I read Descartes' wrestling match with doubt as being more concerned with advancing his Method than solving a problem with it. The Discourse on Method argues using only "clear and distinct ideas" to develop inquiry into phenomena. The point is made that deduction from what is obvious can only go so far and that further understanding requires exploring cause and effect by means of hypothesis and experimentation. The separation of mind and body given as necessary in some syllogisms don't match up well with all that stuff about the pineal gland as the seat of consciousness.

A lot of his writing displays what Ortega y Gasset referred to as a willful obscurity but none of that sort of thing is present in On Geometry, where centuries of mathematical problems are solved for all time.

It's impossible for me to determine whether he did or not. And it's unclear to me if that's even possible.

For example, I looked into Flat Earth theory because I wanted to know what those people believed. But it was simply impossible to let go of our current cyclical model of the universe.

Perhaps it's a psychological defence mechanism to prevent you from getting insane.

Learn psychology. That will keep you sane. Philosophy will always remain subordinate to it.

:smirk:

It’s certainly possible that nature is not uniform, and that contradictions can exist in nature. — Pinprick

Is it? A contradiction is when one statement is the negation of another, yet both are asserted.

Is nature is made up of statements? That's what you seem to be asserting. How else could it be that "contradictions can exist in nature"?

A better way to think about this is that nature just is, and that apparent contradictions mean that we have simply spoken improperly.

Coming across a contradiction means we have said it wrong.

Throwing reason away because someone disagrees with you seems an overreaction, Pinprick.

Is it? A contradiction is when one statement is the negation of another, yet both are asserted.

Is nature is made up of statements? That's what you seem to be asserting. How else could it be that "contradictions can exist in nature"? — Banno

No, that’s not what I’m trying to say. I didn’t realize the definition of contradiction was strictly limited to statements. I was meaning facts in nature may not be rational, thereby contradicting reason. Also, that fundamental laws (I.e. physics) aren’t necessarily required to be reasonable. The universe does not have to be ordered to the extent that fundamental laws are constant and universal.

Throwing reason away because someone disagrees with you seems an overreaction, Pinprick. — Banno

Right. The point I was trying to get across is that a belief isn’t necessarily true simply because it’s reasonable, logical, etc. It would have to match up (correspond) to whatever the object of the belief is. It may be reasonable to believe it’s raining outside, for example, but the only way that belief can be true is if it in fact is raining. The bottom line is reason isn’t infallible. So any belief based solely on reason has a chance of being wrong.

I was meaning facts in nature may not be rational, thereby contradicting reason. — Pinprick

I don't think this works.

Consider an example fo a contradiction - light being both a wave and a particle; the speed of light being the same in any direction despite the Earth moving around the sun; whatever you like. What do we do here? We don't shrug and accept the contradiction. We find a description that is consistent - quantum mechanics and special relativity.

An apparent contradiction means that our description is wrong, not that the world is inconsistent.

But yes, reason is not infallible, and "it's raining" will indeed be true if and only if it is raining. Worth the reminder.

Learn psychology. That will keep you sane. Philosophy will always remain subordinate to it. — Atman

This wasn't always the case. And Sigmund Freud, the founder of modern psychology had some very dubious theories about women. He viewed them as utterly inferior to men. The power of philosophy lies in questioning psychology and its claims.

We find a description that is consistent - quantum mechanics and special relativity. — Banno

Right, but I think it’s telling that neither theory suffices on its own. IOW’s they aren’t universal, so it’s doubtful that there can be a unified theory; a strict set of laws that the universe follows at all scales from the quantum to the astronomical. If the universe was completely reasonable, then it would have consistent rules, and we could use reason alone to explain everything.

An apparent contradiction means that our description is wrong, not that the world is inconsistent. — Banno

How do you know?

Is truth shocked that we're shocked by the truth?

So do you think that truth can perceive, because surely that would turn into a conscious entity, more like a god, even if only in the sense that the pagans or Egyptians meant? That is if truth exists in a distinct way, of course, independent of our perception and meaning.

Because that's how language works. The question is not "is the world consistent?" but "is that a consistent description?" - and if it is not, then we re-think the description.

An apparent contradiction means that our description is wrong, not that the world is inconsistent. — Banno

Preach it, brother!

