P2 is related to P1 through the concept of what it means to follow a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only possible connection between P1 and P2 that I can see are the words "act" and "outside of". The logic of your argument is no different to this:

P1. To follow a rule is to not act outside of that rule
P2. People often act outside of the theatre
C. The theatre is not a rule

P! is intended as a definition of "to follow a rule". P2 is intended to state that activities related to conventions ( call them conventional activities) are often outside that definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

P1 defines following and breaking a rule. P2 tells us that people often break conventions. You know what that means:

P1. To follow a rule is to not break that rule
P2. People often break my heart
C. My heart is not a rule

The conclusion does not follow from the premises. You have begged the question with your argument and assumed what you set out to prove.

That there are distinct referents for "rule" is taken for granted. — Metaphysician Undercover

This leads to ambiguity and confusion, as has been demonstrated. Also, I'd hate for there to be any equivocation.

The argument is meant to show that the activities described, or referred to by "rules", def#2, what you call unspoken rules, or conventions, do not qualify as activities called "following a rule", as dictated by def#1. — Metaphysician Undercover

How so? You gave a definition for following a rule in premise 1 and in premise 2 you say that conventions are often not followed. What's the connection between them, the word "follow"?

P1. To follow a rule is to not break that rule
P2. People often do not follow a sports team
C. A sports team is not a rule

What I want from you is to accept that a custom or tradition def#2, is not a principle of conformity, i.e. not a rule being followed, nor a rule to be followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, of course it is. Even the dictionary says customs and traditions are rules. And following a rule is one of the main things you can do with a rule.

Maybe if you had a better argument I might be convinced otherwise.

Just so that we have clarity, can you define "rules" for me? — Metaphysician Undercover

Certainly. A rule is one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity.

The only possible connection between P1 and P2 that I can see are the words "act" and "outside of". — Luke

Right, the argument concerns a type of action, what we were calling "rule-following". That's why P1 and P2 have "act" in common. I believe you've graduated from kindergarten to grade one, in your effort to understand the argument, but I don't think you'll ever obtain a full understanding in my lifetime. In fact, I think that if you don't understand by now you never will, because you seem to be unwilling to make the effort, and I can't see that changing at all.

Certainly. A rule is one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity. — Luke

OK, now let's follow your definition.

Do you see that a custom, or tradition, is not a regulation or principle governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of action, because such things as customs and traditions have no capacity to govern our conduct?

And so the OED has a distinction between def #1, which is consistent with your definition, and def #2,: "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things". Do you agree that a prevailing custom is not a "rule" by your definition because it has no capacity for governance? It is a "rule" by def #2, but we ought not equivocate. And do you acknowledge that our ways of talking, our ways of using words, in ordinary language use, are customs, rather than rules by your definition (which require regulations or principles governing conduct)?

Right, the argument concerns a type of action, what we were calling "rule-following". That's why P1 and P2 have "act" in common. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can see that P1 concerns the act of rule-following. What I don't see from your argument is how P2 concerns the act of rule-following.

The argument is basically:
P1. Rules are followed
P2. Conventions are (often) not followed
C. Conventions are not rules

P2 is about convention-following, not rule-following. What does (not) following conventions have to do with following rules? There must be some relationship between them in order to infer the conclusion from the premises. It can't be that there is no relationship between P1 and P2.

What I don't see from your argument is how P2 concerns the act of rule-following. — Luke

What is described in P2, conventions and unspoken rules, do not concern the act of rule-following, that's whole the point of the argument. to show that you were wrong in assuming that they did. I'm glad you now understand that this type of activity does not concern rule-following

So, let's forget about that argument, and move on to your definition of "rule" now. Do you agree with the following from my last post:

OK, now let's follow your definition.

Do you see that a custom, or tradition, is not a regulation or principle governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of action, because such things as customs and traditions have no capacity to govern our conduct?

And so the OED has a distinction between def #1, which is consistent with your definition, and def #2,: "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things". Do you agree that a prevailing custom is not a "rule" by your definition because it has no capacity for governance? It is a "rule" by def #2, but we ought not equivocate. And do you acknowledge that our ways of talking, our ways of using words, in ordinary language use, are customs, rather than rules by your definition (which require regulations or principles governing conduct)? — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, the argument concerns a type of action, what we were calling "rule-following". — Metaphysician Undercover

What is described in P2, conventions and unspoken rules, do not concern the act of rule-following — Metaphysician Undercover

Then how does the conclusion follow? Explain it to me like I'm a first-grader.

