It sounds like the part of my model that still hasn’t gotten through to you is my differentiation between appetites and desires or intentions, which is analogous to the difference between sensation and perception or belief. — Pfhorrest
these are not claims about any particulars of human psychology or neurology, these are just different concepts. — Pfhorrest
...merely the whatever-it-is that lies in the direction that our ever-growing accumulation of sensations is headed. — Pfhorrest
by “appetites” I mean the “sensations” of pain, hunger, etc. These do not directly tell us (or constitute us thinking) that particular states of affairs ought to be the case — Pfhorrest
Someone doesn't just have reason to do something because they exist with a related objective. It would make as much sense, in terms of existence, for them to fail. They actions to success only make sense if their is an ought.
Otherwise, it makes as much sense for them to fail in respect to their objective as succeed — TheWillowOfDarkness
You are confused. Of course I do - how could I not? Assuming, of course, that they are assessments of the same thing. — SophistiCat
Yes they are, each of those processes takes place in a brain. Sensation>perception>belief, and appetite> desire>intention are directional, staged processes — Isaac
We can model descriptive data points because (and only because) we assume a cause. Our modelling process is exactly to speculate as the the cause of our sensations (and thereby predict the results of our response). Without cause the modelling makes no sense at all. — Isaac
But nowhere in that model would there be anything that we 'ought' to do. — Isaac
But we cannot check if the target valence is the 'right' valence — Isaac
But an objective answer is an unbiased answer. So an objective morality is one that takes into account all such feelings (all appetites). — Pfhorrest
If I was tied to five other people it would really matter that we agreed on which direction to walk (I might get injured if we don't all agree), but none of us would consider the chosen direction to be objectively 'right', we might as easily have tossed a coin for it. — Isaac
That's what I thought, and what I was talking about. When you're not making a moral assessment, but just an assessment about something like ice cream flavors, you don't judge others as wrong just because they disagree with you. — Pfhorrest
Constructionist thought militates against the claims to ethical foundations implicit in much identity politics - that higher ground from which others can so confidently be condemned as inhumane, self-serving, prejudiced, and unjust. Constructionist thought painfully reminds us that we have no transcendent rationale upon which to rest such accusations, and that our sense of moral indignation is itself a product of historically and culturally situated traditions. — Gergen
And the constructionist intones, is it not possible that those we excoriate are but living also within traditions that are, for them, suffused with a sense of ethical primacy? As we find, then, social constructionism is a two edged sword in the political arena, potentially as damaging to the wielding hand as to the opposition. — Gergen
This is a classic naturalistic fallacy, an instance of is/ought confusion. The natural origin of morality is not the same as the grounding for moral claims. A constructivist may believe (rightly or wrongly) that normative beliefs come about as a result of social construction. But that is neither here nor there as far as what that same constructivist believes ought to be the case. — SophistiCat
That would just be an inter-subjective morality. — khaled
The way you use objective just seems really odd. — khaled
and the other of which I oppose because it’s a useless non-sense of the term that I would rather never be used. — Pfhorrest
The latter is the sense of “objective” as in transcendent, the opposite of phenomenal — Pfhorrest
there is no sense to speak of about either of them that is not grounded entirely in our experience of the world, and if there somehow was more to either, whatever that would mean, we definitionally could not ever tell, because to tell we would have to have some experience of it. — Pfhorrest
But conversely I’m also adamant that we take both to be equally “objective” as in universal, not relative: never accepting that anything short of unlimited intersubjectivity be taken as sufficient in our answers, though because we are limited in our knowledge and power we will often be forced to make do for the time being with just the most intersubjectivity that we can manage. — Pfhorrest
But there’s no sense getting on to that topic at all if we’re not even on the same page that there is some objective good that we’d be trying to approximate. — Pfhorrest
the "is" amounts to an objective account of who someone is with respect to normatively. — TheWillowOfDarkness
In this respect, we have a moral realism, just grounded on the signifcance of an individual's existence rather than a transcendent force or encompassing standard. — TheWillowOfDarkness
The ought becomes a feature of the contingent being-- "this is an existence which ought to be treated in this way"-- and grounds questions of how to treat them. (and versions of this are common amongst "PC" culture because it's frequently about respecting and valuing a given individual for who they are, for the fact they are an existence which is valuable). — TheWillowOfDarkness
Also the more common use. — khaled
To me it always seemed like the task of finding the most "inter-subjectively" fitting morality was a task for the social sciences, politics, and some neurology, not really the task of philosophy. I don't see the point in musing about it without data and research. — khaled
"Objective morality" is a term that has already been booked as the second use (I think thanks to the Abrahamic religions which make morality transcendental). — khaled
Sort of "dress up" subjectivity as objectivity — khaled
people who, like I fear you might be doing, rightly reject transcendentalism and “therefore” wrongly adopt relativism (when all they needed was phenomenalism, which you can have without relativism). — Pfhorrest
I am wholly on board with everything, reality and morality both, being “subjective” as in phenomenal, not transcendent — Pfhorrest
But conversely I’m also adamant that we take both to be equally “objective” as in universal, not relative: never accepting that anything short of unlimited intersubjectivity be taken as sufficient in our answers, though because we are limited in our knowledge and power we will often be forced to make do for the time being with just the most intersubjectivity that we can manage. — Pfhorrest
Exactly what is or isn't going on in the underlying mechanisms that give rise to experience and thought doesn't change anything at all about the ability to categorize kinds of experiences and thoughts in this way. — Pfhorrest
