids too. I see I've just not thought this through properly... — Isaac

Yes, all of whom have been born.

So now some people who are born do not deserve pleasure as a result of their being made to suffer. Poor sods. What did they do have such a reward taken away, was it something in a past life? — Isaac

Yes, not everyone who suffers comes thereby to deserve pleasure. This is because some of the suffering we undergo we deserve to undergo by dint of our behaviour. Suffering that you deserve to undergo doesn't, at least not typically, make one deserving of pleasure.

So how much? You've not answered my question about your deserve-o-meter. How much is one entitled to in compensation for being born, and how much does one actually get (and is there somewhere I can make a claim if I feel I've been short-changed)? Presumably you've done the maths, let's have it laid out for us — Isaac

Well, I haven't been talking about what we deserve in terms of compensation for the injustice our parents did to us - for that presupposes that procreative acts are wrong and yet whether they are is what I am interested in finding out and what my argument is supposed to provide some insight into. So your question puts the cart before the horse. But anyway, I'd say that parents owe their children a decent living for having, of their own free will, subjected them to a life in a world in which having a decent living is needed if one is to have a reasonable prospect of happiness.

Why is it 'bad'? Your whole argument for it being 'bad' is that it causes undeserved suffering, but only undeserved pleasure in balance. If it actually delivers deserved pleasure in balance, then there's nothing left making it 'bad' is there. So this counter doesn't work. — Isaac

What I've assumed is that most of the suffering procreative acts create is of the undeserved kind. Some of the suffering contained in our own lives (though not all, of course) is undeserved, especially virtually all of the suffering that befalls us when we are children (for we are not responsible agents at that point). And the suffering - which is magnitudes greater - we visit on others, including other animals. The vast bulk of it all is going to be undeserved (I mean, animals lack agency, so all suffering that they undergo is undeserved).

It's also worth noting, I think, that there's a 'direction' to desert. Past undeserved sufferings can't become deserved by dint of one's future actions. So, let's say you suffer a lot as a child, but then you go on to do terrible things in the rest of your life. Well, that suffering was still undeserved, and all your subsequent career has done is make your subsequent sufferings deserved and your subsequent pleasures undeserved.

As for pleasures - well, most of suffering we create is, I think, suffering visited upon other animals, whereas most of the pleasure we create is pleasure that we ourselves enjoy. And I think that, in general, our own lives contain more pleasure than pain - thankfully quite a lot more. So, that's why I think most of the pleasures in our lives are non-deserved, other things being equal.

The more I think about it, however, the more doubtful I become about that. For it occurs to me that most people do something terribly wrong in their lives, namely they procreate. And it seems to me, that once a person does that - once a person freely decides to subject someone else to the same risks of unjust harm that they themselves were exposed to - they come to deserve everything they get in the way of suffering. That is, to procreate is to make oneself deserving of all the injustices that subsequently befall you. And all the pleasures that befall you subsequent to that act - well, they seem undeserved now. So, procreate and everything switches, at least in the context of your own life. Procreate, and the pleasures that would otherwise have been non-deserved become undeserved, and the pains that would otherwise have been undeserved, become deserved. Perhaps that's too harsh though. Not sure at the moment.

some of the suffering we undergo we deserve to undergo by dint of our behaviour. Suffering that you deserve to undergo doesn't, at least not typically, make one deserving of pleasure. — Bartricks

This then would make it sound like the amount of undeserved please (the pleasure not accounted for by undeserved suffering) is dependent on a person's behaviour. Behave well and you will unlikely put yourself in a position of not deserving your pleasures because any suffering you undergo will be undeserved (and therefore continue to yield a debt of deserved pleasure to make up for it).

parents owe their children a decent living for having, of their own free will, subjected them to a life in a world in which having a decent living is needed if one is to have a reasonable prospect of happiness. — Bartricks

How have you calculated this? What maths have you used to work out that the sum total of pleasure deserved (in return for the all the undeserved suffering being born brought about) is 'a decent living'. I want to see your workings.

