Relativism is a kind of anti-realism. (Also, not all universalism is realism).

the choice of words is misleading to say the least because subjectivity has nothing to do with it. Why cause confusion by choosing words that could, like inter"subjectivity"? — TheMadFool

Because “objectivity” is booked by religions to refer to things that are the case regardless of what anyone perceives or thinks.

A consensus relies on what people perceive and think.

Shall there be no more shoulds and oughts?

I read your posts but your arguments are wrong.

The necessary moral conditions for communicative debate are not in place. Language is made up, therefore it's all bullshit! :vomit: — unenlightened

It’s more like nihilism knows we made all this stuff up. It is similar to language and one could argue it’s all BS because we made it up but considering language is what we need to communicate I’m not putting it on par with morality. You sound like the rest trying to desperately create some objective standard to live by when it’s foundations are just opinion.

The only problem we end up with is what do we make of the person who has no conscience and can live with the consequences of anything: murder, rape or genocide. That is where things become a bit tricky with what I will call the subjective utilitarian approach. Do we say that there is no objective criteria and that there are no objective moral principles at all? This is where we begin to get into the rough waters and possible moral nihilism. Okay, most of us have consciences but, unfortunately, not everyone does. — Jack Cummins

That’s not a problem at all, again you are attaching aspects that don’t exist on to actions, in this case murder and death as bad. If they can live with that then I have nothing to say, same with someone who is intent on killing me. I can tell them no but in the end it’s only my opinion against their own.

Moral nihilism is pretty much what morality is from what I see. Anything else seems like lying to yourself.

"We" did make it up; that doesn't mean it is merely arbitrary and capricious opinion. It's is also true, especially in your case, that your mere opinion will not outweigh everybody else's. — Bitter Crank

I mean...when you get down to it the whole thing IS arbitrary and capricious opinion. That’s not my opinion that’s a fact. Morality being a value judgment can’t be anything other than opinion.

Also I would like to reply to the beginning comments that I don’t believe that everyone agreeing to something makes it objective, just means that everyone agrees. But how many times have people done that and it led to ruin? Plus isn’t that a fallacy or appealing to popularity?

Bob and Alice decide it would be good to tie you down and do to you things that caused you some experience (what does not matter much). Are your experiences capricious and arbitrary?

Or another way. You see in the newspaper a photograph. What is it a photograph of? Is it a photograph? What is it?

The point is that meaning is provided at an appropriate level or closeness of engagement with the thing to which the meaning is given. Not so close or far away that meaning is lost. And that meaning is neither capricious nor arbitrary, rather instead it is meaning itself, and according to the precision of that application, absolute.

We usually do not question if good things befall us - maybe we should. But these matters are usually honed and stropped on bad things. So the question becomes what is the value of the capricious and arbitrary. If your objection to being hurt by Bob and Alice is mere arbitrary caprice. What claim can you make on them to get them to stop?

To answer your question directly (and of course in my opinion), yes. To explain further, morality is simply the consensus subjective opinion of the group in question. It helps explain why morality differs with time, location, theological underpinnings, etc.

When did I say that?

Plus isn’t that a fallacy or appealing to popularity? — Darkneos

The scientific method is based on people agreeing on observations and coming up with theories based on the agreement. Does that make Einstein’s laws an appeal to popularity?

I mean...when you get down to it the whole thing IS arbitrary and capricious opinion. That’s not my opinion that’s a fact. — Darkneos

Brought about by the way you choose to define your words.

But how many times have people done that and it led to ruin? — Darkneos

Newton was wrong. So should we give up on physics?

Regardless though, if you agree that:

1- People generally have the same moral compass.
2- There are and will continue to be punishments for immoral acts
3- You have no basis on which to say those should stop.

Then really your view is practically the same as meta ethical realism or relativism. You will continue to try to be moral and avoid being immoral to avoid punishment. And you will not have a basis to argue something like “Murderers should not be punished”. And you will probably also continue to feel like murderers and such “deserved it”.

Which is why I think meta ethical questions are usually a waste of time.

I think your view is very silly.

If morality is a matter of opinion, then if I have the opinion that Xing is right, it is right, yes? I mean, unless that follows I don't know what you mean by 'a matter of opinion'.

Well, that's clearly false. If I have the opinion that X is right, that doesn't entail that it actually is right. I will believe it is right. But it won't necessarily actually be right.

That's as foolish as thinking that if I have the opinion that I have a partner, then I do. No, whether I have a partner or not is not a matter of opinion, even though I have opinions about it. Likewise, morality is not a matter of opinion, but is rather a matter about which we have opinions.

This fallacy - the fallacy of confusing a means of awareness with an object of awareness - is what's principally responsible for the widespread belief in individual and collective moral subjectivism among the public.

Yet it is just poor reasoning.

