Coffee cups do.

Yes, but the notion of a coffee cup doesn't.

The notion of a coffee cup might be part of an inquiry. You see an object on the table, but the lights are low, so it just looks dark. You turn on the light, and you see it's a coffee cup.

When you pick it up, you see the little notch where you dropped it. Now you know it's this coffee cup.

So what?

When you and I look tot he Newton's Cradle before us, do we see a type or a token? Is your claim that I see my token, you see yours, and together we make a type? — Banno

I think it was fairly clear from my post that I was talking about types and tokens of experience, rather than types and tokens of objects. My point was that your experience of the cradle and my experience of the cradle are different tokens of experience. Whereas, you seem to want to reject talk about tokens of experience on the basis that we each have the same types of experience, e.g. seeing Newton's Cradle.

How can we have a discussion about subjectivity (and how/whether subjectivity can be shared) if you reject all talk about different tokens of experience, i.e. if you reject subjective experience and subjectivity altogether?

If the word 'fallible' introduces confusion, the same idea can be stated without it: the value of intersubjectivity has a lot to do with the assumption that each individual observer may report incorrect observations, or be biased in a way that other observers may not be. In such an epistemology, having one's observations checked by others brings value, especially if the different observers are independent from one another and hence can be assumed to have different biases. — Olivier5

I have no argument with any of that. But I still don't think the word "fallible" causes any confusion.

So....you’re correct, in that language is not as tidy as we might like it to be, but I would add it is our own fault that it isn’t, and for that, I would say it is our aesthetic response alone, that is sufficient causality. And that, for the simple reason that aesthetic response, in its common and ordinary iteration, is not predicated solely on logic, as are, theoretically, the remaining cognitive components. — Mww

Right, I think I agree. You seem to be saying that if we didn't have any aesthetic response, then there would be nothing about the objects of sense that cannot be talked about in fully determinate terms, that is there would be nothing that could not be shared.

So, "it is our own fault" in the sense that we have aesthetic responses; do you think that is something we could actually dispense with even if we wanted to?

Well, no. It's the fact that we can all talk about the same thing. It's the fact that we all share a public world which is the basis of commonality. — Banno

I know I’m repeating myself but I’m more so saying this hoping to resolve disagreement with others. And seeing how others would disagree with me.

I think the main disagreement is in saying this “public world” is set in stone. That it is the same for all of us. It doesn’t need to be so for communication to take place.

We each have a private world. Some parts of that private world are isomorphisms of each other. Those parts are the public world. This “public world” is inter subjective. Because it is the isomorphic part (inter) of each person’s private world (subjective).

“Isomorphism” is a technical term that is part of introductory set theory. It means that two groups share the same “structure”. It would probably be easier to look it up but I’ll try my best to explain it.

So if I have a group of objects, and their colors. Let’s say for me, objects A, B and C have the colors X, X, Y respectively. And for you, object A, B, C have the colors Y, Y, X. Those two would be isomorphisms.

What will happen is, I will see A and say “This is red” for example. And you will see A and ALSO call it red. Same will happen for B. And for C we will both call it green.

So communication is possible, even though the private experience is different. That is because our experiences have the same “structure” in this case. And it is in these cases only where communication is possible. Note, A does not have to have the color X for both of us for communication to be possible. As long as every object that, for me, has the color X has the color Y for you, and every object that for me has the color Y has the color X for you, we can talk. Because the private experience itself is not what we’re talking about. We’re talking about the structure. And that’s all we can talk about.

On the other hand, say someone sees, A, B, C as Z,Z,Z. We call that person “colorblind”. NOT because Z is different from X and Y. But because the structure is different. In their world, there is no distinction between C and A/B. So if they learn to call A “red” because they’ll see others calling it red, they will also end up calling C “red”. That’s how we know they’re colorblind.

The Xs, Ys and Zs are Qualia.

A glimpse is rich enough; and may be rich indeed. What can be determinably shared is the prosaic; and that is what diminishes art, and subjective experience. — Janus

Nice.

Now, what about

But let's go back to the topic of this thread. Suppose I allow that there are things that cannot be said, that are properly he domain of a subjective world.

Then how could that stuff become inter-subjective? By definition, it cannot move between subjects. Only the public, non-subjecitve stuff can do that.