Sigmund Freud, the founder of modern psychology had some very dubious theories about women. He viewed them as utterly inferior to men. The power of philosophy lies in questioning psychology and its claims. — TaySan

I don't think many psychologists would take the Freudian model too seriously. His ideas would be seen as historically important - a seminal influence. Psychology is as fraught with sectarian division and as any religion.

Learn psychology. That will keep you sane. Philosophy will always remain subordinate to it. — Atman

A claim like that requires some texture otherwise it is no more profound than a bumper sticker.

Learn psychology. That will keep you sane. Philosophy will always remain subordinate to it. — Atman

No, no, no, no. Psychology as science yields results as sound as the scientific methods used. That is, in some areas psych. can lay claim to being a science, in respect of the degree that it acts like one. Much psychology does not, and it's claims are, most charitably, a matter of popular acceptance. Freudianism an example of the latter.

Because that's how language works. The question is not "is the world consistent?" but "is that a consistent description?" - and if it is not, then we re-think the description. — Banno

Doesn’t having a consistent description of the world depend on whether or not the world is consistent to begin with? Reason relies on order, so when we approach the world using reason, an order is assumed. But, if there is no order at the fundamental level of reality, then we could never arrive at a reasonable (consistent) description. Chaos, or randomness, cannot be comprehended through reason.

I think this is correct, but I also think there are two distinct levels to this. Language is inherently relative so when we describe we first must decide whether we have described the scenario correctly. Then we must decide whether our description is appropriate to the world itself. So both atman and pinprick are right, they are just right about different things.

Doesn’t having a consistent description of the world depend on whether or not the world is consistent to begin with? — Pinprick

Again, it's descriptions that are consistent, not worlds. IF the description is inconsistent, you need a better description.

Chaos, or randomness, cannot be comprehended through reason. — Pinprick

On the contrary, chaos and randomness have quite sophisticated mathematical descriptions - they need to be complex in order to accommodate what they are describing.

An apparent contradiction means that our description is wrong, not that the world is inconsistent. — Banno

Sorry to butt in but my personal view, supposing it's worth anything, is that consistency is probably a feature of the world at the human scale. Go up a few levels and enter cosmic scales or go down a few levels into the world of the very small and what we encounter are baffling inconsistencies. It's kinda like the frog in the pond story - the frog assumes, at its own peril, that the pond which it calls home is all there is.

Also, let's not forget what seems to be an ever-growing list of paradoxes that people are discovering lying at the heart of so many important philosophical and non-philosophical issues we're grappling with. It reminds me of the prevailing wisdom in astronomy that at the center of every galaxy for which there's a gravitational equation there's a supermassive blackhole inside which these equations break down.

My two cents.

Go up a few levels and enter cosmic scales or go down a few levels into the world of the very small and what we encounter are baffling inconsistencies. — TheMadFool

They're "baffling" when one forgets or denies that only as one deviates farther from this – our – scale-perspective the more "inconsistent" those higher or lower scales seem, and like Banno points out, the more necessary it is to abandon descriptions adequate to this – our – scape-perspective and adopt descriptions adequate to those higher and lower scales. It's analogous to apparent "inconsistencies", or nonsense, which confuse us whenever we play one language-game (e.g. describing the movement of stars) in terms of another language-game (e.g. describing the impact of the zodiac on horoscopes). All that we "encounter" is, first and foremost, the "inconsistencies" of our inadequate descriptions.

That damn Evil Demon just keeps messing with us.

Again, it's descriptions that are consistent, not worlds. — Banno

Again, how do you know? Are you just claiming this because the term “consistency” only applies to language? If so, then feel free to replace that term with another that suits you. Regardless, we seem to be stuck. The OP was about doubt, and seemed to me to imply that the most reasonable explanation is always the best. My comment was meant to call reason itself into question, because it isn’t a given that the world is reasonable, or necessarily ordered. I think the fact that all (?) of our physical laws are limited in their explanatory power illustrate this point. In some ways quantum physics contradicts general relativity. This is what I mean by being “inconsistent.”

However, I’m not trying to imply that we should just give up when we discover something that seems contradictory (inconsistent). Of course we should try an alternative explanation. But the insistence that every explanation must be reasonable may be faulty, because the world may not be rational, or uniform, or parsimonious. Therefore, the possibility of being wrong is always a possibility. Therefore doubt, depending on what’s exactly meant by that term, is justified (paradoxically via reason).

