Free will

khaled

The insight is the result of a choice by the mind to explore, to learn something new, to create a new idea, and with whom to share it. — MondoR

Evidence? It could just be that the insight is a result of atoms bumping into each other.

As usual you make unsubstantiated claims. You’ve been doing it since the start of the thread. The answer to “Do we have free will” can’t simply be an unsubstantiated “Yes”. You need to support your argument.

Otherwise one is just a bowling ball colliding with pins because the Maker [the Big Bang] made all of the decisions at that point in time — MondoR

Possible.

The Big Bang gets credit for everything. — MondoR

Why would it? You are willing to give credit to a literal explosion than to give it to the group of atoms that is most influential to the insight (the scientists)?

MondoR

Evidence? It could just be that the insight is a result of atoms bumping into each other. — khaled

Of course. One can choose to believe any story they wish.

You choose to be a balling ball thrown by the Maker.

I choose to be a Creator making choices.

In life, we all make choices, and we learn from them.

khaled

↪MondoR

You choose to be a balling ball thrown by the Maker. — MondoR

When have I said that? I don’t know if the world is deterministic or not. Again, unsubstantiated claims and oversimplification.

And in either case, what makes you think either of those leads to freedom?

Of course. One can choose to believe any story they wish. — MondoR

Again, unsubstantiated claim. You could merely be feeling like you’re choosing. You can’t dodge the problem by saying “Why yes I have a choice” over and over.

MondoR

Yes, I feel like I am choosing as does pretty much every human being. So why the mythology of determinism? There is no substantiation for it. It's just a story. Just continue having a life making choices that are one's own. No reason to believe otherwise.

khaled

↪MondoR

Yes, I feel like I am choosing as does pretty much every human being. So why the mythology of determinism? — MondoR

“It feels that way therefore it must be that way”

There is no substantiation for it. It's just a story. — MondoR

There is plenty of substantiation for it. Physics for one is deterministic. Or can be at least

No reason to believe otherwise. — MondoR

Maybe. But notice how your argument changed from “The world is not deterministic” to “No reason to believe the world is deterministic”

The latter is much easier to make.

And regardless, even if this were true and the world was indeterministic, how does that result in free will? How does adding some randomness help? You seem to think that establishing indeterminism is equivalent to establishing that we have free will.

MondoR

No. It feels that way and there is no reason to create a mythology that says otherwise, whatever one wishes to call the Original Maker. But many people can, and do, choose to believe in determinism/fatalism for whatever personal reason. Their choice.

There is zero evidence that physics is deterministic. By all accounts, it is probabilistic. However, you can believe so if you wish. That is what makes life interesting.

I didn't make an argument that there is choice. On the contrary, I stated they is no way of knowing one way or the other. It is just a personal, spiritual decision that one makes on how they wish to think of their life. Some picture themselves as bowling balls, others as marionettes, and others as personal creators. We are all actors on this earth, playing roles.

If we are making choices, then we have meaning.

khaled

↪MondoR

There is zero evidence that physics is deterministic — MondoR

False.

It is just a personal, spiritual decision that one makes on how they wish to think of their life. — MondoR

Or it could only feel that way while not being a decision at all. That is the matter in question in this thread. Repeatedly saying “it is a choice” does not make it so.

Some picture themselves as bowling balls, others as marionettes, and others as personal creators. — MondoR

All of these picture are compatible with determinism. They’re just attitudes.

MondoR

Everything is also compatible with God. You believe that physics is deterministic. One chooses what one wishes to believe. That's life.

khaled

↪MondoR

One chooses what one wishes to believe. — MondoR

......

InPitzotl

What do you mean it matters that you go to a doctor???? — MondoR

I mean that the future state is a function of the current state, as opposed to fatalism, where the current state is irrelevant to the future state.

It's already Determined. There is no choice. — MondoR

Why not?

Determinism is a form of fatalism. — MondoR

Nope; there's a clear difference.

Fatalism:

Nostradamus predicts he and his host will eat the black pig. The host then orders his chef to prepare the white pig. As the chef begins to prep the kitchen, a wolf sneaks in and steals the white pig. The chef, left with only a black pig, prepares that.

