You accept that a p-zombie could recite the Gettysburg Address. Then you should accept that a p-zombie could recite the phrase "I feel good about X". All that is required is that the appropriate sounds are produced in response to the appropriate stimulation. — Michael

But if you probe the zombie - why do you feel good about it? What do you like about it? What kinds of things do you like? - how long would it take to ascertain that you're speaking to a zombie? I think it wouldn't take long. How could it react spontaneously to a series of questions which it had no programming for? That is the point made by Descartes: ' For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.'

Speech is more than stimulus and response - it relies on the ability to make inferences and connections, to interpret meaning. And those faculties are constitutive of 'the inner life' - there is no evidence they exist anywhere else (except for simulated in computers, which are instruments of human thought.)

So, yes, I can imagine a thing that looks like a human, and speaks, but I can't imagine where it would derive 'the ability to speak' when it is supposed that the very thing which underwrites that ability is not present in it.

Both arguments are in the form:

If A then B
A
Therefore B. — Michael

You are simply wrong. P-zombies are not conceivable unless consciousness is believed to be non-physical. Believing that consciousness is non-physical means you already believe physicalism to be false.

But if you probe the zombie - why do you feel good about it? What do you like about it? What kinds of things do you like? - how long would it take to ascertain that you're speaking to a zombie? I think it wouldn't take long. How could it react spontaneously to a series of questions which it had no programming for? That is the point made by Descartes: ' For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.'

Speech is more than stimulus and response - it relies on the ability to make inferences and connections, to interpret meaning. And those faculties are constitutive of 'the inner life' - there is no evidence they exist anywhere else (except for simulated in computers, which are instruments of human thought.)

So, yes, I can imagine a thing that looks like a human, and speaks, but I can't imagine where it would derive 'the ability to speak' when it is supposed that the very thing which underwrites that ability is not present in it. — Wayfarer

Are you saying that human biology and the natural laws of physics are insufficient to explain human behaviour? If so then you're taking the p-zombie hypothesis out of context. It's specifically directed at those who claim that human biology and the natural laws of physics are sufficient to explain human behaviour.

You are simply wrong. P-zombies are not conceivable unless consciousness is believed to be non-physical. Believing that consciousness is non-physical means you already believe physicalism to be false. — Real Gone Cat

How am I wrong? It's a straightforward modus ponens.

If Socrates is a man then Socrates is mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal

If we can conceive of p-zombies then consciousness isn't physical
We can conceive of p-zombies
Therefore, consciousness isn't physical

To conceive of a being which is physically identical to a human, but which is different as regards consciousness, it is necessary to believe that consciousness is not part of its physical make-up. Why do you not see that the presumption that physicalism is false is required for this to be possible?

You have to start from a presumption that consciousness is not physical to imagine a being physically identical to a human but which is not conscious. Consciousness has to already be regarded as "something else" or it would be part of the "physically identical" stipulation.

EDIT : To use the phrase "physically identical" is to imply that a physical world exists. But then to assume that consciousness is not part of the physical, is to be a dualist. So dualism must be assumed for p-zombies to be conceived of. And dualism is the case only if physicalism is false. This makes the conclusion a premise, and destroys the argument.

It's specifically directed at those who claim that human biology and the natural laws of physics are sufficient to explain human behaviour. — Michael

Right, well I suppose you have to speak to people on their level. X-)

How am I wrong? It's a straightforward modus ponens. — Michael

It's not the form that has a problem, but the content.

It would be like saying:

If your user name on thephilosophyforum.com is Michael, then everything you say is inane.
Your user name on thephilosophyforum.com is Michael.
Therefore, everything you say is inane.

"How is that wrong? It's a straightforward modus ponens!"

Obviously, an argument isn't sound just because it's valid.

Actually, what I should have went with was this:

If your user name on thephilosophyforum.com isn't Terrapin Station, then you're going to PayPal Terrapin Station your life savings.
Your user name on thephilosophyforum.com isn't Terrapin Station.
Therefore, you're going to PayPal Terrapin Station your life savings.

Obviously, an argument isn't sound just because it's valid. — Terrapin Station

I'm not saying that it's sound. I'm saying that it doesn't beg the question, contrary to Real Gone Cat's claim.

