...if we’re honest and conscious of how others relate, that this relation at least possibly exists prior to (or beyond) its meaning so attributed. ‘Truth’ is an example of this, and so is ‘existence’. Both of these relations exist in their entirety prior to becoming meaningful... — Possibility

Why the scare-quotes around the terms truth and existence? The words are part of a relation, so if that's what you're saying by calling them both relations, I would concur. However, as parts of language use, they are meaningful, so it doesn't make sense to say that both exist in their entirety prior to becoming meaningful.

I would also not call existence "a relation" or a relationship that exists in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful.

It seems that perhaps your framework will not allow us to say something about that which exists in it's entirety prior to meaning, without ending in self-contradiction, but that inevitable result is - I strongly suspect - due to the inherent flaws within that framework. — creativesoul

Well, my framework is not a logical one, but a relational structure which is founded ultimately on a binary contradiction. I’m okay with that, because I can relate to it. Relation doesn’t fit within a logical framework, no matter how hard we try.

Why the scare-quotes around the terms truth and existence? The words are part of a relation, so if that's what you're saying by calling them both relations, I would concur. However, as parts of language use, they are meaningful, so it doesn't make sense to say that both exist in their entirety prior to becoming meaningful. — creativesoul

Okay, but let’s take a look at all of what I said:

‘Truth’ is an example of this, and so is ‘existence’. Both of these relations exist in their entirety prior to becoming meaningful, and the relations that we construct within the bounds of language are more accurately understood as an incomplete perspective (an approximation) of the possible relation in its entirety. — Possibility

The relation is not meaningful in its entirety necessarily within language use, only as a partial render/construction of the entire relation. So, even as parts of language use, ‘truth’ can only grasp the meaningful aspects of a relation that possibly exists beyond our faculties of imagination, understanding and judgement. Sure, it doesn’t make sense as parts of language use, but it doesn’t really have to.

I would also not call existence "a relation" or a relationship that exists in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful. — creativesoul

What would you call it then?

Existence is a relation to the possibility of non-existence. In its entirety, and prior to becoming meaningful, the possibility of existence is inseparable from its negation.

Well, my framework is not a logical one, but a relational structure which is founded ultimately on a binary contradiction. I’m okay with that, because I can relate to it. Relation doesn’t fit within a logical framework, no matter how hard we try. — Possibility

Interesting. It reminded me of para-consistent logic or rejecting bivalence or rejecting the LEM. Have you no issue with explosion? No use for truth?

Relation doesn’t fit within a logical framework, no matter how hard we try. — Possibility

This might be our main point of contention. It seems to fit fine to me, without ending in incoherency, equivocation, or self-contradiction.

Interesting. It reminded me of para-consistent logic or rejecting bivalence or rejecting the LEM. Have you no issue with explosion? No use for truth? — creativesoul

Truth has use, of course - but I’m not talking about use, but about relation. Acknowledging that truth as we use it is an approximation guards against hubris, and encourages awareness, connection and collaboration with what we don’t yet understand.

This might be our main point of contention. It seems to fit fine to me, without ending in incoherency, equivocation, or self-contradiction. — creativesoul

We can make it fit, sure - by ignorance, isolation or exclusion of possibility, as impossible.

I would also not call existence "a relation" or a relationship that exists in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful.
— creativesoul

What would you call it then? — Possibility

Having an effect/affect. A necessary precondition of becoming meaningful and/or becoming part of a causal and/or spatiotemporal relation.

Existence is a relation to the possibility of non-existence. In its entirety, and prior to becoming meaningful, the possibility of existence is inseparable from its negation.

That looks like an attempt at a logical rendering to me.

Here's my issue with it...

When something exists in it's entirety prior to language use, there is no possibility that it does not, and there is no negation.

Considering whether or not something or another exists; parsing existence in terms of the possibility of non-existence; claiming that existence is inseparable from it's negation presupposes that negation itself exists. Negation is entirely existentially dependent upon language use. Existence is not. Hence, as above, when something exists in it's entirety prior to language use, there is no possibility that it does not, and there is no such thing as negation.

The relation is not meaningful in its entirety necessarily within language use, only as a partial render/construction of the entire relation. — Possibility

I don't talk in terms of things being meaningful in their entirety. Existing is not equivalent to being meaningful.