So if we allow for a private subjective world, the notion of inter-subjective becomes a nonsense. — Banno

So, the issue you seem to be stumbling over is the distinction between what about our experience of sense objects can be determinably or definitively shared, and the kinds of responses to, associations with and feelings for them that cannot be determinably or definitively shared but may be evoked or alluded to by poetic language and the other arts. You still haven't dealt with the problem for your position which is demonstrated by the very different drawings of things that people produce.

It's the fact that we all have our private worlds which is the basis of commonality. — Janus


Well, no. It's the fact that we can all talk about the same thing. It's the fact that we all share a public world which is the basis of commonality. — Banno

The "public world" exists only in a formal sense; in actuality it exists only insofar as it is perceptually revealed privately to each of us in ways similar enough that we can talk about some features of what is perceived. If we didn't have private worlds of experience we would have nothing to talk about.

There is a commonality in the mere fact that we all do have such perceptual worlds, and that we simply pre-reflectively accept that others do have such worlds, even though we obviously cannot experience any perceptions but our own.

animals probably have no idea about, much less what, their fellows or themselves are feeling. — Janus

It seems you do not have a pet. — Banno

I actually do have two dogs. In any case, again you are misunderstanding what I've said; I said that animals probably have "no idea about, much less what, their fellows or themselves are feeling"; I didn't say they do not have feelings responses. I say they have no ideas about such things, because having ideas arguably requires language capability.

The part you left out should have given you the clue that I wasn't saying what you apparently thought I was:

Think of social animals: they can participate in communal life by responding to body language; the incarnate language of pleasure and pain, of friendliness and anger. But none of this that is shared among them is determinable; animals probably have no idea about, much less what, their fellows or themselves are feeling. We can do that by reflexive self-awareness and linguistically mediated memory. — Janus

The scenario in question is one where they have failed to do so, and we're looking for a way to move forward despite that impasse. Saying that what we're usually inclined to do is all we possibly can do is just to deny that any resolution to such an impasse is impossible, which is just to not try to resolve it. — Pfhorrest

What resources do you expect to tap into other than those of our mental processes? Do you think perhaps we should use supercomputers? It just seems you're saying "when all of our mental faculties fail to show us the right way, why not use some of our mental faculties to help". If a whole load of intuitions, gut feelings and empathetic emotional states, all processed by various rational algorithms didn't solve the problem, why would it help to throw away half the data sources and just do the calculation again?

Did you mean this the other way around? — Pfhorrest

I did, yes. Oops.

None of those things are arguments. Those are other kinds of responses I would find positive; and also things I would like to help other people do too. But none of them seem to be anything like you do around here. If you're aiming to do any of those things, it's coming off all wrong. — Pfhorrest

Oh dear! Come to think of it, my students used to have a similar complaint about my draconian marking scheme, maybe there's a pattern...

...using someone as a lab rat without their consent, are both trollish things to do — Pfhorrest

Really? I don't see taking an academic interest in people's posts as an unethical thing. Publishing examples thereof maybe, but I think you're trying to legislate the wind if you want people to suspended any meta-level interest in the way people present themselves or their ideas. Maybe if on some occasion one were to poke a little too hard just to see what happens that might cross a threshold, but would it be any worse than poking too hard out of anger or frustration? Notwithstanding, I always thought I was one of the lighter pokers. You should see the ethical compliance statement for the experiment Streetlight is running on us all.

So you think progress beyond the impasses we've been stuck at is impossible, then? — Pfhorrest

Yes.

Imagine if that view had prevailed during the transition from the Dark Ages to the dawn of the scientific revolution."There's nothing to be done about disagreements on what is real, as taught by the infallible church, other than try to kill the people who disagree."? That's pretty much the state of moral discourse still, except with the state in place of the church, in places where those aren't still the same thing. — Pfhorrest

We managed to live for nearly half a million years in fairly stable, egalitarian (if modern hunter-gatherers are anything to go by), and successful societies. In just the last 10,000 we've managed to enslave half the world, kill most of it's animals, make entire habitats uninhabitable, and now stand on the brink of self-destruction from irreversible climate change. I don't think it's our native faculties that are at fault.

Not in the sense of "you are correct! what a brilliant genius!" that you seem to impute. But also not "let's see how I can interpret you in a way that you're clearly wrong" either. Just "oh hmm curious" is the most I really hope for. — Pfhorrest

Is it not obvious from the extent of my engagement that I at least find your position curious?