When one is proving that B is not an A, then what is required to be an A is stated (definition), and the description of B is stated. If the description of B does not fulfil the stated requirement for being an A, then the conclusion follows that B is not an A. It does not matter that B is a completely unrelated thing, it might be a theatre, or a broken heart, or anything, so long as it does not fulfill the condition required to be an A, then the conclusion follows, that it is not an A.

If "animal" is a stated defining feature of "human", then anything mentioned which does not fulfill that condition of "animal" can be ruled out as not being human. It doesn't matter what is mentioned, it could be a plant, a rock, a car, so long as the mentioned thing is not described as an animal, we can conclude that it is not human.

When one is proving that B is not an A, then what is required to be an A is stated (definition), and the description of B is stated. — Metaphysician Undercover

In your argument, you are attempting to prove your conclusion that a convention (B) is not a rule (A). Your argument does not state what is required to be a rule (A).

Try again.

How many times do I have to repeat the same thing Luke? A is an action, the action of following a rule. The first premise defines this action. It does not define "rule". The argument concerns actions, what type of actions qualify as "following a rule". That is what we were discussing. I may not have stated the conclusion clearly when I first posted the argument, but I clarified later, the conclusion is that the actions referred to as customs, traditions, conventions, unspoken rules, do not qualify as rule following actions.

The argument is meant to show that the activities described, or referred to by "rules", def#2, what you call unspoken rules, or conventions, do not qualify as activities called "following a rule", as dictated by def#1. — Metaphysician Undercover

How many times do I have to repeat the same thing Luke? A is an action, the action of following a rule. The first premise defines this action. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, okay. Your argument demonstrates that a convention is not the act of following a rule. Or should that be: The act of following a convention is not the act of following a rule?

Sorry to be a pain, but how do we infer this from the premises?

I'll try and follow what you've said:

When one is proving that B is not an A, then what is required to be an A is stated (definition), and the description of B is stated. If the description of B does not fulfil the stated requirement for being an A, then the conclusion follows that B is not an A. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm just a little unclear on how the description of B does not fulfil the stated requirement for being an A. That is, how does "often act[ing] in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules" not fulfil the stated requirement of "act[ing] within the confines of [a] rule"?

Do we assume that conventions and unspoken rules are rules and, therefore, that people not following conventions and unspoken rules are not following rules? Otherwise, I don't understand how the stated requirement is not fulfilled by the second premise. If the second premise were instead that "People often act in ways within conventions and unspoken rules", would the conclusion then be that the act of following a convention is the act of following a rule?

I'm just a little unclear on how the description of B does not fulfil the stated requirement for being an A. That is, how does "often act[ing] in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules" not fulfil the stated requirement of "act[ing] within the confines of [a] rule"? — Luke

Obviously, going outside the boundaries contradicts staying within the boundaries, therefore going outside the boundaries does not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries.

Do we assume that conventions and unspoken rules are rules and, therefore, that people not following conventions and unspoken rules are not following rules? — Luke

No, we conclude that so-called "unspoken rules" are really not instances of rules being followed.

If the second premise were instead that "People often act in ways within conventions and unspoken rules", would the conclusion then be that the act of following a convention is the act of following a rule? — Luke

No, because acting sometimes within the bounds of a rule, and sometimes outside the bounds, does not constitute (fulfill the requirements of) following the rule, as defined by the first premise.

Obviously, going outside the boundaries contradicts staying within the boundaries, therefore going outside the boundaries does not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does going outside the boundaries of a convention not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule?

What is the common factor here? Is a convention a rule (prior to the conclusion)?

If a convention is not a rule, then what does staying within the boundaries of a convention, or not staying within the boundaries of a convention, have to do with staying within the boundaries of a rule? If the answer is "nothing", then what is the common factor between the premises that enables you to derive the conclusion?

acting sometimes within the bounds of a rule, and sometimes outside the bounds, does not constitute (fulfill the requirements of) following the rule, as defined by the first premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then how would you ever know if someone were following a rule? Any observation that they appeared to be might at any future time be undermined by an observation that they fail to. You could never say "X is following a rule" if the criteria for that assessment were that they continue to do so forever".

