Sure, one of those worlds may contain a unicorn, but it would have to be shown that it does to meaningfully discuss it; same with the flying. As for the invisibility part, that sounds like an amphiboly. I've never seen my liver either, but I don't think I can call it invisible based on that. — InPitzotl

You can see your liver with a CT scan. Can you see these other worlds posited by MWI?

Can you see these other worlds posited by MWI? — Olivier5

MWI doesn't posit that everything you can think of happens. You need to show there actually is a part of the universal wave function with unicorns on it; otherwise you're just fantasizing. It's the same speculative leaps you would have from positing if there's a planet somewhere in the universe with unicorns on it.

What is the point of this discussion? If you're trying to convince me that MWI is incorrect, you're kind of bypassing everything I hold to be relevant. I think the proper criteria for that (along the view you're arguing) is to show that the SE and the BR is ontic; I don't know how to do that, but certainly arguments from absurdity about universes with flying unicorns are irrelevant.

You call it absurd, I don't. I'm just saying that human beings are contingent. They could never had appeared, or be different than they are. Therefore their reason, our reason, which has at least some natural, evolutionary basis, could also be different. It's at least possible that it be contingent. Otherwise what? God gave us the Logos? — Olivier5

In relation to the human condition, such as morality, the irrationality of our existence lies exactly in the fact that the initial state of the environment are contingent. I agree that our human sensibilities may not be grounded in the natural law, and instead be product of arbitrary initial circumstances. That can most certainly be true and I am inclined to be absurdist in that sense for sure.

But when we consider our analytic faculties, I think that reason arises as consequence from a low-entropy system trying to simulate the external environment in an internal heavily compressed image of the external state and natural laws. And the goal is to anticipate hypothetical outcomes and construct plans that sustain the system. This is oversimplification, because we don't actually simulate our surroundings. Frequently, we just make associations. But there is some approximate probabilisitic homomorphism between the external state and the neurological state. To that extent, some part of being reasonable is arbitrary, as it can never be perfect and it is formed over time, and each organism needs different kind of reason. But the potential for the emergence of approximate probabilistic homomophic representation is what makes the world reasonable. And to me, an absurd world is one where the lack of reproducibility in the local relations between prior and posterior physical conditions and the lack of enough stability, as low-entropy, make such construction impossible long-term. I believe that to be true for this world, ultimately. We are doomed to fail to sustain ourselves. But it is not because of non-determinism, but because there is too much entropy in the world and it increases constantly.

But if you are proposing that the natural law is completely impossible to internalize homomorphically, then this type of analytic absurdism, let's call it that, I propose cannot be reasoned with.

MWI doesn't posit that everything you can think of happens. You need to show there actually is a part of the universal wave function with unicorns on it; otherwise you're just fantasizing. — InPitzotl

Okay so I can't prove that determinism is not lurking somewhere in this infinite number of invisible universes, and you cannot prove that a unicorn isn't hiding in some of them either. That makes us even...

What I meant is, that as long as indeterminism doesn't include the notion of propensities, it is testable by a finite collection of observations. QM is a different kind of indeterminism, which allows the weighing of different outcomes in accordance to hypothesized propensities. Those propensities are actually called counter-factual outside of the multiple worlds interpretation (where they are, we could say, simultaneously factual, if you will) Such counter-factual properties, such as the wavefunction, cannot be confirmed by any amount of observations, although they can be judged by statistical inference - i.e. interval testing, bayesian inference.

But if you are proposing that the natural law is completely impossible to internalize homomorphically — simeonz

Not saying that, just saying that our human reason may not be fit for this purpose. There could be stuff that forever escape us humans, but they would not escape any conceivable species of course. Others could think better than us.

But if some such representation is possible by any species, then the world is approximately deterministic, at least on the necessary scale. And if that is true, then the neurological processes are governed by deterministic laws (assuming they are not influenced by microscopic interactions sufficiently.)

