So it is your understanding that cats know about mats and can communicate their position on the mat telepathically with humans? At that point, I guess, the human needs to be able to convey this amazing fact without uttering? Are these the facts that we are discussing? I hope not.

My point is that the answer to the question in the OP is that the question itself is grammatically erroneous; with the corollary that facts are not the sort of thing that can be true or false. — Banno

Well, it's hard to disagree with states of affairs. Provided, Joe believes that it is not raining outside, when actually it is, then facts are always true, if they weren't then we'd all be solipsists arguing over what red, white, and blue really look like with other solipsists.

So you are claiming that all philosophers use the word in the same way?

OK. So we agree so far?

Actually there is no unequivocal philosophical definition of .metaphysics', and I think it is generally understood to be distinct from ontology; so I wouldn't agree that it is "mostly ontology'. If you think that is, then what would be the differences between the two disciplines and if there are no significant differences then why not dispense with one or the other?

From the Online Dictionary of Etymology:
meta-
word-forming element meaning 1. "after, behind," 2. "changed, altered," 3. "higher, beyond;" from Greek meta (prep.) "in the midst of; in common with; by means of; between; in pursuit or quest of; after, next after, behind," in compounds most often meaning "change" of place, condition, etc. This is from PIE *me- "in the middle" (source also of German mit, Gothic miþ, Old English mið "with, together with, among;" see mid). Notion of "changing places with" probably led to senses "change of place, order, or nature," which was a principal meaning of the Greek word when used as a prefix (but also denoting "community, participation; in common with; pursuing").

Third sense, "higher than, transcending, overarching, dealing with the most fundamental matters of," is due to misinterpretation of metaphysics as "science of that which transcends the physical." This has led to a prodigious erroneous extension in modern usage, with meta- affixed to the names of other sciences and disciplines, especially in the academic jargon of literary criticism.

Metaphysics, as Aristotle is usually taken to have originally used it meant 'after physics'.

In any case the point is that in philosophy today metaphysics is generally understood to deal with matters outside of (beyond) the scope of empirical (physical) inquiry.

Anyway, I love the way you throw in red herrings to avoid answering the difficult questions that are put to you. .

Seems so.

I won't be offering you much more than some statements and maybe a question or two. If you were sitting on a mat within range I might kick you.

One can observe cats. one can notice where they are, on or off the mat. What's all the nonsense about?

Just want to know who decides? Who is nominated to decide what is a fact based upon their observations? And how is this communicated? Very fundamental. Very simple.

So you are claiming that all philosophers use the word in the same way? — Banno

Is that what "standard usage" refers to?

Try reading more closely: I said "true or false".

Are you not familiar with the truth tables for disjunctions?

I think it is generally understood to be distinct from ontology — John

You think wrong.

Just want to know who decides? Who is nominated to decide what is a fact based upon their observations? And how is this communicated? Very fundamental. Very simple. — Rich

Ok, I decide, and I tell you and you have to accept it. This is not the case is it? No one decides the facts, people find out the facts, or sometimes they don't. Quite often I have no idea where the cat is. But your silliness is boring me now, so I'll duck out.

"standard usage" — Terrapin Station

Is there such a thing in English?

Should we take a descriptive or proscriptive approach?

I vote descriptive.

Then it is pretty much what I described originally. A belief which a certain population agrees upon as being a fact. The population can be one, two, or more. Problems arise when two populations disagree upon what was thought to be facts. The attribute "fact" is just assigned to this belief to give it more weight. Rather than say: "I believe" it is said "It is a fact", followed, of course, but the discussion where the are disagreements. Every discipline had facts that are in constant dispute. It fills libraries.

Then it is pretty much what I described originally. A belief which a certain population agrees upon as being a fact. The population can be one, two, or more. Problems arise when two populations disagree upon what was thought to be facts. The attribute "fact" is just signed to this belief to give it more weight. Rather than say: "I believe" it is said "It is a fact", followed, of course, but the discussion where the are disagreements. Every discipline had facts that are in constant dispute. It fills libraries. — Rich

All you have done here is misuse the word fact. A fact is what is the case regardless of your belief, not because of it.

Is it a fact that 2+2=4?

Still think use of the word 'fact' is equivocal. Sure I can accept that facts are neither true nor false, simply states of affairs, but who decides what are those states of affair. It is easy to determine if 'the cat is on the mat' is a fact is quite another thing to say that salt is comprised of sodium & chlorine.

It seems that I can easily tell whether or not the cat is on the mat, but in the case of what salt is composed of, I have had to accept a whole conceptual frame work to recognize that it is a fact.


Just noticed Question's '2+2=4' question. I don't consider it a fact, that is a true statement.

The arithmetic symbolic representation is something that is learned as a child and is merely a convention.

The actual imprinting of this concept as something meaningful in someone's memory has been an ongoing area of investigation. It was a very important part of Bergson's intensive study as well as Piaget who studied under Bergson. I don't think there is any concenus of how this concept comes into being. The old nurture vs. nature debate I imagine. Part psychology, part metaphysics. It is a subject that I am just beginning to study. It is by no means a closed subject.

I am not convinced that simply because someone is sure about something, e.g. where the cat is, is enough to make it a fact. Being positive about something appears to be just a very strong belief. These kind of facts or beliefs are constantly being contested in courts of law.

A fact is what is the case regardless of your belief... — Banno

Is it a fact that
facts are what is the case regardless of your belief
or
is it true that
facts are what is the case regardless of your belief?

Oooo! Recursion! How exciting!

Facts as states of affairs, or what make true statements true, can only hold an ontological distinction between facts and true statements, and not an epistemic one. As you can't actually distinguish the two in practice, let alone say what, in what way, or what is the nature of the relationship between them.

We require this ontological distinction though, to make sense of counter-factuals, fantasy, and to distinguish between words themselves, and what those words are about. Again, the relationship between the two is not obvious.

That there is a distinction though, and that these are separate things that somehow relate in important consistent ways is difficult to doubt though, and all but required for meta-discourse on the subject.

I guess another way to interpret my question would be

Why can't it be true that
facts are what is the case regardless of your beliefs
and a fact that
facts are what is the case regardless of your beliefs

If you want.

Not at all sure how this helps, though.

If facts are the case regardless of beliefs then they are inaccessible, and therefore becomes a general concept with no concrete examples.

Is it a fact that 2+2=4? — Question

Sure thing. But whether mathematics is a social construction, or refers to something independent of thought, is another kind of question altogether, namely, a metaphysical question.

And I think it ought to be mentioned that in general terms positivism is the attempt to ground all philosophical discourse in verifiable fact; to establish a 'foundation of certainty' from which inferences can be drawn. (Come to think of it, you can see the echo of Descartes in that).

If facts are the case regardless of beliefs then they are inaccessible — Rich

Why would you think that?

If it is not a belief then one must claim that they have the ability to state a fact without imbuing the statement without any personal subjectivity. It may be possible for someone with infallibility who can totally remove all subjectivity from their utterances. I believe some feel that the Pope has such abilities.

the ability to state a fact without imbuing the statement with and personal subjectivity — Rich

"The cat is on the mat".

There, done.

So your claim seems to hinge on the impossibility of a commonplace.