What is the distinction between the physical and non-physical? — Hanover
I don't see how the thought experiment offers an explanation for the metaphysical composition of consciousness. — Hanover
It doesn't. It's the same old incredibly stupid idea that conceivability has ontological implications (beyond the fact that something is conceivable). — Terrapin Station
I don't remember a "phenomenal concepts" phrase, by the way. What the heck are "phenomenal concepts" supposed to be contra "non-phenomenal concepts"? — Terrapin Station
If "physically identical but not conscious" isn't a contradiction (and so conceivable) then consciousness isn't physical. — Michael
If we can conceive of a p-zombie then consciousness isn't physical
We can conceive of a p-zombie
Therefore, consciousness isn't physical — Michael
If "physically identical but not conscious" isn't a contradiction (and so conceivable) then consciousness isn't physical. — Michael
But, the example you gave was 'bread that was molecularly identical to bread' except that it wasn't nourishing. So that example seems to me to violate the law of identity, as it basically amounts to saying 'imagine bread that isn't bread' - which amounts to saying 'imagine an instance of A that is not actually A'. — Wayfarer
Whereas bread that was molecularly slightly different, and therefore had different, or no, nutritional value, is a very different kind of idea. But then the point is lost. — Wayfarer
For that matter, I can imagine a being with a radically different type of inner life - an alien intelligence perhaps - but not one with no inner life, because then, how would they simulate an answer to the question, 'how do you feel about X'? — Wayfarer
There's a favourite quote of mine from Descartes which makes this point brilliantly (not least because he made it in the 1630's) — Wayfarer
That's why I posted in that long quote from Feser. Basically, he is arguing that expressions like 'the laws of motion' or the rules of Euclidean geometry are concepts, as distinct from imaginings, in part because they are determinate - they stipulate precise outcomes. They're not reducible to imaginings, either - you can't imagine the outcome of a calculation, you need to actually perform the calculation, i.e. exercise reason. Although that is somewhat tangential to the main point. — Wayfarer
Oh yes I most certainly do, but there is some entertainment to be had in saying why. But I am still at a loss why so much ink is spilled over the question. — Wayfarer
I expect that, given enough time and resources to develop, artificial intelligence will meet and exceed human capacities of speech, creativity, and performance. None of that is sentience. — Cabbage Farmer
Wayfarer: In any case, if the responder has no inner life, then the response 'I feel good about it', is actually a falsehood, obviously, because they don't feel anything.
I don't understand the relevance of this. — Michael
What I said was the bread and the p-bread are "molecule-for-molecule the same". I don't mean it's the very same molecules, but rather exactly the same type of molecules, in exactly the same numbers and arrangements. — Cabbage Farmer
The passage strikes me as rather primitive. Descartes seems to be imagining a machine made of pulleys and cables and levers and buttons and gears, running on mechanical principles — Cabbage Farmer
Thus one would discover that they [machines, p-zombies] did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.
I'm not sure there is a standard of clarity, definiteness, precision required before we count something as a "concept". There are formal rules of math and logic, there are norms of syntax, and so on — Cabbage Farmer
When Hanover asked if a distinction had been made between physical and non-physical, the question is crucial to Chalmer's argument. — Real Gone Cat
The problem is that the things we are asked to conceive (p-zombies) are only possible if you assume the conclusion - i.e., that consciousness is not physical.
...
Look at the argument:
If we can conceive of a p-zombie then consciousness isn't physical
We can conceive of a p-zombie
Therefore, consciousness isn't physical
— Michael
Now ask yourself : Can the p-zombie be conceived of if you do not already accept that consciousness is different from the physical?
And this goes to my much maligned comparison of coherence and conceivability. If you do not define your terms (consciousness, p-zombie, et. al.) - which is what it means to be coherent - then I fail to see how you can meaningfully think about them (conceive of them).
"Physically identical but not conscious" is in fact a contradiction unless you define it in a way that it's not. — Hanover
To a physicalist all the world is physical. For two things to be identical, they must be physically identical. So, if you asked a physicalist if a conscious person and his doppelganger p-zombie were identical, he'd say of course they aren't; they can't be. The distinction between the two means the distinction must be physical because that's all there is.
To the point of what I can conceptualize, I cannot conceptualize of two identical entities (a regular person and his corresponding p-zombie) having no physical differences if I assume physicalism. It simply makes no sense to assume physicalism and then to assume non-physicalism at the same time.
It's relevant, because the whole notion of 'p zombie' is a thing that looks like a human but has no inner life - therefore doesn't feel . If you say to such a thing 'how do you feel?' then the answer can't be based on a real state, as there is no such state. So what is the response based on? On what basis does it answer? — Wayfarer
If we accept that speech is physical behaviour and that all physical behaviour is caused by prior physical behaviour then the question-answer scenario is simply a matter of physical stimulation and reaction. — Michael
But speech ISN'T physical behaviour. It conveys meaning and intention, neither of which are physical. So again, ask a zombie a question, and how can it respond? Without any inner life, reason, or anything else that is constitutive of a human being, what could it say? — Wayfarer
Well, it's crucial to both Chalmers' and the physicalist's argument. — Michael
How is it different to any other syllogism? — Michael
Because Chalmers conditional is of the form "A implies A". The p-zombie is only conceivable if you already accept that consciousness is not physical. Otherwise, two "physically identical worlds (with) different properties of consciousness" would be a contradiction. So, in this case, the second premise does assume the conclusion. — Real Gone Cat
The physicalist's argument is not up for consideration.
But here you're up against the distinction between sound and meaning. A zombie could produce many kinds of apparently-vocal noises, it could recite the Gettysburg Address - but how does it answer a question? What does it say? It won't do to say 'look, it's making noises, it must be able to speak.' — Wayfarer
A speech act requires cognitive faculties, in addition to the physical organs; which is why a person whose larynx has been removed because of surgery, can still express themselves through writing, which a chimp (for instance) cannot.
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