@Olivier5
I should actually make a correction, that my "factual non-determinism" is not verifiable by finite number of observations, but two such hypotheses are distinguishable by finite number of observations. Whereas with QM, two hypotheses may not be ever discernable completely.

that as long as indeterminism doesn't include the notion of propensities, it is testable by a finite collection of observations. QM is a different kind of indeterminism, — simeonz

Ah okay. I guess I go by the QM type then. Didn't know a form of indeterminism existed that did not function with probabilities.

But if some such representation is possible by any species, then the world is approximately deterministic, at least on the necessary scale. And if that is true, then the neurological processes are governed by deterministic laws (assuming they are not influenced by microscopic interactions sufficiently.) — simeonz

A lot of assumptions you got there... The reason in question could be purely probabilistic.

Ah okay. I guess I go by the QM typethen. Didn't know a form of indeterminism existed that did not function with probabilities. — Olivier5

It doesn't. At least not in physics. That was just to clarify that QM non-determinism isn't just some arbitrary outcome. It includes underlying properties (it is counterfactually definite), which make it statistically predictive.

make it statistically predictive. — simeonz

Rest assured that I am well aware of this.

A lot of assumptions you got there... The reason in question could be purely probabilistic. — Olivier5

It still has to guarantee sufficient utility. Meaning it has to be deterministic enough.

Rest assured that I am well aware of this. — Olivier5

Well, then you understand why I don't consider it the opposite of determinism. It still has predictive utility. And consequently it makes certain processes very reliable, whether they can be completely determined or not. So, I doubt that free will can rest on that. Or that we can claim that the prediction-based model of the world is just a fairy tale.

But that's the thing: indeterminism never ever pretended that the world was pure chaos. It just says that the future is not fully determined by the past.

But that's the thing: indeterminism never ever pretended that the world was pure chaos. It just says that the future is not fully determined by the past. — Olivier5

I agree with that. This is how physics works. At least locally. Globally, as I said, we cannot discuss. (I am not alluding to superluminal effects, but to some property that is feature of the initial conditions of the universe and cannot be measured other then by the outcome of the quantum interactions. This is meaningless to talk about, because it is undetectable.)

So, to the extent of QM being locally non-deterministic at a certain scale, I agree. And there is nothing more that can be said about that, I think.

So, I doubt that free will can rest on that. — simeonz

"That" is indeterminism, a metaphysical view of a universe open to novelty, where opportunities happen, where time is not wholly redundant, where something as radically new as life can emerge from inanimate matter.

It's not about total chaos, it's about letting a little lash between the big wheels of determinism, a little play without which those big wheels won't turn.

I personally don't see much of a connection between the question of free will, which in my view is rather straightforward, and the question of determinism vs. indeterminism, a question which I see as at best aesthetical, and at worse metaphysical.

"That" is indeterminism, a metaphysical view of a universe open to novelty, where opportunities happen, where time is not wholly redundant.

It's not about total chaos, it's about letting a little lash between the big wheels of determinism, a little play without which those big wheels won't turn. — Olivier5

But don't you think that lack of determinism within spatially and temporally confined setups, as in the double-slit experiment, is not the same as the suggestion that the universe is not pre-determined. It is just evidence, that it not predictable using the locally acting physical laws. I am not claiming that we can even discuss determinism vs non-determinism other then locally, but I am making the point that we cannot call the universe non-deterministic. It is more accurate to call it locally unpredictable.

question of determinism vs. indeterminism, a question which I see as at best aesthetical, and at worse metaphysical. — Olivier5

I agree with that, I think.

I am making the point that we cannot call the universe non-deterministic. It is more accurate to call it locally unpredictable. — simeonz

If it's locally unpredictable, it is no-deterministic in that sense of the word. It may still be called deterministic in the sense that some predictions can be made at macro scale. Like we can predict that the sun will become a red giant at some point, but not who will win the lottery tomorrow.

If it's locally unpredictable, it is no-deterministic in that sense of the word. — Olivier5

I can shake on that. Although that is the physics definition and this is a philosophy forum, so people may have different intended ideas behind the same term.