Here's some more poor reasoning (I have never been able to comprehend how anyone can think this a good argument - it's just so obviously stupid - yet whenever I ask anyone to defend their individual or collective subjectivist views, this is the argument I am invariably given).

1. Different people and groups have different moral beliefs
2. Therefore, morality is individually or collectively subjective

Obviously as stated the conclusion doesn't follow. It needs the following premise added to it

1. Different people and groups have different moral beliefs
2. If different people and groups have different moral beliefs, then morality is individually or collectively subjective
3. Therefore, morality is collectively subjective

But 2 is obviously false. I believe it's raining. You believe it is sunny. Therefore whether it is raining or sunny is just a matter of opinion. That's the same logic, yes? The same logic by which many reach the conclusion that morality is individually or collectively subjective, would imply that weather is too. Yet it isn't.

(Reply on behalf of the ignorant - 'oh, but, dur, weather is objective'.....er, yes, that's the point!)

Note: the fact that different people at different times and places have had different moral beliefs is, at best, evidence for 'relativism'. But relativism isn't subjectivism. If morality is individually or collectively subjective, then it is also relative. But it does not follow that it morality is relative it is individually or collectively subjective.

The fact is there is no good evidence that morality is individually or collectively subjective. Which is why you find that it is almost exclusively non-experts who hold that view about morality, whereas the experts- though they disagree among themselves about exactly what morality is - nevertheless agree that it is not individually or collectively subjective.

↪180 Proof I read your posts but your arguments are wrong. — Darkneos

I'm interested in why you think so.

I don't understand the question.

If you mean right as in true or correct in terms of facts then that's a different story.

But morality speaks in terms of should and should not, which is what they mean by right and wrong. In this sense they are value judgments and as such morality can never not be an opinion. If by Xing you mean some act then sure.

Obviously as stated the conclusion doesn't follow. It needs the following premise added to it

1. Different people and groups have different moral beliefs
2. If different people and groups have different moral beliefs, then morality is individually or collectively subjective
3. Therefore, morality is collectively subjective — Bartricks

Incorrect. Premise two is redundant and unnecessary. Premise 3 logically follows from premise 1. Though judging by your post I find you to be an idiot.

Because what you have listed are still just value judgments and I already said that everyone sharing a value doesn't really make it objective fact. Not everyone sees pain as bad or crippled as bad either.

Regardless though, if you agree that:

1- People generally have the same moral compass.
2- There are and will continue to be punishments for immoral acts
3- You have no basis on which to say those should stop.

Then really your view is practically the same as meta ethical realism or relativism. You will continue to try to be moral and avoid being immoral to avoid punishment. And you will not have a basis to argue something like “Murderers should not be punished”. And you will probably also continue to feel like murderers and such “deserved it”.

Which is why I think meta ethical questions are usually a waste of time. — khaled

1 is false. People I come across have quite the different moral compass when it comes to a variety of issues. I'm still reminded of abortion debates or welfare or government assistance. Folks don't have a moral compass.

2 isn't entirely true and some "immoral" acts are quite legal and people can and do perform and get away with them. Repeatedly.

3 is on you to say why they should even start to begin with.

I'm not trying to be moral or immoral, I just avoid conflict if possible. Sometimes that involves "immoral" acts and not as much. I have a value and act in ways to facilitate that. I do in fact have a basis that murderers should not be punished, mainly that there isn't a basis to begin with when punishing them. I don't feel they deserve it either, but I don't feel they don't either.

You keep trying to foot the whole thing on me but the reality is that it's on YOU and anyone espousing morality as to why such things are right or wrong to begin with. But YOU can't because it's just opinion.

Bob and Alice decide it would be good to tie you down and do to you things that caused you some experience (what does not matter much). Are your experiences capricious and arbitrary?

Or another way. You see in the newspaper a photograph. What is it a photograph of? Is it a photograph? What is it?

The point is that meaning is provided at an appropriate level or closeness of engagement with the thing to which the meaning is given. Not so close or far away that meaning is lost. And that meaning is neither capricious nor arbitrary, rather instead it is meaning itself, and according to the precision of that application, absolute.

We usually do not question if good things befall us - maybe we should. But these matters are usually honed and stropped on bad things. So the question becomes what is the value of the capricious and arbitrary. If your objection to being hurt by Bob and Alice is mere arbitrary caprice. What claim can you make on them to get them to stop? — tim wood

Yes they are capricious and arbitrary. I wouldn't like them doing that, but that's still opinion as me wanting them to stop. I cannot make a claim on them to get them to stop that wouldn't be personal opinion. Only force would do so. In fact that's the only way moral claims carry weight, the threat of not doing them. Essentially morality is about forcing your views on other people.

Essentially morality is about forcing your views on other people. — Darkneos

And what's your stand on forcing people to do things? Macht macht rechts?

