"But the order of things is the best it can be, since the power of the first cause does not fail the potency in things for perfection." — Gregory

Fair enough, then it's a question whether Leibniz is right or whether Aquinas is right (given some assumptions).
I'm open to both possibilities. What reasons does Aquinas give for accepting that? You can just tell me where you got the quote if you don't want to put it here.

Why is it suspect? — Amalac

Because it undefended. I am not saying it's indefensible, but you have not given a reason to think we can turn all our ideas of good into a single subject. The argument you used in the OP to "prove" this subject exists is just a "bait and switch" linguistic tactic and it's not going to fool people who read philosophy

Fair enough, then it's a question whether Leibniz is right or whether Aquinas is right (given some assumptions).
I'm open to both possibilities. What reasons does Aquinas give for accepting that? You can just tell me where you got the quote if you don't want to put it here. — Amalac

That was from the Summa Theologica I believe. I do not have the exact article from that work but I wrote down that sentence when I was reading the Aquinas's works. According to Aquinas God could create infinite universes so this one is relatively perfect, but God could always have created greater ones. Leibniz thought this was THE greatest universe, period. Leibniz believed in the ontological argument, Aquinas did not. You're version of it is not stronger than Anselm's or Descartes or Malebranches's or Leibniz's. You just choose a different way to try to trip up the reader, AND I don't say this to put you down but just to be objective. You obviously like these kinds of ideas/arguments and I do to. But again they say much about the mind but say nothing about what is outside the mind.

you have not given a reason to think we can turn all our ideas of good into a single subject. — Gregory

I'm open to the possibility that there may be more than one subject of all perfections, provided we define that subject also as one such that nothing more perfect or better can be conceived.

But if such a subject is defined as also being greater than all other beings without exception, then clearly there can only be one.

The argument you used in the OP to "prove" this subject exists is just a "bait and switch" linguistic tactic and it's not going to fool people who read philosophy — Gregory

Again you just make assertions and don't give a reason to accept them. It may be that it is only a linguistic trick, but it is not enough to say that it is, you should give a reason to accept that claim.
And like I said before, I only mentioned it because I thought it was a curious idea. I don't claim that I know with certainty that it is valid.

You're version of it is not stronger than Anselm's or Descartes or Malebranches's or Leibniz's. You just choose a different way to try to trip up the reader, AND I don't say this to put you down but just to be objective. You obviously like these kinds of ideas/arguments and I do to. But again they say much about the mind but say nothing about what is outside the mind. — Gregory

1.I never claimed it was. It may or may not be weaker, stronger or as strong. That's what I want to find out.

2. Don't worry, since I don't think the argument proves that God exists, it doesn't put me down. (That is to say, I don't assert that it is certain that it is valid)

3. As for your claim that they say nothing about what is outside the mind, once again: give a reason for accepting that or it's just a bare assertion. At worst, it still says «much about the mind» as you say, and it may help clarify some logical and epistemological matters.

You say (1) we have the idea of perfection. (2) existence is a perfection "which would imply that it would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind. Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind"

Youre just playing with logic. We can think that we have an idea of perfection. But again, does that idea have a consistent form in our minds and does it accord with something outside our minds? You don't have the crucial form of an argument because you use a linguistic trick. You haven't laid out a clear argument really for anything

You say (1) we have the idea of perfection. — Gregory

I first gave a definition of perfection, then I said we have the idea of the subject (or a subject) of all perfections.

(2) existence is a perfection "which would imply that it would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind. Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind" — Gregory

Which would imply the subject of all perfections (not perfection) would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind.

Youre just playing with logic. We can think that we have an idea of perfection. But again, does that idea have a consistent form in our minds and does it accord with something outside our minds? You don't have the crucial form of an argument because you use a linguistic trick. You haven't laid out a clear argument really for anything — Gregory

Once again you are trying to say that I say perfection=God, but what the argument says in that regard is:

1. There is more than one perfection.

2. A subject of all perfections can be conceived.
That we (or at least I) can conceive of a «perfection» (perfections rather) is shown by the fact that I understand the definition of it given by Leibniz: «A simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express», and in fact can understand it without the need of clarifying it further.

If you don't understand it, then there is nothing I can reply to that.

If you think there is something self-contradictory about that definition, I will listen to that contradiction.

1, Semantic distinctions are tangential to the core issue.

2. As a human being, the only kind of thinking I can have both an idea of, and a direct personal experience of, in the first person, present tense mode, is a kind of thinking that is open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. What I call contingent thinking, or human thinking.

Nothing prevents me from entertaining the idea of a kind of thinking that is closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. What I call necessary thinking, or divine thinking.

