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Raul
215After a few weeks I realize there is a big unknown across this forum... naturalism!
This forum is a good example of what happens nowadays in philosophy. Like in politics socially it is simple to think in a binary way... are you a leftist or a rightist?. So are you a dualist or a materialist?
Some try to be eclectic and invent new theories but there is already a very solid and well structured one, naturalism, that I claim is underestimated but very valid for contemporary times.
How does naturalism, the old philosophical thesis which claims that nature embraces all that exists, concern all of us? It is because today it takes the form of a powerful current, born from the convergence of research programs, philosophical or scientific (carried in particular by cognitive sciences, neurosciences, evolutionary biology, genetics), which offer theoretical answers and proposals for action - whether it's autism or dropping out of school, dyslexia or psychopathy, social persuasion or public policies, culture shock or sustainable development, diet penal or obesity, social inequalities or risk perception, racism or crimes against humanity. These are all areas where it is necessary to make decisions, legislate, remedy, administer and direct research.
What yesterday seemed to escape "scientific" management in principle, because it was based on relationships between individuals, on authority, trust, deliberation and personal conviction, seems within the reach of material systems, "intelligent" optimizers. It is all the more urgent to measure what relationship exists between this technological 'naturalization' and the naturalism developed by science and philosophical analysis that "humanoid" technologies (artificial intelligence, robotics, etc.) are profoundly modifying. both the conditions of the decision and its object.
Few are those who take the trouble, and the intellectual means, to go and see as closely as possible, beyond a simplistic rejection, this naturalistic approach which, striving to redraw the human silhouette, sometimes goes to pretend to rule our world.
Looking forward for your enriching reactions :wink: -
SolarWind
207
To what extent does naturalism make statements about technology, ethics or politics? I don't see any connection.
In my opinion, naturalism only says: "Everything is natural", which is not a statement at all, because if there were ghosts, then they would also be natural.
I hate naturalism because it presents itself as clever, but ultimately only asserts a triviality. -
Raul
215naturalism only says: "Everything is natural" — SolarWind
What is already something :wink:
Someone could say same thing of dualist or materialist, physicists as a reaction too simplistic to explain any of these philosophical paradigms.
Naturalism has a lot of to say about technology, ethics and politics (Ref. Daniel Andler or Sandro Nannini for example). I think successful governamental reactions to Covid19 have been done with a naturalistic approach in many western countires. Avoiding falling into scientism but using science as a reference and avoiding being dogmatic in political and ethical aspects of their decisions.
Could it we that we all like discussions and dialectics but at then end we're all naturalistic? Well, this is not the case of course of some states. There re states where religion is still embedded in their politics... what I think is a good example of consequences of a not-naturalistic approach that puts a God above everything.
Western politics have developed the brilliant and I would say transcendental idea of laicism and secularism. Could it be this idea is deeply anchored in a naturalistic view of the world and mankind? -
counterpunch
1.6kMy immediate impression is that naturalism does not account for the reflective quality of human intellectual awareness - that stands apart from reality and observes it, and insofar as human awareness misunderstands reality, reinvents and deceives - it creates an unreality.
This un-naturalism is difficult to account for if the foundational claim of naturalism is that nature encompasses all that exists. The claim "nature should encompass all that exists" is arguable, but has less normative authority.
Skipping through the wikipedia entry - I'm okay with a lot of it, but for my money, everything begins with epistemology - and the questions; "what can we know?" and, "how can we know it?" ...that bring human intellectual awareness into accord with the naturalistic reality. Otherwise, the assertion:
"metaphysical naturalism rejects the supernatural concepts and explanations that are part of many religions."
