How could it make sense to deny that suppositions are beliefs? — Janus

As I wrote in one of my posts:

To me, the most important insight of Collingwood's essay is that absolute presuppositions are not facts. They are not true or false. They are useful or not useful in the particular situation in which we find ourselves. As I see it, we choose absolute presuppositions, either consciously or, more likely, unconsciously. I'm not sure if Collingwood would agree with that. — T Clark

As you can see, the discussion is on absolute presuppositions.

If suppositions or presuppositions are beliefs, which in accordance with ordinary parlance they indeed are, then absolute presuppositions are absolute beliefs. The logic is inexorable.

If suppositions or presuppositions are beliefs, which in accordance with ordinary parlance they indeed are, then absolute presuppositions are absolute beliefs. The logic is inexorable. — Janus

As I said to Pantagruel, consistent with Collingwood, an absolute presupposition is neither true nor false. It has no truth value. If you and he want to call that a "belief," knock yourselves out, but you are being misleading. Perhaps you argument is with Collingwood and his choice of words rather than with me.

You should not presume to know that Collingwood would have rejected the use of the term belief as a synonym for presupposition. It just doesn't happen to be the term he used is all; to quibble over that thus seems quite pedantic and supercilious, and irrelevant to the OP.

You should not presume to know that Collingwood would have rejected the use of the term belief as a synonym for presupposition. It just doesn't happen to be the term he used is all; to quibble over that thus seems quite pedantic and supercilious, and irrelevant to the OP. — Janus

If you and Pantagruel want to misuse words and misrepresent what Collingwood said in a significant way, have at it. I reserve the right to keep pointing out what you are doing until I get tired of it.

OK, then why don't you explain exactly how substituting the word 'belief' for the word 'presupposition' misrepresents Collingwood. All you have said so far is that absolute presuppositions (in distinction to ordinary presuppositions) can be neither true nor false. I know Collingwood says that; I have read An Essay on Metaphysics. I am not convinced he is right, but that is a separate issue. He could equally have said that absolute beliefs (in distinction to ordinary beliefs) can be neither true nor false.

why don't you explain exactly how substituting the word 'belief' for the word 'presupposition' misrepresents Collingwood. — Janus

We're not talking about presuppositions. We're talking about absolute presuppositions.

See above; I was preempting your objection as you made it.

In Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, I explore a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs, doxai, are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful. — Katja Vogt

I don't know if this is meant to be in answer to my response to you. The passage you quoted presents what Vogt takes Plato to have believed, but I don't see how that has any authority beyond that.

In any case, as I see it, if there is anything that we know, as opposed to merely believe, then it is ("Evil Demon" type skeptical doubts aside) what is apparent to our immediate senses, conventional facts about the world (like for example Paris is the capital of France), and analytic truths.

We might feel that we know what we take to be our intellectual intuitions about metaphysical matters to be true, but that we do know such things is warranted only by our feeling that we do. I can't see how it could be otherwise, and no one has ever convincingly explained to me how it could be.

If I have an experience of such a feeling of metaphysical knowing (and I have had many) I value them aesthetically, but I don't take them to be authoritative, or that thereby I definitely know anything definite about anything.

How could it make sense to deny that suppositions are beliefs? — Janus

(Relative) presuppositions and absolute presuppositions. The absolute usually do not surface, any more than the foundation of your home surfaces - that is, it had better not and if it does you have a problem! Further, if they were mere beliefs, they might be questioned in the way most of us question our own beliefs. But it's RGC's argument that absolute presuppositions simply do not function that way. First, they're rarely explicitly expressed. Second, folks who hold them and are exposed to them are rarely sympathetic to the idea that they're in question. How many folks here at TPF will argue until the cows come home that every effect has a cause? And they have zero interest in the history of that idea, which is that it was partially accepted, then entirely accepted, and is now in some areas of physics not accepted at all. Hardly that a rule of the universe!

And the problem with calling them beliefs is the simple inaccuracy of the label. Anyone who reads RGC can more-or-less understand him reasonably well. Why not use his terminology for his ideas? And if there's a problem with his ideas, best they're argued out using his terms. .

All you have said so far is that absolute presuppositions (in distinction to ordinary presuppositions) can be neither true nor false. I know Collingwood says that; I have read An Essay on Metaphysics. I am not convinced he is right, but that is a separate issue. — Janus

You can't disagree with him. Collingwood defines absolute presuppositions as having no truth value.