We actually figured out the source of the misunderstanding in that thread: there are (at least) two different things meant by "confirmationism", one of them that I was arguing against, and another championed by someone (Hempel) who also argued against what I was arguing against. Janus et al thought I was arguing against Hempel's view, when I was actually arguing against the same view Hempel argued against. That explains why everyone kept saying things I already agreed with as though they were refutations of my position. — Pfhorrest

Well, that's not how I understood the critique, but I'm not going to get back into that again, the point is that even if the fact that "Janus et al thought I was arguing against Hempel's view, when I was actually arguing against the same view Hempel argued against." does explain why "everyone kept saying things I already agreed with as though they were refutations of my position" doesn't that just exactly prove my point. Your initial presentation was insufficient to give the clear understanding you thought you were imparting. People didn't misunderstand you in weird ways, they didn't interpret you uncharitably, they misunderstood you in a perfectly reasonable way and interpreted you wrongly, not for uncharitable reasons, but for reasons entirely resulting from the lack of clarity about the matter inherent in your presentation.

It seems very odd to expect charity from others, but when those others misinterpret or misunderstand you, your default explanation is that they're doing so deliberately out of malice. Surely charity works both ways, no?

I don't have to assume I'm flawless to see that you clearly think I mean something other than I do. — Pfhorrest

No, but you assume you're flawless to see that as my problem in understanding and not your problem in presentation.

I'm having to figure out what weird assumptions you're making about me, rather than you showing me what weird assumptions I'm actually making. — Pfhorrest

...is basically the definition of assuming you're flawless. My assumptions are the weird ones because...

If you did actually understand what I was saying, and pointed out things that must be true in order for the things I think to be true, that would actually be helpful and welcome. But that's not what's happening. I'm just spending all my time clearing up your misunderstandings about what I think in the first place. — Pfhorrest

You're not teaching me, you know that, right? I don't require my misunderstanding to be 'cleared up' because I'm not signed up to some 'Cult of Pfhorrest' where it's vital I understand exactly what you're saying. You are the one trying to publicise you ideas. If they cause misunderstanding you can either walk away, or try to present your ideas more clearly. Either way it's your choice and of benefit only to you. It shouldn't be an onerous task which needs doing. If it is then I'll save you the bother. I'm not in the least bit interested in what your philosophy actually is. Why on earth would I be? I have access via the internet to the libraries of the world, philosophy papers online and in journals, personally I'm even fortunate enough to have access to one or two philosophers themselves (if I'm willing to shell out for a flashy coffee). So please don't put yourself under any obligation to ensure that I've understood you properly unless you want to. I shan't be taking the exam later, and it's been longer than I care to remember since I had to be concerned about my grades.

___

Anyway, all this talk about your approach is way off-topic. Fascinating to me, but I suspect completely irrelevant to everyone else.

The on-topic point is that we personally find persuasive is a psychological matter, not a matter of some golden chalice of propositional properties, and it necessarily precedes any attempt at 'inter-subjective' agreement.

Thanks for starting a thread with I question that I had asked.

Anyway, to cut to the chase, what's got me confused is how the convergence of ideas which is part of intersubjectivity seems to bear a resemblance to reproducibility in scientific objectivity.

As per scientific objectivity the convergence of observations by which I mean observations that have been made by many people is like a certificate of objectivity conferred on whatever the observation is - that it's not just a private, subjective affair.

Compare the above scientific principle if you will with what intersubjectivity is. Like scientific reproducibility, intersubjectivity too is about a convergence, a convergence of ideas, and yet the claim is that intersubjectivity and (scientific) objectivity are two different things.

What resources do you expect to tap into other than those of our mental processes? ... If a whole load of intuitions, gut feelings and empathetic emotional states, all processed by various rational algorithms didn't solve the problem — Isaac

What I'm advocating is a rational algorithm by which to process those things. We can invent new algorithms. You sound to be suggesting that it's only the intuitions, gut feelings, etc, that we have to rely on, and if those aren't doing the trick, tough, there's nothing more to be done. I'm suggesting that we can invent new things to try doing, besides just whatever comes naturally.

I don't see taking an academic interest in people's posts as an unethical thing. — Isaac

You seemed to be saying that you're pushing people's argumentative buttons to see how they react, out of academic interest. Just being curious what it is that people think would not be unethical. I would gladly explain in as much detail as you like what my views actually are, if you're just trying to understand what I think out of interest, even if you don't agree with those thoughts. I don't care to try to persuade you, or really anybody, that I'm correct. I'm not looking to "pick a fight", to try to tell people what to think or convince them to think as I do; I don't have the energy for that. I'm interested in sharing alternate possibilities about things that one could think, and then letting people choose between them as they please. And I just get tired of being argued against by people who don't even understand what claims I'm making.

