This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.
In one way talk of private sensations is false, and in another nonsense. — Banno
so... the bit about being able to talk about private stuff... you know, the stuff that cannot be talked about...? — Banno
But you would talk of private sensations:
246. In what sense are my sensations private? Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself! It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean a except perhaps that I am in pain?
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.
In one way talk of private sensations is false, and in another nonsense.
You would perhaps talk of private subjective stuff; and speak either falsehood or nonsense. — Banno
most people simply have pain without needing to make any predictions. But this highlights our differences in talking about the issue. You're talking about our brains making predictions, which happens unconsciously, whereas I'm talking about our conscious experiences of having pain sensations. — Luke
You want me to cite the studies proposing the disagreements that you're referring to? I don't know these studies. I had in mind something along the lines of Wittgenstein:
244. ...How does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations? For example, of the word “pain”. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.
257. “What would it be like if human beings did not manifest their pains (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word ‘toothache’.”
Presumably, the reason for these expressions of pain are (consciously experienced) pain sensations. — Luke
People's heights are not private. You can see and measure how tall someone is. You cannot see or measure someone's pain sensations which are private. — Luke
You're trying to make this about language again, here, instead of the privacy of subjective experience. It's a given that we use the same words to refer to the same sets of behaviours. — Luke
But more to the point you don't have access to that particular set of signals either. — Isaac
What particular set of signals? — Luke
fMRI scans, conversation, behavioural observations... — Isaac
These can only measure pain behaviours, not pain sensations. — Luke
If these aren't enough for you to know we have the same experiences, then it is a question of 'sameness'. — Isaac
They're not enough, because there is no way to verify the sensations themselves. — Luke
We can compare and look at each other's phones, though. That's the difference. — Luke
It would be clearer if you could define what 'private' does mean, instead of what it does not mean. — Luke
Indirect realism"s weakness is about the trustworthiness of representations. How do you confirm that they're accurate? — frank
But you grant that people can have experiences that aren't publicly know — frank
We have the same experiences because we're both human. We each have private pains because you don't have access to my nociceptors. — frank
The reporter asks what it's like. I say I can't explain it. You'll just have to go through it yourself.
A unique, private experience has been talked about. — frank
One can understand. Hmmmm. Does that mean one has to calculate? Or might he....you know....introspect? — Mww
and by your own admission, this science is itself speculative, so all that’s happened is we’ve substituted an older speculative system for a newer one, which is nonetheless speculative for it. — Mww
for all intents and purposes, why not just say we simply reason to the prevention of cause? — Mww
humans can reason to prevention, then proceed to ignore it. — Mww
One thing I noticed: the paper recognizes the human cognitive system as representational; there are eleven instances of that conception therein. Always a good first step, methinks. — Mww
why not just say we simply reason to the prevention of cause?
— Mww
You could, but 'reason' has typically been reserved for conscious processing, and much of the modelling that brain regions have been shown to do is subconscious. It 'acts like' reason. — Isaac
this science is itself speculative (....), substituted an older speculative system for a newer one (...),
— Mww
Yes, indeed. A common objection it seems. I remain unconvinced by this idea that since the science is only 'modelling' models it's somehow open season and anything goes. Models can be more or less coherent with each other, more or less useful, more or less parsimonious. — Isaac
We've replaced the older speculative system for the newer one, not on a whim, but because it works better. — Isaac
humans can reason to prevention, then proceed to ignore it.
— Mww
I don't believe they can. — Isaac
'Reason' is usually a post hoc construction to rationalise a decision that has been made anyway further back in the subconscious. — Isaac
If you were talking only about your conscious experience of pain, that which is in your mind as being an experience (regardless of it's origins, or historical accuracy) you would have absolutely no ground at all to say that such an experience was unique, or intrinsically private. How on earth would you know? — Isaac
There might be a set of only a dozen such experiences identical in all humans which we consciously experience one of on each occasion. If you are solely talking about your personal experience, uninvestigated, and unsubstantiated, then on what grounds would you even suspect it to be unique, private...? — Isaac
Your argument about privacy relies on an assumption about the causes of experience, an assumption that those causes are so multifarious that their rendering must be unique, that those causes obtain inside you and so are not accessible to others, hence private. — Isaac
Presumably, the reason for these expressions of pain are (consciously experienced) pain sensations.
— Luke
Why 'presume'? — Isaac
I've cited a dozen papers now in our various discussion on the topic. I've done my best to explain the current theories of active inference, yet without any contrary citation at all you just 'presume' that what I've said and what all the collected neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists I've cited have said, is wrong — Isaac
and that there are such things as 'pain sensations' which cause expressions of pain. — Isaac
People's heights are not private. You can see and measure how tall someone is. You cannot see or measure someone's pain sensations which are private.
— Luke
You can ask. — Isaac
But more to the point you don't have access to that particular set of signals either.
— Isaac
What particular set of signals?
— Luke
Whichever signals you're interpreting as your being 'in pain'. — Isaac
FMRI scans can measure pain sensations. — Isaac
The point here is disputing your claim that it's not about how we use 'sameness'. — Isaac
The point of Wittgenstein's Eiffel Tower example is — Isaac
1) the exact range of sensations are like the exact scratches on your phone, or the dimensions to the nanometre, we don't use those properties to talk of 'sameness' when it comes to phones. Why should we use them to talk of 'sameness' when it comes to experiences? — Isaac
Your conclusion that experience is radically unique and private is hooked into a model of it being caused by these unique and private 'pain sensations'. that is a) a psychological model and b) wrong. — Isaac
Hence, accessible to no-one would not count as private. — Isaac
You can access their "neural regions involved, behaviours produced, words used to describe it...etc", but whether these are associated with the same sensations seems like little more than an assumption. How can you prove it? — Luke
It's the fact that we cannot access other people's sensations in order to compare them. — Luke
All of this of course assumes that, identical bodies produce identical experiences. — khaled
No, sensations are biological, 'Pain' is a concept created by a socially communicating group collecting some of those sensations and naming them. — Isaac
Also, does this imply that near-identical bodies produce (only) near-identical experiences? Perhaps this is what Isaac is getting at with his talk about 'sameness'. — Luke
All of this of course assumes that, identical bodies produce identical experiences.
— khaled
So it's no more than an assumption, right? — Luke
Why can it not be anything stronger than an assumption? — Luke
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