I am not sure how you mean it. Human beings, I believe, are capable of classification according to features and of mental homomorphic representations without explicit involvement of applications, just by physical assessment. There is obviously always some action involved, because observation or measurement are usually tied in to some action, but the concept is not always action-oriented. It depends on the concept, and how we mean it.A better way to approach it is to forget about meaning and look to use. Knowing what a number is consists in being able to count, to add, to subtract, to do the things that we do with numbers; not with a definition set out in words. — Banno
the concept is not always action-oriented. — simeonz
That's not what was suggested. Rather, that in this sort of analysis we would do better to look to use rather than to meaning. As your lawnmower example shows.The notion that meaning is identical to use is wrong. — frank
"Would you care for another glass of 'Two Barrels'*?" — Isaac
That's a play on words, both meanings are using "two" as a number. — frank
No, because if the whiskey were called 'Three Barrels' and I asked for 'Two Barrels', I would not be given two thirds of a whiskey, I'd just be given the wrong brand. 'Two' in that sentence is not being used to count, it's being used to indicate the type of whiskey wanted (not that it ever would, Two Barrels is awful).
But yes, this is a digression. As you were. — Isaac
The syntactical or neurological processing is undeniably an action. Symbolic inference using a deduction system is an action. Thinking is an action. In that sense, mathematics is alive, not stationary. And formal models are sound with respect to the matching between those evaluations made using rules and the facts of the real world. I got the impression that you consider the subject matter of a model, i.e. its interpretation, to be some action in itself. In other words, I thought that you might suggest that before we formalize stationary physical relations around us, we first discover them in terms of applications, uses, and activities. That without some active involvement on our part, it is insufficient to simply observe physical features in order to derive conceptualization. I was trying to clear out in what precisely sense you meant your remark.I disagree. Each concept has a place in a language game. — Banno
When TheMadFool quoted the numeral, I assume that they meant to emphasize the syntactical nature of the symbolic constant. Not to prompt interpretations that do not conform to the algebraic requirements posed by the axioms of arithmetic.TheMadFool, incidentally, Fool's question was about "2", not 2, so I don't see that emancipate's syntactic answer was improper, nor Isaac' plonk, but moreover @frank's lawnmower is a semantic example. — Banno
Fool's question was about "2", not 2 — Banno
If you subscribe to total moral and intellectual relativism, then of course there is no such thing as a correct intuition. — Acyutananda
good and bad refer to the same things, — TheMadFool
The syntactical or neurological processing is undeniably an action. — simeonz
Do you mean "good and bad refer to the same thing [singular]," which would mean "good and bad refer to good-bad," or do you really mean "thingS," in which case the things would be something apart from good and bad? If you mean the latter, what would be examples of the things? — Acyutananda
moral values vary with culture with all of them being as equally right. However, for that to be true, the notion of morality has to be universal in scope i.e. every culture must mean the same thing when they use the words, "morality", — TheMadFool
I guess I now understand what you're saying, but – perhaps changing the subject – wouldn't you say that in order for the terms "good" and "bad" to be most useful, to be truly normative (using your examples), "good" in Iran would have be associated not only with the Quran, but also with a positive quasi-emotional feeling, and "good" in America would have be associated not only with equality, but also with a positive quasi-emotional feeling? — Acyutananda
We can all agree on word definitions, for the sake of communication, without agreeing on anything else. People of all cultures can agree that "good" should be associated with a positive quasi-emotional feeling, even if in some people that feeling is elicited when they hear "marry whomever you love," and in others when they hear "throw homosexuals off rooftops." I wouldn't see any value in lack of agreement that "good" should be associated with a positive quasi-emotional feeling, and thus people talking past each other. — Acyutananda
You mean to say that "positive feelings" are not a good yardstick for morality. — TheMadFool
I have little formal background in Western philosophy, but I'm under the impression that in Western philosophy, propositions such as "'2 + 2 = 4' cannot be proved, but rather rests on intuition" and "'A square must be rectangular' cannot be proved, but rather rests on intuition" are rejected, or considered true but trivial. If my impression is correct, I would like to know why such propositions are rejected, or considered true but trivial. — Acyutananda
On the matter of numbers, it looks like Wittgenstein is N/A. The meaning of numbers is confined to mathematics i.e. for a number, say 2, there are no other contexts in which 2 has a meaning. In short, the meaning of 2 isn't a use thing. — TheMadFool
I believe that correct intuitions exist and are monumentally important. But I don't see why for every correct intuition that exists (there is a maximum of one correct intuition per issue), I should consider all the many incorrect intuitions that might exist on the same issue to be monumentally important. — Acyutananda
there is no answer to the question, why? Why does the leg opposite the largest angle of a triangle have to be the longest leg?
This is about as close to a genuine intuition that I can imagine. I don't deny that such things are intuitively apprehended. — Constance
The syntactical or neurological processing of what? An action on someone's part would seem to require some fiat on their part... as if my feeling a surface somehow required my consent. — Banno
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