However, within the span (scope) of the time where we exist, and within our lives, we act and behave in a manner that is not deterministic but is probable. This localized behavior of our agency is probabilistic in nature and is what we call free will. — hume

Yes, life is waveforms of habits (probabilistic behavior), as well as choice/creativity (redirection of actions). This is what everyone does and recognizes. It describes the act of learning any skill, but most especially the arts. However, back in human history, some philosophers and scientists, without any evidence or substantiation, just decided to create a mythology that life is equivalent to billiard balls. One can guess that their motivation was no different from clerics in all history. As outlandish as such a story may be, it actually took root in education, just as similar stories took root in Churches. Such is the nature of the human mind. I doubt even a roach could bear such tales.

It's not just the philosophers. :sad:

History of quantum physics is full of misleading thought-experiment expressions that historians decided to keep on in describing various aspects of QM which ends up confusing laymen - e.g. Einstein's Does moon not exist if we don't look at it? Spooky action at a distance, Schrodinger's cat dead and alive at the same time. Neumann-Wigner interpretation of observer induced reality, so on and so forth.

It's not just the philosophers. :sad:

History of quantum physics is full of misleading thought-experiment expressions that historians decided to keep on in describing various aspects of QM which ends up confusing laymen - e.g. Einstein's Does moon not exist if we don't look at it? Spooky action at a distance, Schrodinger's cat dead and alive at the same time. Neumann-Wigner interpretation of observer induced reality, so on and so forth. — hume

Yes, the modern form of creating tales and stories for people to sit around and listen to. Darwin was totally wrong. Humans don't evolve. They just change in form.

What I mean is, assuming you are not a dualist, do you suggest that a quantum indeterminacy of some kind, by simply spurring a chance decision here and there in our development, could be more important factor in our guilt or our license to blame a person then the presence of elaborately expressed personality and its relation to the outcome after the development has taken place? — simeonz

Sure, there must be quantum indeterminacy for freedom to be actual; if everything were wholly causally determined there would be no freedom in the sense required for the idea of moral accountability to be rationally justified.

I'm not positing any theory that quantum indeterminacy is relevant to our understanding of agential freedom though, because events at that scale are so remote from and inscrutable to us that they can have no relevance for understanding human decision making, other than being thought to allow for the sheer possibility of emergent freedom (which would be impossible in a billiard ball cosmos).

So, I am not a dualist, but I think in terms of emergent agency and freedom, and I think this requires that our decisions are not wholly determined by any antecedent events, whether those events are wholly observable events, or inscrutable neural processes.

Quantum entanglement has been observed at the molecular level and over great distances. It is no longer a matter of the small. All matter operates as probabilitistic, yet the myth of determinism goes on.

Hahaha — some humans even evolve regressively.

All matter operates as probabilitistic, yet the myth of determinism goes on. — MondoR

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics#Comparisons

Interpretations, is basically a story. Some are pretty wild. But none claim that the Universe we live in is anything but probabilitistic. Probabilitistic nature is fully baked into quantum physics which makes the universe fully baked probabilitistic in its nature. A point that is conveniently not addressed in modern education which still teaches the billiard ball view of nature. No doubt the primary reason, determinism is still taken seriously on Philosophy forums.

Sure, there must be quantum indeterminacy for freedom to be actual; if everything were wholly causally determined there would be no freedom in the sense required for the idea of moral accountability to be rationally justified. — Janus

I simply... disagree. Not for pragmatic or legal moral accountability, not for abstract ethical one. I agree with you that QM non-determinism is necessary for freedom of the physical outcome, as in non-uniqueness of the relation between prior and posterior state in the temporal ordering. This type of freedom in the very definitional sense, is going to depend on non-determinism. But you are asking me to equate my personal accountability and responsibility to a coin toss, i.e. the aforementioned physical freedom. I think that the two are completely unrelated.

Even if physical non-determinism never existed, and life was just a scripted story, I would be agent "in the story". Because that is what characters are, they save damsels, frogs turn to princes, evil stepmothers try to poison their daughters, etc. Their decisions are what they are described to be, ant they are just as important as ever, accountable for who they are as characters. That is the purpose of the story - to make them accountable for their character. What if kids started to ask, why do we blame the evil step mother, when it is us who tells the story. It doesn't matter, because how the character comes to be is unrelated to who they are. The character is in our head, and they are guilty precisely by design in this case, but that doesn't change the fact.