I'm not saying that it's sound. I'm saying that it doesn't beg the question — Michael

He's not saying that stated as a modus ponens it begs the question.

He's saying that it begs the question as an argument for consciousness being non-physical because the only way that it's conceivable in the first place is if you already believe that consciousness isn't physical.

He's saying that it begs the question as an argument for consciousness being non-physical because the only way that it's conceivable in the first place is if you already believe that consciousness isn't physical. — Terrapin Station

Then the same is true of the Socrates syllogism. Does it beg the question as an argument for Socrates being mortal because the only way that he's a man is if he's mortal?

It just doesn't work that way. Modus ponens arguments don't beg the question, whether it's the p-zombie syllogism or the Socrates syllogism.

However, if you reject one of the premises because you assume that the argument's conclusion is false then you've begged the question. For example, if you claim that Socrates is immortal and so not a man, and therefore reject the premise that Socrates is a man, then the fallacy is with you, not with the argument that tries to argue that he's mortal.

He's not saying that stated as a modus ponens it begs the question.

You've confused me here. You accept that it doesn't beg the question but then go on to say that it begs the question.

Then the same is true of the Socrates syllogism. Does it beg the question as an argument for Socrates being mortal because the only way that he's a man is if he's mortal? — Michael

It would be the same if the only way that he's a man in the first place is if you already believe that he's mortal.

Modus ponens arguments don't beg the question, — Michael

Jesus Christ. I JUST SAID that it's NOT the argument stated in the form of a modus ponens that's begging the question. No one is arguing that.

Jesus Christ. I JUST SAID that it's NOT the argument stated in the form of a modus ponens that's begging the question. No one is arguing that. — Terrapin Station

Then what are you saying? Because this modus ponens is the p-zombie argument. If modus ponens doesn't beg the question then the p-zombie argument doesn't beg the question. And if the p-zombie argument doesn't beg the question then Real Gone Cat's claim that it does is false.

Then what are you saying? — Michael

I answered this already:

it begs the question as an argument for consciousness being non-physical because the only way that it's conceivable in the first place is if you already believe that consciousness isn't physical. — Terrapin Station

The issue has to do with how it's conceivable that consciousness isn't physical.

It's really straightforward. If A then B. A. Therefore, B. Such arguments do not beg the question. The p-zombie argument is stated in this way. Therefore, the p-zombie argument doesn't beg the question.

The fact that you accept that it doesn't beg the question but then go on to say that it begs the question doesn't make any sense.

If A then B. A. Therefore, B. Such arguments do not beg the question. — Michael

Do you understand that no one is saying that the modus ponens begs the question?

Do you understand that no one is saying that the modus ponens begs the question? — Terrapin Station

The p-zombie argument uses modus ponens. If modus ponens doesn't beg the question the the p-zombie argument doesn't beg the question. Therefore, the p-zombie argument doesn't beg the question.

There's another modus ponens for you.

So, again, what you're saying doesn't make any sense. How can you accept that modus ponens doesn't beg the question, accept that the p-zombie argument uses modus ponens, but then claim that the p-zombie argument begs the question? You're just contradicting yourself.

You didn't answer if you understand that no one is saying that the modus ponens begs the question.

Aren't you interested in understanding what we're saying?

You didn't answer if you understand that no one is saying that the modus ponens begs the question.

Aren't you interested in understanding what we're saying? — Terrapin Station

I don't understand what you're saying, hence why I said "what you're saying doesn't make any sense". You claim to not be saying that modus ponens begs the question but then also claim that the p-zombie argument – an argument that uses modus ponens – begs the question. As far as I can see, you're just contradicting yourself.

'

Haha, okay.

Do A and B in the argument have any content? Or are they just A and B?

Do A and B in the argument have any content? Or are they just A and B? — Terrapin Station

A is "if Socrates is a man then Socrates is mortal" or "if p-zombies are conceivable then consciousness isn't physical" and B is "Socrates is a man" or "P-zombies are conceivable".

Sure. And is that just a random list of words, or is there any semantic content?