That was the point of the apple/eggplant metaphor. If you just don't like apples, that's fine with me.

So you think progress beyond the impasses we've been stuck at is impossible, then? — Pfhorrest

Yes. — Isaac

Then your position is exactly the "just giving up" that I say all of the philosophical positions I'm against imply. Thanks for proving my point.

It seems very odd to expect charity from others, but when those others misinterpret or misunderstand you, your default explanation is that they're doing so deliberately out of malice. — Isaac

It's not my default explanation, or I wouldn't bother trying to explain myself. It's a suspicion I begin to have after going around and around in circles for a long time, running into increasingly implausible interpretations of what I'm trying to convey.

I didn't think Janus et al were being uncharitable, I thought they just misunderstood me somehow, and in the end we figured out how. It's only you who gives me suspicious feelings.

You're not teaching me, you know that, right? — Isaac

My point was that you are not teaching me, as you seemed to suggest. I'm not being shown some unseen assumptions I have, because you don't even accurately understand what my views are, so instead I'm working to figure out what assumptions you think I'm making that lead to that misunderstanding, so I can clear it up.

I'm not in the least bit interested in what your philosophy actually is. [...] So please don't put yourself under any obligation to ensure that I've understood you properly unless you want to. — Isaac

Okay, so back to ignoring you it is then. Saves me a load of time. I had gotten the impression that you didn't like that I was ignoring you before, didn't like that I thought you were arguing in bad faith and weren't worth responding to, and you were trying to extend an olive branch or something, to show that you mean well and we can have friendly productive conversations. The only outcome I hoped to get out of that latest one was to reach some point or another where I don't have to worry that every time I say anything here you're going to jump in and the whole thread will just become the same argument with you over again.

So what — Banno

I was hoping you'd take the stance that we can do without talk of concepts, ideas, and notions. If we think of universals as an aspect of investigation, of narrowing down from vagueness to specific, then we can't.

You sound to be suggesting that it's only the intuitions, gut feelings, etc, that we have to rely on, and if those aren't doing the trick, tough, there's nothing more to be done. I'm suggesting that we can invent new things to try doing, besides just whatever comes naturally. — Pfhorrest

And where does the will to invent these new algorithms come from? Where does the sense that they're working (or not working) come from? Where does the determination to follow through on their product come from? If we're bereft of intuition as to what's right, the why would we follow the prescription the algorithm produced, we might just as easily throw it away.

Just being curious what it is that people think would not be unethical. I would gladly explain in as much detail as you like what my views actually are — Pfhorrest

That assumes you have privileged and exhaustive insight into what you actually think which would be fully and faithfully reported verbally. I don't believe that to be the case, and I think a substantial canon of psychological literature supports my view. My interest is in what you actually think and how you actually arrive at and shore up those thoughts. I don't believe you have any more privileged an insight into that by reporting how it seems to you than I do by observing how you present ideas and respond to dissonance.

Then your position is exactly the "just giving up" that I say all of the philosophical positions I'm against imply. Thanks for proving my point. — Pfhorrest

I don't see it as giving up any more than I see acknowledging that we can't defy gravity as 'giving up'. We can lead perfectly happy lives within the limits of our abilities, I really don't see any reason to struggle against them.

It's a suspicion I begin to have after going around and around in circles for a long time, running into increasingly implausible interpretations of what I'm trying to convey. — Pfhorrest

Yeah, that's basically what I mean. When faced with the situation where a simple linguistic misunderstanding has to be ruled out, your only other recourse is that the other person must be maliciously misinterpreting you. Not that the other person has such a radically different way of looking at the problem, that your statements, in their framework, don't mean what you think they mean. Things that seem obvious to you don't always seem obvious to other people. One's language, one's whole presentations is infused with such seemingly obvious assumptions such that you don't even think about them and the word 'just mean' what they seem to you to mean. The only way to see what these are is to talk to other people with different assumptions and explore why what you're saying doesn't mean what you think it means.

I'm not being shown some unseen assumptions I have, because you don't even accurately understand what my views are — Pfhorrest

Again, how would you tell the difference between "I don't understand what your views are " and "your views mean, in my framework, exactly what I say they mean, they don't seem to mean that to you because of the hidden assumptions outlining your framework"?