Nonetheless, because I think that we seem to have fundamentally different idea of morality, I will still test you with a thought experiment, if you would oblige me. Imagine that the universe was completely deterministic with exception of one single fair coin. All murderers in the world have killed with complete physical predetermination of their actions, except one that tosses the said coin. Are you telling me that this person, for you, is the only one that can be held accountable for their actions, based on the flip of this single non-deterministic coin?

Interpretations, is basically a story. — MondoR

It seems very important to you to make sure people realize that everything here is just a story.

To a more complete disclosure, I want to make another example. But I hope that you will answer the above question. Lets say there are two puppets governed by the hands of a puppeteer. One puppet beats the other one. Are they morally responsible, if all their mechanical actions are governed externally. I wold say, sort of, but not when seen merely as a puppet, but when considered in their extended self, which is connected with the master. The puppet doesn't have description of their personality on their own. Their agency, scripted as it may be, is embodied in the master. Thus, the master is responsible, yet, it is evil only in character of the aggressive puppet, not the victim puppet.

I am "in character". If there is will of some sort, in the natural law, in any sense of the word, whichever it may be, determinism or not, intelligent or not, I will be still "in character", even if by virtue of that governing overarching will. My responsibility stems from being the very boundary of the features of this character. I understand your idea of morality, because it requires independence of state, and physical non-determinism can afford that. To you, moral delineation without physical delineation makes no sense. But, first, I don't think that there is enough independence in QM to call for moral accountability, considering what we know about character development and how it is very compellingly affected by the conditions early in life of an individual. And it still remains just a physical nuance, about some spatio-temporal relation, which fails to translate into moral tone for me. After all, non-deterministic outcomes can be scripted, but just not scripted by locally acting physical laws that allow prediction. Even if we are together in this play, and are merely aspects of the same big idea for a script, like with the puppeteer case, even if I am ultimately not truly independent from you, because we are moved by the same forces, I am "bad puppet" by virtue of my connection to the will of the master. I am evil in their mind. Someone has to be evil in their story, and there is no excuse for it, or the story will turn into non-sense. If the master decides to throw a dice here and there, or it seems to me that the story is full of unexplained dice-like turns of events, it doesn't change my character. I am still me, or they are me "in character", whichever our case might really be.

It seems very important to you to make sure people realize that everything here is just a story. — InPitzotl

Pretty much that is what it is. People musing about possibilities. It's the nature of human existence. Every civilization creates it's own mythology. Determinism is one of our great ones. Determinism applied to life is so absurd, one has to wonder have we regressed from Greek mythology.

People musing about possibilities. It's the nature of human existence. — MondoR

Sure. But you're a person, right? It's kind of like you're trying to tell people to believe you because, well, those other people, they're just being people.

I'm not telling anyone to believe me. I'm just saying that if you look at the history, Determinism was just a story concocted by some people with zero evidence to support it. Believe it if you want, but let's not pretend there is any science behind it. There is as much science behind Determinism as they is behind the Sun God riding across the sky. That people believe it, gives lots of insight into the nature of human beings. Mythology exists throughout history. People choose to believe what they want to believe. The Big Bang didn't decide who believes what. An absurdity that I guess some people really believe. I suppose they have proof of such a claim.

I'm just saying that if you look at the history, Determinism was just a story concocted by some people with zero evidence to support it. — MondoR

...that's too hyperbolic to be true. The development of the sciences suggest that the universe follows a set of natural laws. That suggests determinism at least to the degree that we can say there's more than zero evidence for it.

Believe it if you want, but let's not pretend there is any science behind it. — MondoR

But that is meaningless. To hold that indeterminism is true because nobody proved determinism true is to hold truth to a double standard. If one should have to prove determinism to justify it, one should have to prove indeterminism to justify it.

The science is not yet decided on the issue. So the rational thing to do, if you appeal to science, is to likewise remain undecided.