If we can conceive of p-zombies then consciousness isn't physical
We can conceive of p-zombies
Therefore, consciousness isn't physical — Michael

The second premise is not supported. To go down the same line of thought others have done in the thread (and at the risk of restating what has already been said), the premise is true if and only if physicalism is false.

P-zombies are potentially conceivable; in a sense, I do not see anything strikingly incoherent about the idea, but this may only be because we, as humans, do not understand the brain and the other physical forces that underlie consciousness. In other words, we may not be epistemologically justified in saying, "p-zombies are inconceivable," as this would require us to flat out illustrate physicalism, but we are not epistemologically justified to declare that, "p-zombies are concievable."

Saying, "p-zombies are convievable," is equal to saying "p-zombies are logically possible." Saying, "p-zombies are logically possible," is equivelant to saying, "it is logically possible to have two worlds, W1 and W2, that are exactly the same physically, but W1 has conscious beings and W2 has p-zombies." The last statement is true if and only if physicalism is false, for if physicalism were true, then it would not be logically possible to have W1 and W2. In this sense, the argument begs the question. There is nothing wrong with the form of the argument as stated (it's modus ponus), but to hold the second premise as true, we would have to assume the conclusion, and thus, we would be begging the question.

The second premise is not supported. To go down the same line of thought others have done in the thread (and at the risk of restating what has already been said), the premise is true if and only if physicalism is false. — Chany

And compare with:

If Socrates is a man then Socrates is mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal

The second premise is true only if Socrates is mortal.

There is nothing wrong with the form of the argument as stated (it's modus ponus), but to hold the second premise as true, we would have to assume the conclusion, and thus, we would be begging the question.

As I've said before, this reasoning undermines any syllogism, as shown above.

The p-zombie argument is conceivable in a semantic way only.
We can conceivably define consciousness such that strictly physical humans do not possess it.
The p-zombie argument does not explain anything though, it is not conceivable in the sense that it is an alternative explanation for conscious phenomena.

So, the counter-argument seems to amount to "but I believe that Socrates is immortal, and so not a man, and therefore your premise that Socrates is a man begs the question". But, of course, that's not how question-begging works, given that the Socrates syllogism is known to not beg the question. Rather, to deny the second premise because you reject the conclusion is to beg the question.

So to say "p-zombies aren't conceivable because consciousness is physical" is to beg the question. You can't deny an argument's conclusion to attack one of its premises. You have to consider the argument without assuming the conclusion to be true, i.e. you can't assume that physicalism is the case.

This is strictly semantic though...
If we can conceive of p-zombies then consciousness isn't physical
We can conceive of p-zombies
Therefore, consciousness isn't physical

The problem with accepting this argument is that it could mean that we are all p-zombies because we are all physical.

if we are strictly physical then we are not conscious (by definition)
we appear to be strictly physical
therefor we may be p-zombies (by definition)

If you were interested in understanding, you wouldn't have simply dumped out of our conversation.

You're not interested in understanding. You're interested in arguing and being right.

But Michael is right, and you have failed to get your point across.

I take your point to be that one would only affirm that p-zombies are conceivable if one believes that physicalism is false. I'm sympathetic to this, but you have not properly argued for it.

Michael is defending the classic p-zombie argument, which is not question-begging without further analysis to reveal hidden premises, because the conceivability of p-zombies does not obviously, or on the face of it necessarily, rest on a denial of physicalism.

But it's true that the notion of conceivability in Chalmers' argument is a bit troublesome. It positively invites the charge of begging the question, because it is so easy to confuse "We can conceive x", with "I believe there could be an x", where the latter obviously rests on one's philosophical commitments.

But the relevant notion of conceivability is something more like logical possibility. So, roughly, you may find it difficult to conceive of flying pigs if you are deeply familiar with evolutionary history, and yet the thought is not a contradictory one, and thus flying pigs are conceivable in the relevant sense.

I'm not saying you're wrong, just that you're not obviously right.

Michael is defending the classic p-zombie argument, which is not question-begging without further analysis to reveal hidden premises — jamalrob

Okay, and you realize that no one is arguing that the modus ponens is question-begging, right?