Whoa. (And welcome). Very sketchy introduction. But what I make of it is that the word 'final' is key. 'Final' means 'something which all must agree on'. So, something final *is* 'singular', being 'something which all must agree with', which is what gives it singular value.

That would usually be contrasted with the idea that 'something has value only in the eyes of the individual or group'. So, for instance, a religious conservative might say that 'God is the final arbiter of value', where a political progressive might say 'there is no "final arbiter", values vary from individual to individual'.

Don't know if I'm reading you right, but that is how I would carve it up.

As I've heard people say, "all roads lead to Rome". If Rome is your destination (the value), and there are multiple ways of getting there, it would be mighty prudent to pick the best route - no or fewer chuckholes, good weather, safer, shorter, convenient locations for a stop to stretch your legs, cost, picturesque landscape, and so on. Mind you, there'll be some compromises you'll have to make. If you have the time and patience, you could try out all the ways of getting to Rome - each road will have its own treasures (and perils) to offer.

That which is of final value is for all intents and purposes, perfect, or ideal, insofar as no more or other conditions are possible for changing its finality, without self-contradiction. The first consideration would then be, how did this unconditioned....ideality....perfection.....obtain? The second consideration would then be, what would cause such perfection to be necessary, which it must be if that which is unconditioned can never be contingent on anything that conditions it.

If it cannot be said how there is a perfect value, but only that a perfect value is given without regard to the considerations, then it is the case that if there is only one reason for valuing a perfect value, is because it is perfect, which a mere tautology. That is, the only singular reason for valuing a perfect thing, is its perfection.

To negate the tautology, either there is no final value, hence no intrinsic necessity, or there is no single reason to value that to which final value belongs, which immediately invokes the possibility for contingencies.

Rhetorical fun and games.....

It sounds Kantian to me. "final value" I guess means value as an end (in itself) rather than as a means. The woodman's axe has value as a means to chop wood, whereas the stone-age obsidian axe head has value in itself as a thing of beauty and historical significance.

So if the stone-age axe was ugly, and had a singular (final) value as a thing of historical significance, its value would be less, but there would still be a normative reason to preserve it or whatever.

I take it the article was about 'buck-passing' accounts of moral value (according to which 'moral value' is reduced to 'something we have normative reason to value')?

I think such views are false. But putting that aside and answering your question: no, the difference between saying 'reasons' or 'a reason' is not significant. Nevertheless, there are different sorts of normative reason and so anyone who offers a buck passing account of moral value should be asked to clarify whether they are grounding moral value in just one kind of normative reason - moral reasons, one imagines - or 'any' kind of normative reason. Their view will be implausible no matter which answer they give, but it's as well to clarify.

Sorry for neglecting my question for so long! Mww. that's just what I was thinking with the single reason for valuing. Bartricks, the difference between reasons and a reason seems significant. I must be missing something could you explain a little more? I wonder why someone would want to say reasons when they were only thinking about one.