So the rational thing to do, if you appeal to science, is to likewise remain undecided. — InPitzotl

Except determinism makes enormous claims, like the idea that this post I am now writing was predetermined since the Big Bang. When you make such a gigantic claim, you got the burden of proof.

Beside, science has decided on this issue. Modern science is undeterministic, on the whole.

Except determinism makes enormous claims, like the idea that this post I am now writing was predetermined since the Big Bang. — Olivier5

And indeterminism makes enormous claims. Like the idea that things can happen for no reason.

What is or isn’t a “gigantic claim” is a matter of personal preference. Burden of proof already assumes that your position is the “default”. There is no such thing.

And indeterminism makes enormous claims. Like the idea that things can happen for no reason. — khaled

Nope. Just because events aren't predetermined, doesn't imply that they happen for no reason. They just happen for reasons that are not predetermined.

When an atom decays, there's presumably a reason for it, and yet no individual decay event is predetermined to happen during any specific time period.

Likewise I cannot predict precisely when and how I will die, yet I know that I will, and that it'll be for some reason or another...

Let's say I am in the process of deliberating about what to do next - have a cup of tea, or a cup of coffee?

Now imagine that the universe is deterministic and, as such, it is determined that at 3pm I will decide to have a cup of tea.

Now imagine instead that it is indeterministic whether I will be alive or dead at 3pm. And thus it is now indeterministic whether I will decide to have a cup of tea at 3pm or be dead at 3pm.

Does the fact it is indeterministic whether I make the decision to have a cup of tea at 3pm magically mean that I am now free in respect of it?

How on earth does that work?

Except determinism makes enormous claims, like the idea that this post I am now writing was predetermined since the Big Bang. — Olivier5

The concept of "predetermined" is a bit broken. On a deterministic pool table, a cue ball hits a 6 ball, that veers off and hits the 8 ball, and that lands in a pocket. Given the state of the table, and that the cue ball started out with its motion, will the 8 ball sink? Of course it will; that's how determinism works. But predeterminism (especially in the sense applied here) seems to say something distinct, and kind of wrong... something akin to the fact that because the 8 ball sinks due to that cue ball, then the 6 ball had nothing to do with it. But of course it has something to do with it.

Beside, science has decided on this issue. Modern science is undeterministic, on the whole. — Olivier5

Nope; that's just pop-sci myth. Science has not decided on this issue. Schrodinger's equation in quantum mechanics is completely deterministic. Indeterminism comes from application of the Born rule. Interpretations that propose the Born rule ontic tend to suggest indeterminism (and e.g. are susceptible to the measurement problem); but interpretations such as MWI that propose the Born rule emergent are still compatible with determinism. See the link I just posted to this thread. Which is correct? Nobody knows.

Science has not decided on this issue. — InPitzotl

It has not yet totally ruled out some invisible unicorn of determinism, hiding behind the empirical data. That may be impossible to do (although Bell tried). But scientists, in their day to day work, use non-determinist models and tools all the time.

The MWI is a ridiculously expensive hypothesis. It assumes the existence of an infinity of worlds, just for the purpose of denying any shred of hazard in the only world we know of. It's pushing risk intolerance a little to far in my view.

The degree to which the MWI is actually usable, practically speaking, in offering greater control is highly debatable. How do you control which universe you end up in? I want to be in the universe where I win the lottery. Can that be arranged by a kind MWI proponent? If it can't, what good is a formally deterministic theory which gives us no additional control? How is it even testable?

I'd rather go where the data lead me: there is only one world that we know of, and undetermined events happens in it.

It has not yet totally ruled out some invisible unicorn of determinism, hiding behind the empirical data. That may be impossible to do (although Bell tried). — Olivier5

Come to think of it, aren't hidden variables the last refuge of metaphysics?

It assumes the existence of an infinity of worlds — Olivier5

That's incorrect; MWI doesn't assume the existence of an infinity of worlds. Refer to Everett's seminal work "The Theory of the Universal Wave Function". Everett notes that the Born Rule (in the introduction, this is "Process 1") is arbitrary and suspect, and lays out an argument for it. Based on this he tosses the rule out, keeping the Schrodinger Equation ("Process 2"). From here the "many worlds" arise; but they arise from "Process 2".