What I am proposing to model is precisely what states of affairs cause all of our appetites to be satisfied, — Pfhorrest
an objective morality is one that takes into account all such feelings (all appetites). — Pfhorrest
Are you familiar with Principled Negotiation? The distinction I'm on about here is basically synonymous with that method's principle to "focus on interests, not positions". — Pfhorrest
I'm left here wondering what the heck you could mean by "we morally ought to do" if not "would consistently please everybody", — Pfhorrest
I'm not proposing we should. I'm only proposing that we model what states of affairs simultaneously match all such valences — Pfhorrest
I like this metaphor, not least for having a Beckettian vibe. — Kenosha Kid
It's interesting to think through the possible configurations of individuals and how they'd handle the situation. It seems clear enough to me that there's not always a right answer, and that the situation will play out according to the particular configuration of individuals. — Kenosha Kid
I do think there'd always be a 'right' answer though, but that's perhaps because of the way I'm using 'right'. I'm using it more like in game theory, than in ethics. — Isaac
(Reference to some subtext that all six people are the same person here.) — Kenosha Kid
I thought it would be clear that I use “objective” and “subjective” in the second, less useful sense. So to reject transcendentalism is to adopt relativism. — khaled
Not only do I disagree with the definition (when “inter-subjective” is available and gets rid of all confusion), I also disagree that the most inter-subjective morality is the correct one. You run into utility monster issues, where people with the strongest appetites get too much leeway. — khaled
That would be entirely fine if all you were doing was categorising, but that's not all you're doing. You go on to treat appetites, desires and intentions as a components in a causal chain. — Isaac
When? Since it is absolutely demonstrably true that the target valences of our apettites change both with time and with cultures, exactly what point in time would your model address? Now?...or now?....or now? — Isaac
What about future generations? Do their appetites not get a look in? — Isaac
discovering it would be a matter of biology and neuroscience — Isaac
The big picture of my overall philosophy involves using science to discover how the world is, and an analogue of it based on hedonic rather than empirical experiences to discover how it ought to be, and then combining those two sets of findings to figure out how to change the former to the latter. — Pfhorrest
A universalist phenomenalism is possible. — Pfhorrest
"Most inter-subjective" doesn't mean "utilitarian". As I said early I'm opposed to utilitarianism on the whole, I just agree with its definition of what makes for a good end; I disagree entirely with consequentialism as a just means. So utility monsters don't blow up the system I advocate. — Pfhorrest
Might you not be better off establishing sustainability as a bridge between is and ought — counterpunch
trusting to the moral sense playing out in political and economic systems, to prioritise factual information to that end? — counterpunch
If by this you mean "universal inter-subjective agreement is possible" sure, I don't think anyone is debating that. — khaled
What is the system you advocate then? — khaled
How do you deal with someone who has an extremely strong appetite for seeing people suffer? — khaled
I’m not sure what you mean by that. — Pfhorrest
That is a part of the deontological side of my ethics. — Pfhorrest
What I’m talking about , what the whole
point of the OP is, is that how people ground their claims in terms of what ‘is’ has everything to
do with how violently and punitively they treat other who violate their standards of what ought to be . What a person assumes ‘is’ in terms of an ontology of nature , the physical or the human, is profoundly connected with how they formulate their ‘oughts’ and the level
of tolerance , the violent and punitive character of the enforcement of those oughts. — Joshs
Gergen’s version of social constructivism does away with the ‘fuel’ forviolent retribution and punishment , for righteous indignation , by removing the ability to believe that another’s choices were a deviation from a correct path. There is no ‘ought’ for Gergen for the same reason that there is no factual realism. — Joshs
We have a moral realism if we , like Sophisticat, are a moral realist. — Joshs
What is common among PC culture is what Gergen is accusing it of , a blameful moralism based on a belief in a normative standard that is claimed to be superior or preferred to standards of other normative cultures. — Joshs
Someone who wants to see other people suffer can get fucked as far as what he WANTS, but whatever psychological pain is probably behind that desire is something that deserves alleviation somehow or another — Pfhorrest
But it doesn’t at all demand that everyone agree, in their desires or intentions, about what is good in order for it to be good. It’s possible that everyone could fail, in different ways, to come up with a model of what concords with all hedonic experiences, and that wouldn’t change that such a model, whatever it is, is the universal good, even though nobody intends it. — Pfhorrest
Some kind of hedonic consumer sovereignty cannot prioritise facts in a way that secures a sustainable future — counterpunch
Universal phenomenalism seems like a contradiction in terms, that refutes acceptance of a scientific epistemology — counterpunch
that again, grinds gears with deontological ethics, that again disputes any kind of moral hedonism — counterpunch
I'm going to forgo any critique for a minute because we keep losing what you're claiming in all your analogies (which I don't find helpful) and I want to see if I can clarify it. — Isaac
1. There may possibly exist some state of affairs, dynamic rather than static, which would most equitably promote every human's (and all future human's) appetites toward their current target valences, at any given time. — Isaac
2. This state of affairs my well not be the desire or the intention of any individual (or even all individuals) and so it's possible for everyone to be wrong about what they desire or intend - hence the 'objective' bit. Relativism, when it comes to what we desire or intend, is thus dismissed. — Isaac
3. An intention which is more 'good', morally, is an intention to make the world match more closely this state of affairs. — Isaac
dying thirst for others’ suffering — khaled
but we're talking here more about the criteria by which something could be judged as normatively important or not, — Pfhorrest
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