...is similarly, open to rejection. If we begin with epistemology we are forced to agnosticism - because we don't know if God exists or not. We can know a lot of things, in their own terms - but we do not have to assert something we cannot know to be true, and therefore open the door to simple contradiction. Or so it seems to me! -
Ciceronianus
3kTo the extent that naturalism rejects the view that we, as individuals but also collectively, are somehow apart from the world instead of being living organisms that are a part of it, and that there is something, or someone, situated in some place or some sense outside of the universe, it seems to me to be entirely reasonable. We know only what we experience in our interactions with the rest of the universe, and to purport to know something outside of the universe or claim that there's something apart from it is necessarily to make claims that can't be made intelligently. I suspect that's why we routinely ascribe characteristics we know through being parts of the universe to what we believe to be beyond it. -
Janus
16.2kI'd say naturalism as a metaphysical standpoint is either trivial or it is eliminative. That is it either says everything that exists is part of the natural order, even if we cannot (currently) explain how certain phenomena, for example mind or consciousness, fit into the natural order, or it says that anything which cannot be fit into the natural order does not exist, or it is merely an epiphenomenon; a kind of illusion.
I've been reading Neo-Existentialism by Marcus Gabriel. I just read this passage this morning, and since I think it's dealing with the question of naturalism in an unusual and interesting way I thought it worthwhile to post it here:
Contemporary scientists and philosophers alike regularly avow that the problem of consciousness is one of the last riddles we need to solve in order to finally sail into the safe haven of a fully naturalistic world-view. Here are two examples. First, the somewhat ironic opening line of Daniel Dennett’s influential book Consciousness Explained:
“Human consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery. A mystery is a phenomenon that people don’t know how to think about – yet” (Dennett 1991: 21).
Second, David Chalmers opens his equally influential The Conscious Mind with a similar, albeit far from ironic confession: Consciousness is the biggest mystery. It may be the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe. … Present-day scientific theories hardly touch the really difficult questions about consciousness. We do not just lack a detailed theory; we are entirely in the dark about how consciousness fits into the natural order. (Chalmers 1996: xi)
Minimally, the naturalistic world-view assumes that we ought to fit all phenomena into the natural order. Everything which dangles free from the natural order either does not really exist or is a surprising epiphenomenon and is, in any event, nothing which could interfere with the real. To claim that consciousness or the mind are mysteries or riddles is to claim that it is hard or maybe even impossible to figure out how consciousness or the mind can be part of nature in a scientifically respectable sense of “nature.”
Here, the metaphysical assumption without which the mystery could not get off the ground is that “the natural order” cannot be maximal in the sense of including all phenomena. For, if “the natural order” were simply everything there is, it would be easy to see how consciousness “fits into the natural order.” Naturalism had better not assume from the outset that consciousness does not exist or that no term in our mentalistic vocabulary is in the business of referring to something real. In order for there to be a mystery of any kind, the natural order has to be thought of in such a way that consciousness is not immediately accessible from within the natural order as we know it to be. That is to say, the naturalist has to restrict the meaning of “the natural order” in such a way that there is room for puzzlement concerning some phenomena which suggest the existence of some kind of things without their yet being integrated into what we know about the natural order. This excludes ectoplasm, phlogiston, witches, and the like, but does not (yet) exclude consciousness in general. Nevertheless, for consciousness to be a puzzle is for it to be on the verge of extinction: whatever is not (yet) clearly included in the domain of the natural order as construed by the naturalist is essentially suspicious.
The naturalistic world-view is supposed to be a safe haven because of its apparent methodological superiority over its actual and imaginary rivals. The historical background idea, which lends genealogical and psychological support to this confidence, is the notion that modernity is clearly an overall cultural progress accompanied, if not actually triggered by, an early modern scientific revolution stereotypically associated with Galileo and Newton. They are seen as decisive, revolutionary cuts in the history of human thought because their discoveries reveal a gap hitherto largely covered up by an ancient, Aristotelian conception of science and nature.
The gap consists in a thorough distinction between how things appear to us as human observers of nature and nature itself. As human observers we are prone to believe that physical objects have smoothly colored surfaces regardless of how they appear to us; we believe in dusk and dawn and in heaven understood as a luminous sphere through which we can see the movement of astronomical phenomena, a sphere blue or grey during daytime (depending on whether you live in Greece or Germany) and mostly black or grey (again depending on location and season) at night, etc. Even Kant, in his famous remark that what awes him most is “the starry sky above me and the moral law in me” (Kant 2015: 129), is in the grip of a pre-modern illusion, the illusion that the starry sky is above him. Even if there were a starry sky, it would be not above him but all around him. Yet, this would make it look less transcendent, as we tend to point upwards when it comes to mysterious or awe-provoking matters, which is just a bad habit inherited from our less enlightened ancestors.