It may still be called deterministic in the sense that some predictions can be made at macro scale. Like we can predict that the sun will become a red giant at some point, but not who will win the lottery tomorrow. — Olivier5

I understand. But I meant that, as you yourself remarked earlier, we cannot test whether if we replicate the universe, it would replicate the outcome. Therefore the more metaphysically inclined interpretation of the question is not essential (for physics). We can only talk about our ability to use mathematically expressed locally acting physical relations to predict the outcome. This is, I think, as you said, aesthetically unrelated to the metaphysical debate, which cannot be decided by any scientific discovery.
Or maybe need not be.

Basically, I mean that we cannot talk about non-determinism or determinism at the scale of the universe and its entire history. At least not empirically.

Or maybe need not be. — simeonz

Hey, a little mystery never hurt anyone...

Alright.

I say, we can leave it at that.

See? Miracles happen... :smile:

Free will implication, heh? I'll settle for tonight.

Why are claiming that the person is not their convictions, values and intentions. Are you suggesting dualism? If you are not, what do you propose is the person? — simeonz

The person is the subject of all the possible true descriptions and explanations of her or him.

But you are asking me to equate my personal accountability and responsibility to a coin toss, i.e. the aforementioned physical freedom. I think that the two are completely unrelated. — simeonz

No, I'm not saying that at all. I'm saying that while quantum indeterminacy is necessary if there is to be freedom, In the sense that it allows that we always could have done otherwise, our moral choices cannot be determined (rather than merely enabled) by that indeterminism, but must be determined by the purposeful self or consciousness in order to themselves count as free and determining, as opposed to merely random, choices.

What is or isn’t a “gigantic claim” is a matter of personal preference. Burden of proof already assumes that your position is the “default”. There is no such thing. — khaled

Where I disagree with you is that you assume there must be one true master explanation, and that people merely disagree about what that explanation is. I don't make that assumption; I think there are a plurality of true explanations that cannot necessarily be unified into one overarching true explanation.

Well, then you understand why I don't consider it the opposite of determinism. It still has predictive utility. And consequently it makes certain processes very reliable, whether they can be completely determined or not. So, I doubt that free will can rest on that. Or that we can claim that the prediction-based model of the world is just a fairy tale. — simeonz

What is proposed by the notion of choices, is that humans have exactly the same behavior as quantum particles. The way humans act is by making choices among a spectrum of possibilities, some being more probable than others, because humans act by habit with the additional possibility of a new creative , innovative, thought/action. Actions of humans can be somewhat predicted, e.g. the approximate time I wake up in the morning, but never precisely predicted. Habit is a very important notion at all levels of life.
Humans and quantum particles pretty much act in similar manner, which is no surprise since everything is quantum. Now, the question arises, what gives rise to spontaneous, non-habitual actions?

Interestingly, there is now new research in hospitals that offer intriguing evidence of conscious thought after a person has biological crossed the threshold of death.

https://nyulangone.org/news/new-studies-explore-end-life-cognitive-thought-improved-cardiopulmonary-resuscitation-methods

Humans and quantum particles pretty much act in similar manner, which is no surprise since everything is quantum. — MondoR

Human cells are made of many quantum particles. Neurons and synapses are made of many quantum particles. Admittedly neurotransmitters are not made of as many particles, but to my understanding a few dozen neuroreceptors need to be stimulated simultaneously to cause a neuron to fire. In other words, I doubt that the variance of the event is that significant. We don't accuse other objects at the macro-scale of acting as quantum particles, because the variability in the output of big aggregate systems is very small. Why do that for human beings? This seems rather selective and intentional on our part.

As I said, I am still not sure why tossing dice has anything to do with personal agency. Consider the thought experiment I proposed earlier. All murderers in some hypothetical deterministic world are completely governed in their actions by natural law, save one that has a dice that they use to decide if they should shoot someone. Are they more free? Are they more responsible?