"The mind is the brain" and "The mind reduces to the brain"? — khaled

First things first, are there are any differences between the mind and the brain?

If the answer is no, then that would be "the mind is the brain".

On the other hand, if the answer is yes, then the task is to explain how "the mind reduces to the brain."

On the other hand, if the answer is yes, then the task is to explain how "the mind reduces to the brain." — TheMadFool

How are they different specifically? Different like in ontological dualism? Different how?

What's the difference between saying "The mind is the brain" and "The mind reduces to the brain"? — khaled

The latter makes sense and the former does not. "Mind" is predicate (processing), "brain" is subject (processor) like e.g. walk and legs, respiration and lungs, respectively. Mind(ing) is what a brain does.

Yep. Mind is to brain as digestion is to guts. Digestion is not a single state of the gut, but what the gut does from teeth to arse hole. Digestion is not the very same thing as gut; mind is not the very same thing as brain. Mind is what the brain does.

Most renditions of "mind" has it doing something though. And by these uses "mind" is not a thing doing something but just a side effect of brains. Digestion is not an entity that does something to the guts, it's just a name for what the guts are doing.

Furthermore, we don't ever need to talk about minds if that's what they are. Just like talk of guts and stomach is sufficient anywhere you want to talk about digestion. "I am digesting a burrito" can be restated in terms of guts doing things, and so the concept of digestion itself is no more than a shorthand, and not really needed.


And besides, this doesn't tell me what the problems are with identity theory rather just asserts reductionism.

just a side effect of brains — khaled

...digestion is not a side effect of one's guts. And isn't "mind' just a name for what the brain does?

But I don't see a reduction here. I don't see that a certain states of mind is exactly equal to a certain state of brain. Anomalous monism is a way around that... Khaled believing that the Pope is Catholic may "correspond" to various different brain states from one time to another.

This is, I think, the specific point on which @Isaac and I differ. If I understand him aright, he thinks that there must be one brain state for one mind state. I suspect this is something he assumes for methodological reasons: it makes the MRI scans more impressive.

I don't see that a certain states of mind is exactly equal to a certain state of mind. — Banno

I'm assuming you mean "of brain". And who said that it has to be one to one? The claim is that certain states of mind ARE certain states of brain. Anger IS a brain state, it is not "something caused by a brain state". What would be the issue with that claim.

Khaled believing that the Pope is Catholic may "correspond" to various different brain states from one time to another. — Banno

Sure. I never said it is one to one. The claim is that Khaled's belief that the pope is catholic IS a brain state. Not some separate entity as the dualists would have it. And not “corresponds to” but IS.

Then again, I struggle to see how this isn't simply identity theory. Here is what Mind/Brain identity theory is according to SEP:

"The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/

(I was using "the mind is the brain" as a shorthand I didn't literally mean it)

And here is what reductionism is according to the IEP (couldn't find an SEP article about it):

"The type of reductionism that is currently of most interest in metaphysics and philosophy of mind involves the claim that all sciences are reducible to physics. This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena."

https://iep.utm.edu/red-ism/#:~:text=The%20type%20of%20reductionism%20that,are%20identical%20to%20physical%20phenomena.

Anomalous monism — Banno

The more I looked into it the more it just seemed to really be reductionism or epiphenomenalism in disguise, though it claims to be neither.

I'm assuming you mean "of brain". — khaled

Yeah, thanks - fixed.

As for the rest - sure. The difference between identity theory and anomalous monism is the rejection of a one-to-one correspondence between brain states and states of mind in favour of a many-to-many relation (very roughly). It rejects the notion that physics might come up with rigid causal links between states of a brain and our thoughts and actions. It fits well with the rejection of causation I expressed in Causality, Determination and such stuff. -

The upshot seems to be that determinism is a metaphysical assumption from which the classical determinist view of physics follows, and that this assumption can be removed with suitable mathematical alterations. — Banno

:up:

The difference between identity theory and anomalous monism is the rejection of a one-to-one correspondence between brain states and states of mind in favour of a many-to-many relation (very roughly) — Banno

Then what’s the difference between identity theory and reductionism? I don’t see a difference. Maybe there isn’t and I’m just getting hung up on words...

