I've read about 20 pages of his work all in all. Ye not much but many talk bad of Hegel although they read maybe a few paragraphs from him. Kierkegaard probably read less Hegel than I've read of Kierk. Hegel doesn't define his terms upfront, so often you have to read a whole book of his before you get his point. I don't see Kierkegaard's thoughts going anywhere and that's just how it is (I'm a very abstract thinker)

Kierkegaard probably read less Hegel than I've read of Kierk. — Gregory

"Kierk" went to Berlin specifically to read Hegel along with other people. The notes to Kierkegaard's books include detailed references to his objections to Hegelians in his milieu.
Perhaps you are mistaken about the conversation that happened there.

Kierkegaard claimed Hegel was confused by his own identity, yet Kierkegaard himself was always looking for supernatural agents to save him. Perhaps they were equally sure of themselves

What text are you referring to in both cases?

It was mentioned above about how Kierkegaard felt about Hegel, and it common knowledge that he called on spiritual beings to save him from anxiety

What might apply to the "Young Hegelians" does not apply to the master

What the "ego" may seen to be in these different psychologies that you refer to is not self explanatory from my point of view. Noting the limits in each theory makes me less inclined to state what is true for everybody than to see the works collectively pointing to one thing. — Valentinus

What limits?

It was mentioned above about how Kierkegaard felt about Hegel, and it common knowledge that he called on spiritual beings to save him from anxiety — Gregory

There is nothing of a textual reference in this. Why is it that Kierkegaard opposed Hegel?

t was mentioned above about how Kierkegaard felt about Hegel, and it common knowledge that he called on spiritual beings to save him from anxiety — Gregory

So, something you claimed earlier as a point of common knowledge is supposed to be a point of reference to a body of work you have no familiarity with.
Pardon me if I am not engaged by the logic.

Kierkegaard clearly was not a very abstract writer and was intimated by Hegel's logic. That's enough context for me

What limits? — Constance

Many of the thinkers you have been referring to have presented themselves as resisting an error of one kind or another. Along with the version that is being put forth as the truth is an explanation where others have gone wrong. Discourse may require the continuing lack of of answers on some level.

Many of the thinkers you have been referring to have presented themselves as resisting an error of one kind or another. Along with the version that is being put forth as the truth is an explanation where others have gone wrong. Discourse may require the continuing lack of of answers on some level. — Valentinus

What error? Don't be shy, what are you talking about?

I don't have a view that solves differences. But the difference between Lacan and Foucault strikes me as a sharp disagreement about what is happening. We live our experiences and the mirror we view them through is significant. The right thing to do is is incumbent upon understanding what is happening correctly.
Easier said than done.

Hegel united the Eleatic school with Heraclitus's dogmas, into a moving principle intimately united with material principle. What is transcendent is immanent in this. Some of Hegel's arguments can take days to read

"Now, immediate actuality as such is quite generally not what it ought to be; on the contrary, it is a finite actuality, inwardly fractured, and it's destination is to be used up. But then the other side of actuality is its essentiality. Initially this is what is inward, which, being mere possibility, is similarly destined to be sublated. As sublated possibility of is the emergence of a new actuality, for which the first immediate actuality was the presupposition.. (A)ny such immediate actuality contains within it the germ of something else altogether.: Hegel, lesser Logic

how is it that he can make claims about other languages' deficit in meaning possibilities if such a thing can only be understood by native speakers, and he is NOT a native speaker of French or English or Swahili anything else? — Constance

At worse he was just expressing a prejudice, at best a joke. The French too think highly of their own language, supposed to be more logical than some other languages... which most French don’t happen to speak! It’s just a self-congratulatory cliché circulating in the culture.

But Being and Time carries none of this resentment itself. Was it in the background? You know, it is speculated that B&T does open this door, after all, dasein is an historical construct, so this invites a competition between cultures and their languages. But I still say, who cares. His phenomenology is an extraordinary reinterpretation the world. Powerful and compelling. F*** the rest of it. — Constance

I cannot comment, as I’ve never read B&T. I happen to think that ‘being’ cannot be understood, and that ontology is a waste of time. I’ve read Husserl though, and Merleau Ponty who said that B&T was a mere expansion on one of Husserl’s late intuitions.

So my question is: does B&T pay its debt to Husserl, or does it not? Does it recognise that it is entirely based on the brilliant, revolutionary thoughts of a JEW? Or is it an attempt to arianize phenomenology?

