True enough. But it doesn’t follow from the general capacity for feeling pain, that individual instances of it are necessarily mutually inclusive. — Mww

I'm not sure what you mean.

SO here's another example of tokens... — Banno

I'm thinking that we've reached the end of what is doable here. Seems there is something underpinning the misunderstanding. "Experience" is being treated as a thing, a mental item of some sort, when as @Isaac and @khaled's discussion showed, it is an event, or better, a sort of action. At the very least there should be concern over talk of having an experience; as if it were like having a car or an iPhone.

There's also the way parts of an experience are sloughed off, as if this were unproblematic. So there's talk fo the experience of red as if it were clear what that is apart from seeing a red car or a red sunset or a red apple. @unenlightened made this point well.

There's also an odd adherence to the notion of universals, if in the new incarnation of tokens and types. There's a pretence that introducing such problematic tools will somehow clarify the issue.

SO here's another example of tokens:

"Rose is a rose is a rose"

The first "Rose" is one of three tokens.
— Banno

You agree?

Suppose you and I are both looking at that sentence.

We both see it. I hope you will agree that there are 2 people, but one token - the first instance of "Rose".

So here we have two experiences of the very same token - the first instance of "Rose". This is a counterexample to your: If there are two of them, then they are not the same token. — Banno

I'm under the impression that you do not understand the type-token distinction.

I agree that the first "Rose" in the sentence is one of three tokens of the word "Rose" in that sentence.
But if two people see or read the word "Rose". then there are two tokens of (having the experience of) seeing or reading the word "Rose".

We can distinguish between instances of the word in the sentence and instances of (having the experience of) reading/seeing the word. My point is about the latter, but for some reason you are talking about the former.

"Pain" or "having pain" is a type of experience. Individuals experience instances (tokens) of having pain.

I'm under the impression that you do not understand the type-token distinction. — Luke

Well, if you think a token is an experience, one of us is wrong. But to be clear, there is no one understanding of the type-token distinction. It's a bit muddled. Think I mentioned that.

But moreover, I only adopted the language of tokens so as to conform to the discussion.


Edit: Perhaps it would be clearer if I said that I do not think that what you are calling experiences are particulars in the way that is required for them to be types.

Hence,

"Experience" is being treated as a thing, a mental item of some sort, when as Isaac and @khaled's discussion showed, it is an event, or better, a sort of action. At the very least there should be concern over talk of having an experience; as if it were like having a car or an iPhone. — Banno

Well, if you think a token is an experience, one of us is wrong. — Banno

I don't think a token is an experience. To repeat:

"The type–token distinction is the difference between naming a class (type) of objects and naming the individual instances (tokens) of that class."

I'm making a distinction between the class of experience, pain, and individual instances of that class. The word "pain" denotes the class. A particular experience of pain is an instance (token) of that class (type).

Well, if you think a token is an experience, one of us is wrong. — Banno

You have it backwards; all experiences are tokens, but not all tokens are experiences.

I think that far too simple.

Have a look at around §48 of Philosophical Investigations, but read "token" for "simple".

What counts as a token is dependent on the language game one is playing.

The word "bicycle" denotes the class; my bicycle (or any particular bicycle) is an instance of that class. This shouldn't be difficult.

I think that far too simple.

Have a look at around §48 of Philosophical Investigations, but read "token" for "simple".

What counts as a token is dependent on the language game one is playing. — Banno

You haven't said why it is "far too simple" in your view. And you haven't explained why you think that "What counts as a token is dependent on the language game one is playing."

Now, this is a discussion between discussants; you shouldn't rely on references to texts that others may or may not have easy access to, and also may read differently than you do. In my case I do have a copy, but it is years since I read it, I have thousands of books and I'm not a very diligent librarian, so it would save a lot of time if you simply stated your argument.

