Sensible objects have colours, shapes, sizes, smells, tastes. But my reason assures me that it is positively confused to think of my mind as having any of these qualities. So my mind does not appear to be a sensible object. It may still be, of course, for appearances are sometimes deceptive. But where's the evidence?

My reason also tells me that I have free will, yet tells me at the same time that I would not have free will - not of the robust responsibility-grounding kind that it insists I have - if everything about me traces to external causes. Yet if I were a sensible object, everything about me would trace to external causes. So my reason tells me, once more, that I - my mind, that is - am not a sensible object.

And on and on it goes - there are loads of these arguments (I think I have about 14). They're not decisive, admittedly. But each one counts for something - each one is some evidence, prima facie evidence, that our minds are not sensible objects.

What countervailing evidence do you have that our minds are sensible objects? — Bartricks

I ask many times - why dualism and not solipsism, pantheism or panpsychism? You can have shapes and colors (which are just relations of some kind, nothing brutal), while still perceiving those shapes and colors. As an analogy, when we look at other people, they have faces, but we can never see our face directly. Why then assume that self-description should be innate quality?

Er, what? I have just argued that the mind is not a sensible object.

You have said 'why not solipsism?' That's not an alternative view - it's like saying "why not eat a pizza?"

Solipsism is not a view about the nature of the mind, but the number of minds in existence (it is the view that there is precisely one mind in existence - your own). Solipsism, then, is neutral between materialist and immaterialist views about the mind.

Pantheism is a view about God. So quite why you're raising it I do not know.

And panpsychism is just silly and not implied by any of the arguments I gave.

Ok...first off I'll say that as a student of philosophy and science, both, I'm surprised at how little stock philosophers seem to put in the science involved with brain injuries and operations - including split-brain operations. In all of these, damage to the brain directly affects qualia. Can you explain that? — GLEN willows

Why are you surprised at this? Do you think philosophers have been labouring under the misguided belief that doing things to the brain has no affect on our minds? You don't need to do any science to know that the sensible world affects what goes on in our minds. I am seeing a computer right now. That's a sensible thing - and it is affecting my mind. I am 'seeing' it - the seeing is a state my mind is in.

So, for thousands of years, and without any assistance from science, philosophers have been abundantly well aware that the sensible world affects our minds. That wasn't a discovery made in science! It's been obvious to anyone and everyone for the history of rational humanity.

And it isn't - isn't - evidence that the mind is a sensible thing. Take a balloon and fill it with water and tie the end. What shape is the water? It's pear shaped, yes? Now alter the shape of the balloon by gently squeezing it. Has doing that to the balloon affected the shape of the water? Yes, obviously. Does it follow that the water 'is' the balloon? No, obviously not. That doing something to A affects B, does not entail that A 'is' B. (And that remains the case even if something about A determines something about B).

Doing things to our brains obviously affects what goes on in our minds. Nobody disputes that. But that is not evidence that our minds 'are' our brains. That would be to reason as fallaciously as in the balloon case.

When I ask for evidence that the mind is the brain, that's all I'm ever given. Yet it rests on a simple mistake: the mistake of thinking that if A affects B, A 'is' B.

The mind is clearly a distinct entity from the brain - that's what the evidence suggests. But it just as clearly interacts with the brain.

Some think this interaction would be impossible if the mind and the sensible objects it interacts with are fundamentally different kinds of entity. Pick up any intro book to philosophy of mind and this one will be lazily trotted out as if it is some kind of decisive refutation.

But a) it is a rubbish objection, as if we have good evidence that the mind is an immaterial object, and good evidence that the mind interacts with radically different objects such as the brain, then we have good evidence that two different kinds of thing can interact. And b) even if it wasn't a rubbish objection, it would not imply the mind is a sensible thing, so much as that sensible things are in fact made of mental states.

most philosophers don't believe free will is possible, using THEIR reason (to use your words) so that point is debatable to begin with. — GLEN willows

That's totally untrue. Most philosophers believe free will is both possible and actual. Only a minority believe we lack free will, and an even smaller number of those hold the even more extreme view that free will is impossible.

As well as being untrue, it is also irrelevant. I made an argument - which premise is false? One can't do philosophy by surveying contemporary philosophers.

Why do you say this? What's your proof of that? If we have free will, but it IS part of the brain, what would the difference be? — GLEN willows

I say it because it is self-evident to the reason of most people. It's even got a name - it's called the transfer principle. If I am unfree in respect of A - so, exercised no free will over A's occurrence - and A is wholly causally responsible for B's occurrence, then I am unfree in respect of B.

If I am a sensible object, then the transfer principle entails I am unfree. But my reason tells me that I am free. Thus, as both the transfer principle and my possession of freedom are self-evident to reason, whereas materialism about the mind is not, then it is materialism about the mind that the rational person will reject.