The consequent moral realist has suspended all self-doubt and anything that could induce it.
— baker
But the proof is in the pudding, a conversation about doubt, moral realism and the rest. — Constance

Not at all. It is beneath the consequent moral realist's dignity to discuss such things.
The pudding proof of consequent moral realism is precisely in its authoritarian, inapproachable stance.
It's that "this is not up for discussion" that makes the consequent moral realist who he is.

Do you think the Buddha in his phenomenological prime, had doubts?

No.
Doubt (vicikiccha) is one of the hindrances, and the Buddha has overcome all hindrances.

So my question is: does B&T pay its debt to the Husserl, or does it not? Does it recognise that it is entirely based on the brilliant, revolutionary thoughts of a JEW? Or is it an attempt to arianize phenomenology? — Olivier5

:yikes:

I’ve gotten a lot further with Husserl than I ever did with Heidegger, in that, a lot of what I’ve read from, and about, Husserl, simply rings true with me - his critique of naturalism, for instance. I’m casting around for an edition of Crisis of the European Sciences, I feel as though it’s a book I really ought to own.

To illustrate my disagreement, IF language is an integral part of the construction of Being, in my interpretation of this sentence, it would imply that a human being speaking several languages is a more complete being than one who speaks only one language. But this is not the conclusion Heidegger draws. Rather for him, who to my knowledge spoke only German, perhaps with a smattering of greek, learning another language such as English or French would have been closer to a compromission with lower forms of thought than those possible in German. — Olivier5

In defense of H., such linguistic supremacism and exclusivism has been a trend in many European nations. In the light of this, learning a living foreign language (or even just a different dialect of one's language) is seen as being beneath one's dignity.

Augustine was a very odd person. There's something strange about his eagerness to confess his sins and misdeeds. He seems to revel in them in a bizarre way, rather like Rousseau does. But like Rousseau he appears to think he's better and wiser than others for having been a sinner and proclaiming his sins to the world. — Ciceronianus the White

But maybe the sins they confessed openly were just the tip of the iceberg, an effort to hide their graver sins?

If you ask me, the Buddha had it right, and that was long ago, but he didn't have the theoretical tools to talk about it, to provide a phenomenological exposition on the actual descriptive features of enlightenment. — Constance

Of course he did:

paṭicca-samuppāda
Dependent co-arising; dependent origination. A map showing the way the aggregates (khandha) and sense media (āyatana) interact with ignorance (avijjā) and craving (taṇhā) to bring about stress and suffering (dukkha). As the interactions are complex, there are several versions of paṭicca-samuppāda given in the suttas. In the most common one, the map starts with ignorance. In another common one, the map starts with the interrelation between name (nāma) and form (rūpa) on the one hand, and sensory consciousness (viññāṇa) on the other. [MORE: SN 12.2, DN 15 ]

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/glossary.html#pa%E1%B9%ADicca-samupp%C4%81da

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.002.than.html



But the problem is, rather, and I don't know how to say this to you nicely, is that you lack respect for the Buddha. Yet you nevertheless keep referring to him. You are determined that you already know what enlightenment is and isn't, and anyone who doesn't match those ideas of yours, is, per you, wrong or insufficient.
I wonder why you look to the Buddha, if you clearly have no intention to take his words seriously.

In defense of H., such linguistic supremacism and exclusivism has been a trend in many European nations. In the light of this, learning a living foreign language (or even just a different dialect of one's language) is seen as being beneath one's dignity. — baker

Yes, but this sort of parochialism ought to be seen for what it is: a rejection of the other.

Yes, but this sort of parochialism ought to be seen for what it is: a rejection of the other. — Olivier5

Philosophy, ie. love of wisdom entails rejecting foolishness and lowliness.
Sometimes, this seems to work out in less than democratic ways ...

his critique of naturalism, for instance. I’m casting around for an edition of Crisis of the European Sciences, I feel as though it’s a book I really ought to own. — Wayfarer

Have you read Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics? It was linked up to on another thread. It reads really well, looks in many ways similar to the Krisis.

Intimidated by what? And you are seeking out "abstract writers"??

