It might make sense to you. If I experienced pain in one area, and then pain in another area I would not say the same pain has moved, but that I now have a different pain in another area. Pain doesn't actually move; different nerves are actuated. — Janus

You're kidding yourself here.

Sure, measuring pain is not exact. But you said:

Obviously there is no calibrated measure. — Janus

There is.

What is obvious is that you cannot feel another's pain, — Janus

Mirror cells and mirror-touch synesthesia show this to be questionable.

OK, have it your own way, you can believe whatever you want.

As can you. Cheers.

Likewise cheers. We can both believe whatever we want in accordance with how things seem to us: the subjectivity of experience at work and play. :smile:

...indeed. In your case you can carry on believing something despite the facts. :up:

indeed, In your case you can carry on believing something despite the facts. :up: — Banno

I accept all the same facts you do (except that you deny that I can't feel, as opposed to merely empathize with, your pain). If that single point is not our point of disagreement, then it must be a matter of different interpretations, not a matter of disagreeing about the facts. (And probably our disagreement over the assertion that I cannot feel your pain is nothing more than a matter of interpretation). It's puzzling indeed!

Now I know, from my own experience that I cannot feel other's pain. I don't know, cannot know, from experience that you cannot feel other's pain: perhaps you're psychically empathic like Deanna Troi?

Ok, we might accept that you have constructed a grammar such that it is not possible to feel someone else's pain; that any example of such would be a different pain.

You can't than take this as empirical support for the notion of subjective privacy.

SO we are back here:

The twist is, you cannot therefore use the privacy of pain as evidence for subjectivism - at least, not without a vicious circularity. — Banno

Same problem as for @Luke

So you're actually serious about this...

"...this..."?

That there is no pain that isn't shared.

That's not what I've argued. I've argued that there is nothing in pain such that it cannot be shared.

10.9k
We should take the time to relate this back to the OP.

There, I questioned what it was to share a common understanding of supposed intersubjective phenomena. Pain is taken by some as the archetype of phenomenon understood intersubjectively. On that account pain is private, unshared, only understood intersubjective.

If that were the case then talk of shared pain would not make sense.

And yet, as the very discussion here shows, we can talk of pains that are the same - both from time to time and place to place in one's own body, and also in the bodies of other people.

This to show that the logic or grammar of pain is not private, unshared, only understood intersubjective.

The archetype of the intersubjective phenomena fails to meet the criteria for being intersubjective.

The conclusion is that the notion of intersubjectivity is fraught. — Banno

There, I questioned what it was to share a common understanding of supposed intersubjective phenomena. Pain is taken by some as the archetype of phenomenon understood intersubjectively. On that account pain is private, unshared, only understood intersubjective.

If that were the case then talk of shared pain would not make sense. — Banno

Or you can check my discussion with Isaac (and with you) where I explain how you can have a public language about private experiences.

Yeah, I admit I dozed through that. Any chance of a synopsis? Looked to me that @Isaac had the better hand.

Maybe this might do.

or do you have access to the structure of other people's experiences?
— unenlightened

I can infer it yes.

Let’s call experience you are subjectively having when looking at a red apple X. And let’s call the experience I am subjectively having when looking at a red apple Y.

We both communicate our respective experience by saying “that’s red”

If we both look at blood, again you will have X and I will have Y. We will again say, that’s red.

But if you look at grass and have X, and so say “That’s red” then we have a different structure. You’re probably colorblind, as you can’t recognize green things.

I on the other hand properly have a different experience from Y when looking at grass (let’s call it Z) and so I say “that’s green”

Now, importantly: Whether or not X and Y are the same experience makes absolutely no difference. What matters is the structure. If the same objects consistently produce the same experience (X for you Y for me) we can talk.

X and Y do not have to be the same at all.

A public language, based on private experiences. — khaled

.

Looked to me that Isaac had the better hand. — Banno

I'm pretty sure I understand what you're saying now, thanks. It seems an odd theory, but valid. — Isaac

So sometimes pain is only shared through empathy. This does not conflict with English grammar.

Well, part of the reason my eyes glazed over was that the premise appeared misguided.

Suppose you look at an apple. The claim is that you have experience X.

You then turn the apple around. You are still experiencing the apple. But it is different. The apple is the same, not the experience. Let's call the new experience X'

When you look at the blood, you will have yet another experience - X"

But you use the same word - "red" - in talking about all three.

Here's the point: Each of your experiences of red is different. You use the same word for them all. What is it that all your experiences of red have in common?