It seems rather pointless to me define away an otherwise perfectly useful term by creating a definition for it which we can never actually use.

How does going outside the boundaries of a convention not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule? — Luke

Luke, how many times must we go through the same thing? If a convention is proposed as a rule, then we must determine whether it fulfills the conditions of being a rule, to make that judgement of whether it qualifies as a rule or not. That's called criteria.

If a convention is not a rule, then what does staying within the boundaries of a convention, or not staying within the boundaries of a convention, have to do with staying within the boundaries of a rule? If the answer is "nothing", then what is the common factor between the premises that enables you to derive the conclusion? — Luke

Do you understand the concept of criteria? We stipulate the criteria, by which a judgement is to be made. We propose things to be judged according to the criteria. We judge yes or no, as either fulfilling the terms of the criteria or not. It does not matter that the proposed thing has absolutely nothing in common, or is even in any way similar to what is stipulated by the criteria, we still reject the thing as not fulfilling the criteria. The question is, does this commonality between P1 (criteria), and P2 (description of the thing in question), exist. If it does we make one conclusion, if it does not we make the opposing conclusion.

Then how would you ever know if someone were following a rule? Any observation that they appeared to be might at any future time be undermined by an observation that they fail to. You could never say "X is following a rule" if the criteria for that assessment were that they continue to do so forever".

It seems rather pointless to me define away an otherwise perfectly useful term by creating a definition for it which we can never actually use. — Isaac

I went through this with Luke already. As human beings, we do not really follow rules. We are free willing beings who choose. We can, and often do, choose what is contrary to the rule. In relation to rule following, the closest we can get is to attempt, to try hard, and this requires significant will power. To describe us as rule following beings is a faulty and misleading description, derived from a determinist perspective, which is a misunderstanding of human activity. Therefore I believe that in this context, the context of a philosophical inquiry, where we are discussing the fundamental nature of human activities, especially natural language use, "rule" is not a "perfectly useful term", because it perpetuates that misunderstanding.

To describe us as rule following beings is a faulty and misleading description, derived from a determinist perspective, which is a misunderstanding of human activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, I see. Everyone should stop using it because you personally don't happen to agree with one of its possible uses. Sounds about par for one of your arguments. As you were then.

As such, my naming is nothing but a relation between the image and my conception of it by which it is known by me. Witt has generalized concepts as having optional characterizations which are then used by anybody, when parsimony suggests concept generation is as private as the mind that contains them. — Mww

Well, we are past trying to understand the method of OLP and even Witt's example and on to just a statement of a theory of language justified by the fact that it is, the simplest conclusion? So we could go down a road where I try to give enough examples where you might see that we do not generate "concepts" or "conceptions" in the "mind' but simply express ourselves in our shared language that mirrors our similar lives in a public process of the uses of our common activities. I don't really want to try to recreate the entire attempt of the Philosophical Investigations to shift people's perspective and attitude, especially because what I seem to be met with appears to be just dogmatic refusal to even consider or understand the process. Not that this isn't a normal and understandable end in philosophical discussions, it's just that in this instance this type of change in perspective is not reached through argument but in you being able to see for yourself what I am (and Witt is) describing. I have tried above to attempt a straightforward argument at times (though that is not the method of OLP), and I would certainly consider discussing specific examples in the PI or any specific one imagined (I just addressed one in the post "How and Why").

“knowing” is not a concept, it is a mental activity, or part of a methodological procedure, as is “conceiving”, and understanding, judging, cognizing. — Mww

The word "concept" here is used as a "term" by Witt with a specific use, not anything like a conception or an idea. It is merely a general grouping of the kind of activities that he is investigating--like, conceiving, understanding, judging, etc., except he is trying to show that they are not like creating meaning with words or generating an individual idea, but, for example, that "thinking" is more like problem solving or trying something new or following a theme into a new context, listening to and seeing the world, etc., than reflecting, or considering, or mulling over, or imagining, or talking to oneself--which all have their own grammar and are their own things separate to "thinking".