Incorrect. Premise two is redundant and unnecessary. Premise 3 logically follows from premise 1. Though judging by your post I find you to be an idiot. — Darkneos

Er, no. 3 does not follow from 1. As for your judgement that I am an idiot - well, that's the Dunning Kruger effect for you. Experts seem like idiots to idiots.

Experts seem like idiots to idiots. — Bartricks

And idiots also call themselves "experts" even though they aren't.

↪180 Proof Because what you have listed are still just value judgments and I already said that everyone sharing a value doesn't really make it objective fact. — Darkneos

Strawman. I never claimed or implied that 'mere consensus' denotes objectivity.

Not everyone sees pain as bad or crippled as bad either.

Yeah, and not everyone accepts that the earth is round either. :roll:

The fact is that harm (e.g. hunger, pain, bereavement, isolation, etc) always causes dysfunction, or worse, especially when it is ignored and not alleviated adequately somehow. This is objective because it obtains whether or not "everyone sees it as bad".

There's a difference between mere preference and obligation. A preference is what I want; an obligation is what everyone ought want. So I prefer vanilla ice cream, but being just about me, that's not a moral obligation. To be a moral obligation it has to be about what everyone ought want - as if I were to insist that everyone ought prefer vanilla ice cream.

I don't believe in right and wrong, well not anymore. There are actions and consequences and it really only boils down to whether you can live with the results of your actions. — Darkneos

You are still making moral decisions. You have just decided not to call them good or bad.

1 is false. People I come across have quite the different moral compass when it comes to a variety of issues. I'm still reminded of abortion debates or welfare or government assistance. Folks don't have a moral compass. — Darkneos

Notice “generally”. I don’t think anyone thinks murder and theft are ok. And we have been consolidating ethical views in general throughout time.

2 isn't entirely true and some "immoral" acts are quite legal and people can and do perform and get away with them. Repeatedly. — Darkneos

Fair enough, but a good chunk aren’t.

3 is on you to say why they should even start to begin with. — Darkneos

No. Since it’s all a matter of opinion I don’t have to provide a reason. It’s my opinion (and the majority of people’s opinions) that they should be punished so that’s that.

I do in fact have a basis that murderers should not be punished, mainly that there isn't a basis to begin with when punishing them. — Darkneos

But why would you require a basis? It’s all a matter of opinion right? Your opinion vs theirs.

When they kill on no basis, why should they not be killed on no basis?

Watch out! It’s almost as if you’re suggesting that it’s not all baseless opinion and that we require valid reasons to hurt others and the lack of such reasons makes it wrong to do so!

You keep trying to foot the whole thing on me but the reality is that it's on YOU and anyone espousing morality as to why such things are right or wrong to begin with. — Darkneos

I’m not trying to “foot” anything on you. I’m trying to show that your belief has no practical consequences. You cannot say “Morality doesn’t exist therefore criminals shouldn’t be punished” or anything to that effect. Nothing follows from the belief. And it changes nothing about the way we act outside of online forums.

I am curious because I share your viewpoints to some extent: what do you think of ideal observer theory as it relates to the possibility of an unbiased, realistic way of figuring out right from wrong in a factual, pragmatic, non-subjective sense, in the way that we can prove 2+2=4? Sure, many people disagree on what is right and wrong, but often this is on account of factual misunderstandings. That, perhaps, if we were on the same page, factually, we would come to more of a consensus. With that in mind: is an unbiased approach to ethics impossible, even to a theoretical yet omniscient observer? If so, explain why you think so? I think your post is very insightful, and I kind of want to talk about this more.

I don't understand the question. — 180 Proof

Well, what are the differences between objectivity and intersubjectivity?

I think this needs a new thread...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10249/intersubjectivity

Well, what are the differences between objectivity and intersubjectivity? — TheMadFool

As pointed out above, the difference is that the latter is socially constructed and the former ineluctably precedes as well as exceeds (though doesn't necessarily exclude) social construction.

re: 'objective' ...

By objective I denote subjectivity [perspective, consensus (intersubjective), language, gauge]–invariance e.g. arithmetic, gravity, boiling point of water, species functional defects of humans, etc. — 180 Proof

re: 'intersubjective' ...