Now I don't see that there need be anything that each and every experience of red that you have has in common. Here, I am following Austin. Why shouldn't we use a word such as "red" for a bunch of different experiences?

If you like, there need be nothing common between our uses of "red" beyond our using the word "red"

So I don't see that your argument gets off the ground.

Yep, I'm denying that there must be an essence of redness.

I'm not going to play half-questions today, Frank. To much other stuff to do. I don't have to show that pain is shared, only that there's nothing stoping it being shared.

But you use the same word - "red" - in talking about all three. — Banno

Because they share something.

Now I don't see that there need be anything that each and every experience of red that you have has in common — Banno

There is no metaphysical reason or anything, sure.

It just so happens that all experiences of red share something. Beyond just us calling them “red”

To demonstrate: If a colorblind person called a green thing “red” he would be wrong. But on what basis? Wouldn’t there have to be some commonality to experiences of “red” for us to be able to see that that commonality isn’t present for the green thing and therefore the colorblind person is wrong? On what other basis is he wrong?

Because they share something. — khaled

That's the assumption Austin pointed to. I think it is wrong.

Wouldn’t there have to be some commonality to experiences of “red” — khaled

I say no. Why should there be?

I say no. Why should there be? — Banno

How else would we tell the colorblind person is being wrong?

That's the assumption Austin pointed to. I think it is wrong. — Banno

Wrong or unnecessary?

The most important piece of writing in modern philosophy is, I believe, Hegel's short chapter titled Sense Certainty, which is the first chapter of his first book (1807). If someone were to get its meaning and feel it's meaning in everyday empirical life they need not read anymore of that difficult philosopher. There is no essence of red. To say otherwise won't let you grasp the questions of infinite duality and non-dualism. Saying "red is red" doesn't get you anywhere in my opinion

. I don't have to show that pain is shared, only that there's nothing stoping it being shared. — Banno

If pain is shared through empathy, that's intersubjective. If it can be shared some other way, so what?

That they keep using the word for the wrong thing would be a big clue.

Austin - are there a priori concepts?, from the bottom of page 84.

That they keep using the word for the wrong thing would be a big clue. — Banno

That would be the ONLY clue in your setup.

So if everyone starts to call both the sky and blood “red” tomorrow, that makes the sky red?

Also link isn’t working.

And again:

That's the assumption Austin pointed to. I think it is wrong.
— Banno

Wrong or unnecessary? — khaled

That would be the ONLY clue in your setup. — khaled

Not so. They would still fail the Ishihara Test.

@unenlightened's friend went for over twenty years without it being noticed that he was colour blind. Presumably he used the word "red" a few times in that period. I rather think the example supports my claim over yours.

Not so. They would still fail the Ishihara Test. — Banno

Fair enough. Still:

if everyone starts to call both the sky and blood “red” tomorrow, that makes the sky red? — khaled

And again:

That's the assumption Austin pointed to. I think it is wrong.
— Banno

Wrong or unnecessary?
— khaled — khaled

if everyone starts to call both the sky and blood “red” tomorrow, that makes the sky red? — khaled

The sky will not have changed colour, if that is what you mean. So what.

Wrong or unnecessary? — khaled

Wrong. If it were just unnecessary it might not have such consequences as folk thinking there are unsharable private experiences of a thing called red, despite it so clearly being shared.

The sky will not have changed colour, if that is what you mean. So what. — Banno

How could you tell? According to you the only thing common to experiences of red is the use of the word “red”. So if everyone calls the sky red the sky is, for all intents and purposes, red.

Another question: How can children tell the color of things they haven’t seen before? When they see something for the first time, and have never heard it being described as red or green or blue, where do they get the uncanny ability to guess the color correctly most of the time?

Heck, how do adults do it? When you see something you never heard described by a certain color before how come you’re able to tell what color it is? The only thing common to experiences of any color is the word use, according to you, so given that you’ve never heard it being described as any particular color how come you can guess the color? You should have nothing to go off of.

despite it so clearly being shared. — Banno

What is shared is the structure not the experiences. But this assumes there is something common to experiences we communicate by using the word “red”. More than just the word.

According to you the only thing common to experiences of red is the use of the word “red”. — khaled

No. The only thing common to our use of the word red might be our use of the word red.

What is shared is the structure not the experiences. — khaled

...and the structure is...? if it is the use of the word, then I don't see that we differ.


Edit: More acutely, there need be no experience that is common to every instance of the use of the word "red".