The only outcome I hoped to get out of that latest one was to reach some point or another where I don't have to worry that every time I say anything here you're going to jump in and the whole thread will just become the same argument with you over again. — Pfhorrest

You realise that you ignoring me is not the same thing as me ignoring you. I have no problem at all with your responses to me, I've thoroughly enjoyed all of them, as I have the opportunity to read what you have to say. I'm intrigued by the limits you have on what you want by way of response, but I don't suppose now I'm going to get a chance to pursue that further.

I was claiming that the materialist position can only hypothesize the existence of objectively correct perception, not inanimate ontology.
— simeonz

The view that there is only perception, with nothing behind it, is one of the strange garden paths that Kant found. It's a misreading, from what I understand, but Mww would be able to tell us more. — Banno

If “only perception with nothing behind it” is meant to indicate the non-cognitive aspect of perception, then that is indeed Kant’s primary metaphysical consideration with respect to empirical knowledge acquisition. Accordingly, perception is nothing but the passive receptivity from which physical sensations arise; they are necessary for, but never enter into, this particular speculative epistemology. Perception tells us an object is present to sensibility, but not what the object is. I think what baffles the non-Kantian, and thereby turns him away from the theory, is why it should be that even a known object must still run the full gamut of reason, when it doesn’t seem necessary or productive to think about that which we’ve already learned.

I’m guessing the misreading follows from the alternate thesis that objects actually do tell us what they are, merely from being presented to us. This methodology seems to be entirely sufficient for extant experiences, but finer theorizing shows contradictions and absurdities will always arise from it. This is not to say Kant got our human knowledge acquisition system right, but only that a purely materialist position stands no chance at all of getting it right, if it grounds itself in experience alone.
—————

All language is ever meant to do is translate subjective activity into exchangeable representations.
— Mww

A neat statement of the myth. Translation occurs between languages, so if translation is the correct model, then there must be a subjective language to be translated into English. — Banno

Half is categorical error, half misses the point. If you’re interested enough, I’ll lay it out.

Still, it confuses the issue to say subjectively inventing words necessitates a subjective language. It could, re: Lewis Carroll, Lisa Gerrard, but it isn’t necessarily the case that it does.

we do things with word as we use them — Banno

Absolutely; uncontested. The invention of words is never in itself sufficient for intelligible communication. Words nonetheless need their own ontological legitimacy. Most folks don’t care about the origin of words, having learned them by rote, but never consider what each single word actually does.

the meaning is not private, but constructed and shared in that very use — Banno

This suggests we always understand each other. But we don’t, which implies what I mean in expressing something does not relate to what you think I mean when you hear it. It follows that either I’m using the wrong words which explains why you don’t understand me, or, I’m using the same word you would use but I assign a meaning to that word with which you do not find meaningful in the same way, which is just as valid an explanation. Mutual understanding is merely common meaning, but each meaning given by each understanding from individual systems, is itself necessarily private.

Another accountability must be reckoned, in that one of us may legitimately use a word from a common language, for which the other does not even know the meaning.

Superfluous philosophical nonsense for Everydayman? Ehhhhh....perhaps. Probably. OK, fine.....yes. But certainly not mythical.

Thanks for starting a thread with I question that I had asked. — TheMadFool

Thanks for not describing me as having ripped off your topic...!

As per scientific objectivity the convergence of observations by which I mean observations that have been made by many people is like a certificate of objectivity conferred on whatever the observation is - that it's not just a private, subjective affair.

Compare the above scientific principle if you will with what intersubjectivity is. Like scientific reproducibility, intersubjectivity too is about a convergence, a convergence of ideas, and yet the claim is that intersubjectivity and (scientific) objectivity are two different things. — TheMadFool

Yep, I think you hit the nail on the head. So is quite happy to bring intersubjectivity in to the discussion, not noticing how it is used by, for comparison, , and .

So there's folk as for various reasons don't differentiate between what is true and what is believed - they suppose for example that nothing is true, just believed to a greater or lesser extent. They've various epistemological structures to reinforce this view, versions of coherentism or pragmatism, sometimes rejecting truth outright, sometimes redefining it in terms of a sort of popular vote or a final goal.

I'd just point out that being popular or being useful is not the very same as being true. I hope that's apparent.

But also I've no objection to the suggestion that some experiment that is repeated successfully should reinforce one's belief in the result; that's not at issue here, at least for me.