This vision of a more public process of language does not mean that I am not an individual with my own interests, insights, perspective, or even experiences; but that all these personal matters can all be expressed (or kept secret) in a more "public" process (one not determined beforehand) that requires our responsibility instead of our "meaning".

it is clear that “how knowing is in our lives” is nothing more than......hey, big deal....we know stuff. I mean, it is quite absurd to suggest that we DO NOT know stuff, so how important can it be to wonder how knowing is in our lives? And if the argument is that knowing has a number of different options in how it can be used, again....big deal. No matter how many options there are for its use, the end result is exactly the same. We know stuff. Thing is....we all know different stuff, and, we all know the same stuff differently. So even if how knowing is in our lives is a valid expression, it doesn’t say anything we didn’t already know. — Mww

And here you see the examples, but are trivializing the impact, which is one of the attitudes taken towards OLP (it can also seem dogmatic, as in: you are not apologizing if you don't follow the criteria of an apology!). With all this agreement, you still feel the need to hang on to the feeling that we "all know the same stuff differently". There is the part where you grant it and the part you take it back Austin will say. The skeptic does have a point, Cavell says in Knowing and Acknolwedging, and OLP must record and take account of it (this is not what I am discussing now though--there are links above to a few Cavell essays that might be interesting on that front). And there are possibilities where we "know the same stuff differently", like "knowing" (in the sense of, experiencing) a movie or a sunset, but we can't be said to "know" our phone number in different ways (the criteria being, we can recall it--and with OLP's method you either agree or not with this claim to criteria--though of course we may remember it in different ways). And when you say "So even if how knowing is in our lives is a valid expression, it doesn’t say anything we didn’t already know" that is exactly how OLP works; Witt will say it leaves everything as it is. We are not finding something new, but rememebering what we may have forgotten--something anyone can see.

Witt went backwards, as did all analytic language philosophers. It used to be that the fact we know things is given, and the quest was in how is knowledge possible. That fundamentalism evolved....probably because of its intrinsically speculative nature....into the broadening of how knowing things interactively affects us, and that broadening determinable, made possible, because the language we use to express how each of us are affected by different options for knowing, is right there in your face, thus being very far from speculative. — Mww

This could be said to be the history of the Enilightenment and how science (or positivism's influence) has, justifiably, chipped away at what philosophy only handled with a speculative epistimology. And the determinism and certainty that this brings is explicit and "right there in your face". However, OLP is addressing the issues that are skipped over that only philosophy can still bring to light--self-knowledge through understanding our responsibilities and the implications we are subject to in the world in our actions and expressions; our human conditions; what a moral moment is; art; political standing and consent; etc.

Hardly a satisfying philosophy, I must say. — Mww

Philosophy and OLP specifically will have its own endeavors and its own satisfactions. Part of what Witt is trying to show in unearthing our desire for certainty is to turn us around to see our real needs and desires. If anything is individual, our interests are, and there is no argument to change that if someone just doesn't care, which is fine.

If a convention is proposed as a rule, then we must determine whether it fulfills the conditions of being a rule, to make that judgement of whether it qualifies as a rule or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Was it assumed in the argument that a convention is a rule? If so, this is the first I've heard about it.

I asked you two posts ago whether this was the assumption, and you responded "No":

Do we assume that conventions and unspoken rules are rules and, therefore, that people not following conventions and unspoken rules are not following rules?
— Luke

No — Metaphysician Undercover

We judge yes or no, as either fulfilling the terms of the criteria or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the terms of the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule?

Ah, I see. Everyone should stop using it because you personally don't happen to agree with one of its possible uses. Sounds about par for one of your arguments. As you were then. — Isaac

Well, if we're going to proceed with a philosophical inquiry concerning where, or how we might find rules, we need some criteria as to what qualifies as a rule. You and I don't agree on this, that's obvious, so it's doubtful we'll ever have any progress on this matter.

Was it assumed in the argument that a convention is a rule? — Luke

No, that's what was proposed by you, outside the argument.

How do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the terms of the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule? — Luke

If this is true than it proves that a convention is something other than a rule. It's pretty much the same conclusion stated in a different way.

How do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the terms of the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule? — Luke

If this is true than it proves that a convention is something other than a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

If what is true? I asked you how do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule.

I understand why going outside the boundaries of a rule would not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule, but I don't understand why going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule.