Well, an objective X, as I discern it, is intersubjectivity-invariant, that is, 'group consensus' (whether aware or unaware) does not 'socially construct' (affect) X – it's there, or how it is, no matter what an individual or group 'believes' or accepts or does not (yet) know about X, like e.g. gravity or what harms all species-members, etc. — 180 Proof

Well, what are the differences between objectivity and intersubjectivity?
— TheMadFool
As pointed out above, the difference is that the latter is socially constructed and the former ineluctably precedes as well as exceeds (though doesn't necessarily exclude) social construction.

re: 'objective' ...
By objective I denote subjectivity [perspective, consensus (intersubjective), language, gauge]–invariance e.g. arithmetic, gravity, boiling point of water, species functional defects of humans, etc.
— 180 Proof

re: 'intersubjective' ...
Well, an objective X, as I discern it, is intersubjectivity-invariant, that is, 'group consensus' (whether aware or unaware) does not 'socially construct' (affect) X – it's there, or how it is, no matter what an individual or group 'believes' or accepts or does not (yet) know about X, like e.g. gravity or what harms all species-members, etc.
— 180 Proof — 180 Proof

I suppose you're not bothered by the fact, what seems to me to be so, that in both cases (intersubjectivity and objectivity), one of the defining features is consensus. Well, I am because, true or not, I'm of the view that consensus defines objectivity - more observers, the more objective that which is observed - and here we are defining intersubjectivity in identical fashion but, here's the catch, providing enough room for the concept to be applicable to subjectivity. What gives?

There are actions and consequences and it really only boils down to whether you can live with the results of your actions. — Darkneos

And why isn't this an acceptable description of where we are in a moral moment? There are such things as actions: a slight, or betrayal, lies, recrimination; and also reactions: an excuse, qualification, etc. And if we look at what they tell us about moral action, we might see that there is the act, then there is the reckoning for it; that there is a responsibility after the consideration of ought and the founding of morals. Most times we know what to do and what to expect, but then there are times when we don't know exactly what to do; nonetheless we act (or fail to). The moral realm is where we stand for what we say (or not), act beyond what is good and right, or against it. But we are held to it, we are separated by it. Where our knowledge of morality ends, we begin; into our future, our self--can you live with the results?

the only thing that really matters is the cost for going against them. — Darkneos

And "what really matters" will be what counts for us (how we will account for ourselves), what we will take as our culture, our words, that we will be heard in, be bound to, answerable for (or flee from).

I don't believe in right and wrong. — Darkneos

But here, right and wrong does not need your belief. You may apologize correctly, or make a mess of it. You can say whatever you'd like, but only some things will be a threat, or an accusation (or both). An excuse has a certain form, or it simply becomes a plea. You can call these "objective", but you'd be using a 300-yr-old framework that wants to ensure something before it happens, enclose an act before we bring our partiality to it (Emerson will say). Must we agree universally or there can be nothing we call a rational discussion of a moral moment? that without agreement or the surety of that outcome, we can never begin?

I'm of the view that consensus defines objectivity ... What gives? — TheMadFool

I believe you're mistaken, Fool. There is no "consensus" – outside of a negligible fraction of human beings alive today – acknowledgement that e.g. relativistic time-dilation happens, and yet it's an objective fact impacting the lives of every person using GPS and/or a cellphone that bounces synchonized signals off of satellites over the horizon. A state-of-affairs which is "consensus"-INVARIANT is neither established by, nor subject to, the assent/dissent of anyone or any group and this is what is meant by objective (e.g. Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, heliocentricity, DNA, the bottom of the Mariana Trench, date time & location of your birth, etc).

There is no "consensus" — 180 Proof

Would you like me to agree with you or does it not matter?

:sweat:

:smile:

Ethics is nothing but value judgments so it's impossible to be unbiased.

And "what really matters" will be what counts for us (how we will account for ourselves), what we will take as our culture, our words, that we will be heard in, be bound to, answerable for (or flee from). — Antony Nickles

No.

The fact is that harm (e.g. hunger, pain, bereavement, isolation, etc) always causes dysfunction, or worse, especially when it is ignored and not alleviated adequately somehow. This is objective because it obtains whether or not "everyone sees it as bad". — 180 Proof

Again, no. That is still mere opinion. Dysfunction is implying a state of deviation from normalcy which itself is a value judgments. So no it doesn't cause dysfunction. It isn't objective. You're still wrong.

And why isn't this an acceptable description of where we are in a moral moment? There are such things as actions: a slight, or betrayal, lies, recrimination; and also reactions: an excuse, qualification, etc. And if we look at what they tell us about moral action, we might see that there is the act, then there is the reckoning for it; that there is a responsibility after the consideration of ought and the founding of morals. Most times we know what to do and what to expect, but then there are times when we don't know exactly what to do; nonetheless we act (or fail to). The moral realm is where we stand for what we say (or not), act beyond what is good and right, or against it. But we are held to it, we are separated by it. Where our knowledge of morality ends, we begin; into our future, our self--can you live with the results? — Antony Nickles

No, again. Because when it comes to morality people want to dress it up with words that in sense avoids responsibility. Saying something is right means you are doing it simply because society deems it such or that you need to validate your choice. That is what people do in moral moments, well technically there are no moral moments.

I said there is no right or wrong but actions and results and it comes down to if you can live with the results. It's not about what is right or wrong. It's responsibility in it's truest form to me rather than hiding behind labels.

Ok.

Under your criteria, what sort of statement wouldn't qualify as opinion?