So, here's my question: are you saying the electric fields of the brain are effected? Or is it the quantum fields that register changes? Or the entangled particles? — counterpunch
Electric field of brain as registered by EEG interacts with quantum fields of entangled particles (qualia) in additive way (like wavelengths of the visible light spectrum), to produce qualitative experience (sounds, images, feels) in the head. — Enrique
My opinion is that an account of subjective consciousness based on quantum physics will not diminish the sense that subjective experience is real or important in any way because subjective experience is nonetheless a causal aspect of reality. If anything, it will dissolve the sense that mind is intangible and objects are tangible to create a synthetic concept of tangible substance as both mind and matter. It overcomes an antiquated philosophical duality that gives rise to our materialist/spiritualist divide, not the cognizance of causal multiplicity and separate theoretical/practical domains. If anything, it will be a cool additional facet of self-knowledge. — Enrique
Why does entanglement generate qualia? This also exists in a laboratory and in a much purer form. And every high-voltage line generates more electric fields than a brain. Consequently, a laboratory that studies entanglement and is under a high-voltage line would have to have qualia. — SolarWind
quantum fields of entangled molecules — Enrique
you cannot understand consciousness in all its richness without recognizing its bias in the dynamics of the self-organization of living systems , the fact that body-environment interaction has the feature of structural coupling in which the organism alters its world
at the same time that the world affects the organism. This reciprocity between inside and outside not only is key to understanding of consciousness but indicates that at some point physicists will find it necessary to alter their own models of the ‘physical’. — Joshs
Molecules are two or more atoms. Does entanglement occur in molecules? I didn't know you could just hop over the quantum/macroscopic fence like that! That changes everything!!! — counterpunch
I do not understand the connection between additive wavelengths and the subjective impression of the smell of roses. — SolarWind
A constructive feedback certainly exists between physical modeling and introspective phenomenology: each new development in either domain gives its complement a better idea of what to look for on the psychological level. They should be collaborators, not rivals, and may one day merge. — Enrique
Maybe an optimal science of brain might be able to say what areas of the brain are responsible for consciousness. But we've mapped all 300 or so neurons of a nematode, and nobody understand why it does what it does. — Manuel
From this perspective, it's all a mystery. — Manuel
Sure, light waves are involved in me seeing the rose, but they say nothing about that colour I see in the world, which we call "red". — Manuel
Saying they are a mixture doesn’t make things clear.
Objectivity is a matter of intersubjective agreement on events which appear in different guises to each of us. We learn to treat our own vantage on an event as just an aspect of the ‘objective’ object , the ‘same’ object for all of us, when in fact it is never ‘same for all’ except as an abstraction, albeit a very useful abstraction. What is certain is that for each of us experience of that world is shaped by constrains and affordances such that some ways of interacting with the world are more useful relative to our purposes that others. The criteria of objectivity change over time as cultural an scientific practices change. — Joshs
cannot be observed — alphahimself
Our metaphysical haunt is not, good lord!: Dualism or Monism or whether ideas subsist in the Real, or if human consciousness is reducible or derivative; it is value and its meta-value consummation. — Constance
Yea, but these are inseparably intertwined. Value isn’t an ineffable internality, it’s a function of intersubjective patterns of relation , and questions concerning dualism and monism, the real and the relative are directly relevant to questions of value. — Joshs
But then, the "meta" end of value is just this ineffable "property" or as Moore put it, non natural property. Putting value into its contexts, theoretical, practical, invites discussion about everything BUT value. Is value Real? Then, what is real, and then follows the categorial move to "totalize" (Levinas borrowed from Heidegger, I think) which is away from the truly mysterious nature of value (that is, the pains, joys, miseries, celebrations, fascinations, interests, anxieties, terrors, and so on). — Constance
Value is not ineffable any more than the ‘objective ‘ is transcendentally true. Moore was a Kantian, still caught up in a subject-object , feeling-thinking split. Value cannot in any shape or form be separated from that which would supposedly be understandable or existent independently of it. The same is true of the relation between affectivity and intentional meaning, which is what we’re really talking about here anyway. Heidegger realized precisely this, which is why he didn’t think of ‘value’ as mysterious in some way that cognition or perception is not. Value is befindlichkeit, how we find ourselves in the world, how things have pragmatic meaning and significance for us. — Joshs
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