Surely, it must be possible that either following or not following a convention, or acting in some way with regards to a convention, could fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundary of a rule? Or have you simply presupposed that either following or not following a convention does not fulfil the requirement?

I asked you how do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule. — Luke

If going outside the boundaries of a convention is the same thing as staying within the boundaries of a rule, then obviously a convention is not the same thing as a rule.

And the converse is also true?

If staying within the boundaries of a convention is the same thing as staying within the boundaries of a rule, then obviously a convention is the same thing as a rule.

Yes, we could make that judgement. But we don't stay within those boundaries, that's P2. I know you disagree with P2, and you could have saved days of back and forth just by refusing to accept it, rather than all the other shenanigans.

Now you're going to say that we don't stay within the boundaries of rules either. And I'll say, I know, that's the nature of free will, and we ought not describe human beings as rule following creatures. We've been through this all already.

Yes, but the real takeaway here is that conventions are no different to rules, so rules do not need to be explicitly stated. You could have saved me plenty of pages by not denying that.

Now, let's get back to discussing whether one needs language before one can learn rules/conventions...

You can make them that way if you want, it's just a matter of definition. You can simply define "rule" in a very ambiguous way, allowing all sorts of things to pass as rules without differentiating distinct types under the one name "rule". But if you do define them like that you cannot take advantage of the analytical benefits obtained from separating the distinct types of things.

Despite the fact that we break rules, we can make a conscious effort to follow rules. But to do this, the rule must exist, in some form which we have access to, such that the conscious mind can consult it and determine how to follow it. This is, as expressed in language. In other words, to adequately judge correct and incorrect the rule must exist in a form which we can consult, i.e. in language.

Those other things, which you are inclined to call rules, such as customs, traditions, and habits of language use, do not exist in any form which we might consult in order to make a decisive determination of correct or incorrect. In fact, we cannot say that there is necessarily even a principle (rule) being followed, if it's just a matter of copying or imitating, so there's no way to say that one person's display is the correct one while another's is incorrect when there are differences.. Sure imitation requires some sort of effort, but it is not at all the same thing as interpreting a rule and adhering to it,. And, in the case of imitation there is no written rule or principle to refer to in order to judge correctness, when different people are carrying on in slightly different ways.

I don't think there's much point in trying to convince people. While OLP is good, it relies on a certain psychological leap that it never figured out how to instill in other people. Lazerowitz said it was a matter of 'clicking,' or like seeing through a magic-eye painting. Much of OLP was, and I think should still be seen, as destructive to philosophy, and is a matter of 'seeing through' it. People who are invested in philosophy as part of their identity have a predisposition not to listen, and even someone who wants to listen has no guarantee it will 'click.' That's the major shortcoming of the method – no one figured out how to make someone see that initial insight. Philosophy is, in some sense, stupid or defective, but we're cognitively disposed to fall into its traps.

The thing that did it for me was Malcolm's 'Moore and Ordinary Language,' which contains something like the OLP 'master argument' in the allegory of the animal, and the argument over whether it's a fox or a wolf.

Suppose we're going through the forest and we hear rustling, so we go to investigate. We look beyond and in a clearing there's an animal. We are close enough to see it perfectly clearly. You say it's a wolf, and I say it's a fox. When you protest, I ask, how can that possibly be a wolf? It looks and acts like a fox – it has all the features typically associated with a fox. But you protest, and say 'I grant you that – it has all the characteristics of what we would normally call a fox. Nevertheless, it is a wolf.'

The idea is that here you're doing philosophy, in insisting that a fox is a wolf. The point is to consider – what sense is there in saying that a creature that has all the characteristics of what is normally called a fox, not a fox? Yet this is precisely what the philosopher spends the great majority of his time doing. — Snakes Alive

I haven't read much OLP (some Austin, basically, and that a while ago) but I've picked up some of the flavor of their thought, which has become more palatable the older I get. That's the disclaimer, since I want to engage with your post here, & am aware I have some domain-specific limitations.