Also, for identity theory it’s not a “correspondence”. A mental state IS a brain state, it’s not that a mental state “corresponds” to a brain state (that seems to open the door for a dualism of some sort)

The latter makes sense and the former does not. "Mind" is predicate (processing), "brain" is subject (processor) like e.g. walk and legs, respectively. Mind(ing) is what a brain does — 180 Proof

:up:

Then what’s the difference between identity theory and reductionism? — khaled

Reductionism would have it that psychology could be replaced by physics. The discussion of causation cited elsewhere shows that at no level of sophistication could physics actually predict your actions accurately.

The notion of a mental state has a certain immobility to it that gives me pause. Hence my hesitancy to say that a certain brain state is identical to a certain mental state. I don't think that pivotal, though. Thinking that the pope is catholic is a series of brain states, at the least.

How are they different specifically? Different like in ontological dualism? Different how? — khaled

The difference between "the mind is the brain" and "the mind reduces to the brain" is the same as that between pantheism and theism. That god is the universe itself is like "the mind is the brain" and that god is distinct from the universe is like "the mind reduces to the brain". The difference rests on whether mind is a distinct entity from the brain.

The latter makes sense and the former does not. "Mind" is predicate (processing), "brain" is subject (processor) like e.g. walk and legs, respiration and lungs, respectively. Mind(ing) is what a brain does. — 180 Proof

Yep. Mind is to brain as digestion is to guts. Digestion is not a single state of the gut, but what the gut does from teeth to arse hole. Digestion is not the very same thing as gut; mind is not the very same thing as brain. Mind is what the brain does. — Banno

The problem with this is that we can observe the guts digesting, we cannot observe the brain minding. It's only one or the other - we can observe a brain, or we can observe our own mind. Brains only appear in minds - as mental models of other people's minds. We never observe minds in brains, like we do digesting in guts. Brains and minds are the same thing, just from different perspectives. Thinking that it's brains that are really "out there" is naive realism.

I think that the reductionist model of psychology developed by B F Skinner has played a critical role in the current thinking about mental states, because it was a view which saw mind as illusory. It is probably hard to see mind and body as separate because they are bound together in an intricate way.

Certainly, we know that mental states are altered by chemicals, and how medication can be the main way for treating affective and psychotic experiences. However, it would seem to me to be a problem if the slant is focused on the brain alone, with the subjective inner experience being left out of the picture. While mental states are affected by the brain, the subjective meanings of experience are also important too. Cognitive behavioral theory recognises this but, of course, cognition still involves brain processes.

However, the key issue is the capacity for reflection and it would seem to me that, while reflective consciousness is dependent on a brain it does calls for a less reductionist perspective on the understanding of mind. This would probably involving more of a holistic one, or a wider view, such as that advocated in the systems view of reality, such as that suggested by Fritjof Capra, who sought to go beyond the determinsm of the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm of reality.

Mind is to brain as digestion is to guts. Digestion is not a single state of the gut, but what the gut does from teeth to arse hole. Digestion is not the very same thing as gut; mind is not the very same thing as brain. Mind is what the brain does. — Banno

The irony of this is that we have neuron connectors outside of the brain down at the gut level, which means a mind that's dislocated from the gut of that body might change into a different mental state. Our guts shape much of who we are as "part" of the mind. So calling someone an asshole might even be literal in some cases :rofl:

Other than that I think you are spot on with your allegory.

The mind is not a single entity, not singular nor "many". It's a result, a consequence of all processes going on. The problem is that we try to "view" our own mind from the outside, get a sense of where it is, but we can't because it is like viewing the inside of our own eyes. We can't invert our vision inwards to see how our vision works and even if we could we would only see details of what makes our eyes work, never grasp the entirety of it in a visual perceptive state.

