I think this debate is not all about contradiction between existing/non existing God as a perfection. I guess this is an argument that can be put inside the "infinite" realities.
Firstly, it is interesting the quote you used about Leibniz saying perfection is

The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.

It is very complex this one. Because he is speaking about positive realism. So I guess he wants to put a divisional line between tangible and non tangible realities. Let me put another example of this. Descartes said perfection is that realism which even dreaming does not drive to failure. It is pretty similar as yours but one important point here: Awareness.
It will depend a lot of how is interpreted perfection and "God" in our awareness. This is the main reason that probably you used empiricism like David Hume but I will go for John Locke.
First, we have to understand what is abstract concepts as "perfection" "limits" and "God" What if you never heard of these? Well welcome to extreme empiricism. It is just impossible to give characteristics to something or someone that we do not even know yet. So I think this perspective wants to be as much as "limitless" in terms of skills and then we can say that those characteristics always existed but it was our fault not knowing it.

This also answers the objection that not-existing might be better than existing, and that therefore non existence might be a perfection

This one is so awesome. If you want to develop this existentialism debate I recommend you a serie: "Social Experiment Lain". It is free around internet. Explain the perfection of non-existence pretty well and I think is one the most interesting doubts about human existentialism.

Why do you think a subject of perfection is conceivable? Firstly, in theology this gets into problems with the "perfect being" having both a necessary will and a free will. Secondly, it's extremely Platonic to think of virtue as some kind of substance that can exist as an infinite nature. Thirdly, a "supernatural" being cannot really be conceived at all so why speak about it in such a context? Fourthly, infinite such persons would be greater than say 3 so you would have to say there are infinite divine persons in this "perfect" substance. Therefore the arguments proved too much and nothing at all at the same time

To clarify, "supernatural" means divine. "Spiritual" means "of the soul". We can understand the soul because we all have a psyche and the psyche, when operating correctly, is "soul". When people feel "grace" that is what the Chinese call "chi" or "qi". When under the influence of grace your will often feels like someone is giving it to you, but rationalizing about this "person" comes at it from the perspective of philosophy and reason, and this gets into a lot of difficulties. So since we can't really form a proper idea of this divine person or persons, the ontological argument really fails

Also remember that if we look at the Jesus story as ancient literature we have the person in history who was more convinced of anyone that he knew or could prove there was a God, yet as he suffered death he too said God had abandoned him

Ontological arguments have always struck me as a bit fishy. I think this is how they strike most, isn't it?

First, why would it be impossible to conceive of God's non existence? God is morally perfect. But one might think that a God who is morally perfect would not be responsible for having created anything less than perfect - such as this world - and so conclude that God does not exist, and conclude this 'from' his moral perfection.

But even if that kind of reflection is confused and properly conceiving of God does involve conceiving of him existing - which seems quite dubious - that would not conclusively establish his existence, as it is possible to conceive of things that are impossible. For instance, when I mistakenly think that 4 x 93 is 374 I am conceiving of something impossible (for it is not possible for 4 x 93 to equal that figure).

As I understand it, the currently most popular version of the ontological argument is Alvin Plantinga's. I am not too familiar with it, but I think it assumes that God is a necessary existent. And then it exploits this by noting that if we accept that it is metaphysically possible for there to be a necessarily existent God, then such a God must in fact exist. I think that's quite right, but the problem is that God is not a necessary existent, for God is omnipotent and thus can do anything, including taking himself out of existence. Thus those who - like me - believe in God, must conclude that nothing exists of necessity. Which undercuts this kind of ontological argument.

1. “Why do you think a subject of perfection is conceivable?” A subject of all perfections can be conceived means: We can understand the proposition: «There is a subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it is true or false). This passage by Bertrand Russell ilustrates what I mean: «(...) This proposition is composed entirely of intelligible words, and the words are correctly put together. Whether the proposition is true or false, I do not know; but I am sure that it cannot be shown to be selfcontradictory».