I'm presuming you haven't just posted to a nationwide public forum to tell us all that you reckon 'a decent living' is a bout the deserved quantity of pleasure appropriate for 'all the suffering one endures in life that isn't itself deserved', using quantities you've just pulled out of your arse.

I presume you've done a fairly substantial amount of research using, say glucocorticoids as a proxy for suffering and maybe oxytocin, serotonin, adrenaline, prolactin, norepinephrine or dopamine as you proxies for pleasure - with some sensible threshold quantities, based on the literature.

Or, maybe, you've quite reasonably decided to eschew the contentious neurological approach and stick to self-reports, that would be understandable. You've conducted a series of wide ranging surveys, or perhaps just relied on the thousands of such that have already been done, to give some quantitative score to these otherwise qualitative measures - did you perhaps use ordinality inducing questionnaire formats, they have a fairly good reputation for generating significant quantitative values in such cases?

Or maybe yours was an historical approach, a meta study of the social and political changes societies have striven for as a measure of pleasures they pursue and suffering they're willing to endure for them. Yes, that would make a good aggregate comparison without getting bogged down in ironing out individual differences. Of course then you'd have to account for the disproportionate influence of he powerful, but...

...No? Please don't tell me you've just written to a public forum advising that all parents owe their children in compensation for being born is 'a decent living' based on absolutely nothing but the fact that you 'reckon' that's the case.

You're the one making an argument in favor of antinatalism.
That means you have to find justifications for why people should not have children, and you have to find a way to convince them of that.

Er, that's what I'm doing. Arguments 'are' justifications. But thanks. Oh, and you don't have to convince people - something doesn't become true just because people are convinced that it is.

This then would make it sound like the amount of undeserved please (the pleasure not accounted for by undeserved suffering) is dependent on a person's behaviour. Behave well and you will unlikely put yourself in a position of not deserving your pleasures because any suffering you undergo will be undeserved (and therefore continue to yield a debt of deserved pleasure to make up for it). — Isaac

The better you behave the more undeserved the suffering you undergo becomes and the more deserving of pleasure you become. There's the desert of pleasure generated - at least typically - by one's undergoing undeserved suffering, and then there's the desert of pleasure generated by the fact one has behaved well. So, someone who leads a very saintly life may well deserve much, much more pleasure than they received in their life - which is terrible, of course, for it is a great injustice if a person does not get the pleasure they deserve. And any suffering they endure will be, from a moral perspective, much much worse than it would be if they hadn't behaved so well.

The rest of what you wrote was just silly. But to reply in kind, I assume you've done extensive research into the nature of desert and the nature of morality and haven't just posted on a public forum from a position of philosophical ignorance?

The better you behave the more undeserved the suffering you undergo becomes and the more deserving of pleasure you become. There's the desert of pleasure generated - at least typically - by one's undergoing undeserved suffering, and then there's the desert of pleasure generated by the fact one has behaved well. So, someone who leads a very saintly life may well deserve much, much more pleasure than they received in their life - which is terrible, of course, for it is a great injustice if a person does not get the pleasure they deserve. And any suffering they endure will be, from a moral perspective, much much worse than it would be if they hadn't behaved so well. — Bartricks

Right. So a population of well-behaved people are perfectly likely to deserve all the pleasure they get (and more) and thus there is no 'badness' in giving birth to them because the pleasure they will revive in life truly does outweigh the suffering, morally, because it is all deserved pleasure. It is a god thing to give birth to them because it will create a situation of greater deserved pleasure than otherwise, whilst at the same time, (given that one strong component of behaving well is reducing the suffering of others), this same population will be working to reduce the amount of undeserved suffering in the world, which is also a good thing.

to reply in kind, I assume you've done extensive research into the nature of desert and the nature of morality and haven't just posted on a public forum from a position of philosophical ignorance? — Bartricks