I always find that talking about mind and perception works best in allegories of computers. In this case, think about a computer with all its components. We can examine each one of them, we know what the graphics card does, we know the power supply, the hard drives, processor, RAM, motherboard etc. But when we turn on the computer, there's this "magic" happening. We can see movies, play games, write philosophy posts online. What we see on the screen is the "mind". It is a consequence of all components working together, but we cannot find "where it is", we can only view it as a result of the components working. And if I were to rip out a RAM board or block the cooling fans, the computer will "get sick", it will not function well, even die completely. If I hit the hard drive with a hammer, I might see blocks of bad code corrupting the "mind" I see on the screen, but I don't know exactly why just that code gets corrupted, or why a part of the "mind" degrades while something else doesn't.

Thinking about our minds in the same way, we can both see how the brain works but not be certain of how the mind relates to all those functions. We just know that the mind and perception are a result of those components.

Our mind cannot view itself, because the mind is not something that can be viewed as a single entity. We have to think about it as a flow of consequence from our components functioning together. Our perception and rational reflection of this process get interrupted in a feedback loop of reacting to the thought of reacting.

We cannot view the inside of our own vision, but we know it is a result of the components linked to vision; the mind is just a bigger version of that same concept and because it's exponentially more complex as such a concept, we have a harder time grasping all of it.

One issue I’ve always had with identity theory is that all brain states are body states. Brains are only a part of much greater dynamic system. Brains are unable to survive, let alone think or feel, outside the rest of the organism.

Brain/body dualism. To avoid replacing one dualism with another, we should consider that mind states are body states.

For anyone who doesn't know: Identity theory in philosophy of mind is the theory that mental states are brain states. Your anger/love/pain/joy is, ontologically, exactly, the firing of certain neurons and the movement of certain chemicals. — khaled

Having read your delineation, I'm conjecturing that Identity Theory encapsulates the two, following meanings:

• Certain mental states are engendered by neuronal states - that is to say, neuronal configurations selectively demonstrate psychological ramifications.
  
• There exists no mental abstraction or event, that can't be rationalized neurologically.

First and foremost, there'll always remain an indeterminacy at the heart of the mind-body problem. That's (perhaps) a precursor to several misgivings against Identity Theory; you can't assert the two propositions above, without being empirically speculative. With premeditated biological models, you can merely approximate a predictive model of cognition - as opposed to creating a satisfactory and infallible scheme, for deriving answers to unforeseen questions.

Personally, I adhere to Epiphenomenalism in this regard, insofar as there's no reciprocal determinism between mental and physical events; there's solely a one-way causation - that, in and of itself, is not exhaustive.

The problem with this is that we can observe the guts digesting, we cannot observe the brain minding — Harry Hindu

I had no idea you're a mysterian too ... :sweat:

"brain minding" :yikes:

What we see on the screen is the "mind". It is a consequence of all components working together, but we cannot find "where it is", we can only view it as a result of the components working. — Christoffer

And isn't that, in a very real sense, what we find when we look for the holy spirit of our lord Jesus Christ? Please turn now to Psalm 56 in your hymn books. Gladys, the organ.

Certain mental states are engendered by neuronal states — Aryamoy Mitra

Nope, certain mental states ARE neuronal states. It’s not that there exists “mental states” as separate from neuronal states, and the formal is caused by the latter no, they are literally the same thing. It’s not dualistic.

First and foremost, there'll always remain an indeterminacy at the heart of the mind-body problem — Aryamoy Mitra

There is no mind body problem in identity theory. How does your emotion of “anger” interact with your body? Confused question. Your emotion of “anger” IS a body state. It’s not something external that “interacts with” your body.

as opposed to creating a satisfactory and infallible scheme, for deriving answers to unforeseen questions — Aryamoy Mitra

Why not?

Personally, I adhere to Epiphenomenalism in this regard — Aryamoy Mitra

I think epiphenomenalism is the only way out for a dualist who wants to respect the science.

For anyone who doesn't know: Identity theory in philosophy of mind is the theory that mental states are brain states. — khaled

What's the difference between saying "The mind is the brain" and "The mind reduces to the brain"? — khaled

I'm just responding to this without reading the rest of the thread so apologies in advance if I reiterate anything already said by others.