At this stage, absent any cogent argument to the contrary I am sticking with what I have said which is in agreement with this concise summation:

The word "bicycle" denotes the class; my bicycle (or any particular bicycle) is an instance of that class. This shouldn't be difficult. — Luke

I see no reason to think this cannot be generalized to apply to any phenomenon.

on what grounds are we saying that your X and my Y are even similar? — Isaac


That we use the same words. — khaled

And yet words are somehow insufficient all of a sudden when distinguishing them?

The artifice here is partly that we can chop up and distinguish elements of 'experience' - a continuous, homogeneous, and post hoc artifact, as @Banno says above - and I think that's the main contention.

Further to that, however, I'm making the point that if we are to artificially chop up and distinguish elements of 'experience', we do so using public notions - 'pain', 'colour', etc...

What's baffling to me, is how, having done so, having sieved and diced this thing, having taken it to the academy, shown it around and agreed where it should be cut and what elements belong in what category,... people then what to claim that the remaining diced and filtered sections are all-of-a-sudden ineffable again, private... This thing, which a minute ago we were publicly dissecting, has somehow turned to fairy dust in our hands.

↪Isaac

Is there a reason you did not respond to my latest post? Oh well, never mind. — Luke

My apologies. I'm not getting notification for some posts (it's been that way for some time and no-one seems to be able to fix it), @khaled reckons the reply function is more reliable than the quote or @-mention function, but I've not tested it yet.

We must firstly recall the distinction between having pain and expressing pain. Having pain is your experience of the feeling that hurts; whereas expressing pain is your physical reaction to the feeling that hurts, such as screaming, wincing or saying "ouch". — Luke

Here we have a problem in the way you've laid this out. If expressing a pain is a physical reaction, then that requires it have a physical initiate (otherwise Newtons laws of thermodynamics have been broken). Yet with an intrinsically private experience (ie one that is not accessible even to suitably advanced neuroscience) I can't see how it could cause such an initiation.

Nobody else can experience your tokens of pain in any way, except via your expressions of pain. — Luke

What does 'via' matter here? It seems that you could then turn around your claim above to say "people can experience your tokens of pain, via your expressions of pain"

Here we have a problem in the way you've laid this out. If expressing a pain is a physical reaction, then that requires it have a physical initiate (otherwise Newtons laws of thermodynamics have been broken). Yet with an intrinsically private experience (ie one that is not accessible even to suitably advanced neuroscience) I can't see how it could cause such an initiation. — Isaac

Fair enough, maybe "physical reaction" was not an apt description. Perhaps "physical manifestation of pain" might be better. However, I was attempting a description which allows one to feel pain without showing it.

It seems that you could then turn around your claim above to say "people can experience your tokens of pain, via your expressions of pain" — Isaac

People don't experience the feeling that hurts when they experience my expressions of pain.

Materialists believing in telepathy... You can't beat this place for entertainment. :-)

Telepathy
(from the Greek τῆλε, tele meaning "distant" and πάθος/-πάθεια, pathos or -patheia meaning "feeling, perception, passion, affliction, experience")
The purported vicarious transmission of information from one person to another without using any known human sensory channels or physical interaction.

What's baffling to me, is how, having done so, having sieved and diced this thing, having taken it to the academy, shown it around and agreed where it should be cut and what elements belong in what category,... people then what to claim that the remaining diced and filtered sections are all-of-a-sudden ineffable again, private — Isaac

Their contents are ineffable and private. But the cuts aren't. The cuts are cultural, biological, and sometimes personal.

In the same way that if I have XXY and you have LLM, we can still communicate because we have the same cuts, but I cannot tell you what X is and you cannot tell me what L is. What matters is when X happens I say "red" and when L happens you say "red", and for X and L to happen respectively when we look at a red apple.

I was attempting a description which allows one to feel pain without showing it. — Luke

Even to sufficiently advanced neuroscience? What form would this pain take if it had no physical expression whatsoever?