Wilfrid Sellars has notoriously named the two sides of the gap “the manifest image” and “the scientific image” of man respectively (Sellars 1963). Notice that Sellars does not speak of the manifest and the scientific image tout court, as he wants to emphasize that both images are systematic overall representations of how things hang together “in the broadest possible sense” (ibid.: 1) from the standpoint of a human being. There are, of course, various other ways of labeling and characterizing the gap in question: subjective vs. objective (Nagel 1989); first-person vs. third-person perspective; thick vs. thin concepts (Levine 2004); life-world (Lebenswelt) and science (Husserl 1970), etc. For brevity’s sake let us just speak of “the gap” in order to avoid hasty conceptualizations of the phenomena in question. Most accounts of the gap draw on a genealogical story in order to account for the alleged fact that only modern people became fully aware of it. We moderns are proud discoverers of the gap and we shun anybody who does not share our sense of it.
On account of the genealogical myths which surround our modern encounter with the gap, the details of the actual story make it hard to see the conceptual core, which will play a central role in due course. Arguably all accounts of the gap rely on a background picture, which I call standard naturalism. Standard naturalism is really a fusion of a number of claims, in particular, a metaphysical claim, an epistemological claim, and two continuity theses.
(SN1) Metaphysical naturalism (materialism): Everything which (really) exists is ultimately material-energetic and therefore woven into the causal web studied by our best natural-scientific practices.
(SN2) Epistemological naturalism: Everything which (really) exists can best be explained with recourse to the standards of theory construction definitive of our best natural-scientific practices. (SN3) Biological continuity: The human brain/the human mind is part of the natural order. It is a natural kind located on a specific branch of evolution.
(SN4) Methodological continuity: Every genuine explanation has always been governed by the standards made explicit by modern science.
There are other ways of classifying the tenets built into the rather vague structure of the modern scientific world-view. In what follows, I will mostly argue against (SN1) and (SN3). Yet, I believe that naturalism fails on all fronts. The human mind is not a natural kind. Only a proper subset of our mentalistic vocabulary picks out natural kinds, even though it is the case that no part of that vocabulary refers to a reality that would have existed had there been no suitable brains or other natural necessary conditions for there to be mental processes in reality.
Nevertheless, let me emphasize before I get to work that naturalism is based on a wide array of actual facts that need to be respected and typically have been respected all along by many critics of naturalism. To start with, I do not intend to deny that humans are animals and, therefore, in part objects governed by the parameters articulated by evolutionary theory. Neither do I want to deny that Aristotelian physics turned out to be a huge failure. When it comes to the human mind, I am a biological naturalist in the sense of someone who holds that a certain type of brain is a naturally necessary condition for human mindedness, albeit not a sufficient one. I am not interested in undermining scientifically established facts, but I am in the business of attacking philosophically misguided interpretations of what natural science has established and can establish in the future with respect to the human mind. Philosophically misguided interpretations of natural science are widespread, both among philosophers and among scientists. In the next part of this chapter, I will sketch some recent arguments against naturalism, in particular against (SN1) and (SN3). I will then address the pressing question of how to conceive of the human mind after the failures of naturalism. If naturalism does not work, we need an alternative unless we are happy to accept an irresoluble riddle, a view which also has some prominent defenders. -
Ciceronianus
3k
Well, what can I say? Consciousness clearly exists in nature. Thus, we're conscious. It seems to me that if someone wants to establish it doesn't exist in nature, or somehow exists in and out of nature, they have the burden of proof. -
Wayfarer
22.3k:up: I find all of that passage congenial, with the exception of the statement that humans are animal. Like the ancients, I believe they have an animal nature, but that we also able to transcend the biological, which is another argument against naturalism. Overall though I agree with most of what's said in that passage.
Consciousness clearly exists in nature. — Ciceronianus the White
Well, please point to where we can observe it! -
Janus
16.2kI agree, consciousness clearly exists in nature, if nature is defined as everything that we encounter. But we also have a conception of the natural order, and we tend to think that the natural order is an order of a material existence, yet consciousness does not seem to be materially existent. If we want to claim that consciousness is a part of the material natural order, then to justify that claim we would need to explain how it fits into what we understand to be the causal and conditional nexus that it constitutes. We cannot accomplish this task (at present at least) and so we are faced with the so-called "hard problem".