I'm not sure I want to get into an argument with you again but you're saying some interesting stuff.

But it just as clearly interacts with the brain. — Bartricks

and good evidence that the mind interacts with radically different objects such as the brain — Bartricks

What makes this so clear? Where is this evidence?

Solipsism is not a view about the nature of the mind, but the number of minds in existence (it is the view that there is precisely one mind in existence - your own). Solipsism, then, is neutral between materialist and immaterialist views about the mind. — Bartricks

Solipsism denies an objective world. Materialism and dualism both require it.

Pantheism is a view about God. So quite why you're raising it I do not know. — Bartricks

It can have implication about the mind, because it spiritualizes matter, making it conscious. In other words, it can become a theistic version of panpsychism.

And panpsychism is just silly and not implied by any of the arguments I gave. — Bartricks

What is so silly about it? You can have mind and it can be the result of your material embodiment's innate ability for experience.
Edit:
You still didn't answer why you believe automatically that the mind must have inherent ability for realization of its own form? (The faces analogy.)

Solipsism denies an objective world. Materialism and dualism both require it. — simeonz

No, that's just confused. Solipsism is a view about the number of minds that exist. It is 'not' a view about the nature of the mind. One can be a materialist solipsist, one can be a dualist solipsist, one can be an immaterialist solipsist.

It can have implication about the mind, because it spiritualizes matter, making it conscious. In other words, it can become a theistic version of panpsychism. — simeonz

What? I made arguments in support of the view that our minds are not sensible objects. No premise in any of my arguments (I gave 2, I have 14 - and what I am about to say is true of all 14) assumed a position on deities.

What is so silly about it? You can have mind and it can be the result of your material embodiment's innate ability for experience. — simeonz

There's nothing to be said for it. It doesn't solve any problems. It's just silly.

You still didn't answer why you believe automatically that the mind must have inherent ability for realization of its own form? (The faces analogy.) — simeonz

I am afraid I don't know what you mean or what your faces analogy was supposed to illustrate.

When I ask for evidence that the mind is the brain, that's all I'm ever given. Yet it rests on a simple mistake: the mistake of thinking that if A affects B, A 'is' B. — Bartricks

The problem is that if you intend to include free will, B must also affect A. We need to corroborate this, and if we cannot perceive it, then it appears to be just your axiom. Which is fine, but little can be debated here. It cannot be confirmed.

And b) even if it wasn't a rubbish objection, it would not imply the mind is a sensible thing, so much as that sensible things are in fact made of mental states. — Bartricks

This would be panpsychism, wouldn't it?

No, that's just confused. Solipsism is a view about the number of minds that exist. It is 'not' a view about the nature of the mind. One can be a materialist solipsist, one can be a dualist solipsist, one can be an immaterialist solipsist. — Bartricks

If there is just one mind, what would draw a boundary between the mind simply being compelled by unnatural forces and the mind being part of a physical world? Those two options become distinguishable only terminologically. There is no other sense of distinction between them.

What? I made arguments in support of the view that our minds are not sensible objects. No premise in any of my arguments (I gave 2, I have 14 - and what I am about to say is true of all 14) assumed a position on deities. — Bartricks

You didn't state whether you are theist, so I provided a theist option.

There's nothing to be said for it. It doesn't solve any problems. It's just silly. — Bartricks

What is the problem? I thought that the problem is how can the mind exist. It solves that problem.

I am afraid I don't know what you mean or what your faces analogy was supposed to illustrate. — Bartricks

You said that your mind tells you that it doesn't have colors. I wanted to tell you through analogy that the mind may have features that it cannot perceive unaided. The same way we cannot perceive that we have face without mirror. (Or photo, or description from another person.)

Yes, well on your scheme no matter how many times I give an argument for immaterialism about the mind it will never constitute evidence in support of the thesis.

But anyway, this argument (and about 13 others) is prima facie evidence that the mind is immaterial (why? Because it is a valid and its premises are powerfully self-evident to reason):

1. If one's mind is a sensible object, then it makes sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture or taste it might have.
2. It does not make sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture, or taste one's mind has
3. Therefore, one's mind is not a sensible object.

Like I say, I have 13 more of these. And to date, I haven't heard a single good one - not a single one - for the materiality of the mind.

So,
1. My mind appears not to be a sensible object.
2. My mind appears causally to interact with sensible objects (I just decided to move my hand, for instance - the decision was a mental event, but that mental event appears to have moved my hand, which is a sensible thing).
3. Therefore, my mind appears not to be a sensible object and appears causally to interact with sensible objects.

There. Two valid arguments, both with manifestly true premises.

