Let's begin with the fact that "qualia" are distinctions in cognitive neuroscience or philosophy of mind which make no informative difference ... (re: summary of Daniel Dennett's "Quining Qualia"). Also, see "the private language argument"(Witty). I'm all for dispensing with apparent / pseudo questions and empty concepts / terms – intellectual hygiene and all that.And what are the best arguments against the existence of qualia? — noname
And what are the best arguments against the existence of qualia? — noname
Do those who deny the existence of qualia also deny subjectivity altogether? — noname
And what are the best arguments against the existence of qualia? — noname
You might now say: "I have sensation S".
What is it that has been left out? — Banno
In conversation - and there have been many on this topic, even here in this forum - these advocates seem to equivocate, talking as if qualia were just "red", "sweet" or "loud" on the one hand, and next telling us that there is something here that cannot be shared. — Banno
Nothing is left out, since "S" is the name of that sensation, so it includes everything about it...
As if names were somehow short descriptions. — Banno
The issue is more about how useful the notion is — Banno
...this does not mean that there is no character or quality of how red looks to each of us. — Luke
Merleau-Ponty had a problem with the concept of individual quale, which was that for him, the quale defined as the elementary unit of sensation is not really what perception is made of. One because perception is holistic, it goes from the general to the particular, two because what really matters in perception is not the positive, objective, elementary color 'red' here or there in the picture but the differences and relationships between colors. — Olivier5
What you are doing is inventing a use of the word qualia to refer to something that drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Banno
That looks like naming a nothing. — Banno
It is as unhelpful as "Last night I saw upon the stair, a little man who wasn't there". — Banno
just because this character or quality "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the language game, this does not mean that there is no character or quality of how red looks to each of us. — Luke
Yes, but perception is itself a kind of ‘private’ language game. That is to say , what you want to call the felt sensation of red is not a stable primitive of experiencing but a bodily mediated interpretation. One can no more isolate a reproducible scenario of red that one can duplicate an expression of emotion. In both cases you have a complex interpretive activity that is context-dependent. How something looks or tastes in any instant of time cannot be separated from a larger whole of attitudes, perceptions and conceptions which are always transforming themselves. — Joshs
Maybe, but I'm sure you could pick out a red object if required. — Luke
Yes, and I’m sure I could spell the word ‘book’ when asked, but that doesn’t tell us very much about what the word means for me, how I’m using it, whether the color red is smooth or textured, whether it feels warm or hot or neutral, what shape or tone or saturation it appears within, whether it is still my favorite color. — Joshs
You can say all that publicly, like you just did. But I still don't know how the colour red looks to you. — Luke
I agree you don’t know how it looks to me, but if we are talking about the usefulness of the concept of qualia, the relevant question here is whether I know how it looks to me. That is, whether there is a such a thing as an interpretation and context-independent fact of privately felt sensation. — Joshs
But I still don't know how the colour red looks to you. — Luke
I agree you don’t know how it looks to me, — Joshs
So let's take "this distinct sensation from my finger tips" and call it "S".
You might now say: "I have sensation S".
What is it that has been left out?
Nothing is left out, since "S" is the name of that sensation, so it includes everything about it...
As if names were somehow short descriptions. — Banno
Does it? Why?
Next time you have the sensation, can you say "ah, that's 'S'"? — Banno
For sure. The meaning of a name need not be given by a description.
SO you have a sensation, and name it "S". Later, you have a sensation and say to yourself "Ah, that's S again..."
How do you know this second event is a recurrence of S? — Banno
I don't see the relevance though — TheMadFool
I'm questioning what it is that makes S a "distinct sensation". How could one know that the second sensation is a recurrence of S?Let's conduct a little experiment with me as the subject. I'm, as of this moment, typing these words from my keyboard and I get this distinct sensation from my finger tips - it has a certain quality to it - but as I try to put into words this "distinct sensation" I can't seem to do it. — TheMadFool
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