All I'm saying is for moral relativism to be true, the word "morality" in America must mean the same thing as the word "morality" in Iran for instance. Only then can we say morality is relative to culture - the same thing (morality) is culturally determined (in America homosexuality is ok but in Iran it's immoral). If, on the other hand, the word "morality" means different things e.g. in America it might have a meaning associated with equality and in Iran the word maybe associated with the Quran then Americans and Iranians aren't talking about the same thing are they? — TheMadFool

But how would Wittgenstein handle international relations, culture exchange, global politics? In the end, aren't we all one society with internal boundaries?
That is, morality may have local meaning, but that does not preclude it from being integrated into a global system of meanings that arbitrates and rejects.

I don’t see how any uncertainty in knowing the foundation of truth necessarily makes truth contingent. Again, my Jesus example. The Jesus in my story may not know where his intuitions came from, and may never know (in which case they are unknowable to him or perhaps to any human being); nevertheless, God put those intuitions in him; so they are not just a construct, and not contingent. — Acyutananda

As I have articulated in another post, intuitions are discovered contingently, but truth is only one possibility behind their conception. There are wrong intuitions. So, when we deal with mathematical abstractions, we usually use a small number of primitive intuitions for which we have consensus and large volume of experience and derive the remaining features of our models in accordance to those intuitions, without proliferating science with myriad of novel intuitions. For example, real numbers as complete ordered set, or completion of the rational numbers, are not exactly prima-facie concept and their soundness is doubted, because we are trying to justify it empirically. As long as we believe in inductive empirical reproducibility, objectivity of sensory experience, rationality of nature, statistical discovery of utility, we can assess the soundness and uses of various concepts. But I agree that those basic intuitions we trust blindly and without justification... (And I should say, not necessarily to a good conclusion.)

I've no idea what you are arguing here.

Arguing is too strongly put. I am expressing opinion. Namely, that only the very fundamentals of mathematics are situated cognition, but most of it relies on modelling through observation and contemplation.

As if modelling and contemplation were not situated.

From the same link

Under this assumption, which requires an epistemological shift from empiricism, situativity theorists suggest a model of knowledge and learning that requires thinking on the fly rather than the storage and retrieval of conceptual knowledge. In essence, cognition cannot be separated from the context. Instead knowing exists, in situ, inseparable from context, activity, people, culture, and language. Therefore, learning is seen in terms of an individual's increasingly effective performance across situations rather than in terms of an accumulation of knowledge, since what is known is co-determined by the agent and the context. — Wikipedia

I am left with the impression that this is utilitarian model of knowledge. I propose that only the basis of mathematics, such as predicate logic, induction, probability, are derived by use, and the rest can be extracted by vain observation of nature or articulated on top of other abstractions, without seeking actual non-epistemic benefit from those models. I believe that the work of Riemann in topology originally lacked applications and found most of its practical uses later.

This much of your post seems to be in almost complete agreement with me. The only difference between us seems to be your "as close . . . that I can imagine." Why not just say "This is a genuine/correct intuition," as I do?

Could not your "there is no answer. . . . apprehended" be paraphrased “The correctness of this geometric principle/proposition cannot ultimately be proved by any discursive argument. Its correctness ultimately rests on intuition, Such intuitions are intuitions that almost everyone has, and they are correct intuitions" – ?

"we are 'shown' things through intuition, but intuition is not that which is shown."

Can you refer me to where Kant says this? Anyway, I agree.

"[Intuition's] foundation is unknowable." — Acyutananda

As to Kant, his transcendental idealism is all about representation. When an idea is put in place, and its logic on tact, this structures our world, but then there is the problem of noumena. This impossible "otherness" of all of our thoughts and experience applies to sensible intuitions as well as the transcendental ego of apperception. I would have to go over this again, read the Deduction and, well, the whole thing, but Kant's analysis takes us to the point where explanations run and even sensible talk runs out, which is why he was so reluctant to talk about noumena. It is unspeakable.

Wittgenstein made it a point to disarm knowledge of its power to penetrate the world absolutely. His argument, among others, was this: for a concept to be sensible, its opposite has to be conceivable. So to talk about something beyond thought, beyond logic, is not even conceivable. When we are faced with the question, what is logic? we really don't have even a possible response, for to have this would require something that is not logical to describe it, lest the question is begged. So while we are irrevocably IN logic, we cannot say what it is.
The "what" of what is shown is impossible to understand. One can only use logic, and observe its structure "through logic itself". All explanations are, after all, propositional.
Take a look at Rorty. Is logic really foundational? Or is it something else? How about pragmatics? I was once an infant child, a world of "blooming and buzzing". How did I come to know the world? Language was modeled, its sounds filled the air and associated with objects, experiences. Thus, IF I say a word in context C, THEN I get lots of smiles and encouragement. This conditional is foundational to language and the experience of the world. The logic of the conditional issues from this pragmatic engagement that is a basic condition to survival and reproduction, an evolutionist would argue, and the conditional is really a pragmatic function of problem solving. The scientific method is this, not a formal condition of ultimate reality, and it is science that ruled the child's acquisition of language skills. The brain evolved to be an instrument of conditional resoning because interface with the environment was essentially conditional.
Time is foundational for logic is executed in time, so it has a beginning, a middle and an end. Dewey called this end consummatory. Logic is essentially a pragmatic, a useful instrument.

Do I buy this? Yes and no. Always has to be kept in mind to conceive of anything, it is done through logic, so a pragmatic theory of logic, presupposes logic in its theorizing, for this talk about pragmatics is logical talk. This makes logic antecedent to pragmatism, doesn't it? But then, the argument itself that places logic as antecedent is itself cast in logic. So where does this lead us?

It leaves us with best guess when it comes to anything.

Are you still representing Kant here? I don’t see why this should necessarily follow from "[Intuition's] foundation is unknowable." Let’s take my Jesus example above (which I don’t believe in, but which I think is a coherent story – not empirically true, but not a story that violates logic). Jesus may not know where his intuitions came from, and may never know (in which case they are unknowable to him or perhaps to any human being); nevertheless, God put those intuitions in him; so they are not just a construct, and not contingent. — Acyutananda

Is knowledge an intuition? I know my cup has coffee without looking. Memory, of course. But memory simply "comes" to you. And how do you know you can rely on memory? Memory tells us about events in the past with a great deal of accuracy. So we have this system which is essentially pragmatic: memory works, it's consistent, and why is consistency preferable? Because it works.
It is a strange business to be like Dostoyevsky's Underground Man and intentionally make great pains to spit in the face of reason and logic (using reason to do so, of course), but frankly, I lean toward your position when all is said and done, for it is not reason the underground man objected to; not really. Reason has no content. It is an empty vessel that neither denies God nor affirms foundational meaning. What the objection is really about is the presumptions of knowing that true conclusions follow from true premises, and here is what is true....Such confidence is ridiculous. A great book: Shestov's All Things Are Possible, in which he shows us how this confidence is groundless. We "know" nothing of the foundation of all things, yet meaning, not Frege's' "sense" of what ideas have, but affect, moods, joys and tragedies, these are the things at the center of the human condition, not clarity is what is true.
The significance of our intuitions lies not with reason, the empty vessel, but with the meaning it carries: the Good! And the Bad! What does it mean that I "enjoy" this danish with coffee? Or love Van Gogh and Ravel? What does it mean to be happy? Or to suffer terribly? These are the things humanity is about, and they simply are "there" and are complete mysteries. Intuitions.