2. “Secondly, it's extremely Platonic to think of virtue as some kind of substance that can exist as an infinite nature. ” I never said anything about virtue.

3. “infinite such persons would be greater than say 3 so you would have to say there are infinite divine persons in this "perfect" substance.” Perhaps, that depends on how you define God. If by the «greatest conceivable beaing» we mean «A being greater than all other beings» then it is inconceivable that there should be more than one of them, since then there would be a being that is not inferior to the «greatest conceivable being», namely: the other greatest conceivable being (s).

If, on the other hand we mean only that no greater being can be conceived, then if the proof were valid, there may be more than one, I don't deny that possibility.

4. “To clarify, "supernatural" means divine. "Spiritual" means "of the soul". We can understand the soul because we all have a psyche and the psyche, when operating correctly, is "soul". When people feel "grace" that is what the Chinese call "chi" or "qi". When under the influence of grace your will often feels like someone is giving it to you, but rationalizing about this "person" comes at it from the perspective of philosophy and reason, and this gets into a lot of difficulties. ” That sounds like the experiential ontological argument, which is not the one I have mentioned.

5. “since we can't really form a proper idea of this divine person or persons, the ontological argument really fails” What is the basis of your claim that «we can't form a proper idea of this divine person or persons»? And before that: what do you mean by «proper idea»? I think that needs to be clarified.

6. “Also remember that if we look at the Jesus story as ancient literature we have the person in history who was more convinced of anyone that he knew or could prove there was a God, yet as he suffered death he too said God had abandoned him” What the bible says is irrelevant unless it is proven beforehand that it is divinely inspired, and that Jesus, if he existed, was in fact how the gospels depict him. That is a matter for another discussion.

1. “First, why would it be impossible to conceive of God's non existence? ” «Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction. »

2. “God is morally perfect. But one might think that a God who is morally perfect would not be responsible for having created anything less than perfect - such as this world - and so conclude that God does not exist, and conclude this 'from' his moral perfection.” That is a fair objection. It may be, however, that only God (if he exists) knows the reason why it is morally better to create something imperfect rather than not to (see Leibniz's doctrine of compossibles and also his proposed solution of the problem of evil) (Notice I said «it may be» that way, not that God exists and it is in fact like that).

3. «But even if that kind of reflection is confused and properly conceiving of God does involve conceiving of him existing - which seems quite dubious - that would not conclusively establish his existence, as it is possible to conceive of things that are impossible. For instance, when I mistakenly think that 4 x 93 is 374 I am conceiving of something impossible (for it is not possible for 4 x 93 to equal that figure).» That's an interesting argument. However, you can only say that it is impossible after reflecting upon it. It may be impossible that the subject of all perfections exists, but it is not enough to say that it is, as you say. Whether it is so is still a matter of debate.
Perhaps I can give a clearer picture of the argument with this passage concerning Leibniz:
«(...) Leibniz wrote out a proof that the idea of God is possible (...) This proof defines God as the most perfect Being, i.e., as the subject of all perfections, and a perfection is defines as a "simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express." Leibniz easily proves that no two perfections, as above defined, can be incompatible. He concludes: "There is, therefore, or there can be conceived, a subject of all perfections, or most perfect Being. Whence it follows also that He exists, for existence is among the number of the perfections."» (Source: Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy).

4. «the problem is that God is not a necessary existent, for God is omnipotent and thus can do anything, including taking himself out of existence.» If you define omnipotence like that, then that is obviously correct. But in order to inquire epistemologically into the most coherent and logically viable notion of God (and also to abide to the principle of charity), we should look at all notions of omnipotence that seem as plausible as possible. For instance, one may define omnipotence as the ability to do anything except what is contrary to the laws of logic. That God cannot kill himself may only confirm his omnipotence, since some also define him as immutable, and dying would imply that he could change (if he existed) which is impossible by definition.

5. “Thus those who - like me - believe in God, must conclude that nothing exists of necessity.” See my response to 1, it is a reductio ad absurdum.

Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. — Amalac

I don't see how that follows. God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. So he's 'morally' perfect.

Well, it is easy enough to imagine that there is no morally perfect being. After all, not existing is not a vice, is it?

It seems to me that you are simply using the word 'perfection' as a synonym for 'exists' and then pointing out that if X does not exist, then X's non existence is a perfection (which only follows because you're using the word perfection in that strange way).

But then all you're arguing is that things that exist, exist.

When you say the subject of all perfections does not exist, then if you admit that existence and non-existence are predicates, then that subject must have the predicate of non existence. But in the subject of all perfections, by definition, all predicates that can be asserted truly of him are perfections.

Therefore, non-existence must then be a perfection. But a perfection is "a simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express." But if God merely didn't exist in reality, and didn't also not exist as an idea in the mind, then non-existence would not be a perfection, since it would have limits. (Remember I used the notion of existence in Leibniz's argument from the eternal truths, according to which ideas also exist in a mind which apprehends them)

Therefore, to reject that non-existence being a perfection entails a contradiction amounts to rejecting the definition of «perfection».

When you say the subject of all perfections does not exist, — Amalac

I think God exists. But what exactly are you talking about when you talk of a 'subject of all perfections'? It seems to me that you are simply using this word 'perfection' to mean 'exists'.

For something to be perfect, is for it to be good. I mean "that's perfect, but bad" sounds incoherent.

For something to be good is for it be valued by God.

So, certainly for any perfections to exist, God needs to exist.

And as God will value himself (for he's omnipotent and if he disliked any aspect of himself he could simply change so as to be as he wants) then God himself will be maximally perfect.

Do you disagree with any of that?

Is 'existence' a perfection? No, not necessarily. For what it is for something to be perfect, is for it to be maximally good - maximally approved of by God. Yet the non-existence of many things could maximally be approved of by God, could it not? And thus we cannot say that existence is always and everywhere good, for it is good for some things not to exist. (And so we cannot say that existence is always and everywhere a perfection, given that a perfection is a good quality).

Does God exist? Yes. But I don't think we can get to this conclusion by just noticing that we have the idea of a maximally good being.

If you define omnipotence like that, then that is obviously correct. But in order to inquire epistemologically into the most coherent and logically viable notion of God (and also to abide to the principle of charity), we should look at all notions of omnipotence that seem as plausible as possible. For instance, one may define omnipotence as the ability to do anything except what is contrary to the laws of logic. — Amalac

Well, what's in a word? Let's dispense with the word omnipotence and just talk about being all powerful instead - or, what amounts to the same thing, let's talk of him being able to do 'anything' (which is how Jesus put it, I believe) - as that is the feature God has.

A being who is constrained by the laws of logic is less powerful than one who is not. Thus an all powerful being is not constrained by the laws of logic. An all powerful being makes the laws of logic what they are - for how else could such a being not be constrained by them?

Thus, God, being all powerful, is not constrained by the laws of logic. He can do anything, including destroying himself (and making square circles and such like).

Note how absurd it would be to suppose that I have a power that an all powerful being lacks. I can destroy myself, but an all powerful being cannot? That is a contradiction, surely, as plain as day.

No good simply noting that some 'define' omnipotence in such a way that a being who is unable to do things that I can do qualifies as omnipotent. After all, I can define omnipotence in such a way that I turn out to be omnipotent. Here: an omnipotent being is a being who is writing this post. Well, that's me. I'm omnipotent according to that definition. I mean, I can't do anything - there's very little I can do, in fact - but I'm still omnipotent according to that definition. And I can define omniscience and moral perfection in ways that will guarantee that I am those things too. And thus, bingo, I am an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. And furthermore, I clearly exist. But that is patently not a way of proving God exists, it is rather just to play with words.

So, God is all powerful. And as an all powerful being he can do anything - which is just to say the same thing again. And as he can do anything, he can destroy himself and anything else. Thus nothing exists of necessity. And thus Plantinga's ontological argument and any other that appeals to a necessary existent fails.