IOW, the many worlds are not assumed, they are concluded.

But the MWI is a ridiculously expensive hypothesis. — Olivier5

It's pushing risk intolerance a little to far in my view. — Olivier5

At this point you're not practicing science.

How do you control which universe you end up in? — Olivier5

That question presumes that there's an "authentic" identity, and that the issue is to get the "authentic" one to be in the universe you like. I question that underlying presumption.

The degree to which the MWI is actually usable, practically speaking, in offering greater control is highly debatable. — Olivier5

If it can't, what good is a formally deterministic theory which gives us no additional control? How is it even testable? — Olivier5

That sounds a bit backwards... suggesting that we start at our favorite pet theories of free will, then go looking to science to find justification for it.

I'd rather go where the data leads me: there is only one world that we know of, and undetermined events happens in it. — Olivier5

But that winds up with two fundamental mechanics in QM instead of one; and one just merely being a result of a guess. Maybe it's a good guess, but it appears unnecessary as well. I would rather actually see evidence one way or the other. You might prefer to include that rule anyway, but don't pretend that's the data leading you... the data is perfectly consistent with both views.

I'm not telling anyone to believe me. I'm just saying that if you look at the history, Determinism was just a story concocted by some people with zero evidence to support it. Believe it if you want, but let's not pretend there is any science behind it. — MondoR

That is true for anything relying on inductive inference, not so much specifically for determinism. Non-determinism and determinism can be both empirical, in that both can specify the possible range of the outcome. There cannot be any science behind inductive inference itself, because science stands on top of it. We have faith in the reproducibility of nature's relations that is not founded on science. Science is founded on it.

There is as much science behind Determinism as they is behind the Sun God riding across the sky. That people believe it, gives lots of insight into the nature of human beings. Mythology exists throughout history. People choose to believe what they want to believe. — MondoR

That is not precisely true. First, we should come to terms that we cannot talk sensibly (as in by virtue of sense experience) of global determinism vs global non-determinism in a meaningful way, because the two conditions are epistemically indistinguishable. That is, whether the universe tosses dices all the time or is a scripted story is undetectable by observation on a global scale (looking at the entire present and prior spatial configuration of matter). I guess, we could discuss the proposition of global non-determinism metaphysically, but it will be a tenuous conversation with rather uncommitted intuition inspired terminology. And to quote Wittgenstein, although there might be all sorts of invisible forces at play, "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." At least epistemically and scientifically, that I think should be the case. Let's focus on the facts for the moment and leave the nebulous area of metaphysics aside.

What we are actually concerned with is local predictability, and more specifically the constrained sort of predictability that extrapolates the conditions from the vicinity of an object in the recent past to the same location in the near future. Again, even then, whether we actually have a rule for any kind, even probabilistic extrapolation, is unknown. We cannot verify that by definition, because the future contains the events that have no consequences for our moment in time. There is no evidence to be had that our laws will continue to work. The future cannot phone in and tell us whether we are right that nature is going to be always regular. (Even if retrocausation is true in the interpretational sense of QM.)

However, inductive inference is retroactively confirmable. What I mean by that claim is that our expectation for regularity of the natural law in the distant past can be evaluated in terms of the recent past. That still says nothing about the future, but it proves that if the people of the distant past did not think of nature as regular and consistent and did not use their predictive capacity to anticipate the outcome based on precedent anecdotal experience, they would be at a disadvantage. In fact, in the extreme case of complete skepticism to any predictability, they would stall even their routine existence and be extinct. This shows that inductive inference was a good thing for us, retrospectively, and more so explains while we are compelled to trust it. Anyone who didn't trust induction died and left no offspring or culture to reproduce their behavior.

Now, as a philosopher, I cannot tell you that induction and therefore scientific empiricism is right. But being a philosopher is expensive proposition. It is life threatening. Being a pragmatic human being, which is more affordable as a lifestyle choice, I would tell you to trust it and suggest that you will perish if you don't. (In fact, if you didn't trust it at all, I am willing to speculate that we wouldn't be having this conversation.) Yes, I know that I am biased by my culture and genetics, and that philosophically the idea of trusting the future still makes no sense. But I cannot refuse those staples on which my existence thrives anymore then I can refuse to eat. That is, I can, but I dare not think what will commence. This features of faith in induction and statistics are mine to have.