What does "absolute belief" mean?

are absolute beliefs. The logic is inexorable. — Janus

"Absolute belief"? This speaks to the believer, yes? And not the thing believed? What is the difference between something "absolutely" believable and truth/knowledge?

And the problem with calling them beliefs is the simple inaccuracy of the label. Anyone wo reads RGC can more-or-less understand him reasonably well. Why not use his terminology for his ideas? And if there's a problem with his ideas, best they're argued out using his terms. — tim wood

As I said to T Clark I know that absolute presuppositions are understood by Collingwood to be beyond truth and falsity, and I am not convinced by that, although I do acknowledge that their truth or falsity cannot be empirically demonstrated.

I know that ordinary presuppositions are truth apt, and presupposition in this context can be synonymous with belief (indeed are if they are taken to be true); so I see no problem with saying that absolute beliefs are not truth apt (even though I might disagree with it just as I might regarding absolute presuppositions).

As to why not use Collingwood's terminology: I think that is a matter of mere taste, and it doesn't matter what you say about Collingwood as long as it does not distort his ideas. I don't see that @Pantagruel has done that; all I see Pantagruel doing is seeking to extend his ideas into another area of inquiry; I don't see Pantagruel taking issue with Collingwood's ideas.

"Absolute belief', in line with Collingwood's terminology, would just be a synonym for 'absolute presupposition' just as 'belief' is a synonym for 'presupposition'. This could also be aligned with Wittgenstein's "bedrock propositions".

I don't even know why I'm bothering to argue about this; I'm buying into the pedantry!

I am not convinced he is right, but that is a separate issue. — Janus

Well, this may be where the matter of interest lies.

From what you have read, Ch. 4, p. 32.
"Absolute presuppositions are not propositions.
"This is because they are never answers to questions; whereas a proposition is that which is stated, and whatever is stated is stated in answer to a question. The point I am trying to make clear goes beyond what I have have just been saying, viz. that the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being peculiar to propositions.... I mean that they are never propounded at all. To be propounded is not their business; their business is to be presupposed. The scientist's business is not to propound them but only to presuppose them."
And so forth.

I know that absolute presuppositions are understood by Collingwood to be beyond truth and falsity, — Janus

You cannot know that because that is not what he says, not his argument. It's nuance, and you have to go back to your book and re-read.

You cannot know that because that is not what he says, not his argument. It's nuance, and you have to go back to your book and re-read. — tim wood

That may be arguable but it's irrelevant. Propositions don't have to be propounded, anymore than beliefs have to be believed or presuppositions have to be presupposed.

If suppositions or presuppositions are beliefs, which in accordance with ordinary parlance they indeed are, then absolute presuppositions are absolute beliefs. The logic is inexorable. — Janus

Not going to gang up on you, so I’ll just say I’m surprised you’d consider presuppositions are beliefs, or, as you say later, are truth-apt. Both of those would seem to make presuppositions congruent with empirical judgements and absolute presuppositions congruent with a priori judgements. Dunno how to justify that, at least from a metaphysical domain.You know...what with logical priority and all.

But you did stipulate “ordinary parlance”, so.....there is that.

That may be arguable but it's irrelevant. Propositions don't have to be propounded, anymore than beliefs have to be believed or presuppositions have to be presupposed. — Janus

What exactly are you arguing, Janus? You're not taking on, not even understanding, what you're caviling about. Word games aren't worth the trouble if you won't take the time to understand how they're being used even in the context you're taking issue with.

Collingwood defines absolute presuppositions as having no truth value. — T Clark

If absolute presuppositions are claimed to be the unquestioned hidden basis of ones worldview, then they exist in their entirety prior to being named and/or picked out to the exclusion of all else.

Given that we're talking about that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming and talking about it, we can be mistaken in what we say about such things.

Collingwood wants to say that these hav no truth value, but is that simply because they've gone unstated, and thus not articulated by the person holding them?

Collingwood wants to say that these have no truth value, but is that simply because they've gone unstated, and thus not articulated by the person holding them? — creativesoul

He does not say that. And they're not propounded (his word); they're presupposed. There's no law against saying them, nor knowing what they are, but there is much confusion about their function.

