What do you think physicalism says about reality? — Marchesk

In my honest opinion, nothing really important or deep, at least in the holistic sense (and not the more specific sense, like social or political issues). Every time someone tries to cover all their bases and come up with a definition of "physicality" or "material" or whatever, something else pops up that contradicts this definition. Cartesian res extensa, Newtonian billiard balls, radiation, waves, and now some super-spooky quantum stuff and anti-matter and all sorts of exotic things that mess up our orderly spice rack model of the world.

We can, of course, come up with a list of what the physical is not, but this negative dialectic ends up looking suspiciously similar to just plain ol' naturalism: no ghosts, no souls, no gods, no teleology. No "spooky" shit, which of course is up for grabs as well. Some might see universals as spooky, I certainly don't. Some might be against teleology, and again, I have to disagree with them. Hell, even "souls" in the Aristotelian sense could be legit. Pretty soon this physicalism/materialism/naturalism becomes less of a methodology and more of a dogma that limits discourse.

But physicalists can be both reductionist and holist. I would say I am resolutely physicalist in rejecting any transcendental or supernatural causes of Being. Yet I treat telos and mathematical form as proper physical causes of being.

And then I go one further in being a semiotic physicalist. So it is important to Being that sign or symbol also really exists by virtue of the fact that it (pretty much) escapes or transcends its own physicality to become a source of regulation over the physical.

Even within its own house, the very fact of "strong physicality" conjures up its own "immaterial" other - even if all codes must be a system of physical marks,

So what you describe is physicalism as reductionism or materialism. You are taking the position of a physicalism that wants to reject all the "otherness" that seems dualistically to betray a desire for monadic oneness.

So every time a metaphysical dichotomy arises, one of the complementary terms must be rejected and cast into the wilderness.

Your kind of physicalism wants to be atomistic, local, mechanistic, deterministic, and therefore not holistic, non-local, organic, probabilistic.

And given quantum theory is what we have discovered to lie at the end of the trail of our atomistic inquiries, don't you think your definition of physicalism ought to take that into better account? The material reductionist project ran right off the road about a century ago now.

I would say I am resolutely physicalist in rejecting any transcendental or supernatural causes of Being. — apokrisis

Are you defining "physical" as "not-transcendental or supernatural"? Then what does it mean to be transcendental or supernatural?

As I was expressing in the other thread, my physicalism isn't in any way subservient to the science of physics.

What I'm saying in a nutshell is that only dynamic structures exist a la matter, relations of matter and processes of matter.

I don't describe myself as a reductionist, but certainly other people have described me that way. I don't at all believe that physics--that is, the science of physics, as a set of social practices done under that title--is a preferred way to talk about anything, though, and I think that the science of physics posits a lot of ideas that are crap to put it bluntly--at least when seen as something other than purely instrumental tools.

Yep. I am defining physicalism as opposed to the transcendental/supernatural. So I am claiming immanence and naturalism.

How do those terms then cash out?

Well immanence in the end has to be a claim about a self-organising or bootstrapping existence. And that riddle has to be solved through its own dichotomy - the developmental concept of the vague vs the crisp.

And naturalism is a claim about existence being a system closed for causality. So again, it is about self-organisation and bootstrapping. But also it stresses the naturalness of hierarchical organisation as the crisply developed outcome. So the dichotomy that gets recognised is that of complexity vs simplicity, or negentropy vs entropy.

So physicalism has to stand against something. And in being a totalising claim, it has to stand against the brokenness of any actual dualism.

Yet it can't achieve that monadistically - through actual reductionism to material being. Instead it must incorporate all valid dichotomies within itself. So physicalism - as holism - winds up being irreducibly triadic (triadicism itself having these two "internal" complementary moves of vague beginnings vs hierarchically organised outcomes).

So physicalism has to stand against something. And in being a totalising claim, it has to stand against the brokenness of any actual dualism. — apokrisis

Are you suggesting then that the dualist claims that the mental is either not self-organising or not closed for causality?

Can this dualist account for the causal basis of the apparent interaction between mind and world in physicalist fashion?

Can this dualist account for the causal basis of the apparent interaction between mind and world in physicalist fashion? — apokrisis

This proposed dichotomy between the mind and the world is a false one. Rather the dichotomy is between the mind and the physical, with both making up the world.