On the contrary, chaos and randomness have quite sophisticated mathematical descriptions - they need to be complex in order to accommodate what they are describing. — Banno

True randomness is uncaused isn’t it? And uncaused events are irrational. If a cause could be determined, then it could be explained, predicted even, but then it wouldn’t be random, and would therefore be rational.

Again, how do you know? — Pinprick

Because consistency is non-contradiction, and contradiction occurs in language. Calling reason into question is self-defeating; any argument against rationality presupposes rationality. showed how we change our descriptions to understand things we find strange. Doubt requires a background of certainty. Descartes took the language in which he formulated his meditations for granted. You cannot be wrong about the bishop always remaining on the same colour, you can only stop playing chess. Randomness is subject to precise statistical analysis, and is not directly related to cause.

Doubt requires a background of certainty. Descartes took the language in which he formulated his meditations for granted. You cannot be wrong about the bishop always remaining on the same colour, you can only stop playing chess. — Banno

:clap: "Goo goo g'joob!"

you can only stop playing chess — 180 Proof

...and learn guitar.

They're "baffling" when one forgets or denies that only as one deviates farther from this – our – scale-perspective the more "inconsistent" those higher or lower scales seem, and like Banno points out, the more necessary it is to abandon descriptions adequate to this – our – scape-perspective and adopt descriptions adequate to those higher and lower scales. It's analogous to apparent "inconsistencies", or nonsense, which confuse us whenever we play one language-game (e.g. describing the movement of stars) in terms of another language-game (e.g. describing the impact of the zodiac on horoscopes). All that we "encounter" is, first and foremost, the "inconsistencies" of our inadequate descriptions. — 180 Proof

Are you saying inconsistences are mere artefacts of our descriptive paradigms, that they're apparent inconsistencies and not real ones? The inconsistencies people have discovered in the world being nothing more than a sign of poor/deficient descriptive frameworks and that once we hit upon the correct way of describing things, these inconsistencies will disappear.

The way it seems to me, your notion of "descriptions" is synonymous with theories and hypotheses devised for explaining the world. @Banno gave an example of how light behaves inconsistently - like a wave and a particle - and as per the two of you this is only an apparent inconsistency waiting for the right theory/hypothesis to come along for a satisfactory resolution i.e. we should expect the inconsistency to vanish away.

It's a nice way to look at the entire issue of inconsistencies as they are found in nature but to say that ALL inconsistencies are simply manifestations of poor descriptions is a really big claim. Perhaps the two of you are coming at it from a Wittgensteinian perspective but that's where you two lost me.

Because consistency is non-contradiction, and contradiction occurs in language. — Banno

Contradiction occurring in language isn’t evidence that it doesn’t occur in nature. I’m not asking if language is consistent. Nature is constantly changing, so why insist on the existence of static fundamental laws?

Doesn’t this:

Calling reason into question is self-defeating; any argument against rationality presupposes rationality. — Banno

contradict this:

But yes, reason is not infallible — Banno

?

↪180 Proof showed how we change our descriptions to understand things we find strange. — Banno

I understand that. I’m not arguing against doing that.

Doubt requires a background of certainty. — Banno

Hmm... You may be correct, but I’ll think on it some more. I’m not finding what global skeptics would consider certain. In any case, then what is your position on doubt? Are any arguments/explanations beyond doubt?

Descartes took the language in which he formulated his meditations for granted. — Banno

Do you mean that he took the meaning of the words he used as certain? I’d agree with that, but it is still possible to doubt language, regardless of whether Descartes did or not.

You cannot be wrong about the bishop always remaining on the same colour, you can only stop playing chess. — Banno

So, if we’re playing chess and you move the bishop incorrectly that’s not a wrong move? Can I not simply correct you?

Randomness is subject to precise statistical analysis, and is not directly related to cause. — Banno

Then what makes something random? If the analysis is so precise, then why can’t we predict things like the stock market, or lottery numbers, or random number generators?

Contradiction occurring in language isn’t evidence that it doesn’t occur in nature. I’m not asking if language is consistent. Nature is constantly changing, so why insist on the existence of static fundamental laws? — Pinprick

Sorry, but the very notion of a contradiction in nature is confused. Nature is not the sort of thing that can be both true and false; because a fact cannot be false.

Was Descartes reasonable in trying to doubt every last belief of his? — khaled

No. Doubt requires a background of certainty. And certainty is far more common than philosophers think.