Nostradamus can say what happens and it must be true, because things are fated.

Determinism:

#!/bin/bash
while true; do
   echo "Which letter will I pick, b or w?"
   read -rsn1 PROPHECY
   case $PROPHECY in
      B|b) echo "I pick W.  You lose." ;;
      W|w) echo "I pick B.  You lose." ;;
      *) echo "Neither?  I still pick B.  You lose." ;;
   esac
done

The outcome depends on the input. Nostradamus cannot win.

MondoR

Whether or not Nostradamus is correct is matter of what story you wish to believe. It's a matter of concocting a story.

Nostradamus predicts he and his buddy will eat a black pig. The host chooses to oblige. Everyone is happy.

Humans can be very creative with explanations for anything. Mythology never dies. Just changes in form. You can believe the bowling ball story or the marionette story, or whatever variation you wish. That the beauty of being human. Enormous creativity.

Janus

Point is: I don’t think freedom is incompatible with determinism. What matters is whether or not you’re doing what you want to do. Not whether or not you can actually do otherwise. — khaled

I don't agree that freedom is compatible with determinism; I've heard plenty of people claim it is so and yet they are never able to explain how it could be. If all events were deterministic in the fullest sense, then every event down to the smallest detail was inevitable moments after the Big Bang (assuming for the sake of argument that the current origin theory is correct). That would mean all our acts and decisions have been predetermined from the beginning of time.

As I see it, the possibility to have done otherwise is essential in order to count decisions as being determined by the self. That's the freedom required for moral responsibility as it is usually understood. Otherwise our acts would be just like natural phenomena, just as inevitable. No one counts the lightning as being morally responsible when it kills someone.

Schopenhauer (a deterministic) said something like: 'we are free to do what we want, but we are not free to want what we want'. This would mean we are compelled to do what we want to, unless some other, stronger desire countermands it. If I want to murder a child, then I will do it unless some other desire, say the desire not to be imprisoned, is stronger. But under determinism I have no control over what my desires are, and which are going to be the stronger in any situation. So, how can I be held morally responsible for something that was never under my control in the first place?

SophistiCat

I don't agree that freedom is compatible with determinism; I've heard plenty of people claim it is so and yet they are never able to explain how it could be. — Janus

Why not learn more about compatibilist arguments then? Your position is what is sometimes referred to as classical incompatibilism - classical because of its long history, going back to antiquity, but especially vigorously debated over the last century or so, when compatibilism rose in prominence.

Janus

↪SophistiCat

Can you outline a cogent compatibilist argument or indicate a relevant text?

simeonz

But under determinism I have no control over what my desires are, and which are going to be the stronger in any situation. So, how can I be held morally responsible for something that was never under my control in the first place? — Janus

I am not sufficiently literate, but I can give you my perspective. I believe that according to your expectation, what we would credit for the moral character of our actions is some entity that sits in the control room of your personality, consults your system of values that is manifested partly externally in your brain and takes executive decisions that affect the outcome. My logic is different. We are actually evaluating your convictions, intentions and desires, and we don't care whether they are deterministically related to the surrounding phenomena. They are yours per-se. There is no control room. You are your personality and system of values.

Janus

We are actually evaluating your convictions, intentions and desires, and we don't care whether they are deterministically related to the surrounding phenomena. They are yours per-se. There is no control room. You are your personality and system of values. — simeonz

If I couldn't but have had the set of convictions, intentions and desires I have then how can I be fairly held morally responsible, and fairly praised or blamed for having them?

I'm not positing "control rooms" just that there is no good reason to believe that I couldn't but have had the set of conviction, intentions and desires that I do. Instead they were, at least to some degree adequate for me to be thought responsible for having them, freely chosen by me.

SophistiCat

↪Janus

I can point you to a comprehensive SEP survey of compatibilism. There was so much to cover there that a supplement was made just for the most recent developments.

simeonz

If I couldn't bquoteut have had the set of convictions, intentions and desires then how can be held morally responsible, and fairly praised or blamed for having them? — Janus

They are what we identify you as. You don't really "have them" in that sense. We don't blame you for having them, we are more-so blaming them for having you, or having become part of you.