Firstly mental states are not identical to brain states; a state of happiness is a state of the person, not just a state of the brain. A brain state is a state of affairs of networks of neurons in the brain, a state of happiness is not such a neural state of affairs, but an emotional state, even if it could be correlated with a state of affairs of neural networks.

The mind is not the brain; if anything the mind is a process, not a thing; whereas the brain may be understood to be either thing or process, depending on the perspective of view.

So the mind is also not reducible to the brain; because to say this would be to say that the mind can be exhaustively understood in terms of brain processes, which it obviously cannot. 'Brain' makes sense as a noun, whereas 'mind' as a noun is misleading; better to think of it as a verb.

Firstly mental states are not identical to brain states; a state of happiness is a state of the person, not just a state of the brain. — Janus

How about "A mental state is a bodily state"

this would be to say that the mind can be exhaustively understood in terms of brain processes, which it obviously cannot. — Janus

Doesn't seem that obvious.

whereas 'mind' as a noun is misleading — Janus

Agreed. The dualists don't seem to think so though.

Firstly mental states are not identical to brain states; a state of happiness is a state of the person, not just a state of the brain. A brain state is a state of affairs of networks of neurons in the brain, a state of happiness is not such a neural state of affairs, but an emotional state, even if it could be correlated with a state of affairs of neural networks.

The mind is not the brain; if anything the mind is a process, not a thing; whereas the brain may be understood to be either thing or process, depending on the perspective of view.

So the mind is also not reducible to the brain; because to say this would be to say that the mind can be exhaustively understood in terms of brain processes, which it obviously cannot. 'Brain' makes sense as a noun, whereas 'mind' as a noun is misleading; better to think of it as a verb. — Janus

I agree with most of this. I think the variability in perspective that enables us to understand ‘brain’ as either/both a thing and a process is important here, because there is a similar variability that enables us to understand ‘mind’ as either/both a process and a capacity.

I think we’re looking for a reductionist methodology that retains awareness of a qualitative complexity recognised as irreducible. I like to think of it as rendering, in the same way that we can render a three-dimensional quality in a two-dimensional drawing.

The problem is often with English language’s reliance on the the verb ‘to be’ as a lazy conjunctive. You can’t render a relation of qualitative complexity with a question of ‘is’ or ‘is not’.

In another thread, we’ve been discussing the Tao Te Ching in detail, and one thing that complicates the translations has been an insufficient quality in this particular relational verb. The Chinese language has so many qualitatively different ways ‘to be’, many of which describe an indirect relation, or the effect of rendering one idea in a certain qualitative relation to another.

In the English language, especially in scientific and technical writing or logic, we focus on clearly defining the terms and try to keep our verbs and conjunctives simple and straightforward. The less qualitative variability in our writing, the more precise it appears to be. But then we discuss an agreed upon statement in detail, and realise that almost every word in it has a different quality to it in your experience than it does in mine, and we’ve been talking across purposes, round and around for hours...

But I digress. The mind is not quantitatively reducible to the brain - there is a qualitative relation between ‘mind’ and ‘brain’ that can only be understood when we recognise their qualitative multi-dimensional structures, with all of the variability that entails. When I apply crosshatch shading to a circle on a page, this doesn’t mean the rendered two-dimensional circle is identical to a three-dimensional sphere, but that it irreducibly includes a third dimensional aspect.

This is more difficult to demonstrate in relation to the mind and the brain, but a similar relation applies. Mind is rendered in our understanding of the brain as a temporal quality that isn’t an aspect of what constitutes the brain. Mind is not identical to this ‘brain state’, but would include every potential state for that brain - just as the sphere is not identical to the shaded circle, but would need to include every possible shaded perspective.

To refer to a ‘mind state’ or mental state is to reduce mind to only one temporal aspect, but the mind isn’t structured that way - it’s more like a block universe. So a ‘mind state’ is a false construct that doesn’t correspond to reality.

Nope, certain mental states ARE neuronal states. It’s not that there exists “mental states” as separate from neuronal states, and the formal is caused by the latter no, they are literally the same thing. It’s not dualistic. — khaled

What does 'are' mean? Superficially, it's not easy to unravel; if one is downtrodden, then is being downtrodden interchangeable with demonstrating a specific neurochemistry? Is the relation semantic, or metaphorical?