...is not replying in kind. Another person experiencing suffering and/or pleasure is a fact about the world. It can only be determined empirically and therefore there will be some body of knowledge about it (a collection of such empirical observations). Whether someone deserves such suffering/pleasure or not is not an empirical observation, it is determined by the assessment of the person considering it. As such there is no body of knowledge, no collection of observations the learning of which would increase the accuracy of such a judgement. If I were critiquing a particular named philosophical position, then there would constitute a body of knowledge about exactly what that position is which I would be well-advised to apprise myself of prior to comment, but this is no such situation,

Oh, and you don't have to convince people - something doesn't become true just because people are convinced that it is. — Bartricks

If you have no aim to convince people of the truthness of your argument, then why on earth are you developing it?

Right. So a population of well-behaved people are perfectly likely to deserve all the pleasure they get (and more) and thus there is no 'badness' in giving birth to them because the pleasure they will revive in life truly does outweigh the suffering, — Isaac

I don't see how you get to that conclusion. First, you need to be more than merely well-behaved. Being well-behaved is morally required, not morally superlative. Yet it is the latter that makes one positively deserving of pleasure as opposed to merely non-deserving. And it is unreasonable to suppose that one's offspring will live morally superlative lives. So, the suffering that a well-behaved person undergoes prior to becoming an agent is undeserved, and the suffering they undergo through the rest of their life - well, most of that is going to be undeserved as well. That may well operate to make many of their subsequent pleasures deserved (though not necessarily - desert is not a simple matter), but it's not going to tip the balance in any particular case. That's because although the goodness of a deserved pleasure is greater than that of a non-deserved pleasure, it is not going to be better than not having suffered the undeserved suffering. We typically recognise this at an intuitive level. For instance, let's say I know that, other things being equal, Janet is going to experience 10 units of non-deserved pleasure tomorrow. I reason that if I subject Janet to 10 units of undeserved suffering right now, then those 10 units of pleasure that she'll experience tomorrow will become deserved and thus will count for more, goodness-wise. Now, does that give me some moral reason to subject Janet to that suffering? No, of course not. That's why knowingly creating undeserved suffering that deserved pleasure may come of it is wrong, at least in most of the cases I can conceive of.

Note as well that if one lives a superlative life, that operates to make the undeserved suffering that you experience even worse, morally speaking. As I said, the better you behave, the worse your suffering becomes - not necessarily in quantity or quality, but in its moral badness. For the better you behave, the more undeserving of suffering you become.

So I think you need to re-sit your moral accountancy exams.

I would like to be able to convince people of its soundness. But my priority is to find out whether it actually is sound. After all, it is irresponsible to try and convince people of a view whose truth one is unsure about. So the priority should be to check if a view is true - which one does by careful rational scrutiny.
It can often be hard to appreciate a good argument - hard to recognise just how much probative force it has. Most people prefer soundbites and simplicity and don't have much time to give a view the amount of thought it needs to uncover its problems or to see its truth.
Imagine trying to convince a 12th century detective of the value of DNA evidence as opposed to dunking people in ponds and seeing if they float. It wouldn't fly. Does that mean DNA evidence isn't good evidence - or wasn't in the 12th centruy? No, of course not. Yet it wouldn't have convinced anyone back then.

it is unreasonable to suppose that one's offspring will live morally superlative lives. — Bartricks

Why?

That may well operate to make many of their subsequent pleasures deserved (though not necessarily - desert is not a simple matter), but it's not going to tip the balance in any particular case. — Bartricks

Why not?

knowingly creating undeserved suffering that deserved pleasure may come of it is wrong, at least in most of the cases I can conceive of. — Bartricks

So why the whole song and dance about deserved pleasure, it's completely irrelevant to your case, which, it turns out, is just standard antinatalism. It's wrong to cause suffering even if it also causes pleasure, so don't have children. Nothing 'new' at all. If no amount of later pleasure justifies the suffering, then it's utterly irrelevant whether that pleasure is deserved or not.