Lets say that you are decided on a life of crime because of your early life experience. We can explain how your lifestyle choices were determined by your past, yet we evaluate the character/personality/system of values for the decisions that led to the consequent damage. If your personality causes pain and suffering, we blame it, and if it causes comfort and happiness, we praise it. You either have a good personality or you don't. Your character is agent in the world. Its interaction with the environment, the transfer of the values within to actions without, which we consider your freedom, is what we evaluate and judge for better or worse.

simeonz

@Janus
Just to clarify. When I say "transfer of the values within to actions without, which we consider your freedom", I don't mean to say that there is some possibility for in-the-last-moment sway on the process of this transfer. That is inessential. It is your character, and you are expected to practice it and manifest it as accurately as you can afford to. You couldn't abstain from living. But as much as we expect you to be yourself, you should expect us to oppose any detriment to us and to judge you for the effects from being you. Freedom is the relation between your personality and the effect it has on its surrounding environment, which is expressed in having involvement in the outcome.

Janus

They are what we identify you as. You don't really "have them" in that sense. We don't blame you for having them, we are more-so blaming them for having you, or having become part of you. — simeonz

I don't think this is true at all. People are not their values. People do have values, intentions and convictions, and sure they are judged on account of them, or at least on the actions which embody them.

Janus

↪SophistiCat

OK, I'll have a read and let you know if I find anything convincing there, or if I find it all unconvincing.

simeonz

I don't think this is true at all. People are not their values. People do have values, intentions and convictions, and sure they are judged on account of them, or at least on the actions which embody them. — Janus

I think that you are objecting, because a person could technically abstain from applying their personality. But that is again due to their convictions, values and intentions. So, the personality can have complex internal dynamics and we don't judge its pieces, but the overall effect.

Janus

But that is again due to their convictions, values and intentions. — simeonz

Yes, but the point is the convictions, values and intentions must be freely chosen or the person is not responsible for holding them.

simeonz

Yes, but the point is the convictions, values and intentions must be freely chosen or the person is not responsible for holding them. — Janus

Why are claiming that the person is not their convictions, values and intentions. Are you suggesting dualism? If you are not, what do you propose is the person?

simeonz

@Janus
What I mean is, assuming you are not a dualist, do you suggest that a quantum indeterminacy of some kind, by simply spurring a chance decision here and there in our development, could be more important factor in our guilt or our license to blame a person then the presence of elaborately expressed personality and its relation to the outcome after the development has taken place?

hume

↪Paul S

Paul,

Atomic decay is certainly a good example of randomness. And no doubt randomness exists elsewhere. My argument in favor of existence of free will is in line with it. However, I think there are few pieces to this picture.

Let's first consider, what for the sake of this conversation, we can call the big picture - The big picture says that entropy will keep increasing to the point that we will have heat death of universe. This is a deterministic behavior of the system. No matter what we do, how many suns explode into supernovas, it's destined to happen.

However, within the span (scope) of the time where we exist, and within our lives, we act and behave in a manner that is not deterministic but is probable. This localized behavior of our agency is probabilistic in nature and is what we call free will.

Now let's take example of nuclear fusion going on in the sun which basically responsible of pretty much everything we are able to do. There is certainly a deterministic cause and effect relationship between sun rays and us. It provides food for us and sustains life. It also causes skin cancer. Now imagine rays from sun shining on a rock vs shining on a human being. The behavior of the rock and the human being are going to be very different. Rock won't but human being will certainly have a reaction. Within human beings, some humans will actually move to come under the sun to bask under it and other will find shade to avoid it. That's a free will behavior that you don't see in objects like rock who always have same consistent behavior all the times to the rays of the sun.

My point is that this behavior exists within local scope. It further has indeterministic OR cause & effect relationship in its surrounding or areas (spacetime) within which it can yield influence but that influence still is impermanent in grand schema of things (the big picture) - So in my view when we talk about free will, we are restricted to the contextual level where that free will is relevant and not at all levels.

Paul S

Within human beings, some humans will actually move to come under the sun to bask under it and other will find shade to avoid it. That's a free will behavior that you don't see in objects like rock who always have same consistent behavior all the times to the rays of the sun. — hume

Plants will reorient themselves to align with the sun. However there is also argument that plants have indeterministic processes, through proton tunneling in DNA mutations.