Now, there's something else. In the end, it is through remnants of the past, not direct knowledge of the pas that we understand of our anecdotal experience with nature. You could, I would claim rightfully, in philosophical terms, suspect that those are also taken on faith. You could mistrust even your own memory, written records and artifact history, and doubt whether science was indeed used at all. That immediately implies radical solipsism. Because, if you cant trust anything that has already transpired by the indirect evidence of its occurrence, then you cant trust even your senses. They are also indirect and are not instantaneous. So, philosophically commendable, but self-defeating.

Except determinism makes enormous claims, like the idea that this post I am now writing was predetermined since the Big Bang. When you make such a gigantic claim, you got the burden of proof.

Beside, science has decided on this issue. Modern science is undeterministic, on the whole. — Olivier5

Lets make some distinction between factual non-determinism and absurdism. What I mean by factual determinism is the experience, or at least the conjecture, that more then one possible outcome can arise from a given circumstance. And by saying possible, I mean it in the positivist sense, as in something that will happen at least once someday. Or we are again dealing with nebulous metaphysical statements in some intuition inspired terminological space. With only epistemologically positive considerations in mind, non-determinism has the burden of proof. So does determinism. There is no point of passing the burden around, because both are empirical statements and can be treated on their own. Both are stating something concrete that is subject to sense experience. Inclined non-determinism is different, because it deals with hidden propensities. It is even more presumptuous statement than determinism, because it relies not only on induction, as a prima facie concept, but on statistical induction as well. Both need to be taken on faith, before propensities/inclinations can even be considered as empirical realities. It still has the burden of proof in those new terms.

Absurdism is not epistemic statement, because it is a counter-epistemic attitude. There is no point of talking about burden of proof for absurdity, because it rejects the notion of effective logic. I do not object to the sentiment philosophically. I am tentatively absurdist myself. I just see no value coming from it in epistemic discussions and therefore would refrain from bringing it up. It is just a conversation ender.

Not sure what you mean by Absurdism. Camus? I don't think the world is absurd at all, personally.

What I mean by factual determinism is the experience, or at least the conjecture, that more then one possible outcome can arise from a given circumstance. — simeonz

That's indeed the idea.

Both [determinism and indeterminism] are stating something concrete that is subject to sense experience. — simeonz

How do you propose to test the above conjecture that more then one possible outcome can arise from a given circumstance? It's not so easy, because if you demonstrate empirically that two outcomes can arise from the same initial conditions, a determinist can always say that you must not have exhaustively and perfectly replicated the initial conditions.

The universe appears indeterministic to mainstream science and to common sense. But we can't check. We don't have another universe, that we could watch in fast forward to check that everything always happens the same manner as it did the first time around...

So to me, the question is metaphysical. It matters not. It's like invisible unicorns, all-knowing daemons and hidden variables. Maybe the gods know what the future holds, or maybe not... We certainly don't know. We want to know, and it's a good idea to try to know what the future holds. But we also sense confusingly that we will forever be unable to predict the future, if only because any advanced prediction of a certain outcome may change our response to the situation that would give rise to this outcome, and thus change the outcome itself. Predictions of the future affect the future...

the many worlds are not assumed, they are concluded. — InPitzotl

Concluded from an assumption, therefore assumed as well. This is nitpicking.

That question presumes that there's an "authentic" identity, and that the issue is to get the "authentic" one to be in the universe you like. I question that underlying presumption. — InPitzotl

And I question the presumption that a new me is born everytime an electron in me changes its orbit. Call me crazy.

Asking if a scientific theory is testable is standard procedure. Whether or not you like the theory, if the MWI is not testable, it falls beyond the realm of empirical science.

the data is perfectly consistent with both views. — InPitzotl

Of course. It's also consistent with the existence of invisible flying unicorns.

However, inductive inference is retroactively confirmable. What I mean by that claim is that our expectation for regularity of the natural law in the distant past can be evaluated in terms of the recent past. — simeonz

Regularity (habitual actions) should be confused with determinism. Nothing has ever been shown to be precisely deterministic. They tried, and then came Quantum uncertainty.