I think I agree with the gist of what you're saying. Our knowledge of that which exists in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful and/or prior to our becoming aware of it is certainly limited.

I would also not call existence "a relation" or a relationship that exists in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful.
— creativesoul

What would you call it then?
— Possibility

Having an effect/affect. A necessary precondition of becoming meaningful and/or becoming part of a causal and/or spatiotemporal relation. — creativesoul

Ok. But do you agree that existence, as a necessary precondition of becoming meaningful, has at least the possibility of a relational effect/affect prior to its own meaning? That is, prior to any awareness of existence?

“Existence is a relation to the possibility of non-existence. In its entirety, and prior to becoming meaningful, the possibility of existence is inseparable from its negation.”

That looks like an attempt at a logical rendering to me.

Here's my issue with it...

When something exists in it's entirety prior to language use, there is no possibility that it does not, and there is no negation.

Considering whether or not something or another exists; parsing existence in terms of the possibility of non-existence; claiming that existence is inseparable from it's negation presupposes that negation itself exists. Negation is entirely existentially dependent upon language use. Existence is not. Hence, as above, when something exists in it's entirety prior to language use, there is no possibility that it does not, and there is no such thing as negation. — creativesoul

As a statement, this would be considered an attempt at logical rendering. As a thinking process prior to language use, prior to formulation into thought, existence is BOTH possible and impossible, and it is in our relation to this binary contradiction that renders existence NOT impossible for the purpose of our thinking about it. So any thought I have about existence excludes its possible negation in order to consolidate the thought in my mind for potential relations.

So, it’s difficult for me to express - using language - the possibility that something exists in its entirety prior to language use, without a logical rendering that approximates the expression, at best.

As a thinking process prior to language use, prior to formulation into thought, existence is BOTH possible and impossible... — Possibility

Existence is not a thinking process...

...

Ok. But do you agree that existence, as a necessary precondition of becoming meaningful, has at least the possibility of a relational effect/affect prior to its own meaning? — Possibility

The question makes little to no sense on my view. Not all things that exist are meaningful. Some causal and spatiotemporal relationships exist in their entirety prior to ever becoming meaningful to any individual creature capable of attributing meaning.

Okay, I need to make this clearer:

The statement would be considered an attempt at logical rendering, as you pointed out. But we are capable of relation prior to language use, prior to any formulation into thought, even - and in this kind of relation, existence is BOTH possible and impossible. But that’s meaningless. Our potential relation renders existence NOT impossible for the purpose of our thinking about it, of structuring our perception of its potentiality in relation to our own. And in that rendering, our perspective of existence is already limited to what seems a ‘necessary’ possibility.

So any thought I might have about existence should exclude the possibility of its negation. But I am nevertheless capable of at least considering the possibility of non-existence. And that is not entirely meaningless.

Ok. But do you agree that existence, as a necessary precondition of becoming meaningful, has at least the possibility of a relational effect/affect prior to its own meaning?
— Possibility

The question makes little to no sense on my view. Not all things that exist are meaningful. Some causal and spatiotemporal relationships exist in their entirety prior to ever becoming meaningful to any individual creature capable of attributing meaning. — creativesoul

Well, let’s start from a point of agreement:

Our knowledge of that which exists in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful and/or prior to our becoming aware of it is certainly limited. — creativesoul

I interpret your position - and I’m confident you’ll correct me if I’m mistaken - as saying that something is only meaningful when meaning is attributed by a creature capable of distinguishing between meaning and change, or between meaning and shape, for instance. So the fact that an amoeba alters direction until it is travelling along a chemical gradient (and I realise we may be going over very old ground here) does not render an amoeba ‘capable of attributing meaning’. Am I close, or way off?

I interpret your position - and I’m confident you’ll correct me if I’m mistaken - as saying that something is only meaningful when meaning is attributed by a creature capable of... distinguishing between meaning and change, or between meaning and shape, for instance. — Possibility

...drawing correlations between that something(whatever it is) and something else; roughly always between different things. Sometimes, it could be between meaning and other things.

So the fact that an amoeba alters direction until it is travelling along a chemical gradient (and I realise we may be going over very old ground here) does not render an amoeba ‘capable of attributing meaning’. Am I close, or way off? — Possibility

I would concur that the fact that an omoeba alters direction until it is traveling along a chemical gradient does not render an omoeba capable of drawing correlations between different things, the chemical gradient being one of those things...