Also, what counts as a physicalist fashion? Presumably a fashion that is both self-organising and closed for causality? Well, that's the question I asked of you. Is the dualist claiming that the mental is either not self-organising or not closed for causailty?

This proposed dichotomy between the mind and the world is a false one. Rather the dichotomy is between the mind and the physical, with both making up the world. — Michael

So again, what is the causal connection?

I myself prefer the dichotomy of mind and world as its speaks to the semiotic modelling relation that is our fullest causal account of physicality.

Your switching it to a dichotomy of mind and the physical suggests you are stuck in the mode of thinking of Being in terms of two imcompatible kinds of "stuff" or substance.

Also, what counts as a physicalist fashion? Presumably a fashion that is both self-organising and closed for causality? Well, that's the question I asked of you. Is the dualist claiming that the mental is either not self-organising or not closed for causailty? — Michael

I confess that I can't make substance dualism a coherent metaphysical position for you. And if you can't manage it on your own, then I suggest you simply abandon it as a bad job.

A practicing Hindu onced explained to me that all religions and all philosophies are Hindu. Hindu welcomes all religions under its umbrella.

And thus it appears does physicalism. It welcomes light, quanta, emotions, qualia, consciousness, all types of forces including dark forces and dark matter under its umbrella. If we sense it, if we feel it, if it is conjectured, if it is needed for mathematical equations, if it is anything other than God or angels it is welcome. It has no limits other than it does not include Hinduism and everything under the Hindu umbrella - except where they overlap. And as with Hinduism, it is useless trying to define it since as the umbrella grows so does the definition change.

So again, what is the causal connection? — apokrisis

I don't know what you mean by this question. How would you make sense of the causal connection between one physical thing and another?

I confess that I can't make substance dualism a coherent metaphysical position for you. And if you can't manage it on your own, then I suggest you simply abandon it as a bad job.

If you define the physical as "self-organising and closed for causation" then you must understand the claim "the mind isn't physical" to mean "the mind isn't both self-organising and closed for causation". I'm just asking you to confirm that this is what you understand the dualist to be saying.

Your switching it to a dichotomy of mind and the physical suggests you are stuck in the mode of thinking of Being in terms of two imcompatible kinds of "stuff" or substance

I don't know what you mean by them being incompatible. It's certainly not a term I've used.

Physicalism

As you can see, there isn't anything like a common agreement on what the term means, and the prospects of it amounting to a coherent stand-alone metaphysical doctrine without limiting it to an exclusive little niche look pretty dim. Your own definition is too narrowly reductionist, and even this definition is vulnerable to the criticisms referenced above.

I think that physicalism is most easily conceived as what it is not, i.e. in opposition to certain specific and wide-spread views, in particular to doctrines that single out the mental for a privileged role in the ontology of the world.

Personally, I care more about epistemology than I do about ontology, and for me physicalism is more about the method of inquiry than about specific ontologies. I associate physicalism with a broadly empiricist and skeptical epistemology.

And thus it appears does physicalism. It welcomes light, quanta, emotions, qualia, consciousness, all types of forces including dark forces and dark matter under its umbrella. If we sense it, if we feel it, if it is conjectured, if it is needed for mathematical equations, if it is anything other than God or angels it is welcome. — Rich

I think you skipped over the crucial bit - if it can be measured. So in the end, physicalism reduces to pragmatism.

Are you saying that anything that cannot be measured is denied by physicalism?

I don't know what you mean by this question. How would you make sense of the causal connection between one physical thing and another? — Michael

I'm losing interest if you are going to start pretending there is no causal issue regarding mind~matter dualism.

If you define the physical as "self-organising and closed for causation" then you must understand the claim "the mind isn't physical" to mean "the mind isn't both self-organising and closed for causation". I'm just asking you to confirm that this is what you understand the dualist to be saying. — Michael

Again, the incoherence of dualism starts before we even get to such niceties in my view. So I'm struggling to see the relevance of the question. It is like asking whether the non-existent unicorn either shits or doesn't shit.

The claim "the mind isn't physical" is not a claim that holds up under my definition of physicalism. So it becomes moot to worry about whether or not dualism then has self-organisation or causal closure as well-formed properties of its position.

So yes. My approach demands that there be always a self-organising and causally closed dichotomy at the heart of things. But by definition, that is an internalist perspective that stands in opposition - an actual rejection - of any externalism.