1. «The subject of all perfections» is the definition of God I take from Leibniz.

2. No, I am not using the words «perfection» and «exists» as synonimous. What makes you think that's the case?: «a simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.» that's the definition I use, Leibniz's. Existence is only one among other perfections, and certainly does not mean the same as that.

3. «Is 'existence' a perfection? No, not necessarily. For what it is for something to be perfect, is for it to be maximally good - maximally approved of by God. Yet the non-existence of many things could maximally be approved of by God, could it not? And thus we cannot say that existence is always and everywhere good, for it is good for some things not to exist» Fair point. But as I said before, The Law of the Excluded Middle states that the subject of all perfections must either have the perfection of existing, or that of not-existing. And if he did not exist, he would have the perfection of not-existing and consequently be inconceivable, which contradicts the fact that he is conceivable.

Also, see my reply 2 on the previous post.

4. “And as God will value himself (for he's omnipotent and if he disliked any aspect of himself he could simply change so as to be as he wants) then God himself will be maximally perfect.” Then he would not be immutable nor pure act, properties many philosophers often atribute to God.

«a simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.» that's the definition I use, Leibniz'. Existence is only one among other perfections, and certainly does not mean the same as that. — Amalac

I have no idea what that means. "Positive" - what does that mean? Does it mean exists, perhaps? I juts don't know what that definition means.

That's perfect but bad makes no sense, right? Can something be maximally morally good and not perfect? No. So, perfect really means morally good.

If you think otherwise, can you provide an example of something that is perfect yet bad, or fully good yet imperfect?

1. «A being who is constrained by the laws of logic is less powerful than one who is not. Thus an all powerful being is not constrained by the laws of logic. An all powerful being makes the laws of logic what they are - for how else could such a being not be constrained by them?

Thus, God, being all powerful, is not constrained by the laws of logic. He can do anything, including destroying himself.» That is one possible conception of God, yes. But many philosophers would not accept it. For instance, Aquinas would retort that it makes no sense to say that God is constrained by the laws of logic, because God didn't «create» the laws of logic, he is those laws, just as he is, literally, truth (once again, according to Aquinas and other philosophers).

2. «Note how absurd it would be to suppose that I have a power that an all powerful being lacks. I can destroy myself, but an all powerful being cannot? That is a contradiction, surely, as plain as day.» Well, if we follow the notion of omnipotence according to which omnipotence does not involve the ability to do what is logically impossible, then the ability to kill oneself would only make one less great, and to affirm that God cannot kill himself amounts to affirming that God cannot cease to be omnipotent. So no contradictions there (at least I don't see any).

3. «No good simply noting that some 'define' omnipotence in such a way that a being who is unable to do things that I can do qualifies as omnipotent. After all, I can define omnipotence in such a way that I turn out to be omnipotent. Here: an omnipotent being is a being who is writing this post. Well, that's me. I'm omnipotent according to that definition. I mean, I can't do anything - there's very little I can do, in fact - but I'm still omnipotent according to that definition. And I can define omniscience and moral perfection in ways that will guarantee that I am those things too. And thus, bingo, I am an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. And furthermore, I clearly exist. But that is patently not a way of proving God exists, it is rather just to play with words.» True, but all one needs to do to avoid equivocation is to clarify the meaning of the terms used.

I don't hold the view that there is such a thing as the «true» definition of omnipotence, only that some definitions are more useful than others for given purposes.

Not to mention, how do you know that it is more likely that it is impossible to prove God's existence a priori and from his notion alone?

« I have no idea what that means. "Positive" - what does that mean? Does it mean exists, perhaps? I just don't know what that definition means.»

«Leibniz argued that, since perfections are unanalysable, it is impossible to demonstrate that perfections are incompatible— (...)» (Source: Stanford Enciclopedia of philosophy)». «Positive» also cannot be analyzed, because it is a simple quality. But we can understand some words without the need of definitions (otherwise, it would be impossible to understand any word due to the ad Infinitum regress which results from defining the words that define a word).