It seems that you could then turn around your claim above to say "people can experience your tokens of pain, via your expressions of pain" — Isaac


People don't experience the feeling that hurts when they experience my expressions of pain. — Luke

To understand my objection to this you'd need to read my post above https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/503932

Something as simple as the activity of mirror neurons can cause me to feel your pain via your expressions of pain.

You'll argue that it's not 'your' pain because it's not taking place in your body, but that makes 'pain' into the set of physiological activities (being the only part fixed to your body). I have no problem with labelling it that way, but it's then not intrinsically private, any sufficiently advanced neurologist can see it.

You'll argue that it's not exactly the same as your pain (intensity, memories and responses unique to you...). But that falls foul of the problem I referred to in my post above - These are not 'pain' either, they are just the sum total of your experience at any given time. Once you decide to chop that up and filter it into parts you're engaging in a language game which is public. If I can't feel your pain, then you can't talk about 'pain' at all.

Their contents are ineffable and private. But the cuts aren't. The cuts are cultural, biological, and sometimes personal. — khaled

How can we know where to cut then?

How can we know where to cut then? — Isaac

By seeing how others use the words.

Finding the commonality between every instance of someone saying "red". The commonality is hazy, but usable.

Sometimes we can't do that. Colorblind people for instance, see the same common elements when people say "red" as when they say "green".

By seeing how others use the words.

Finding the commonality between every instance of someone saying "red". — khaled

How does that tell us where to cut the continuous and unfiltered 'experience'. If my X response (as opposed to your Y) might be caused in part by my big toe (but I can't know that so as to tell other people), then how can I know that the commonality is not our big toes (rather than the wavelengths of light)?

How does that tell us where to cut the continuous and unfiltered 'experience'. — Isaac

?

When you hear "apple" a thousand times you tend to understand what the common element in all those utterances is. Mainly, the observation of a sweet spherical object that is red, yellow or green.

then how can I know that the commonality is not our big toes (rather than the wavelengths of light)? — Isaac

Because people of all toe sizes can use color words accurately. So if toe size affects our experience it would be a content-determining difference.

The toe size could be a content-determining difference, not a structure determining one. The latter are what matter, and what we study. If it was a structure determining difference we would have discovered that above a certain toe size, (or below) people stop being able to distinguish colors. That is not the case.

Your use of content and structure is becoming problematic as you relate it to conceptual matters such as experience. Physical things have a content (component parts) and a structure (spatiotemporal positions of those parts in relation to one another). You seem to have imported this language into pure concepts (experience) with making it clear what the correlations are.

I thought you were treating response events as the equivalent of component parts and sequence (temporal) as the equivalent of relative spatiotemporal position). But...

The toe size is a content-determining difference, not a structure determining one. — khaled

...doesn't make any sense in that context. So (for tomorrow, as I have work today) could you explain again the difference between structure and content as you're using the terms in the context of experience?

Even to sufficiently advanced neuroscience? — Isaac

Neuroscience, like language, cannot get at the feeling itself; it can only work with the behaviours.

304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. — Wittgenstein

You'll argue that it's not 'your' pain because it's not taking place in your body, but that makes 'pain' into the set of physiological activities (being the only part fixed to your body). — Isaac

I don't see how this follows.

I have no problem with labelling it that way, but it's then not intrinsically private, any sufficiently advanced neurologist can see it. — Isaac

The sufficiently advanced neurologist would see only the behaviours, not the feelings. The feelings are not directly accessible; in other words, private. The idea of a "sufficiently advanced neurologist" begs the question.

So (for tomorrow, as I have work today) could you explain again the difference between structure and content as you're using the terms in the context of experience? — Isaac

I think the best way to explain is this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isomorphism

Specifically the bit around this: "Even though these two groups "look" different in that the sets contain different elements, they are indeed isomorphic: their structures are exactly the same."

I am saying that our experiences need only be isomorphisms, not identical, for us to be able to communicate. I'm treating experiences as a set. So you have the set of experiences XXY, and I have LLM. Same structure but different contents.