All you have here is bog standard antinatalism.

would like to be able to convince people of its soundness. But my priority is to find out whether it actually is sound. After all, it is irresponsible to try and convince people of a view whose truth one is unsure about. So the priority should be to check if a view is true - which one does by careful rational scrutiny.
It can often be hard to appreciate a good argument - hard to recognise just how much probative force it has. Most people prefer soundbites and simplicity and don't have much time to give a view the amount of thought it needs to uncover its problems or to see its truth. — Bartricks

An argument in favor of not having children is specific in that it is aimed at people making an important change in their lives.
This means, among other things, that such an argument needs to be formulated in such a way that people of all walks of life can accept it, and with minimum effort, at that.
IOW, you need an argument that will convince even the average Joe and Jane, in a commercial break while they watch tv.

Why? — Isaac

Because most people do not live morally superlative lives (nor ought they, of course). Kind of obvious.

Why not? — Isaac

I explained. It's the wordy bit that followed-on from that quote.

All you have here is bog standard antinatalism. — Isaac

How?

Not sure what you're on about now. It doesn't really connect to anything I've said.
This is a philosophy forum, not a rhetoric forum. Philosophy involves using reason to try and find out what's true. The test of a good argument is its rational plausibility, not its persuasiveness. Like I say, bad arguments can persuade people and good arguments can leave people cold.
Most people are going to have kids and aren't remotely interested in whether it's ethical to do so or not. I mean, have you met people?

Why? — Isaac


Because most people do not live morally superlative lives (nor ought they, of course). Kind of obvious. — Bartricks

Most people are not grade 8 pianists either, but one could almost guarantee one's children would be if one were to train them from birth. That most people are not something does not in any way lead to the conclusion that it's not possible to ensure one's children are that thing.

Why not? — Isaac


I explained. It's the wordy bit that followed-on from that quote. — Bartricks

The bit I wanted explaining was ...

it's not going to tip the balance in any particular case. — Bartricks

So what I'd need was not your further opinion of what the balance might be but an explanation of why it could not be any other way.

You simply declared that...

the goodness of a deserved pleasure is greater than that of a non-deserved pleasure, it is not going to be better than not having suffered the undeserved suffering — Bartricks

...without support, and then went on to say that all this showed...

why knowingly creating undeserved suffering that deserved pleasure may come of it is wrong, at least in most of the cases I can conceive of. — Bartricks

Yet the statement in want of explanation was not about making future pleasure deserved, it was about balancing suffering with pleasures.

All you have here is bog standard antinatalism. — Isaac


How? — Bartricks

I explained. It's the wordy bit above the conclusion.

Most people are not grade 8 pianists either, but one could almost guarantee one's children would be if one were to train them from birth. That most people are not something does not in any way lead to the conclusion that it's not possible to ensure one's children are that thing. — Isaac

Beside the point. Yes, most people are perfectly capable of leading morally superlative lives, the point is that they're a) highly unlikely to and b) they're not obliged to (they wouldn't be morally superlative otherwise) and c) even if they did, that would only operate to exaggerate the badness of the suffering they undergo, for the better one behaves, the more unjust it becomes that one suffers.

even if they did, that would only operate to exaggerate the badness of the suffering they undergo, for the better one behaves, the more unjust it becomes that one suffers. — Bartricks

Right. So if their life was full of 'deserved' please (because they're morally good people), or if their life is full of undeserved pleasure (because they're not), make no difference at all to the extent to which birth is justified - it's unjustified either way.

So why bring it up at all? You've just wasted three pages which could have been summed up by saying "I agree with Benetar's asymmetry argument" which you claimed to have read.

The only conclusion you're drawing here is that birth is unjustified because it causes an amount of suffering which no amount of pleasure in life is sufficient to justify.

Well obviously I think the moral sums come out against procreation - it's a new argument for 'antinatalism'! A new argument for antinatalism is still an argument for antinatalism. Presumably you think otherwise and will not deem it original unless it reaches a natalist conclusion!? Bizarre.

It's not the same as Benatar's argument. I reject his argument.