But if that still bothers you, let's use this definition instead: a simple quality which is absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.

That is one possible conception of God, yes. But many philosophers would not accept it. For instance, Aquinas would retort that it makes no sense to say that God is constrained by the laws of logic, because God didn't «create» the laws of logic, he is those laws, just as he is, literally, truth (once again, according to Aquinas and other philosophers). — Amalac

Yes, but those philosophers are confused and did not have the benefit of being exposed to my argument. I have been exposed to theirs, but not they to mine. And mine is better, is it not?

Plus I have Jesus and Descartes on my side. Who's got the better army?

But anyway, the point stands, does it not? Surely no reasonable person can deny that an all powerful being cannot lack a power that I, a far less powerful being, possess? I mean, how is that not a contradiction?

I have the power to destroy myself. So, God - being all powerful - also has the power to destroy himself, otherwise he'd lack a power i possess and so could not sensibly be called 'all powerful'.

Thus, God does not exist of necessity. For he exists by his own grace and thus exists contingently (as does all else, of course).

And note, you cannot say "ah, but Aquinas disagrees" because Aquinas is not here and hasn't read what I just said. I think there's a very good chance he'd agree if he was!

True, but all one needs to do to avoid equivocation is to clarify the meaning of the terms used. — Amalac

Yes, so God is 'all powerful', and that is one meaning of the word 'omnipotence'. And thus God is omnipotent in that sense of the word.

Now, if someone comes up with another meaning of the word omnipotent - such as 'being able to do all things it is logically possible for one to do' - then that's fine, but the word can no longer correctly be used to characterise God.

Similarly, if I say "God" just means "the sum total of what exists" and then argue that as the sum total of what exists exists, God exists, then although I have proved God, the God I have proved is just "the sum total of what exists" and not an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being.

1.«Yes, but those philosophers are confused and did not have the benefit of being exposed to my argument. I have been exposed to theirs, but not they to mine. And mine is better, is it not?» Is your conception of God better? I don't know, I merely pointed out that it is not the only possible conception.

2.«Yes, so God is 'all powerful', and that is one meaning of the word 'omnipotence'. And thus God is omnipotent in that sense of the word.

Now, if someone comes up with another meaning of the word omnipotent - such as 'being able to do all things it is logically possible for one to do' - then that's fine, but the word can no longer correctly be used to characterise God.»
Only if you hold the dogmatic view that yours is the «true» definition of omnipotence, does «but the word can no longer be used to characterise God» follow.

It's possible that God has the property of omnipotence according to that other meaning, and that you are wrong in thinking that he had omnipotence in an absolute sense. Just because someone defined a term first, that doesn't mean theirs is the «true» definition of a word.

But at any rate, if that bothers you, we may just say: Maybe God does not have the property of being omnipotent, but rather this other property (call it whatever you like) which is like omnipotence but with some limitations. And this may be used to characterise God.

All that we know of good is beauty in the world, the goodness of children, and virtue in adults. Trying to conceptualize a being having all those "to infinity" or whatever is not a sound philosophical move. You can't prove the first step of your argument. It's not a clear and distinct idea like Descartes said so it is not possible to prove anything from it

Descartes implicitly admitted the ontological argument doesn't work unless the idea of God is clearer than all other ideas. I'm saying it's the least clear of all our ideas so the argument doesn't get off the ground. There isn't a new form of the argument. People put it into different language structures and call it modal and whatnot but it's the same all lost cause

1. «All that we know of good is beauty in the world, the goodness of children, and virtue in adults. Trying to conceptualize a being having all those "to infinity" or whatever is not a sound philosophical move» Because you say so?

2.«You can't prove the first step of your argument»

The first step? Do you mean the first premise?:
«A subject of all perfections can be conceived.»
If so, I already clarified what I meant by that:
A subject of all perfections can be conceived means: We can understand the proposition: «There is a subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it is true or false). This passage by Bertrand Russell ilustrates what I mean: «(...) This proposition is composed entirely of intelligible words, and the words are correctly put together. Whether the proposition is true or false, I do not know; but I am sure that it cannot be shown to be selfcontradictory».