If you mess with the V4 area I might then suddenly have experiences LLL or MMM in response to the same stimuli. As in, I no longer can tell that the last object is different. Here I have a different structure AND different content from you (L/M is not X or Y). So changes in V4 area change the structure. They might ALSO change the content, but I'm assuming they only change structure for now.

Now if I mess with some physical property P of yours, I might be able to get you to experience TTN. In this case, the contents changed but the structure is preserved. P would be a structure preserving difference. A simple example: Color inverting glasses. You still have the ability to distinguish between the colors, but the contents have all changed. Your experiences in that case change from XXY to YYX.

You can adjust to color inverting glasses. Heck, you can put on color inverting glasses and practice a bit to "flip" your wording accordingly (so if you see something you used to call "red" you now call it "green") and no one in the world would be able to tell that you have them on except by seeing them. Eventually, you might forget you ever put them on, as you completely adjust. The structure of experience is preserved but the content changed, and that makes no difference to your behavior (after you adjust).

Glaucoma on the other hand is an example of a structural physical change. If you get Glaucoma, XXY becomes YYY. You now cannot distinguish between red and green. And we can easily tell when that happens. You can never adjust to it.

Content-determining differences preserve the isomorphism.

Some philosophers think human colour experience is composed of internal colour elements which may or may not correspond to physical properties of external stimuli. For them, red-green colour-blind means having (roughly) one internal element type correspond to both of two external properties, whereas most people have two distinct internals, one for each of the two externals. For those philosophers, it makes perfect sense to ask whether two internal elements, one in each of two normal-sighted people, where these elements apparently correspond to the same set of external stimuli, are of the same or different type. Whether, upon seeing into each other's minds, they might be surprised at the type of internal colour element thus revealed.

Most of this thread is about disputing the nature of the supposed internal elements: about whether they are private, or objectively specifiable, or coherently discussable, or how they map onto external stimuli. But not about disputing their role as a basic material.

Other philosophers* think human colour experience is composed of just external colour elements, which are sets (or classes or types) of external stimuli (illumination events) as ordered and classified through language and other symbol-based social interaction. (And pain is types of trauma-event, etc.) That view could also be relevant to the topic of "intersubjectivity", I submit. Because classifications can develop from particular points of view, and be more or less in conflict.

* @un, maybe? Witty? Quine? Churchills? Goodman says: go with internal or external, but both is a mess.

So what? There's no structure to things? Things are whatever we want them to be? Is that what you and this guy Goodman are saying?
— Olivier5

I think what he is saying is that good analysis of intersubjective representations on a non-cosmic scale is always hobbled by reasoning about their possible foundations on a cosmic scale. I.e. about, usually, objectivity. — bongo fury

Only if one obsesses with attaining perfect objectivity. As a beakon or azimuth, a goal that will never be attained but nevertheless indicates a worthy direction to take, objectivity is not a problem but a solution to a problem.

But to be clear, there is no one understanding of the type-token distinction. It's a bit muddled. Think I mentioned that. — Banno

Evidence That subjectivity is a very real aspect of language use?

As a beakon or azimuth, a goal that will never be attained but nevertheless indicates a worthy direction to take, objectivity is not a problem but a solution to a problem. — Olivier5

But that direction not, presumably, towards just maximum possible approximation to infinite information and complete truth? That doesn't seem to be what people are driving at with

We do see things as they are - the sugar in the bowl, the tree in the garden. — Banno

and such.

But that direction not, presumably, towards just maximum possible approximation to infinite information and complete truth? That doesn't seem to be what people are driving at — bongo fury

It’s exactly what people are driving at, in science, journalism, justice and scores of other fields where it is really important to try your best at being objective.

it is really important to try your best at being objective. — Olivier5

Are you equating objective with truthful?

Are you equating objective with truthful? — frank

More as ‘unbiased, fair in appreciating the available evidence.’