Empiricism is a matter of how we know, — Marchesk

??? Check your dictionary maybe.

?? Check your dictionary maybe. — Terrapin Station

That everything we know is derived from sense-experience? That's still a matter of knowledge, not ontology. An empiricist might limit their ontology to what can be sensed, but that's still too different kinds of inquiry.

Also, one can be an empiricist and a skeptic about the nature of the external world. They fit quite well together.

That everything we know is derived from sense-experience? That's still a matter of knowledge, not ontology. An empiricist might limit their ontology to what can be sensed, but that's still too different kinds of inquiry.

Also, one can be an empiricist and a skeptic about the nature of the external world. They fit quite well together. — Marchesk

I'm not talking about "empirical" in the sense of epistemological empiricism obviously.

I'm not talking about "empirical" in the sense of epistemological empiricism obviously. — Terrapin Station

What sense are you talking about it in? A peculiar one where you get to say that everything is physical, but don't have to back it up with ontological considerations?

What sense are you talking about it in? — Marchesk

In the sense where we're talking about the "furniture of the world" so to speak a la things that can be known via experience, whether directly or not, and whether extrapolatively/interpolatively or not.

In the sense where we're talking about the "furniture of the world" so to speak a la things that can be known via experience, whether directly or not, and whether extrapolatively/interpolatively or not. — Terrapin Station

So in all possible worlds where the furniture of the world is exactly the same, do you always have consciousness, intentionality, abstract categories, etc?

So in all possible worlds where the furniture of the world is exactly the same, do you always have consciousness, intentionality, abstract categories, etc? — Marchesk

You're trying to skip to the "point" or "meat" of the argument. I'm not interested in that. I'm interested in what "logically possible" or "logically accounting for" is supposed to refer to, because I'm challenging that it refers to anything significant in the argument. I'm kicking at the supposed framework of the argument, I'm not looking to fall back into the main polemic of the two sides of the argument.

ou're trying to skip to the "point" or "meat" of the argument. I'm not interested in that. I'm interested in what "logically possible" or "logically accounting for" is supposed to refer to, because I'm challenging that it refers to anything significant in the argument. — Terrapin Station

The rules of the game of life plus it's initial starting position logically entail any patterns that emerge during that game. If you had a super complex game of life such that there was something akin to characters and societies, with different levels of abstraction from which one could make sense of that game, they would all be logically entailed by the rules and starting conditions.

You could make a probabilistic game of life, and then the resulting complexity could be understood in terms of probabilities.

The question is whether physics is like that for all phenomena.

The rules of the game of life plus it's initial starting position logically entail any patterns that emerge during that game. — Marchesk

Well, then the answer to my question "logically possible with respect to what (domain)?" would be "the domain of metaphysical facts" then, no?