Jesus man, this isn't that difficult of a concept. Is everything made up of the stuff of physics, or not? — Marchesk

Again, it seems like you're wanting to simply rehash the old physicalism vs dualism (or whatever) argument. I'm not interested in that. We've done that a bunch already.

Again, it seems like you're wanting to simply rehash the old physicalism vs dualism (or whatever) argument. I'm not interested in that. We've done that a bunch already. — Terrapin Station

What is the goal, then? The OP is asking how intentional content can be incorporated into a physicalist framework. That is traditionally part of the mind/body problem.

Do you have a different approach?

What I was hoping to discuss with you in this tangent was "What does 'entailed by physics" mean exactly?" We never got very far with that.

What I was hoping to discuss with you in this tangent was "What does 'entailed by physics" mean exactly?" We never got very far with that. — Terrapin Station

That the physics of the world necessitates the existence of everything. Which means that particles, fields of force, spacetime, constants, and laws of nature determine absolutely what can and what cannot exist.

Which means that something like math owes its existence entirely to physics. There is no platonic realm. So does consciousness. There can be no physical identical world lacking it. And so on.

That the physics of the world necessitates the existence of everything. Which means that particles, fields of force, spacetime, constants, and laws of nature determine absolutely what can and what cannot exist. — Marchesk

But you don't have to be a realist on physical law to be a physicalist either.

ut you don't have to be a realist on physical law to be a physicalist either. — Terrapin Station

Sure, I was just making a list. Causality is it's own deal. Arguably, laws of nature, if they're real, transcend physics.

But that is a totally different discussion, attacking physicalism from a very different angle.

?? I don't really understand your comment. You can be a physicalist who believes that some phenomena can be acausal or ontologically random, and you can be a physicalist who doesn't buy realism for physical laws.

Physicalism need not have anything to do with the science of physics.

And one need not be a realist on logic, either.

So how is it the case that physicalism is necessarily about "what's logically necessitated by physics"?

Physicalism need not have anything to do with the science of physics. — Terrapin Station

Yes it does. Physicalism is predicated on the stuff of physics being what's ontologically fundamental.

And one need not be a realist on logic, either. — Terrapin Station

So what? You need logic to make meaningful statements.

So how is it the case that physicalism is necessarily about "what's logically necessitated by physics"? — Terrapin Station

If it's not, then there's more to heaven and earth than is dreamt of by physicalists.

Yes it does. Physicalism is predicated on the stuff of physics being what's ontologically fundamental. — Marchesk

So you can't be a physicalist and an instrumentalist?

The science of physics is not the same thing as what the science of physics studies. You seem to be continually conflating the two (because you seem to be using the term interchangeably for both things).

So you can't be a physicalist and an instrumentalist? — Michael

No, no way. An instrumentalist is not making any ontological commitments.

The science of physics is not the same thing as what the science of physics studies. — Terrapin Station

Okay, sure. But you can't argue for physicalism by positing something not part of the science of physics, and use that to defend physicalism.

So panpsychism is not physicalism, because they are positing an extra ontological property onto the world.

Okay, sure. But you can't argue for physicalism by positing something not part of the science of physics, — Marchesk

Yes you can. In no way is physicalism necessarily subservient to the science of physics. It's not some sort of supplication to another discipline. The only thing that's required is that you think that everything is physical. You can believe that the science of physics has just about everything completely wrong and still think that everything is physical.

The only thing that's required is that you think that everything is physical. You can believe that the science of physics has just about everything completely wrong and still think that everything is physical. — Terrapin Station

That is literally saying nothing whatsoever, since you're free to state whatever you want and call it physical. What would it even mean for physics to be completely wrong and yet physicalism to be true?

That's got to be about the stupidest comment I've ever heard. "Just in case your physicalism isn't a deferral to the science of physics, then we have no way to tell what in the world you might be referring to by 'physical.'"

That's got to be about the stupidest comment I've ever heard. "Just in case your physicalism isn't a deferral to the science of physics, then we have no way to tell what in the world you might be referring to by 'physical.'" — Terrapin Station

Well, what do you mean by "physical"? The world? What we sense? Reality?

Because that's not saying much. Any metaphysical doctrine can do the same.

Instead of saying what I mean by it--because my view is relatively idiosyncratic, at least with respect to how I state it, let me ask this: aren't you familiar with materialism in general? And if you are, you know that materialists go back hundreds and hundreds of years, right?--long before there even was anything like a science of physics per se. So how do you make sense of there being materialists prior to the formal development of science? Are you at a complete loss what they're talking about ontologically with respect to their materialism?

nd if you are, you know that materialists go back hundreds and hundreds of years, right?--long before there even was anything like a science of physics per se. So how do you make sense of there being materialists prior to the formal development of science? — Terrapin Station

Because of the Greek atomists positing that atoms and the void were all that ontologically existed. Everything else was made up of that. I suppose that Thales and Aristotle posited alternative materialistic views with water or the five elements.