It does not make sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture, or taste one's mind has — Bartricks

If you justify this presupposition as being evident to you, then there is little that can be said about it. It is not evident to me. Nothing wrong altogether (doesn't make us both right either), but it is a difficult debate when the fundamental perspectives of two people cannot align.

Edit: And don't claim that my perspective is stupid. It hardly aids the discussion.

If there is just one mind, what would draw a boundary between the mind simply being compelled by unnatural forces and the mind being part of a physical world? Those two options become distinguishable only terminologically. There is no other sense of distinction between them. — simeonz

I don't know what you're talking about. Imagine materialism is true. Now imagine you're the only material object that has conscious states. Bingo, now you're a materialist solipsist.

Imagine dualism is true. Now imagine that your material body is the only one with an immaterial mind associated with it. Bingo, now you're a dualist solipsist.

Imagine immaterialism is true and imagine that your mind and its mental states are all that exist. Bingo, now you're an immaterialist solipsist.

Solipsism is a view about the number of minds in existence. It is the view that there is 1. It is not a view about what the mind is made of.

Solotincanism is the view that there is one tin can in my cupboard. It is not a view about what's in the can. It is consistent with beanism, and beetrootism, and pinneapleism.

You didn't state whether you are theist, so I provided a theist option. — simeonz

I didn't state it because it is not relevant. You can be a theist materialist, a theist dualist, and a theist immaterialist. Theism is the view that God, or a god, exists. It is not a view about the nature of the mind.

What is the problem? I thought that the problem is how can the mind exist. It solves that problem. — simeonz

And how does it solve that problem? Let's just be clear: this is a problem for the materialist, yes? They - and they alone - have difficulty explaining how mental states can somehow emerge from, or 'be' material states. Now, a) I have refuted that view. So there's no problem. B) even if there was a problem, how on earth would panpsychism solve it?

If you justify this presupposition as being evident to you — simeonz

It is self-evident to virtually everybody. "Is your mind rough or smooth?" makes no sense. It's like asking "how loud is 3?"

This radical apparent dissimilarity between minds and sensible objects is what most contemporary philosophers of mind are, in one way or another, grappling with. So, the powerfully self-evident nature of my first premise is not exactly peculiar to me.

This is contemporary philosophy of mind: let's assume as our working hypothesis that the mind is a piece of cheese. Now let's note what a whole heap of problems this generates. And now let's exercise our ingenuity and strut our intellectual stuff trying to solve them.

It's really silly.

Materialism to me has only one consequence, objective reality, meaning agreement between subjects about the nature of compelling external forces. There can be nothing to agree upon, if there is only one subject. The notion of objectivity becomes meaningless to me, if there are not multiple subjects.

I didn't state it because it is not relevant. You can be a theist materialist, a theist dualist, and a theist immaterialist. Theism is the view that God, or a god, exists. It is not a view about the nature of the mind. — Bartricks

I provided an option that afforded it in case you were theist, because otherwise you may not have subscribed to the others. It is related to the mind, as I said, because if matter is inherently spiritual, then it is also conscious. You cannot have soul and not mind, in a theist worldview.

It is self-evident to virtually everybody. "Is your mind rough or smooth?" makes no sense. It's like asking "how loud is 3?" — Bartricks

It makes no sense to ask it as unaided self-reflection, but that doesn't mean that through some assisted view (externally) your mind could not see itself better.

Materialism to me has only one consequence, objective reality, — simeonz

That's just the thesis. Materialism 'just is' the thesis that there is an objective - that is, 'existing extra-mentally' - reality.

Yes, well on your scheme no matter how many times I give an argument for immaterialism about the mind it will never constitute evidence in support of the thesis. — Bartricks

False. Minds are immaterial. I agree with that bit. I disagree with the bit that says that they interact with the brain. On the grounds that that would violate conservation of energy and momentum. Which I think are principles that supersede how things seem to us in terms of reliability. Because they haven't been false for centuries.

1. If one's mind is a sensible object, then it makes sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture or taste it might have.
2. It does not make sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture, or taste one's mind has
3. Therefore, one's mind is not a sensible object. — Bartricks

Sure, and that's the first argument I gave on the thread. I asked "What's the relative molar mass of Love"

and appears causally to interact with sensible objects. — Bartricks

But you said you had some evidence for this. By "evidence" did you simply mean that it seems so?

I was expecting some study or something showing that when people raise their arms, the causal chain leading to the movement starts arbitrarily, suddenly, without any detectable material causer. That's what we would expect to see if immaterial minds really did interact with material brains.

That would constitute evidence.

That's just the thesis. Materialism 'just is' the thesis that there is an objective - that is, 'existing extra-mentally' - reality. — Bartricks

"Exist" is just another word for having a form. But the only way we define the idea of form is through the account of our interactions, through phenomenology. How can we talk about objectivity vs subjectivity of the form we perceive when there is only one subject. The two ideas are indistinguishable even conceptually to me. But I must say, I see where you are coming from. You are not asking the question epistemically at all it appears and to you the ontic difference is evident.

