The strangeness evaporates once we appreciate the substantial difference between the kind of relationship of the past to the future that we get from the laws of physics, and the kind we usually think of as cause and effect. The laws of physics take the form of rigid patterns: if the ball is at a certain position and has a certain velocity at a certain time, the laws will tell you what the position and velocity will be a moment later, and what they were a moment before.
When we think about cause and effect, by contrast, we single out certain events as uniquely responsible for events that come afterward, as “making them happen.” That’s not quite how the laws of physics work; events simply are arranged in a certain order, with no special responsibility attributed to one over any of the others. We can’t pick out one moment, or a particular aspect of any one moment, and identify it as “the cause.” Different moments in time in the history of the universe follow each other, according to some pattern, but no one moment causes any other.
Certainly when we speak of the actions taken by human beings, we like to assign credit or blame to them; that won’t work if we can’t even say that their actions caused any particular outcome. Causality provides a very useful way of talking in our everyday lives
The world is what exists and what happens, but we gain enormous insight by talking about it—telling its story—in different ways
Within poetic naturalism we can distinguish among three different kinds of stories we can tell about the world. There is the deepest, most fundamental description we can imagine—the whole universe, exactly described in every microscopic detail. Modern science doesn’t know what that description actually is right now, but we presume that there at least is such an underlying reality. Then there are “emergent” or “effective” descriptions, valid within some limited domain. That’s where we talk about ships and people, macroscopic collections of stuff that we group into individual entities as part of this higher-level vocabulary. Finally, there are values: concepts of right and wrong, purpose and duty, or beauty and ugliness. Unlike higher-level scientific descriptions, these are not determined by the scientific goal of fitting the data. We have other goals: we want to be good people, get along with others, and find meaning in our lives. Figuring out the best way to talk about the world is an important part of working toward those goals.
I think what is most useful here is to take the assumption that everything happens at once. That is, time move forwards as easily as backwards — Accursius
The strangeness evaporates once we appreciate the substantial difference between the kind of relationship of the past to the future that we get from the laws of physics, and the kind we usually think of as cause and effect — Sean Carroll
There is the deepest, most fundamental description we can imagine—the whole universe, exactly described in every microscopic detail
The world is what exists and what happens
but we gain enormous insight by talking about it—telling its story—in different ways
I think there are many scientists who do not speak about patterns at all, they speak about causes and why shouldn't they? If how we talk about things is based on what is useful, then for a modern atheist scientist like Mr. Carroll talking about patterns is the most useful way but that does not mean that this is the only way a scientist can talk about things. Other scientists might find it more useful to talk about causes. — mew
I'd argue that patterns indicate causes, and vice versa. — Heister Eggcart
Why could neither Hume nor Russell could find causality anywhere in Reality? What did they miss? — tom
To paraphrase, even though the principle of causality can't be demonstrated empirically, the operations of thought are predicated on its reality. In other words, reason cannot proceed without it, and insofar as we know things by way of reason, then we must presume causal relationships, in the absence of which, scientific analysis would not be able to proceed. — Wayfarer
Does he ever fully explain what he means by this? This reads super vaguely. — Heister Eggcart
The broader ontology typically associated with atheism is naturalism—there is only one world, the natural world, exhibiting patterns we call the “laws of nature,” and which is discoverable by the methods of science and empirical investigation. There is no separate realm of the supernatural, spiritual, or divine; nor is there any cosmic teleology or transcendent purpose inherent in the nature of the universe or in human life. “Life” and “consciousness” do not denote essences distinct from matter; they are ways of talking about phenomena that emerge from the interplay of extraordinarily complex systems. Purpose and meaning in life arise through fundamentally human acts of creation, rather than being derived from anything outside ourselves. Naturalism is a philosophy of unity and patterns, describing all of reality as a seamless web
Yet, the same man who just wrote the above is also vehemently against the many religious traditions that, unfortunately for him, tell a similar story in a multitude of different ways! — Heister Eggcart
-There are many ways of talking about the world.
-All good ways of talking must be consistent with one another and with the world.
-Our purposes in the moment determine the best way of talking.
Though, does Carroll provide a measure for what constitutes greater and lesser degrees of usefulness? — Heister Eggcart
I’m going to argue for a different view: our fundamental ontology, the best way we have of talking about the world at the deepest level, is extremely sparse. But many concepts that are part of non-fundamental ways we have of talking about the world—useful ideas describing higher-level, macroscopic reality—deserve to be called “real.” The key word there is “useful.” There are certainly non-useful ways of talking about the world. In scientific contexts, we refer to such non-useful ways as “wrong” or “false.” A way of talking isn’t just a list of concepts; it will generally include a set of rules for using them, and relationships among them. Every scientific theory is a way of talking about the world... Today, we would say that Kepler’s theory is fairly useful in certain circumstances, but it’s not as useful as Newton’s, which in turn isn’t as broadly useful as Einstein’s general theory of relativity
What we’re seeing is a manifestation of the layered nature of our descriptions of reality. At the deepest level we currently know about, the basic notions are things like “spacetime,” “quantum fields,” “equations of motion,” and “interactions.” No causes, whether material, formal, efficient, or final. But there are levels on top of that, where the vocabulary changes. Indeed, it’s possible to recover pieces of Aristotle’s physics quantitatively, as limits of Newtonian mechanics in an appropriate regime, where dissipation and friction are central. (Coffee cups do come to a stop, after all.) In the same way, it’s possible to understand why it’s so useful to refer to causes and effects in our everyday experience, even if they’re not present in the underlying equations. There are many different useful stories we have to tell about reality to get along in the world.
I think Carroll's is foolish talk, for the most profound knowledge lies in poetry, music and art, and scientific knowledge is itself marvellous but not all-encompassing. — mcdoodle
I think he means that there's no other realm, no supernatural realm, that the world exists by itself... — mew
“Life” and “consciousness” do not denote essences distinct from matter; they are ways of talking about phenomena that emerge from the interplay of extraordinarily complex systems.
-There are many ways of talking about the world.
-All good ways of talking must be consistent with one another and with the world.
-Our purposes in the moment determine the best way of talking.
There is no separate realm of the supernatural, spiritual, or divine; nor is there any cosmic teleology or transcendent purpose inherent in the nature of the universe or in human life.
I’m going to argue for a different view: our fundamental ontology, the best way we have of talking about the world at the deepest level, is extremely sparse. But many concepts that are part of non-fundamental ways we have of talking about the world—useful ideas describing higher-level, macroscopic reality—deserve to be called “real.” The key word there is “useful.” There are certainly non-useful ways of talking about the world. In scientific contexts, we refer to such non-useful ways as “wrong” or “false.” A way of talking isn’t just a list of concepts; it will generally include a set of rules for using them, and relationships among them. Every scientific theory is a way of talking about the world... Today, we would say that Kepler’s theory is fairly useful in certain circumstances, but it’s not as useful as Newton’s, which in turn isn’t as broadly useful as Einstein’s general theory of relativity
If usefulness determines the reality of things, then doesn't it follow that different people who find different things useful (in order "to get along in the world") will talk about the world differently? After all, talking about causes at the fundamental level, does not make predictions less accurate. Am I wrong? — mew
So, our purpose is to determine the best way of talking about the world without there, however, being a transcendentally true purpose...So, how exactly, can one determine what is "best" if there is no end purpose? — Heister Eggcart
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