But those have been outdated by the findings of science. You can't seriously maintain an old-fashioned version of materialism. We know they were inadequate. There's more than atoms and the void, or water, or the five elements.

Because of the Greek atomists positing that atoms and the void were all that ontologically existed. Everything else was made up of that. I suppose that Thales and Aristotle posited alternative materialistic views with water or the five elements.

But those have been outdated by the findings of science. You can't seriously maintain an old-fashioned version of materialism. We know they were inadequate. There's more than atoms and the void, or water, or the five elements. — Marchesk

You're getting confused here regarding the exact content of their views with the sort of thing they were talking about. What do all materialists pre-science have in common that makes them materialists?

You're getting confused here regarding the exact content of their views with the sort of thing they were talking about. What do all materialists pre-science have in common that makes them materialists? — Terrapin Station

Mind independent, natural stuff? It's kind of hard to specify a material ontology without being specific. Thus atoms and voids, or five elements.

Mind independent, natural stuff? — Marchesk

That doesn't really work either. If the physical is mind-independent stuff then the mind isn't physical by definition.

A clue should be in the term "materialism"--materialists/physicalists generally think that everything is material or matter as well as perhaps "forces" of matter and so on.

A clue should be in the term "materialism"--materialists/physicalists generally think that everything is material or matter as well as perhaps "forces" of matter and so on. — Terrapin Station

Really? You fall back on matter after rejecting physics? BTW, there is a reason it's called physicalism. And that reason is because physics has shown that the world is made up of more than matter, and that matter itself isn't even truly fundamental. It's a form of energy.

Really? You fall back on matter after rejecting physics? BTW, there is a reason it's called physicalism. And that reason is because physics has shown that the world is made up of more than matter, and that matter itself isn't even truly fundamental. It's a form of energy. — Marchesk

That would matter if physicalism were adherence to whatever the received view is in the scientific discipline of physics, but it isn't.

There are a couple reasons that "materialism" started to fall out of favor as a term, and one of them was assocations with Marxism.

The idea that energy can obtain apart from matter is part of the "crap" I was referring to earlier. It's incoherent.

That would matter if physicalism were adherence to whatever the received view is in the scientific discipline of physics, but it isn't. — Terrapin Station

I think you have your own version of physicalism as evidenced by:

TThe idea that energy can obtain apart from matter is part of the "crap" I was referring to earlier. It's incoherent. — Terrapin Station

As such, whenever I mention physicalism going forward, just ignore it, because it obviously has nothing to do with your form of materialism.

I think you have your own version of physicalism as evidenced by: — Marchesk

It's not just "my form." It's ridiculous to think that every (other) physicalist is merely deferring to the science of physics, and that that's all there is to the position.

It's not just "my form." It's ridiculous to think that every (other) physicalist is merely deferring to the science of physics, and that that's all there is to the position. — Terrapin Station

Of course it's not just deferring, since it's a philosophical position. But the term is physicalism for a reason, and that's because modern physics has shown that matter isn't the only game in town. Or to put it a better way, matter is only part of the physical picture.

Of course it's not just deferring, since it's a philosophical position. But the term is physicalism for a reason, — Marchesk

The term changed from physicalism because "materialism" fell out of fashion, again with Marxist connotations being a major part of the reason for that. "Physics" etymologically simply refers to "the natural things" so it was a good choice for a substitute term.

Theres no requirement to accept that there's anything like "independent" energy to be a physicalist.

The term changed from physicalism because "materialism" fell out of fashion, again with Marxist connotations being a major part of the reason for that. — Terrapin Station

That's the first I've heard of this. As far as I'm aware, the term "physicalism" was adopted over "materialism" because modern physics includes things that can't be considered as matter as the term "matter" was originally understood.

The ontology of materialism rested upon the illusion that the kind of existence, the direct 'actuality' of the world around us, can be extrapolated into the atomic range. This extrapolation, however, is impossible... atoms are not things. — Werner Heisenberg

Then came our Quantum theory, which totally transformed our image of matter. The old assumption that the microscopic world of atoms was simply a scaled-down version of the everyday world had to be abandoned. Newton's deterministic machine was replaced by a shadowy and paradoxical conjunction of waves and particles, governed by the laws of chance, rather than the rigid rules of causality. An extension of the quantum theory goes beyond even this; it paints a picture in which solid matter dissolves away, to be replaced by weird excitations and vibrations of invisible field energy. Quantum physics undermines materialism because it reveals that matter has far less "substance" than we might believe. — Paul Davis and John Gribbin

Do you have any reference to Marxism being a major part of the name-change?