But logical thinking, which is human after all, cannot enable me to have also a direct personal experience of this kind of necessary thinking, in the first person, present tense mode.

Logical thinking is not divine. Logical thinking has its limits, and this is one of them.

3. I am not pretending to know God's essence. What I am speculating about is one way in which divine thinking might differ from human thinking, if the divine existed, by extending certain basic principles derived from Descartes' epistemology.

4. Human thinking is the idea of an: "While I think contingently, I exist contingently," which idea I can experience in the first person, present tense mode.

5. But Divine thinking is the idea of an: "While I think necessarily, I exist necessarily," which idea I cannot experience in the first person, present tense mode.

"Leibniz' definition of perfection is: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. (Source: Monadology)"

Let that be the definition.

"For the following argument, I shall also use the notion of existence given by Leibniz, specifically from his argument from the eternal truths, according to which eternal truths (eg: 2 • 2 = 4) exist in the mind that apprehends them. The proof, which is a new form of the ontological argument, can be formulated like this: A subject of all perfections can be conceived."

Ok

"Said subject either exists or does not exist."

Of course

"If existence and non-existence are predicates, then either existence is a perfection or non-existence is a perfection."

Existence is a perfection

"When existence is a perfection, then in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that it would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind."

If it exists yes.

"Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind."

FALSE. It exists only in the mind so far

"Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind."

FALSE. It exists only in the mind so far

"But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction."

NO. The idea that it exists as perfection exists in the mind but there is no argument so far that absolute perfection must exist

"And therefore this assumption must be false. From which it follows that God has the perfection of existing, that is: He exists."

So why are you now retracting and saying you are no talking about God.


"Hume's objection to the original argument is the following: «I will begin by noting that there is an obvious absurdity in the claim to prove a factual point, or to prove it with a priori arguments. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies contradiction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies contradiction. Everything that we can conceive as existing, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is, therefore, no being whose non-existence implies contradiction. Consequently, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and I am willing to let the entire controversy depend on it.'
But we see that if this new argument were valid (which I neither affirm nor assure), the manifest contradiction would be that if God did not exist outside the mind, he would not exist as an idea in the mind either."

FALSE. The idea is an idea only. Getting from idea to REALITY was the goal, right?

"This also answers the objection that not-existing might be better than existing, and that therefore non existence might be a perfection."

It doesn't answer that at all. Non-existence of a good is not a perfection. But you presented not one argument for anything. No argument was presented.

"It does not, however, answer the objection that existence is not a predicate."

It's not a predicate if its absolute. Something may lack something, but the non-existence is not a predicate

"Thoughts?"

You are being really dumb

"1. Either nonexistence is a mark of greatness OR Existence is a mark of greatness [premise]"

Existence us

"2. Nonexistence is a mark of greatness [assumption]"

False


"3. If nonexistence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [premise]"

Yes

"4. The greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [2, 3, Modus ponens]"

Outside our thoughts, yes

"5. God is the greatest being [definition]"

In thought

"6. God cannot exist in any way possible [4, 5 Substitution: The greatest being = God]"

Outside us

"7. If God cannot exist in any way possible then God cannot exist as an idea"

THERE is the problem. You go from saying God can't exist in any way is non-existence is a perfection. God exists in our thoughts and the thought is that his existence is a perfection. HOWEVER, it does not prove he is outside our thoughts to say we have the thought of him existing even is non-existence cannot be a predicate

"8. God cannot exist as an idea [6, 7 Modus ponens]"

9. God exists as an idea [premise]"

God can exist as an idea

"10. God cannot exist as an idea AND God exists as an idea [8, 9 Conjunction, contradiction]"

You didn't prove this contradiction exists

"11. False that nonexistence is a mark of greatness [2 to 10 Reductio Ad Absurdum]"

Obviously

"12. Existence is a mark of greatness [1, 11 Disjunctive syllogism]"

Obviously

"13. If existence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being must exist [premise]"

FALSE

As a human being, the only kind of thinking I can have both an idea of, and a direct personal experience of, in the first person, present tense mode, is a kind of thinking that is open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. — charles ferraro

1.The complete cessation and non-existence of what? Of anything?

2. Why are you only open to that kind of thinking?

But logical thinking, which is human after all, cannot enable me to have also a direct personal experience of this kind of necessary thinking, in the first person, present tense mode. — charles ferraro

The argument is a priori, which means precisely «independent of any experience», just as I don't need experience to know that 1638373783 is an odd number. The difference is that unlike mathematical truths it is not nearly as self evident, and I don't know if it is valid. But if you are going to say the argument depends upon the experience of the divine, it seems to me you are mistaken. That applies only to experiential ontological arguments. Earlier you said:

The point being that your argument is false precisely because you do not recognize that it must depend upon that experience in order to be true. — charles ferraro

Then when I asked you why if the argument is not a posteriori then it can't be valid, you just repeat that it can't be. Seems to me like circular logic.