Do you deny that we can understand that proposition?

If that is not the «step» you meant, then please point out to me which step it is that I cannot prove.

3. «Descartes implicitly admitted the ontological argument doesn't work unless the idea of God is clearer than all other ideas.» Well, I am not Descartes, so that's irrelevant. (Edit: I now noticed that this is not a reply to me, so ignore my reply if you meant this as a general comment).

4. «I'm saying it's the least clear of all our ideas so the argument doesn't get off the ground.»

How do you know that it is the «least clear of our ideas»?

Plus, perfection doesn't just involve «good». Goodness is only one among other perfections, such as existence. The argument depends on «existence» as a perfection, not of «goodness».

Your arguments have many assumptions woven into them. Maybe ultimate goodness is a place and feeling we experience when we die, not some God out there watching us

1.Let's hear those assumptions then.

2. Again, I don't see what «ultimate goodness» has to to do with the argument. I don't mention goodness even once in the argument I mentioned. The perfection with which the argument deals is «existence» not «goodness».

You mention Pure Act, which is of course from Aquinas. God as understood by Aquinas have 3 parts: his essence, his free will, and his necessary will. Now moral goodness doesn't flow from essence. You can't define goodness by substance. This is not how moral goodness is properly understood. It is impossible for any being to simply possess moral virtue. Morality is act. God's goodness might be seen as infinite possessed goodness, but that couldn't be as good as proper virtue. So let's set essence aside for a moment. So we have necessary will now. Nothing willed necessary is morally perfect. That's obvious.

Also, how would do you reconcile God having one will when he wills necessarily and freely? I thought he was supposed to be perfectly simple.

It is said when talking about the "problem of pain" that God cannot create free creatures who can gain virtue without allowing them pain. However, since God was always happy, couldn't he create creatures more in his likeness (without having to allow pain)? God doesn't face struggle to find happiness. His act of existing is blissful I thought. So we have an infinite deity who loves infinitely but does so with bliss and necessity. And we have his creatures who have animal natures which earns its way in life through strain of their muscles and wits. Doesn't this seem strange to you?

So the conclusion is your idea of God is vague and probably inconsistent, and therefore trying to prove his existence from sheer logic is ridiculous

del

Yes, that is a good formalization of the argument.

You should only add a premise that 2 is true because that is what is implied by non-existence being a perfection, and by the subject of all perfections having that perfection.

then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction. — Amalac

For my money, everything rides on this part of the argument. It's necessary that the greatest being conceivable but nonexistent should lead to a contradiction forcing us to accept that the greatest being conceivable is one that exists.

1. Either nonexistence is a mark of greatness OR Existence is a mark of greatness [premise]

2. Nonexistence is a mark of greatness [assumption]

3. If nonexistence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [premise]

Ergo,

4. The greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [2, 3, Modus ponens]

5. God is the greatest being [definition]

6. God cannot exist in any way possible [4, 5 Substitution: The greatest being = God]

7. If God cannot exist in any way possible then God cannot exist as an idea

Ergo,

8. God cannot exist as an idea [6, 7 Modus ponens]

9. God exists as an idea [premise]

10. God cannot exist as an idea AND God exists as an idea [8, 9 Conjunction, contradiction]

11. False that nonexistence is a mark of greatness [2 to 10 Reductio Ad Absurdum]

12. Existence is a mark of greatness [1, 11 Disjunctive syllogism]

13. If existence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being must exist [premise]

Ergo,

14. The greatest being exists [12, 13 Modus ponens]

14. God exists [5, 14 Substitution: The greatest being = God]

Am I on the right track?

Yes, even better stated.

Yes, even better stated. — Amalac

:ok: Thanks for the thread but I feel something's off somehow, somewhere.

I'll be eagerly waiting for when you find what is off then.