So dualism is simply moot - so ill-formed as to not even be dialectically opposed in my view (even if there is a religiously-inspired tradition in philosophy that takes the dichotomy of mind and the physical with all apparent seriousness).

In practice.

So I'm struggling to see the relevance of the question. — apokrisis

The relevance is that if you don't understand the dualist's claim "the mind isn't physical" to mean "the mind isn't both self-organising and closed for causation" then you accept that what the dualist means by "physical" is not what you mean by "physical". Therefore the two views are not necessarily in competition. If by "everything is physical" you just mean "everything is self-organising and closed for causation" and if the dualist accepts the claim "everything is self-organising and closed for causation" then your views are compatible.

Your disagreement, then, would seem to be simply a terminological dispute. Whereas you use the term "physical" to refer to everything that is self-organising and closed for causation, the dualist uses the term "physical" to refer to just some of the things that are self-organising and closed for causation, with "mental" referring to the rest and something like "real" referring to both.

Therefore the two views are not necessarily in competition. — Michael

Well they are. One is coherent, and the other incoherent (according to the position I have taken on physicalist explanation).

Again, my position is distinctive in recognising (nay, necessitating) vagueness as a further category of existence or being. And so dualism - in simply failing to talk about being in properly counterfactual terms - can be classed with the explanations that are merely vague, or "not even wrong".

So my employment of counter-factuality cannot be used against me in the way you appear to be attempting. Again, it is moot whether your imagined unicorn of a position either shits or doesn't shit as a necessary further corollary of its non-existence.

Your disagreement, then, would seem to be simply a terminological dispute. Whereas you use the term "physical" to refer to everything that is self-organising and closed for causation, the dualist uses the term "physical" to refer to just some of the things that are self-organising and closed for causation, with "mental" referring to the rest and something like "real" referring to both. — Michael

Well, in fact consistency demands that in the end I don't really believe in "mind" or "mental" as an ontically foundational category.

As I have said often enough, my physicalism is semiotic. So the deep and foundational distinction would be that between matter and sign, not matter and mind. "Consciousness" is just a word that people bandy about. A metaphysician is going to get a lot further talking in concretely counterfactual terms about habits of interpretance rather than states of experience.

I'll say it again. The inability to think of the "mind", or the "mental", except as another dualistic kind of stuff - a witnessing soul, a phenomenal display, a state of experience, a substantial property - is where philosophy so regularly goes off the rails.

It is just reductionist materialism doubling down, reducing formal and final cause to more of the same old materially-effective "stuff".

Well they are. One is coherent, and the other incoherent (according to the position I have taken on physicalist explanation). — apokrisis

How is it incoherent? If they agree with your claim that everything is self-organising and closed for causation then they agree with the proposition expressed by your claim "everything is physical".

So at the moment you haven't explained how your physicalism differs from their dualism.

So at the moment you haven't explained how your physicalism differs from their dualism. — Michael

As I said, I can't agree or disagree with the "not even wrong". It doesn't even achieve the threshold of intelligibility.

But if you want to now flesh out the views of this mysterious "they" who can offer a counterfactual account of how their notion of the mental is "self-organising and closed for causation", then I'm all ears. What do "they" mean exactly when they say that (if it is ever in fact actually said).

But if you want to now flesh out the views of this mysterious "they" who can offer a counterfactual account of how their notion of the mental is "self-organising and closed for causation", then I'm all ears. What do "they" mean exactly when they say that (if it is ever in fact actually said). — apokrisis

I don't know if they understand the mental to be self-organising and closed for causation. But that's not relevant to my question. Again, given that you define the physical as being self-organising and closed for causation, it must then follow that you understand the dualist's claim "the mind isn't physical" to be the claim "the mind isn't self-organising and closed for causation". I just wanted you to clarify this. You don't seem to have given me an answer.

I don't know if they understand the mental to be self-organising and closed for causation. But that's not relevant to my question. — Michael

Of course it is bloody relevant. And who is this mysterious "they"? Why are you being so shifty here?

Again, given that you define the physical as being self-organising and closed for causation, it must then follow that you understand the dualist's claim "the mind isn't physical" to be the claim "the mind isn't self-organising and closed for causation". — Michael

I've already explained why it doesn't have to follow in just the same why that it makes no real difference if unicorns shit or don't shit.