Logical thinking is not divine. Logical thinking has its limits, and this is one of them. — charles ferraro

And how do you that it has a limit that makes the argument invalid?

I am not pretending to know God's essence. What I am speculating about is one way in which divine thinking might differ from human thinking, if the divine existed, by extending certain basic principles derived from Descartes' epistemology. — charles ferraro

Did I say that you claimed to know God's essence? No, I said:

If, on the other hand, you mean that God's existence cannot be proven a priori because we do not know God's essence (like Aquinas maintained) it is not enough to say that that is so, if you want your position to be convincing. Tell us how you know that we DO NOT know God's essence. — Amalac

But Divine thinking is the idea of an: "While I think necessarily, I exist necessarily," which idea I cannot experience in the first person, present tense mode

That is not «divine thinking», that's just Descartes' cogito, and it's not relevant to the argument.

"If existence and non-existence are predicates, then either existence is a perfection or non-existence is a perfection."

Existence is a perfection — Gregory

"1. Either nonexistence is a mark of greatness OR Existence is a mark of greatness [premise]"

Existence us — Gregory

But do you accept that those disjunctions are true? If you do, then either p or not p must be true, where p is «Existence is a perfection» and not p is «Non-existence is a perfection».

"Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind."

FALSE. It exists only in the mind so far — Gregory

If the proposition «the subject of all perfections does not exist» is true, and you admit that existence and non-existence are predicates, then said subject (precisely because it does not exist) must have the predicate «non existence» (non existent subjects have predicates too). But what is it that has such a predicate? The subject of all perfections, and it follows from the definition of perfection that said predicate, since it is a perfection, must be expressed without any limits, and if that's true, then necessarily it can't also not not exist as an idea in the mind, for otherwise it would not have that perfection, meaning non existence would not be a predicate of it, which contradicts either the disjunctions or the Law of the Excluded Middle.

How can you deny that when you yourself accept premise 3?:

3. If nonexistence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [premise]"

Yes — Gregory

And since God exists as an idea, that is a fact that contradicts the idea that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of non-existence (since he does exist in that way: as an idea in the mind). Whence it follows that the assumption that non-existence is a perfection must be false. And because of the disjunction, the only possibility is that existence is a perfection, from which it follows that said subject must exist not only as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind.

"Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind."

FALSE. It exists only in the mind so far — Gregory

What leads to that conclusion is the assumption that non-existence is a perfection, and since God exists «only in the mind so far», that can't be the case. Therefore, via Reductio ad Absurdum (Proof by Contradiction), we conclude that the only possibility , in view of the disjunctions and the Law of the Excluded Middle, is that existence is a perfection, from which it follows that said subject exists not only as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind, for to say that the subject of all perfections exists only as an idea in the mind is to deny the only possibility that we have left.

"But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction."

NO. The idea that it exists as perfection exists in the mind but there is no argument so far that absolute perfection must exist — Gregory

1.Do you deny that the subject of all perfections exists as an idea in the mind? If you don't, and you accept the previous premises and steps, you must also accept what you have quoted right there.

If you do, then you must hold that the subject of all perfections is inconceivable. But the fact that we (or at least I) can understand the proposition «There is a subject of all perfections» contradicts that claim. Unless you say that you don't understand that proposition, in which case this argument won't convince you.

Remember that the notion of existence (the one used in Leibniz' argument of the eternal truths, which you accepted) I mentioned implies that what exists as an idea in the mind also, in some sense, exists (with said predicate either being a perfection, or not; in the latter case whatever has that predicate only exists as an idea in the mind, but not in the former case) and the same applies, the other way around, to non-existence.

2. Again, the argument does not attempt to prove that «absolute perfection» exists, rather it attempts to prove that «the subject of all perfections» exists.

"And therefore this assumption must be false. From which it follows that God has the perfection of existing, that is: He exists."

So why are you now retracting and saying you are no talking about God. — Gregory

I am not retracting, when for example I said that the subject of all perfections might be a «state», I meant that God (defined as the subject of all perfections) might be a «state» (until I read one post of yours that I skipped, and realized that you were talking about a «mental» state.)
I am not assuming that God must be a person, as I said previously.

"This also answers the objection that not-existing might be better than existing, and that therefore non existence might be a perfection."