Is there an afterthought, that underlies the statement? Without one, this seems an absurd equivalence.

First and foremost, there'll always remain an indeterminacy at the heart of the mind-body problem
— Aryamoy Mitra

There is no mind body problem in identity theory. How does your emotion of “anger” interact with your body? Confused question. Your emotion of “anger” IS a body state. It’s not something external that “interacts with” your body.

as opposed to creating a satisfactory and infallible scheme, for deriving answers to unforeseen questions
— Aryamoy Mitra

Why not?

Personally, I adhere to Epiphenomenalism in this regard
— Aryamoy Mitra

I think epiphenomenalism is the only way out for a dualist who wants to respect the science. — khaled

Since the two, preliminary statements were apparently inconsistent with Identity Theory, none of these conclusions (the ones you've questioned) bear any significance anymore.

Firstly mental states are not identical to brain states; a state of happiness is a state of the person, not just a state of the brain — Janus

You're conflating mental states with states of a person? Mental states are brain states, just from a different perspective. Is your big toe and pubic hair included in this happiness that your taking about? We all know that the same thing looks different from different perspectives. Why would it be any different for brains - (observing a brain that is part of you vs observing a brain that is not part of you)?

I had no idea you're a mysterian too ... — 180 Proof

Strange. You seem to believe that a processor can exist independent of its processing.

if one is downtrodden, then is being downtrodden interchangeable with demonstrating a specific neurochemistry? — Aryamoy Mitra

Idk why you'd pick "Downtrodden" out of everything. Do you mean it as an emotion or a financial state? If it is the former then, yes, according to identity theory it is interchangeable with a neurological state.

Is the relation semantic, or metaphorical? — Aryamoy Mitra

semantic.

Without one, this seems an absurd equivalence. — Aryamoy Mitra

Why? What problems arise when we replace all talk of minds and their emotions with talk of neurological states? If anything it seems to be more accurate and allows for more common sense usages.

"His anger made him punch the wall". According to you this statement is false. Since you're an epiphenomenalist, to you, the anger did nothing. Had no effect. Since you separate the mental from the physical dualistically, which coupled with the fact that physical systems seem self sufficient (no need for minds) leads you to the conclusion that minds exist, as a separate kind of things from physical stuff, but do nothing. Anger is "mental" and so causes no physical change.

But if "Anger" refers to a neurological state then the sentence actually makes sense. If that initial split is not made in the first place, if a mind is just a brain state and an emotion is just a brain state and so on... things becomes much simpler. And you can actually say "His anger made him punch the wall"

Strange. You seem to believe that a processor can exist independent of its processing. — Harry Hindu

I do? Cite where I've given you that impression.

You're conflating mental states with states of a person? Mental states are brain states, just from a different perspective. Is your big toe and pubic hair included in this happiness that your taking about? — Harry Hindu

'Mental states', as the term is ordinarily used, refers to states of a person. I have no idea what you think big toes and pubic hair have to do with it.

I agree with most of this. I think the variability in perspective that enables us to understand ‘brain’ as either/both a thing and a process is important here, because there is a similar variability that enables us to understand ‘mind’ as either/both a process and a capacity. — Possibility

Right, so a mind can be understood as the capacity to experience, feel, remember, question, consider, understand, judge and so on? I agree that those things are possible only for a being that is minded, capable of minding. But I would usually think of those capacities as belonging to the person, because they entail being embodied as well as being emminded.

Anyway all these considerations are about ways of thinking about things, about which ways seem most fruitful of insight.

To refer to a ‘mind state’ or mental state is to reduce mind to only one temporal aspect, but the mind isn’t structured that way - it’s more like a block universe. So a ‘mind state’ is a false construct that doesn’t correspond to reality. — Possibility

That's true: the notion of 'state' represents the idea of a hypostatized "snapshot" of a moment of process. There are no frozen moments in reality, but thinking that way can certainly yield insights that would be otherwise impossible.