Philosophers can and should muse using inductive reasoning. I do all the time. Troubles set in when people begin to claim that their musings has a scientific basis as in the case of Determinism.

Concluded from an assumption, therefore assumed as well. This is nitpicking. — Olivier5

No, it's accuracy. What you're doing is spinning. The key question here isn't whether we should assume multiple worlds; it's whether we should assume the Born rule. Technically, the multiple worlds are there anyway; they're in the wave function. The photon goes through the left slit and it also goes through the right slit. Think also path integrals and Feynman diagrams.

And I question the presumption that a new me is born everytime an electron in me changes its orbit. Call me crazy. — Olivier5

It's not craziness, it's just not science.

Of course. It's also consistent with the existence of invisible flying unicorns — Olivier5

This is a false equivalence. We have good evidence that the Schrodinger equation works. We don't even have a model for when Born rule actually applies (i.e., the measurement problem).

How do you propose to test the above conjecture that more then one possible outcome can arise from a given circumstance? It's not so easy, because if you demonstrate empirically that two outcomes can arise from the same initial conditions, a determinist can always say that you must not have exhaustively and perfectly replicated the initial conditions. — Olivier5

Healthy skepticism is justified, but doubt is not an argument. If we start doubting the exhaustiveness of our observations, we are not going to make any progress. A non-determinist could similarly argue that when the the outcome is perfectly predicted, it is only because not all hidden features were measured, and if they were, some of them would turn out different every time. Which turned out to be true in the case of QM. But that didn't change the fact, that in its scope, Newtonian mechanics did make progress for humanity, and pragmatically speaking was correct. I hinted in my (rather longish) reply that we apply determinism and non-determinism with respect to some narrow amount of conditions, not with respect to all there is potentially to know.

The universe appears indeterministic to mainstream science and to common sense. But we can't check. We don't have another universe, that we could watch in fast forward to check that everything always happens the same manner as it did the first time around... — Olivier5

The universe of QM is not just non-deterministic, but probabilistic, which I paraphrased as inclined non-deterministic. This is not the same as arbitrary non-deterministic. Propensities are counter-factual phenomenon, because they are not testable from finite amount of measurements. If you don't accept statistics as prima-facia instrument of reason, they remain untestable, whereas range-based non-determinsm (either/or outcomes) is confirmable by some amount of measurements. At least retroactively/retrospectively as I explained.

So to me, the question is metaphysical. It matters not. It's like invisible unicorns, all-knowing daemons and hidden variables. Maybe the gods know what the future holds, or maybe not... We certainly don't know. — Olivier5

This is what I call absurdism. I consider this different from non-determinism, even when the range of prescribed outcomes of the latter is trivially all-inclusive. A demonstrable statement should be reproducible to some extent, recurring to some extent, and empirical non-determinism should be demonstrable. Whereas absurdism claims that both determinism and non-determinism are deceptive, transient, incidental. As Shakespeare wrote in King Lear - "As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods; they kill us for their sport." Absurdism claims that the universe does not conform to analytical comprehension. A form of contention to reason.

We want to know, and it's a good idea to try to know what the future holds. But we also sense confusingly that we will forever be unable to predict the future, if only because any advanced prediction of a certain outcome may change our response to the situation that would give rise to this outcome, and thus change the outcome itself. Predictions of the future affect the future... — Olivier5

We consider what the future holds under the hypothesis that we react and that we don't react. If we predict that the future is adverse when we withdraw, we react and thus change it. We evaluate our possible choices - actions and inaction - in accordance to the prediction of their effects. If we predict right, we will change the future precisely as we expect to.

I still want to stress, that induction is not rationally justified. It is pragmatic instrument, that we can infer from retrospective observations is the product of very early natural selection. That still does not verify it.

The development of the sciences suggest that the universe follows a set of natural laws — InPitzotl

There is no such thing as natural laws in science. There are very specific equations that attempt to predict approximate outcomes. The term natural laws are used by philosophers as a way of appearance of science. Shrodinger's equations are science. Determinism is a story.