(...)Non-existence of a good is not a perfection (...). — Gregory

1. «Non-existence of a good»? Non-existence of the subject of all perfections is what that part of the argument asserts.

2. Do you deny the disjunctions then? If you say non-existence is not a perfection, either you deny the disjunctions or you accept that existence is a perfection. If you deny the disjunction, then you must hold that the proposition «God exists» is neither true nor false, that it is meaningless/nonsense.

If you say that existence is a perfection and don't deny the disjunction, then necessarily the subject of said perfections must exist (for the reasons given above: it follows from the definitions that you have accepted and the remarks on this comment). To reject this is to reject the definitions of «perfection», «the subject of all perfections» and/or «exists».

"4. The greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [2, 3, Modus ponens]"

Outside our thoughts, yes — Gregory

1. If you mean that the greatest being can exist outside our thoughts, remember that what the argument asserts here is the following: IF non-existence is a perfection, then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible. IF that's true, then obviously it can't exist outside our thoughts either.

If you mean that It only cannot exist outside our thoughts but may exist in our thoughts, If it cannot exist in any way possible (If you accept 2, 3 and Modus ponens), it can't exist in our thoughts either, for then he would exist as an idea in the mind, which contradicts the definition of non-existence as a perfection, since it would then be limited and not a perfection.

And if you deny that non-existence could be a perfection while accepting the disjunctions, then you must, as I said, accept that God must have the perfection of existence, that is: He must exist.

"7. If God cannot exist in any way possible then God cannot exist as an idea"

THERE is the problem. You go from saying God can't exist in any way is non-existence is a perfection. God exists in our thoughts and the thought is that his existence is a perfection. HOWEVER, it does not prove he is outside our thoughts to say we have the thought of him existing even is non-existence cannot be a predicate — Gregory

You go from saying God can't exist in any way is non-existence is a perfection.

No, the argument says: IF non-existence is a perfection, THEN God cannot exist in any way possible, not the other way around. This is setting up a Reductio ad Absurdum.

God exists in our thoughts and the thought is that his existence is a perfection.

No, «God exists in our thoughts» means: we can conceive of the subject of all perfections, which means we can understand the proposition: «There is a subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it's true or false). It does not mean: «God's existence is a perfection».

it does not prove he is outside our thoughts to say we have the thought of him existing even is non-existence cannot be a predicate

It does if you accept that the disjunctions are true, and if you accept the definitions.

"12. Existence is a mark of greatness [1, 11 Disjunctive syllogism]"

Obviously

"13. If existence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being must exist [premise]"

FALSE — Gregory

If you accept 12 you must accept 13, for to deny 13 while accepting 12 is to deny either that existence is a perfection or a mark of greatness, or the definitions given. Remember that the «greatest being» is in the argument synonimous with «the subject of all perfections».

The argument (in summary) is that if the proposition «The subject of all perfections does not exist» were true, then necessarily non-existence would be a perfection of said subject, which would imply a logical contradiction, which would then imply that the proposition «God does not exist» must be false.

"But do you accept that those disjunctions are true? If you do, then either p or not p must be true, where p is «Existence is a perfection» and not p is «Non-existence is a perfection»."

I said existence is a perfection. I wont repeat that

"If the proposition «the subject of all perfections does not exist» is true, and you admit that existence and non-existence are predicates, then said subject (precisely because it does not exist) must have the predicate «non existence» (non existent subjects have predicates too)."

Of course. To not exist is to not exist

"The subject of all perfections, and it follows from the definition of perfection that said predicate, since it is a perfection, must be expressed without any limits, and if that's true, then necessarily it can't also not not exist as an idea in the mind, for otherwise it would not have that perfection, meaning non existence would not be a predicate of it, which contradicts either the disjunctions or the Law of the Excluded Middle."

False on every point. The LEM has nothing to do with this. God exists only as an idea

"And since God exists as an idea, that is a fact that contradicts the idea that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of non-existence (since he does exist in that way: as an idea in the mind)."

I never said God has the perfection of non-existence but the fact that one can have a vague notion of him does not mean he exists or does not exist

Whence it follows that the assumption that non-existence is a perfection must be false. And because of the disjunction, the only possibility is that existence is a perfection, from which it follows that said subject must exist not only as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind."

Existence is a perfection, a perfection only this world has.