So in my view when we talk about free will, we are restricted to the contextual level where that free will is relevant and not at all levels. — hume

I think you are more concerned with the consciousness level, than say the free will of a beetle to move around.

I was more concerned with the conditions to make free will possible, which I was arguing is just fundamentally indeterminism. Maybe this is where we misunderstood each other.

I'm not convinced the universe is indeterministic in a physical sense, my mind can't settle on it like it flips on me when I get close to a settled perspective.

I think henceforth, I will remove any notion of the purely physical from my relationship with the universe on any perceived indeterministic level or spiritual level. It has polarized my mid in that I innately seem to want the universe to be deterministic because that makes sense to me, but that throws up issues with free will. The good news is there is probably no way to prove determinism in the universe and I needn't worry so much.

It may be that we have free will only if we want it and what makes us free may be beyond any notion of determinism or indeterminism. If there is a physical aspect to free will, it may even be beyond this universe as we understand it physically.

hume

↪Paul S

Sure. Plants are living beings and they have agency and can use that agency to act in free will sort of way. The premise of my argument is that living beings have free will. The notion is applicable only to living beings and not inanimate objects like rock.

One can argue that when we mix sodium with water then there some sort of chemical reaction which is not inanimate. But underneath it's simple the chemical reaction born out of electron bonding and has to do with their charge and energy so yes, you're right in assuming that I'm speaking of free will in terms of presence of "consciousness".

I was more concerned with the conditions to make free will possible, which I was arguing is just fundamentally indeterminism. — Paul S

Free will by its very virtue is a phenomenon of a living agent. It's tied to the notion of choice. This element of choice is the one that creates indeterministic outcomes when the agent interacts with his/her environment for survival. I do not think we can speak of free will in case of non-living things. However, we can certainly speak of indeterminism in case of both living and non-living things.

Paul S

Free will by its very virtue is a phenomenon of a living agent. It's tied to the notion of choice. This element of choice is the one that creates indeterministic outcomes when the agent interacts with his/her environment for survival. I do not think we can speak of free will in case of non-living things. However, we can certainly speak of indeterminism in case of both living and non-living things. — hume

I agree with that. What I was getting at is that despite how complex we assume ourselves to be, if we live in a deterministic universe, it could be argued that our complex behavior is deterministic, it was an inevitable consequence of prior deterministic manifestations. As wonderful as it is, it could be just inevitable.

I tend to agree that for true free will to exist, our intent to do something needs to be indeterministic.

A quote from Psychiatric Times

"The second source arises in the presupplementary motor area, which is stimulated when laboratory animals make the same movements mentioned above, but they do not originate from responses to an external source. The movement instead arises spontaneously; a thought is internally generated through intentional actions. There is an observed rapid rise in electrical signals that build up just before the brain executes these actions. This has led to the notion that the presupplementary motor area harbors some kind of readiness potential, a useful function in generating movement"

It appears that the intent may well be its own system. Maybe it's a key to our to the universe's entropy or maybe we are sufficiently complex to generate our own. I tend to see it as the former, we have a dependency on the universe for our randomness, and that the universe has that randomness.

The research article seems to suggest we commit to an action separately of the action itself, almost like the dice is rolled separate to the action to be undertaken.

Of course I agree that free will has no context for a stone. Although a stone in molten active state could be a conduit to spread the randomness around for the universe so that we can draw on a source of randomness to experience free will. Or if the rain falls in an indeterministic manner on the slope of a stone to add to the overall background randomness of the environment we perceive and draw randomness from.

taxasiv236

conclusion? people are too biased and never will be able to accept that everything is out of their control, we might make few "free" choices in regards how we feel inside, doubt there is much more. to be truly free you have to be nothing, humans cannot understanding nothingness same way goes for infinity. i like when you ask people if they are free to do whatever they want they tell you things that already exists, huge indication free doesn't exist same as original, it's just combination of few complex things that are out of scope of understanding that it becomes original and people that tell you such as

some humans will actually move to come under the sun to bask under it and other will find shade to avoid it. That's a free will behavior

just missed whole point of how human algorithm works

Free will

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