E.g., no doubt you suppose your mother loves you (I hope). But it's nothing you really question, nor even mention. You simply presuppose it, and likely you absolutely presuppose it, because likely it is never in question, but is itself a ground for other presuppositions, perhaps as your supposing she thinks you're wonderful - in answer to the question, "Does my mother think I'm wonderful?"

Or the idea that all events have causes, or that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, or that a steady stream of virgins thrown into the volcan will keep it from erupting, and so forth. ,

Collingwood wants to say that these have no truth value, — creativesoul

He does not say that. — tim wood

:brow:

I have said that presuppositions don't have to be believed by anyone just as beliefs don't. But if it be said that someone holds a presupposition is that not equivalent to saying that they believe it?

If absolute presuppositions are claimed to be the unquestioned hidden basis of ones worldview, — creativesoul

This is not the case. I take Collingwood's essay as an invitation to question our absolute presuppositions. I think it's true that they are often unexamined, but they should be. From what I can see, Collingwood agrees with that.

Collingwood wants to say that these hav no truth value, but is that simply because they've gone unstated, and thus not articulated by the person holding them? — creativesoul

No, it's not because they are unstated. This next part is my interpretation. I don't remember if Collingwood wrote anything like this - APs (I give up. I'm tired of writing it out) have no truth value because they are metaphysical entities. They are chosen, not discovered. We philosophers, or scientists, or whatever we are, pick the most useful APs so we can play the game we are playing. As I've said, we might not be aware of that choosing. I think a lot of the difficulty between followers of science and those of religion is caused by the fact that we have chosen different APs.

...your mother loves you... — tim wood

Absolutely presupposing the above is something that cannot happen unless one can first say that. Absolutely presupposing the above is one result of an ongoing process. Roughly, it goes like this...

Be loved by your mother. Feel loved by your mother. Learn to talk about it. Have experiences where love is shown, shared, and lived with the individual one calls "mother". Live it often enough and the idea, the belief that your mother loves you becomes unconscious. Then, and not one second before then, can we begin to absolutely presuppose that our mother loves us.

That's a bare minimum criterion of what it takes.

I’m surprised you’d consider presuppositions are beliefs, or, as you say later, are truth-apt. Both of those would seem to make presuppositions congruent with empirical judgements and absolute presuppositions congruent with a priori judgements. Dunno how to justify that, at least from a metaphysical domain.You know...what with logical priority and all. — Mww

Presuppositions can be beliefs, but APs are not. I'm thinking about whether APs are the same as a priori judgements. I think the answer again is maybe.

a steady stream of virgins thrown into the volcan will keep it from erupting, — tim wood

I don't think that is an AP. We don't need to go into it any further.

"Absolute belief"? This speaks to the believer, yes? And not the thing believed? — tim wood

It speaks to both the believer and the belief that they form, have, and/or hold.

Divorcing believer from belief eliminates the very ability to take proper account of either. Basing one's subsequent considerations upon such a split leads the line of thought astray. That much can only be realized by virtue of keeping ourselves from inadvertently severing those connections.

The Gettier problem is built upon divorcing another individual from their belief.

If absolute presuppositions are claimed to be the unquestioned hidden basis of ones worldview,
— creativesoul

This is not the case. — T Clark

Good to know.

Ok. It's time for people to read. Either buy the book, $15 well spent. Or the library, or here in PDF: https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.187414

What he wrote is very clear and no more open for debate than the fact that water boils at 212 degrees at sea level, and it's useless to repeat what he wrote to people who seem only interested in their own ill-informed ideas about a subject they have not even "paid the cold respect of a passing glance."

Absolute presuppositions are not considered, weighed, and chosen, although some scientific theories do evolve them more consciously, and usually when the current idea after an onslaught of new data is no longer tenable. Gravity, for example, a force? But now a field. These in use not themselves questioned but instead used as the ground for other work. Of course gravity itself did become questioned explicitly, resulting in part in new understandings and theories. But in less formal applications, it's still a force. Others: slavery good, homosexuality bad, and these currently exploded. Underlying the failure to understand the nature of absolute presuppositions is the notion that what is accepted now is in fact the case, always was the case, and always will be the case. Which in plain fact is simply not the case at all. I welcome correction on my own expression of these ideas, but the arguments are to RGC, and if folks won't engage with his ideas, then the discussion is a waste of time and effort.

It speaks to both the believer and the belief that they form, have, and/or hold. — creativesoul

They? And how can a belief itself be anything other than a belief? And certainly how can it be absolute?