"1.Do you deny that the subject of all perfections exists as an idea in the mind? If you don't, and you accept the previous premises and steps, you must also accept what you have quoted right there.
If you do, then you must hold that the subject of all perfections is inconceivable. But the fact that we (or at least I) can understand the proposition «There is a subject of all perfections» contradicts that claim. Unless you say that you don't understand that proposition, in which case this argument won't convince you.
Remember that the notion of existence (the one used in Leibniz' argument of the eternal truths, which you accepted) I mentioned implies that what exists as an idea in the mind also, in some sense, exists (with said predicate either being a perfection, or not; in the latter case whatever has that predicate only exists as an idea in the mind, but not in the former case) and the same applies, the other way around, to non-existence.
2. Again, the argument does not attempt to prove that «absolute perfection» exists, rather it attempts to prove that «the subject of all perfections» exists."

All you are SAYING is that you have the idea of God. That's not going to get it into someone else's head by the laws of logic unless you have a true argument, which you CLEARLY do not

"If you say that existence is a perfection and don't deny the disjunction, then necessarily the subject of said perfections must exist (for the reasons given above: it follows from the definitions that you have accepted and the remarks on this comment). To reject this is to reject the definitions of «perfection», «the subject of all perfections» and/or «exists»."

There is no moving "two ideas" you are using. There is one idea, that you have an idea of God. Where is the other idea

"1. If you mean that the greatest being can exist outside our thoughts, remember that what the argument asserts here is the following: IF non-existence is a perfection, then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible. IF that's true, then obviously it can't exist outside our thoughts either."

God doesn't exist outside our thoughts within the paradigms of this discussion. Nothingness has nothing to do with the argument. You have a premise "I have an idea of God" and nothing else. Don't use that "nothing" as an argument.

"If you mean that It only cannot exist outside our thoughts but may exist in our thoughts, If it cannot exist in any way possible (If you accept 2, 3 and Modus ponens), it can't exist in our thoughts either, for then he would exist as an idea in the mind, which contradicts the definition of non-existence as a perfection, since it would then be limited and not a perfection.
And if you deny that non-existence could be a perfection while accepting the disjunctions, then you must, as I said, accept that God must have the perfection of existence, that is: He must exist."

False. Modus ponens and all forms of argument require more than one premise.
You have one premise "I have an idea of God"

"This is setting up a Reductio ad Absurdum"

There is no reduction except of your words to one premise "I have an idea of God". I don't care if you have an idea of God, I don't care FOR your idea of God, your game you have devised is boring, and your agenda is clear

"The subject of all perfections does not exist» were true, then necessarily non-existence would be a perfection of said subject, which would imply a logical contradiction, which would then imply that the proposition «God does not exist» must be false."

But Divine thinking is the idea of an: "While I think necessarily, I exist necessarily," which idea I cannot experience in the first person, present tense mode. — charles ferraro

There.

Maybe you think you are God. Oh well

1. The occurrence of my personal thinking along with the simultaneous occurrence of my personal existing are open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. In this sense they are both contingent.

2. No one knows why the occurrence of my personal thinking and the occurrence of my personal existing are open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence; i.e., are contingent. They just are.

3. I am "only open to this kind of thinking;" viz.; contingent thinking, because I cannot engage in any other kind of thinking. All my thinking is contingent. If I could engage in necessary thinking, which I cannot, I would be divine, because my existence would also be necessary.

4. Descartes' Cogito Sum is primarily an existentially consistent and existentially self-verifying performance which must be executed in the first person, present tense mode. It is not originally a proposition, although it can be expressed as one; viz., Cogito, ergo Sum. In other words, if, whenever, and while I am thinking in the first person, present tense mode, I will simultaneously have an indubitably certain intuition of the truth that I must be existing. Any attempt on my part to try to perform the opposite in the first person, present tense mode will be existentially self-defeating. But my thinking and my existing are inherently contingent.

5, I think issues revolving around the Cartesian notions of Contingent and Necessary Thinking and Existing are extremely relevant to all ontological arguments, including yours, even if you persist in preferring not to think so.

1. The occurrence of my personal thinking along with the simultaneous occurrence of my personal existing are open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. In this sense they are both contingent. — charles ferraro

I agree, but I don't see what that has to do with the argument.

2. No one knows why the occurrence of my personal thinking and the occurrence of my personal existing are open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence; i.e., are contingent. They just are. — charles ferraro

How does that relate to the argument exactly?

3. I am "only open to this kind of thinking;" viz.; contingent thinking, because I cannot engage in any other kind of thinking. All my thinking is contingent. If I could engage in necessary thinking, which I cannot, I would be divine, because my existence would also be necessary. — charles ferraro

Oh, so that's what you meant by that. I thought you meant that you only accept the «kind of thinking» that rejects right off the bat that the existence of anything can be proven a priori.