Do you take a firm position on unicorn dung? Perhaps you can run me through the irrefutable train of logic that demands that imaginary shitting is something imaginary beasts must do.

I just wanted you to clarify this. You don't seem to have given me an answer. — Michael

You just didn't like the very reasonable answer I have given.

I've already explained why it doesn't have to follow in just the same why that it makes no real difference if unicorns shit or don't shit.

Do you take a firm position on unicorn dung? Perhaps you can run me through the irrefutable train of logic that demands that imaginary shitting is something imaginary beasts must do. — apokrisis

I don't understand this at all. If I define a bachelor as an unmarried man then I will understand the claim "I am not a bachelor" as the claim "I am not an unmarried man". If I define an American as someone born in New York then I will understand the claim "Trump is not an American" as the claim "Trump was not born in New York". So if I define the physical as something that is self-organising and closed for causation then I will understand the claim "the mind isn't physical" as the claim "the mind isn't self-organising and closed for causation".

What am I missing? It seems pretty simple.

What am I missing? It seems pretty simple. — Michael

Well, for a start you made a huge swerve and avoided my actual question about unicorn dung. Let's see how you would run the actual argument I posed to you.

We can see how your own carefully chosen examples - hinging on socially accepted fictions like legalised monogamy and legalised citizenship - are just a dodge to avoid dealing with any physicalist ontic commitments.

So if you are not going to try harder here, what's the point?

I'll state what I think it means. Everything that exists is physical. Even though we experience the world through varying levels of abstraction that we don't consider physical, such as societies or mind, at the ontological level, it's all just particles, forces, fields and what they constitute. — Marchesk

The problem is that physicalism has now been hoist by its own petard. It is shown beyond doubt that physical stuff is nearly all empty space. A visual metaphor that is sometimes given is that of the nucleus of an atom being the size of a baseball in the middle of a stadium, with the electrons being the size of rice grains whizzing around the outside perimeter. (And whether electrons exist at all is still a vexed question - they seem to 'semi-exist' or 'kind of exist' prior to being measured). So the triumphant flourish of materialism - 'look here, it's all just matter in motion' - is much more like that of a stage magician than that of an architect.

a table is purely physical. It's components, structure, and function are 100% physical. — Marchesk

So, in light of the above, nothing can be said to be '100% physical', because the definition of what constitutes 'physical' is still open. The world's most expensive and largest machine was built with the express purpose of providing that definition, and it hasn't been able to do it.

That is aside from the criticism that 'a table' itself is simply the instantiation of an idea which can be manufactured in any kind of material - so what is 'the real table'? Is it the principle of a flat surface held up from the ground with legs, or is it this or that particular thing?

.

I would agree, but physicalism just makes something that is empty into something physical and then the deed is done. Emotions are nothing more than electrical impulses which are nothing more than empty forces which are all physical because they can move a dial. It is as Hindus do. Physicalism creates a universal umbrella that includes everything that has ever been and continues to expand as the future unfolds. I would describe physicalism as the ever expanding Hindu Eye though rather than call it physicalism, I would call it knowledge. Immeasurable, of course, but physicalism somehow makes it measurable.

As such, all fields of science are in principle reducible to a complete physics, even if such a thing is impossible for us to accomplish.

What do you think physicalism says about reality? — Marchesk

I'm not a physicalist but I feel I've come to see its claims pretty clearly. The world of the physical is causally closed in one way or another - this might be via current physics, or an imaginable future physics based on present structural principles or some other physical set of explanations like apo's or Dennett's. There are then a multitude of variations about how to deal with psychology and social sciences, let alone the arts, etc. One might be reductive but that's pretty rare; one might say the mental supervenes on the physical, i.e. it's useful to us humans to talk about stuff in a non-physical way and we may never be able to reduce it to the physical but such talk is not extra to physical explanations, it's just a different way of putting it; or one might find elegant ways of remaining monist in metaphysical ways like Cynthia Macdonald (too intricate to go into here), or in a critical realist way that sees abstraction working at the right level of approximation but with the physical still underpinning everything.

I think all this says about reality is that we're in an age when such an underlying idea is in vogue, but these things come and go. Historically physicalism is a fairly rare thing as a prevalent notion.