If we think of universals as an aspect of investigation, of narrowing down from vagueness to specific, then we can't. — frank

Universals - they are medieval. Nor need they be vague: "seven" is not vague, nor is "odd number".

perception is nothing but the passive receptivity from which physical sensations arise; they are necessary for, but never enter into, this particular speculative epistemology. Perception tells us an object is present to sensibility, but not what the object is. — Mww

Psychologist and their fellow travellers have pretty much dismissed the notion fo passive receptivity - @Isaac? Nor does there seem to be any difficulty outside of philosophy tutorials in moving from perception-of-shoe to shoe. "...but not what the object is" - its a shoe. Kant lived a while back - things moved on.

If you’re interested enough, I’ll lay it out. — Mww

Not disinterested; I just have other things to do.

...subjectively inventing words... — Mww

Why "subjectively"? Would that we could share a bottle of red and clear these little oddities. I'm not sure if you are talking about some form of mentalese, or implying that all our words are subjectively invented. But ironing that out will take us away from the topic at hand. Sad.

the meaning is not private, but constructed and shared in that very use
— Banno

This suggests we always understand each other. — Mww

I don't see how. There will obviously be misconstruel during the construction process. In what follows you treat as if there were a fixed thing which is "the meaning of a word". What is that? Where do we find it? Is it located in each subjective mind?

In contrast, the suggestion is that we treat of the way we use words rather than a secret meaning we must guess.

A myth is a narrative that serves to explain certain otherwise curious behaviour. Killing goats at an alter, for example, or long posts on philosophy. Mine as well as yours. Cheers.

Universals - they are medieval — Banno

So is wearing pants.

Nor need they be vague: "seven" is not vague, nor is "odd number". — Banno

True. The vague universal is just one example of how we can't do without talk of concepts and notions. That doesn't imply anything ontological, anymore than talking about specific cups does.

Much as I love you, you are not saying enough to entice me into a continuing discussion.

So what? Pass me that yellow cup, would you? Are you wanting to say that the cup is no more than a perception? Out with it!

So what? Pass me that yellow cup, would you? Are you wanting to say that the cup is no more than a perception? Out with it! — Banno

I think we agree that we have no truth-apt ontological statements to make about either cups or numbers.

As for sharing ideas amongst ourselves, we have to assume that we do to even start the discussion about it. We agree on that as well, right?

I think we agree that we have no truth-apt ontological statements to make about either cups or numbers. — frank

Oh, I do - it's a yellow cup. Hence "there exists a yellow cup" is a true ontological statement.

As for sharing ideas amongst ourselves, we have to assume that we do to even start the discussion about it. We agree on that as well, right? — frank

The idea is the sharing.

Oh, I do - it's a yellow cup. Hence "there exists a yellow cup" is a true ontological statement. — Banno

Ok. But then, the same logic applies to seven.

The idea is the sharing. — Banno

That sounds like some sort of zen mantra. Is there an ontological commitment behind it?

the same logic applies to seven. — frank

Why? Are you supposing tht all universals have the very same ontology? Why should that be so?

Why? Are you supposing tht all universals have the very same ontology? Why should that be so? — Banno

The logic was: it's a yellow cup, hence there exists a yellow cup.

Seven is a prime number, hence there exists a number 7.

Same thing.

Sure. Existence as being the subject of a predicate. A grammatical, not an ontological, fact.

I" m using "Here is a cup" as an ontological statement. Can you say "here is a seven"? Not in the same way.

I" m using "Here is a cup" as an ontological statement. — Banno

What ontology are you expressing? How does the statement differ from a grammatical fact so that it's ontological?

Psychologist and their fellow travellers have pretty much dismissed the notion fo passive receptivity — Banno

Indeed. I'd cite the evidence, but I fear the publication dates may upset poor @Mww. Like waking a sleepwalker, one must be careful with Kantians not to too abruptly alert them to the fact that people have, in fact, continued to think things after 1804.

Thanks for weighing in.

No problem.

To the topic... I have to admit to using the term myself quite a bit, but I've found myself persuaded by your arguments here. I really can't make an argument for what "inter-subjectively agreed" adds to just "agreed". All agreements in such a context are agreements between subjects. I begin to suspect the addition of the word tries to give the agreement some weight which would otherwise not be entailed by the agreement alone. Probably not a helpful thing to do when that is exactly the matter in question.

Cheers. It's a loaded term, and I suspect many of those using it - ? - do not see the baggage.