But I have a hunch that what's going on is something like:

In the the fox/wolf conversation, the 'wolf' guy has all sorts of complicated stuff attached to wolves- values, emotions, modes of awareness. For whatever reason, he's at a point in his life where all these things have gotten attached to championing wolfness, whenever possible (and through the exercise of an intricate structure of axioms and inferences which serves that purpose). For the pro-wolf guy, if the fox can't be called a wolf, then all those values and emotions are in jeopardy. In defending the wolfness of the fox, he's trying to defend all these things. I think the impulse to defend those things is good and fundamental to being human, but the way in which that impulse is attempting to be realized suggests a deep confusion.

If I understand OLP correctly, the move to look at what's actually happening in philosophical discussion is right - people are talking about words and how they're used. A lot of the animus toward OLP seems to stem from a feeling that it's trivializing those values and emotions and modes of awareness. But values are borne out in action, not discussion; And emotions, or different ways of attuning to the world, are borne out in activities that do that kind of attuning. The 'click' can only happen if you're also willing to give up the (implicit) idea that living-well (in accordance with your values, say) means simply verbally laying claim to the right kind of thing, or discussing the world in a certain way.

Some of the tone of (early to mid 20th century) analytic philosophy I've read veers into being hammily scotch-and-a-cigar-in-the-drawing-room. There's a wry irony in Quine, or Davidson, say. That's bothered me in the past, but there's a case to be made that it stems from a refreshing self-awareness of the actual stakes, which are the stakes of talking about words over scotch and a cigar.

You can simply define "rule" in a very ambiguous way, allowing all sorts of things to pass as rules without differentiating distinct types under the one name "rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

This must be what you did in your argument, then? You know, since you ended up agreeing that a convention is the same thing as a rule.

Despite the fact that we break rules, we can make a conscious effort to follow rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Breaking a convention is not the same as breaking a rule? I thought we just agreed that it was.

Those other things, which you are inclined to call rules, such as customs, traditions, and habits of language use, do not exist in any form which we might consult in order to make a decisive determination of correct or incorrect. — Metaphysician Undercover

We can never know whether "customs, traditions, and habits of language use" have been broken? Didn't Trump break with tradition by not attending Biden's inauguration? I guess we'll never know.

I don't think there's any one reason people make these sorts of claims – emotional issues is probably a big one, but not the only one. Other people probably really think they're 'discovering' things while doing it. The point is just that philosophy takes place in a confused register where the conversation goes back and forth, but as far as inquiry goes, nothing is really happening. It's like watching a cat try to catch a laser light, or something.

So it's not just that people are too emotionally invested, and don't want to admit they're just trying to use words in nonstandard ways. It's more that language is the medium in which philosophy takes place, and there's some lack of meta-cognitive awareness of what goes on when we use it, in general. But sadly, I think philosophy itself is also not a great medium for giving people these meta-cognitive skills. Any understanding of the destructive portion of OLP has to start with the recognition that philosophy, objectively, doesn't work. That is, it is not what it claims to be – a form of effective inquiry.

This must be what you did in your argument, then? You know, since you ended up agreeing that a convention is the same thing as a rule. — Luke

Sorry Luke, you misunderstood again, as usual. I didn't agree that a convention is the same thing as a rule. I agree that for you it is. But I believe that's a misunderstanding you have, which I don't share.

Oh, I see. It is only a requirement of your argument that a convention is the same as a rule. Okay then.

Where did you ever get that idea from?

I don't think there's any one reason people make these sorts of claims – emotional issues is probably a big one, but not the only one. Other people probably really think they're 'discovering' things while doing it. The point is just that philosophy takes place in a confused register where the conversation goes back and forth, but as far as inquiry goes, nothing is really happening. It's like watching a cat try to catch a laser light, or something.

So it's not just that people are too emotionally invested, and don't want to admit they're just trying to use words in nonstandard ways. It's more that language is the medium in which philosophy takes place, and there's some lack of meta-cognitive awareness of what goes on when we use it, in general. But sadly, I think philosophy itself is also not a great medium for giving people these meta-cognitive skills. Any understanding of the destructive portion of OLP has to start with the recognition that philosophy, objectively, doesn't work. That is, it is not what it claims to be – a form of effective inquiry. — Snakes Alive

Yeah, I didn't want to suggest it was just a matter of emotion. I think the pull toward 'discovery' is also part of the same nebula of things I'm talking about with values, modes of awareness and so forth. But I take your point - you're focusing more on the 'how' than the 'why.'