He used Hegelian dialectics in his own reasoning to confound Hegel. His complaint with Hegel goes to the very foundation of existential philosophy. What is real is existence, and this is experienced as a single subject. Kierkegaard presented a phenomenology of alienation that saw rationalists like Kant and Hegel privileging an abstraction, as if the universal of a concept AS a concept could encompass palpable existence. You have to read Philosophical Crumbs and Repetition, among other things to see how this complaint plays out, especially in ethics.
But the real reason why K is so important is that he proclaimed the true reality we face lies in the interiority of experience, in the "passionate engagement" of actuality. This yearns for consummation and redemption beyond dogma of mere ideas. We are made of the dramatic stuff of a lived existence, and Kierkegaard thought this is a place where the finite meets the infinite at the level of ontology, the "meta" level of analysis of existence. Of course, he was, as Heidegger called him, a religious writer, and explicitly so, but his philosophy is not like this at all. In fact, in The Concept of Anxiety, he argues largely outside religious references.
Then there is Hegel who, like a good rationalist, put the onus of religious understanding on reason. I'm with Kierkegaard, in my own way: what is reason? It has no content as such, but is the mere form of judgment, and always takes its meaning from the content delivered by actuality. Saying that the real is rational is not entirely wrong, but only if we keep this in mind: reason is an abstraction ONLY because it is taken (abstracted) from existence to be observed analytically, and the same goes for all such inquiries. Originally they are part of an ineffible whole, ineffable because one cannot stand apart from it to say what it is; one is always , already In it the moment inquiry even begins. "Actuality" is the same. Originally it is an integral part, not separable at all. We do the separating when we think about it. Talk about reason and actuality as separate is like talking about heat and molecular activity separately (both scientifically conceived terms, here).
In the context of Kierkegaard's position, rationalists simply ignore actuality.

But the problem is, rather, and I don't know how to say this to you nicely, is that you lack respect for the Buddha. Yet you nevertheless keep referring to him. You are determined that you already know what enlightenment is and isn't, and anyone who doesn't match those ideas of yours, is, per you, wrong or insufficient.
I wonder why you look to the Buddha, if you clearly have no intention to take his words seriously. — baker

Don't worry about being nice, you do just fine.
But you know where I am going with this: When Buddha had is his significant enlightening moment (moments, period, whatever), was he following the four noble truths? Did he read this somewhere, follow the methods laid down after the fact? Of course not. The four noble truths is not an ontological dogma. It is an observation and a method. I am interested in how to describe the enlightenment experience in the context of Husserl's epoche. This is actually being done. If Buddha had read Husserl and others, he would have said, why yes! Of course!

I like to talk to all kinds of thinkers, but some schools of thought i dont like to read. What could eventually resolve Kierkegaard's anxiety if God is a fiction? He did not want to go to reason, it was a path too arduous with its anxiety for him. Hegel's dialectic comes to an end while continuing forever. I do not know what Kierkegaard's final conclusion was. He is too Augustinian for me

paṭicca-samuppāda
Dependent co-arising; dependent origination. A map showing the way the aggregates (khandha) and sense media (āyatana) interact with ignorance (avijjā) and craving (taṇhā) to bring about stress and suffering (dukkha). As the interactions are complex, there are several versions of paṭicca-samuppāda given in the suttas. In the most common one, the map starts with ignorance. In another common one, the map starts with the interrelation between name (nāma) and form (rūpa) on the one hand, and sensory consciousness (viññāṇa) on the other. [MORE: SN 12.2, DN 15 ] — baker

It is not to say this wrong at all. But it is incomplete, and ANY philosophy that can help complete it is valid regarding what Buddhism is.

It is not to say this wrong at all. But it is incomplete, — Constance

Incomplete how? Because it's a short paragraph from a glossary? Every term in that paragraph has numerous references in the suttas and in the commentaries, which have further references in suttas and commentaries.

The incompleteness is in your approach to the matter.

and ANY philosophy that can help complete it is valid regarding what Buddhism is.

Why look outside of Buddhism for things to help one understand Buddhism?

Philosophy, ie. love of wisdom entails rejecting foolishness and lowliness.
Sometimes, this seems to work out in less than democratic ways ... — baker

Then it is a mistake of philosophy. This chimera of a philosopher king is what it's all about.

I saw the Emperor -- this soul of the world -- go out from the city to survey his reign; it is a truly wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrating on one point while seated on a horse, stretches over the world and dominates it. — Hegel, October 13th, 1806, Correspondance