So we can say that consciousness is part of nature (if nature is considered to refer to simply everything) but that is a different claim than to say that consciousness is part of, and determined by, a natural order consisting in a nexus of deterministic conditions and causes. -
Janus
16.2kLike the ancients, I believe they have an animal nature, but that we also able to transcend the biological, which is another argument against naturalism. — Wayfarer
As I read him Gabriel is not denying that consciousness is not completely determined by the biological; in fact that it is not so determined is the central pillar of his "neo-existentialism", just as it was of Sartre's existentialism. -
Wayfarer
22.3kWell, if he had put the 'in part' qualification before 'animals' instead of 'objects' it would change the meaning quite a bit.
I do not intend to deny that humans are animals and, therefore, in part objects governed by the parameters articulated by evolutionary theory.
Anyway, Husserl's critique of naturalism anticipates this line of analysis by a century or so. -
Ciceronianus
3k
I see. It must have a location in order to exist in nature, where it may be seen, touched, smelled? It's a thing, then? Would it have a location if it exists outside nature? -
Wayfarer
22.3kIt must have a location in order to exist in nature, where it may be seen, touched, smelled? It's a thing, then? Would it have a location if it exists outside nature? — Ciceronianus the White
well, that's the question! There is such a thing as the domain of natural numbers - where's that? It's a rhetorical question, of course, but it makes a point. The objects of reason - numbers, logical laws, and so on, which are indispensible to the operations of reason - these certainly not observable in nature - nor need to be, in the case of a priori truths. These kinds of ideas are the basis of 'transcendental arguments' in philosophy. -
Ciceronianus
3khe objects of reason - numbers, logical laws, and so on, which are indispensible to the operations of reason - these certainly not observable in nature - nor need to be, in the case of a priori truths. These kinds of ideas are the basis of 'transcendental arguments' in philosophy. — Wayfarer
I think we err when we maintain that nature is made up only of observable objects or their equivalent, myself. -
Ciceronianus
3k
I'm sure my knowledge of the kinds of naturalism is dated, but I'm sympathetic with SN2 and SN3 as described in Janus' quote from Gabriel. I suppose mine is a kind of fusion of Dewey's naturalism and the Stoic belief in immanence. -
Gnomon
3.7k
I suspect that most of the posters on this forum are aware of the philosophical position called "Naturalism". But, it's not very enlightening, because it's based on circular reasoning : everything in the natural world is natural . . . duh!.After a few weeks I realize there is a big unknown across this forum... naturalism! — Raul
The unstated & un-proveable assumption of Naturalism is that the physical universe is a closed system, with no inputs from outside our finite world. Unfortunately, the Big Bang theory implies that something, energy & laws at least, necessarily existed prior to the sudden appearance of space-time from some unknown & unknowable source. That's why a few Cosmologists have postulated an imaginary turtles-all-the-way-down natural series of Multiverses, to explain the provenance of our local Nature, and to take the place of traditional imaginary creator-gods.
My own personal worldview is a form of Naturalism, in that it accepts the theory of physical & biological Evolution, as far back as Science can track the cosmic expansion. But, like Multiverse proponents, I'm not content to leave the story of evolution open-ended at the beginning & end --- no overture or finale. The scientific method dictates that empirical Physics must stop at the point where material evidence fades away into nothingness (e.g. Planck Time). Fortunately, theoretical physicists and philosophers are not bound by Bacon's practical rules. So, we can speculate about the time before time, and the nature before Nature. Which is literally super-natural, whether it posits an eternal realm of redundant Multiverses, or an eternal realm of necessary Creative Force (energy) & Lawmaker (organizer). :nerd:
Is philosophical naturalism circular reasoning? :
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/8241/is-philosophical-naturalism-circular-reasoning
Planck Time : Before a time classified as a Planck time, 10-43 seconds, all of the four fundamental forces are presumed to have been unified into one force. All matter, energy, space and time are presumed to have exploded outward from the original singularity. Nothing is known of this period.
http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/Astro/planck.html
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