I would concur that the fact that an omoeba alters direction until it is traveling along a chemical gradient does not render an omoeba capable of drawing correlations between different things, the chemical gradient being one of those things... — creativesoul

So...the chemical gradient is not meaningful to the amoeba? The amoeba is incapable of drawing a correlation between the shape of the chemical gradient and the direction of motion?

I would concur that the fact that an omoeba alters direction until it is traveling along a chemical gradient does not render an omoeba capable of drawing correlations between different things, the chemical gradient being one of those things...
— creativesoul

So...the chemical gradient is not meaningful to the amoeba? The amoeba is incapable of drawing a correlation between the shape of the chemical gradient and the direction of motion? — Possibility

The chemical gradient is not meaningful to the amoeba. The amoeba is incapable of drawing correlations between different things.

Okay... (I’m surprised I’m making much sense to you at all, then)

So, meaning exists by virtue of a correlation between not just different things, but significant objects, as in the focus or goal of a thinking subject. The potential or capacity for thought, for you, is a precondition to the possibility of meaning, then - not the other way around.

So, meaning exists by virtue of a correlation between not just different things, but significant objects, as in the focus or goal of a thinking subject. The potential or capacity for thought, for you, is a precondition to the possibility of meaning, then - not the other way around. — Possibility

I use "things" and not "objects" for good reason. I reject the subject/object dichotomy/framework as well as a few other inherently inadequate, but nonetheless commonly used ones.

As far as the last statement goes, I would tentatively agree, but it's quite a bit more nuanced than that, especially after language use has begun. Along the evolutionary timeline, there are situations where some prior meaning is a precondition for some potential thought. But, as a matter of initial emergence, meaning and thought are co-dependent upon one another.

I use "things" and not "objects" for good reason. I reject the subject/object dichotomy/framework as well as a few other inherently inadequate, but nonetheless commonly used ones. — creativesoul

Fair enough - I’ve no argument with you there. But it seems to me that you’re not referring simply to difference, but to significance. And that these ‘things’ are more specific than you’re implying with the term.

As far as the last statement goes, I would tentatively agree, but it's quite a bit more nuanced than that, especially after language use has begun. Along the evolutionary timeline, there are situations where some prior meaning is a precondition for some potential thought. But, as a matter of initial emergence, meaning and thought are co-dependent upon one another. — creativesoul

I can see how a ‘bottom-up’ emergence would appear logical from an evolutionary standpoint. But it just seems unnecessarily complicated, to me. A bit like a geocentric structure of the solar system.

...these ‘things’ are more specific than you’re implying with the term. — Possibility

There's a curious thing about both implication and entailment, but that's another topic in it's own right.

When we talk about particular circumstances involving particular individual creatures capable of attributing meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between different things, the things will be stipulated and/or more clearly identified. "Thing", however, I found fits best in a universally applicable description of that basic process(the attribution and/or misattribution of meaning). I used to use "objects of physiological sensory perception", but I become 'painfully' aware of the fact that not all meaningful things are such. In addition, I've a host of other reasons for rejecting object/subject talk. So, as any reasonable critical thinker ought do, I decided to no longer use that description as a result of finding it lacking and/or inadequate for taking proper account of all attribution and misattribution of meaning.

When I'm making the claim that all meaning is the result of drawing correlations between different things, I'm offering a basic outline which can be applied to any and all particular examples of meaning. There are no exceptions to the contrary.

So, with regard to the concern expressed in the quote at the top of this page...

When we begin talking about particular examples, as we did earlier with my cat, those "things" become less vague. It's not a flaw. It's a feature.

I can see how a ‘bottom-up’ emergence would appear logical from an evolutionary standpoint. But it just seems unnecessarily complicated, to me. A bit like a geocentric structure of the solar system. — Possibility

Hmm. That strikes me as rather odd. On the one hand, you point out that "things" are much more specific(and rightly so, by the way) than the term implies, but then on the other you claim that an evolutionarily amenable theory of meaning such as the one I've been advocating 'just seems too unnecessarily complicated', and further compare it to Ptolemy???

That sort of comparison - if warranted - ought at least be accompanied by some real life example that somehow shows a lack of explanatory power inherent to the position I'm advocating here. Ptolemy's position failed to be able to account for observation.