Now, if what you are saying is: The existence of something cannot be proved a priori using «contingent thinking» (meaning, someone whose thinking can cease to exist cannot prove the existence of anything a priori) , but only through «necessary thinking», i.e. that only God (if he existed) could prove his existence a priori, then:

1. I ask: how do you know that that is true?

2. It seems to me that such a view leads to the kind of paradox that Leszek Kolakowski pointed out as follows:

The reason Thomists were opposed to the (ontological) argument was that it seemed to endow our fallible intellect with too much power: we can, in fact, conceive of God as non-existent, the Thomists say, not because his existence is not really included in his essence, but because of the weakness of our reason; In short, we are so mentally weak that we can be atheists. It might be suspected, although St. Thomas did not say it in these terms, that St. Anselm's reasoning exhibited a certain hubris, an unacceptable confidence in the skill of philosophy; In Thomist terms, the only path that leads to God and that is within the reach of natural lights (that is, apart from revelation and the rare gift of mystical union) begins with the imperfection and non-self-sufficiency of creatures and not by our knowledge of the nature of God.

It might even be appropriate to say that for thomists the ontological argument is valid, but that only God can understand its validity (which, however, seems to lead us to an antinomy, just like a statement of the form 'A is valid but only God can know why "implies" I know that A is valid, but I cannot know that it is. "Thus, the content of the sentence would be negated by expressing it, in a way not very different from what would happen if we said:" I am unable to say a single word in English "or" I'm mute ").

(Source: If there is no God...)

Unless of course you accept that the existence of God has not been proved yet by any argument at all, as I do.

In your attempt to mechanize an abstract logical puzzle so that it can be told to society "a computer can prove there is a God", consider that if we mechanize the barber paradox and set it side by side with yours, a computer would say relativism is true. The barber shaves those and only those who do not shave themselves. Think of those being shaven as holding the razor away from themselves. So the barber shaves those and only those who hold the razor away form themselves. So the barber does not shave himself. He does not shave himself because he shaves only those who not shave themselves. Even if he shaves everyone who does not shave themselves, he still couldn't shave himself. But as TPR member Srap Tasmaner said here awhile back:

"Let S be the set of all men who don't shave themselves.
P is a member of S.
To be a member of R, you have to shave all the members of S.
Since P is a member of S, to be a member of R he would have to shave himself.
But he doesn't.
Therefore P is not a member of R."

Check out my thread on the barber paradox if you want to see other renditions which explain how this expounds to infinity (and I always want to, again, give credit to Srap for the above). These kind of ABSTRACT logic puzzles can go on forever and if you set your "argument" side by side with the barber paradox a computer can come up with the solution of "infinity" as in the sense of a spurious infinity of relativity

Though I already know about the barber paradox, I will check out your thread when I have the time.

I'm not trying to PROVE the existence of anything! You are!

All I'm saying is that the occurrence of NECESSARY thinking and existing cannot be EXPERIENCED by a human being in the first person, present tense mode. Only the occurrence of CONTINGENT thinking and existing can be EXPERIENCED by a human being in the first person, present tense mode.

And you're claiming that this fact has no bearing on whether an ontological argument for the existence of God is feasible? Not true or false, but feasible?

I beg to disagree!

The only kind of thinking and existing human beings can experience, in the first person, present tense mode, is contingent, i.e., vulnerable to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. Ontological arguments, in one way or another, try to contest this fact. Ontological arguments claim that necessary thinking and existing can also be experienced by human beings, in the first person, present tense mode.

Ontological arguments can, at most, only prove the occurrence of human ideas of necessary thinking and necessary existing. They cannot, and do not, prove the occurrence of human experiences of necessary thinking and existing, in the first person, present tense mode.

If not necessary thinking and necessary existing, then what would an ontological argument argue for?

I'm not trying to PROVE the existence of anything! You are! — charles ferraro

No, I'm not trying to prove anything either, I only mention that this is an argument that can be presented, I don't maintain, like some theists who defend some form of ontological argument would, that it's certainly valid or even more likely to be valid than not.

All I'm saying is that the occurrence of NECESSARY thinking and existing cannot be EXPERIENCED by a human being in the first person, present tense mode. — charles ferraro

1. That the occurrence of necessary or divine thinking cannot be experienced by a human being is obviously true, since said «occurrence» could only be experienced by God, in God's mind (which is doing the «necessary thinking») (if he exists). But the argument does not imply that one has that experience.

2. You use the term «experience» in a strange way:

I may experience pain or a cold sensation for example. But if, hypotetically, I said that I can prove the existence of the subject of all perfections a priori, and that it exists necessarily, does that mean I am «experiencing necessary existence» or «experiencing necessary thinking» in the same way as I experience pain or a cold sensation? No, because «I can prove that X exists necessarily» does not equal «I am experiencing necessary existence» nor «I am experiencing X's necessary existence», nor «I am experiencing necessary thinking» (where «necessary thinking» means «God's thoughts») in the usual sense of the term «experience».