It makes no sense to ask it as unaided self-reflection, but that doesn't mean that through some assisted view (externally) your mind could not see itself better then you mind alone can. — simeonz

I am not entirely sure what you mean. I interpret you as saying that just because our reason tells us that it makes no sense to ask "what does your mind smell of?" that does not entail that our minds lack smells.

I agree. None of the 14 arguments I have is a proof. Not by themselves. The 14 together are. But individually they just provide prima facie evidence.

There's an animal in my kitchen that appears to be a cat. Perhaps I'm just hallucinating it. Perhaps it is a cleverly disguised hamster. But it appears to be a cat. And that's good prima facie evidence there's a cat in my kitchen.

Likewise, my reason represents my mind to be an immaterial thing, for it says of it that it makes no sense to wonder about what sensible properties it might have.

That is not a proof, for my reason could be misleading me. But it is prima facie evidence nonetheless. And to challenge it one would need to locate some more powerfully rationally self-evident countervailing evidence.

Likewise, my reason represents my mind to be an immaterial thing, for it says of it that it makes no sense to wonder about what sensible properties it might have. — Bartricks

Does your mind say that it makes no sense to wonder about (derive by contemplation itself) its sensible properties, or that it makes no sense to witness its sensible properties?

On the grounds that that would violate conservation of energy and momentum. — khaled

Where's your argument for this?

I've read over all your comments, and the main conclusions that come out the most clearly are

1) You don't seem to think the mind-body problem is a problem. You say "The mind is clearly a distinct entity from the brain - that's what the evidence suggests. But it just as clearly interacts with the brain."
How?

2) You have 14, not 13, not 15...but 14 arguments against materialsm (repeated multiple times).

3) You seem a tad antagonistic?

4) Just teasing

Thanks - much appreciated. The objection I have to qualia is quite specific: if they are private, then they can't be the subject of conversation. But love - we can talk about that. So it's not a qual. — Banno

If it didn't have some degree of privacy we could never lie.

Sure, and that's the first argument I gave on the thread. I asked "What's the relative molar mass of Love" — khaled

That's not my argument. That's just a question. There's playing every note on the piano, and then there's a Chopin etude. If Chopin plays his etude no. 1 you can't then say "yes, I wrote that - I did it when I played all those notes earlier".

I was expecting some study or something showing that when people raise their arms, the causal chain leading to the movement starts arbitrarily, suddenly, without any detectable material causer. That's what we would expect to see if immaterial minds really did interact with material brains.

That would constitute evidence. — khaled

No, that's just you being confused and begging the question. It's what you do.

A thought occurred to me....I have no problem continuing the discussion, but can we at least stop a second and agree that consciousness/qualia/love etc reside IN the physical brain? That is NOT the same as saying they ARE the brain.

Where's your argument for this? — Bartricks

Argument? That momentum and energy are conserved? I have none, because it's not a conclusion arrived at by argument. It's a conclusion arrived at by observation. Centuries of it.

And you for some reason think that that makes it more reasonable to doubt than doubting what things seem like to us?

That's not my argument. That's just a question. — Bartricks

The purpose of the question is to demonstrate that asking for physical properties of minds makes no sense, and the reader is expected to fill in that "Thus the mind cannot be a physical object" from the premise "If the mind is a physical objects it would make sense to ask for its physical properties". Don't be obtuse just for the purpose of being obtuse.

Or did you seriously not get it? If so you'd be the only one.

No, that's just you being confused and begging the question. It's what you do. — Bartricks

You would rather doubt the conservation of energy and momentum than doubt what things seem like. That would put you in the same boat as flat earthers.

If "it seems like this" is all your evidence, not sure there is much more to say.

If you were to say "Caused by the brain" I would agree but "reside in the brain" already assumes they're physical. Or else they wouldn't "reside" anywhere.

What exactly do you mean by the mind/body problem? It's not the name of anything very clear.

And yes, I have 14 arguments for the immateriality of the mind (most of them aren't mine, I hasten to add - but the vast bulk of the great philosophers have thought the mind immaterial due to there being such overwhelming evidence in support of the thesis......most contemporary philosophers disagree, but who'd you rather have on your side? A thousand contemporary philosophers, or Plato, Avicenna, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Bartricks... the list goes on). I haven't heard a single good one for the materiality of the mind. Not one.

Yes, I suffer fools crossly.

Argument? That momentum and energy are conserved? I have none, because it's not a conclusion arrived at by argument. It's a conclusion arrived at by observation. Centuries of it. — khaled

I don't dispute the laws you mention. I want you to show me that they are inconsistent with a premise in my argument.