Aside from that false analogy and/or false equivalence, there's something else a bit curious about the charge of 'unnecessarily complicated' that becomes clear to one who chooses to compare our explanations here. I mean, to be clear, I would say much the same thing regarding the framework you've been employing - and have if memory serves me.

If you compare our respective positions, what are the benefits of the theory of meaning that you advocate that are found sorely lacking in mine?

As I said, I have no argument with you preferring ‘thing’ to ‘object’, or indeed rejecting the object/subject dichotomy as an essential distinction. That makes sense to me.

My argument is not that you should be more specific, but that your theory is not as ‘universally applicable’ as you seem to imply by the terms ‘different’ and ‘things’. You’ve admitted as much here with regard to what is a ‘thing’: what you don’t wish to give a specific name to - a potential, if you will. However, you’re also not referring to what is merely ‘different’, but only what is significant.

So it seems to me a more accurate description of your theory to say that meaning exists by virtue of drawing correlations between significance.

That sort of comparison - if warranted - ought at least be accompanied by some real life example that somehow shows a lack of explanatory power inherent to the position I'm advocating here. Ptolemy's position failed to be able to account for observation. — creativesoul

Ptolemy’s was not the only geocentric model - it is the convoluted attempts made to account for observation within the assumptions of geocentrism that I was analogising, with regard to your theory being ‘more nuanced’, that ‘some prior meaning is a condition for some potential thought’, and that their initial emergence is essentially ‘co-dependent’. All of this suggests to me there is something limited in the perspective, leading to unpredictable variance in the structure. That’s all.

I’m certainly not assuming I have a better or more complete theory - I haven’t done anywhere near enough work to warrant such a claim, and couldn’t hope to match your grasp of the topic. I only wonder if you’ve considered a more inclusive understanding of meaning than you already propose - one that structures ALL possibility of meaning existentially prior to potential thought, regardless of consciousness. You seem resistant to the notion, which is understandable. I’m still trying to work through it myself.

Damn. It looks like we have a respectful conversation happening. I appreciate that more than these words can possibly convey(pun intended :wink:). Your latest response shows some promise for more detailed explanations than just "different things" to be worth getting into. I'll incorporate significance as well by making the distinctions between it and the attribution of meaning clear.

May be a while though...

Cheers!

I... ...couldn’t hope to match your grasp of the topic... — Possibility

I appreciate your saying that but I'm still stitching it all together, so to speak.

There is a naturally occurring process by which all meaningful things become so.

Some things that make significant impact upon what happens next are not at all meaningful to the creature being significantly impacted.

So,

Significance and meaning are distinct.

There is a naturally occurring process by which all meaningful things become so. — creativesoul

Significance and meaning are distinct. — creativesoul

Yes - the detail I think we seem unable to agree on is whether meaning or significance is prior...

Some things that make significant impact upon what happens next are not at all meaningful to the creature being significantly impacted. — creativesoul

Not in the sense that meaning is distinct from significance, no. But only self-conscious creatures are even potentially aware of this distinction. I’m proposing that, for those creatures unable to distinguish between meaning and significance, meaning IS that significance.

I’m proposing that, for those creatures unable to distinguish between meaning and significance, meaning IS that significance. — Possibility

The aquarium plays a life sustaining role in my cat's life. Since water is life sustaining and the aquarium provides water, the aquarium is a significant part of my cat's life. That is never considered by the cat. The aquarium's life sustaining role in my cat's life goes completely unnoticed by my cat.

So, meaning is not that significance.

Not all things significant to the cat are meaningful to her. All things meaningful to the cat are also significant to her.

The aquarium plays a life sustaining role in my cat's life. Since water is life sustaining and the aquarium provides water, the aquarium is a significant part of my cat's life. That is never considered by the cat. The aquarium's life sustaining role in my cat's life goes completely unnoticed by my cat.

So, meaning is not that significance. — creativesoul

The cat doesn’t need to distinguish purpose or meaning in order for her interactions to be purposeful or meaningful. The relation between the cat and the aquarium may not have a particular meaning for the cat - she recognises its significance, and manifests that significance through her actions. But the relation is NOT meaningless, regardless of what the cat does or doesn’t notice or consider.

Not all things significant to the cat are meaningful to her. All things meaningful to the cat are also significant to her. — creativesoul

I think perhaps I’m still interpreting ‘things’ differently to you. Do you consider relations to be things?