If by «the occurrence of NECESSARY thinking and existing cannot be EXPERIENCED by a human being in the first person, present tense mode.» you mean « It can't be the case that a human being thought or conceived as an idea that the subject of all perfections exists necessarily», then once again I say you must give a basis for the claim that that is impossible.

So now I need to know what you mean by «experience» in order to make the discussion clearer.

Ontological arguments claim that necessary thinking and existing can also be experienced by human beings, in the first person, present tense mode. — charles ferraro

No, they claim the subject of all perfections exists necessarily, that is not the same as «necessary thinking and existing can also be experienced by human beings, in the first, present tense mode».

If not necessary thinking and necessary existing, then what would an ontological argument argue for? — charles ferraro

They argue that the subject of all perfections exists necessarily, «The subject of all perfections exists necessarily» ≠ «necessary thinking and necessary existing»

[reply="Amalac;506998"

I think it would be more measured to say that I use the term "experience" in a way you choose not use it. I do think your use of the word "strange" conveys an unwarranted negative value judgment. Perhaps I think your use of the same term "experience" is not comprehensive enough and somewhat narrow.

Experience = whatever I can encounter. I can encounter objects as objects. I can encounter my consciousness (thinking) as an object. I can encounter my consciousness (my thinking) as a subject.

But, I cannot encounter the other's consciousness (the other's thinking) as a subject.

Excuse me, I don't know why, but your use of the term "the subject of all perfections" reminds me of the term "the great wizard of Oz." I think my ability to experience your "subject of all perfections" (by the way, how do you define a subject and perfections?) is less likely than my ability to experience "the great wizard of Oz."

So, let me see if I understand correctly. I must believe that some, or all, ontological arguments are capable of convincing me of the truth of the idea that a purported subject of all perfections exists necessarily, but I can't verify the truth of this idea empirically because I can't have a personal experience of it's perfect thinking and its perfect existing in the first person, present tense mode.

Suppose one were to admit that existence is a predicate. You still need to argue that existence or non existence are perfections, after all, maybe there are no perfections at all, or maybe perfection is inapplicable to either existence or non existence. Forget not, also, that whatever argument you give, its premises must be more acceptable than the conclusion that god exists is rejectable.

I do think your use of the word "strange" conveys an unwarranted negative value judgment — charles ferraro

Strange as in unusual, since when many philosophers use that term they usually mean something different from what you say. Didn't want to convey anything negative.

Experience = whatever I can encounter. I can encounter objects as objects. I can encounter my consciousness (thinking) as an object. I can encounter my consciousness (my thinking) as a subject.

But, I cannot encounter the other's consciousness (the other's thinking) as a subject. — charles ferraro

Like I said, I don't disagree, unless you are saying at the end that encountering God's (the subject of all perfections') consciousness = thinking that God exists necessarily. If you are saying that, I think you are wrong: what I would be experiencing in that case would not be God's thinking, nor God's necessary existence, nor necessary existence, rather I would be experiencing a thought (of mine, not of God's), namely the following: «I think the subject of all perfections exists necessarily». The thought about the idea of «the subject of all perfections» is not the same as that subject which may exist outside the mind, meaning when saying that, I am not «experiencing» that subject, but rather an idea of it.

If we phrase it according to the notion of existence used in the argument, then you could say that I hold that God exists as an idea in the mind, and that therefore I must, in some sense, experience God (as an idea in my mind), then in that sense what I would be experiencing isn't God, but rather a thought about the idea of God. Now, if you are going to say that experiencing that is impossible, you should add your reason for thinking that.

So if you are going to say I can't even experience an idea of that subject in the way that I have described, I ask: Why not?

your use of the term "the subject of all perfections" reminds me of the term "the great wizard of Oz." I think my ability to experience your "subject of all perfections" (by the way, how do you define a subject and perfections?) is less likely than my ability to experience "the great wizard of Oz." — charles ferraro

1. When I say subject I don't mean «person», I mean it as in «the subject of X, Y, Z... predicates». By definition, all the predicates that can be truly asserted of said subject are the perfections it possesses. (Though you are right that I forgot to add this in my OP)

2. You don't need to «experience the subject of all perfections» for the argument to be valid. Like I said before, this is not an experiential ontological argument.

So, let me see if I understand correctly. I must believe that some, or all, ontological arguments are capable of convincing me of the truth of the idea that a purported subject of all perfections exists necessarily, but I can't verify the truth of this idea empirically because I can't have a personal experience of it's perfect thinking and its perfect existing in the first person, present tense mode. — charles ferraro

You can't verify the truth of the idea empirically and you don't need to, beacuse the argument is a priori. Just as you don't need to verify empirically that 2+2=4. All you need to know that that's true is to analyze the meaning of «2+2» and «4». And as I said, you don't need to have a personal experience of perfect thinking and/or perfect existing.

What the argument says is: If God didn't exist and it is admitted that existence and non-existence are predicates, then by analysis we would see that that implies a logical contradiction (if the argument were valid). At no point in the argument is there a need to experience anything. No more than you need to experience the «4» that is eternal, and exists beyond space and time (if indeed platonism is correct, which I neither affirm nor deny) to know that 2+2=4.

You still need to argue that existence or non existence are perfections, after all, maybe there are no perfections at all, or maybe perfection is inapplicable to either existence or non existence. — jkg20

By definition they are, because the perfections the subject of all perfections possesses are all those things can can be predicated truly about it. If existence or non-existence can be predicated about it, then necessarily one of them must be a perfection, since otherwise they would not be predicates of the subject of all perfections.
If you are going to say that there are no perfections, then you must hold that you can't conceive of a subject of all perfections, meaning that you must hold that the subject of all perfections is impossible even as an idea.
The definition of perfection given by Leibniz is: «A simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express». Are you going to say that there is something logically selfcontradictory contained in that definition? There might be, but I've yet to see what that is. I don't affirm nor deny that there is not anything contradictory about it.
As you say, maybe the very concept of «perfection» is a mistake, I'm open to the idea that someone could prove that it is.

You have the idea of God and the idea that existence is perfection. So I see you are using two premises and really using Descartes's first ontological argument of the third meditation and then linking it to his next argument. Because you have a thought of God, does it have to correspond to what it represents? I did threads on them but the moderators didn't like the topic and deleted them. I at least presented them in true philosophical form, while you are (im sad to say) presenting muddle in order for people to have faith in your logic. I don't use faith, I use logic. Descartes, ironically, did not use faith but logic, yet they could not get him out of his arguments in the "Replies". Why does your idea of God have any substance in it? Why should you assume it has any potency to do anything by way of showing what is outside subjectivity? Atheist nowadays are not into phenomenology of spirit. They are looking for an objective demonstration that there is a God, and even Mr. Feser's or whatever Thomistic "proof" doesn't do it for them. Too many assumptions!!

Descartes' Evil genius scenario postulated hyperbolic conditions under which the necessary a priori truths of logic and mathematics (his clear and distinct ideas) could be doubted.

You have the idea of God and the idea that existence is perfection. — Gregory

The idea of God (defined as the subject of all perfections) and the idea that existence is A perfection (one among other perfections).

Because you have a thought of God, does it have to correspond to what it represents? — Gregory

When saying «The subject of all perfections can be conceived», that implies «The subject of all perfections exists as an idea in the mind» just like a unicorn exists as an idea in the mind, and so my «thought» is: the idea of «the subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it exists outside the mind or not).

Does it «correspond» to the subject of all perfections, that is: to a subject that exists not merely as an idea in the mind but also outside the mind? That depends upon the validity of the argument: If it is valid, then yes, meaning: it is the idea of that subject which exists both as an idea in the mind, and also outside it. If it's not valid, then it refers to something that exists merely as an idea in the mind, and does not refer to something that also exists outside the mind.

you are (im sad to say) presenting muddle in order for people to have faith in your logic. — Gregory

I never claimed that people should have «faith in my logic». I myself already said many times that I don't hold that it is certain that the argument is valid nor do I even hold that it is more likely to be valid than not. I try to follow Aristotle's maxim:

It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.

I know about Descartes' Evil Deceiver argument. And so far as theory is concerned, I am a philosophical sceptic, so I am not concerned with refuting it (which seems to me to be an impossible task anyway).

In practice, however, no human being can pretend to act doubting the most self-evident a priori truths of logic and mathematics, and also to survive more than 5 minutes or not act like a lunatic.

I was under the impression that for the sake of the discussion we took for granted the most obvious truths of logic, because if we don't, then there is no point to this discussion at all. You can't criticise whatever flaws you think the argument has because you may be deceived about that, and the same goes for me.
What's more, if we don't accept the law of contradiction then there's no reason why we should have not both asserted and denied everything that we have said thus far.

You need to stop using these: «»

It's already been mentioned on your other thread

In practice, however, no human being can pretend to act doubting the most self-evident a priori truths of logic and mathematics, and also to survive more than 5 minutes or not act like a lunatic. — Amalac

Descartes tried and he ended up using the ontological argument to get out